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Abstract 
Popular Policing? Sector Policing and the Reinvention of Police 
Accountability 
The aim of this thesis is to explain the change in the debate about police 
accountability in Britain that took place in the 1980s. In seeking such an 
explanation in the reinvention of police accountability over this period, a four 
dimensional analysis of accountability is presented. This is used to examine, in 
... 
turn, the history of polic~ governance in London, the debates about police 
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accountability that took place in the -1980s; and the $plications of the growing 
influence of community policing that culminated in tiie introduction by the 
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Metropolitan Police of a new style':of'se'ct~r' policing'.· 
A series of questions about whether and how police accountability was reinvented 
in the 1980s are posed, and the implications of the reconceptualisation that took 
place are assessed in their historical and theoretical contexts. Use is also made of 
empirical data drawn from a study of the implementation of sector policing on an 
inner city police area in North London. It is argued that far-reaching changes 
took place in the conceptualisation of police accountability during the 1980s on 
all four of the dimensions identified, and that this reinvention of the relationship 
between police and people made policing in London neither more democratic nor 
more consensual. 
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The 1980s was the decade of monetarism, the miners and Margaret Thatcher. It 
was also the decade of police accountability. 1 No critical dissection of the state of 
the nation seemed complete without some expatiation on the constitutional status 
and social role of its most prized asset, the British bobby. As radical 
conservatism set about demolishing the post-war 'Butskellite' consensus, the 
police and their governance formed the centrepiece of many an analysis of the 
'law and order society' (Hall, 1980)? Other writers - concerned as much with 
'demystifying' (Reiner, 1985) the police institution itself as with diagnosing the 
social ills of Conservative Britain - were producing an extensive specialist 
literature on police accountability.3 Theoretical criminologists - for whom, 
hitherto, the issue might have seemed something of a diversion - were also forced 
to take an interest when two self-styled left realists answered the question, 'What 
is to be done about law and order?' by calling for democratically accountable 
policing (Lea and Young, 1984). 
By the early 1990s, however, interest in police accountability had subsided. The 
package of proposals for police reform unveiled by the Major government 
between 1993 and 1995 led to renewed interest in the subject (Home Office, 
1993; Sheehy, 1993; Royal Commission, 1993; Home Office, 1995). But, with 
the odd exception, the terrain on which the debate was taking place was 
unrecognisable.4 In the 1980s, existing mechanisms of police accountability had 
been widely assailed as inadequate and undemocratic (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 
1984; Spencer, 1985; Lustgarten, 1986), and ambitious plans for a thoroughgoing 
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democratisation of policing put forward (Greater London Council, 1983). But, 
less than a decade later, critics of the Conservative reform programme were 
forced to adopt a far more defensive position against what they saw as the 
centralising tendencies of an overweening state (Reiner and Spencer, 1993). In 
part this can be attributed to the extent to which successive Conservative 
governments and their ideological supporters had succeeded in shifting the 
political agenda on 'law and order' - as on economics, education, and much else -
sharply to the right (Downes and Morgan, 1997). With the Labour Party 
retreating from its radicalism of the early 1980s first into a cautious social 
democratic realism under Neil Kinnock and then, after a brief interlude, into the 
neo-conservatism of 'New Labour' under Tony Blair, the political space in which 
demands for the democratisation of policing had flourished gradually disappeared 
(Keith and Murji, 1990; Panitch and Leys, 1997). 
Reinventing police accountability 
But this was not all because, by the mid 1990s, the very concept of police 
accountability - what an accountable policing force might look like and who it 
ought to be accountable to - seemed to have changed. At least part of the 
explanation for the enormous change that had taken place in 'the contours of 
public discourse about policing', characterised by the virtual disappearance of 
police accountability from the political and scholarly agenda, seemed to lie in the 
way police accountability itself had been reinvented (Loader, 1994: 521). That 
this had indeed happened was suggested in what was, at least for this writer, a 
seminal paper by Tony Jefferson, Joe Sim and Sandra Walklate presented to the 
British Criminology Conference in York in 1991. Sub-titled Accountability, 
Control and the Social Construction o/the Consumer, the paper's aim was to 
demonstrate that the criminological project of left realism - 'taking crime 
seriously' - was 'neither as radical nor realistic as it claim[ ed]' (Jefferson et ai, 
1991: 2). In doing this the authors concentrated their fire on four aspects of 
realism. First they attacked radical realism's 'unproblematised notion of crime' 
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by suggesting that the 'real crisis in criminology' was not aetiological as the 
realists argued but definitional. 5 Allied to this, they argued, was a failure to 
situate 'the debate about crime and disorder within the broader political 
programme of Thatcherism' that undermined realism's radical credentials.6 
'Ritual calls for more democratically accountable policing' did not place 'the state 
and state power centre stage' where realism claimed it should be. Thirdly - and it 
was here that they addressed the issue of accountability directly - Jefferson and 
his colleagues argued that: 
[T]his failure to situate [realism'S] work within the concrete context of 
new right politics renders invisible precisely what any radical project 
needs to keep central, namely, the shift within the 'Law and Order' 
debate from the left-inspired issues of the accountability of the state for 
its use of coercive force, to the more problematic notion of citizen as 
individual consumer of a range of state-run and privati sed services. This 
shift, at the heart of the political project of Thatcherism is hardly 
challenged by the narrow focus on certain individual victims of crime so 
central to the new realist project. (Jefferson et aI, 1991: 3, emphasis in 
original) 
As a result of their almost exclusive focus on individual victims of crime, 
Jefferson et al went on to suggest that realists rendered invisible the 
'contradictory dialectic' between victims, the state, the public and offenders. This 
in tum flawed realist attempts to understand the 'complex interactions' between 
the four points of what they liked to call the 'square of crime' and prevented them 
from engaging with the problems of (in)justice that flow from the state's lack of 
accountability. 7 
Critics of the state's lack of accountability, whatever their other 
differences, highlighted the way state coercion was focussed [sic] upon 
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the economically marginalised, the politically disenfranchised, and the 
socially outcast - epitomised most dramatically by relations between the 
police and black youths during the 1970s and 1980s. It was these 
criminalised 'offenders' who were, and are, 'victims' of a variety of state 
practices. [ ... ] More generally, many official victims of crime come 
from the same social category as offenders - with the important 
exceptions of crimes against women, racial attacks and crimes of the 
powerful (which all too often fail to get registered anyway). (Jefferson et 
aI, 1991: 3) 
Apart from exposing the hollowness of left realism's claims to radicalism 
Jefferson and his colleagues raised several critical issues about how the focus of 
the debate on law and order and therefore - as part of that broader discussion - on 
policing moved over the course of the Thatcher years. What they seemed to 
suggest was that, from being concerned with the way in which the police as a state 
institution charged with the use of coercive force were held to account for its 
social distribution, the policing debate moved on to their accountability for 
providing a service. In the process, awkward questions about the justice of over-
coercing and under-protecting the least powerful members of society were neatly 
avoided, and the exact nature of the 'service' the police deliver became 
conveniently obscure. At the same time, ideas about what it meant to be a citizen 
and the relationship of the citizen to the state and its institutions were changing 
too. With Mrs Thatcher famously declaring that there was no such thing as 
'society', the people to whom the police were accountable were reconstructed as 
citizen-consumers of a service delivered to them individually as victims of crime, 
and collectively as 'communities' from which 'the over-policed, marginal, and 
powerless groups, for whom policing ... constitutes part of the their problems' 
were excluded (Jefferson et aI, 1991: 6). 
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Taking Jefferson et aI's paper as its starting point, this thesis sets out to answer 
three basic questions. First, was the concept of police accountability reinvented 
during the 1980s as they suggest? Second, if so, what was it exactly that changed 
about its conceptualisation and how did the change come about? And, finally, 
what were the implications of any reconceptualisation that did take place for the 
accountability of the police in practice? In answering these questions I will 
concentrate on Britain's largest police force, the Metropolitan Police (MPS), and 
its implementation of a new style of community-oriented 'sector' policing 
designed to deliver policing by popular consent. I do this partly because the 
unique - but seldom studied - system of police governance pertaining in the 
Metropolitan Police District (MPD) highlights many of the issues I want to 
address; and partly because the design and implementation of sector policing 
provided a rich and - for reasons that will become clear in a moment - accessible 
source of empirical data on changing conceptions of police accountability and 
their impact on police/public relations. 8 
The thesis in outline 
I begin the search for answers to the questions prompted by Jefferson et al in the 
next chapter by considering what is meant by 'accountability' in the context of 
'the police' and how it relates to the notion of 'policing by consent'. After 
reviewing some of the literature on accountability in the police and other public 
services both within the criminal justice system and beyond, I set out a four-
dimensional analysis of police accountability that provides the main theoretical 
framework for what follows. In Chapter 3 I apply this four-dimensional analysis 
to developments in the governance of the Metropolitan Police from its foundation 
in 1829 to the coming of Thatcherism 150 years later. In doing so, I suggest that, 
while the unique constitutional position of the force remained constant throughout 
this period, the way in which the main parties to the arrangement both perceived 
their roles and behaved changed quite dramatically. I then show how the de facto 
independence of the force was defended against all-comers during the course of 
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the 1980s. Chapter 4 looks at some of the vast critical literature on accountability 
that accumulated during the 1980s and identifies four distinct theoretical 
approaches to the problems posed by police governance. The proposals for 
reform, and suggestions as to how it might be accomplished, offered by writers 
with these different perspectives are also considered. Chapter 5 takes this a step 
further and looks in some detail at plans for the 'democratisation' of the 
Metropolitan Police put forward by the generation of 'municipal socialists' who 
dominated local government in many parts of London until the mid 1980s. An 
account is also given of how the debate about police accountability ran its course 
between the early 1980s and the early 1990s in the London Borough of Islington. 
The chapter ends with a four-dimensional analysis of the various positions and 
plans that emerged from the critical literature of the 1980s. In Chapter 6 I 
examine the origins and development of sector policing as an explicitly 
community-based style of policing and argue that, in common with other 
programmes in the 'community policing' tradition, its design contemplates a 
significant reconceptualisation of police accountability at neighbourhood level. 
This point is taken up and developed in Chapter 7 which considers the 
implications for accountability of four elements or themes central to the design of 
sector policing. Once again, the dimensions of accountability identified in 
Chapter 2 provide the main analytical tool for the discussion. Having examined 
the theory and design of sector policing in some detail, I turn in Chapter 8 to its 
implementation on an inner city police division in north London. Using data 
collected during over 18 months of field work I try to illustrate how far the 
reinvention of police accountability had progressed by 1992 when sector policing 
was implemented and indicate what the implications of its reinvention were for 
policing in a not untypical slice of urban Britain. A ninth and fmal chapter draws 
the threads together as I attempt to answer the questions I have posed. 
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Methods 
It should be clear from what has just been said that this thesis adopts a somewhat 
eclectic approach to its exploration of police accountability embracing theoretical 
and historical inquiry as well as the results of empirical research. All that needs 
to be said for now on my approach to matters of theory and history is that the 
'background assumptions' (Gouldner, 1971) I make in addressing the profoundly 
political issues of consent and accountability are quite deliberately those of 
mainstream liberal democratic thought. In so far as I offer a critique of police 
accountability, its main thrust is that the police are not as accountable as they 
should be if liberal democratic principles are properly applied. Only in the final 
chapter do I suggest that it may be necessary to step outside the liberal democratic 
paradigm if truly democratic and accountable policing is to be achieved. 
Considerably more needs to be said about my empirical data. A small proportion 
of the material presented here (mainly in Chapter 5) derives from documentary 
research using minutes and other papers held in the archives of the London 
Borough of Islington. These documents provide a public, though not immediately 
accessible, record of the deliberations of the Council's Police Sub-Committee 
through the 1980s and into the early 1990s. Original Metropolitan Police 
documents relating to the design and implementation of sector policing provide 
the basis - but not much more than that - for Chapters 6 and 7. Only in the next, 
and penultimate, chapter do I rely almost exclusively on empirical data and it is to 
some of the issues raised by that data and how it came to be collected that I now 
turn. 
Aims and origins 
The most important point about the empirical data on sector policing presented in 
Chapter 8 is that I use it not to make any large or generalisable claims about its 
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merits or defects as a policing strategy but to illustrate some of my theoretical 
arguments about how - and to what effect - police accountability came to be 
reinvented during the course of the 1980s in very much the same way as Crawford 
(1997: 8) refers to his research on community crime prevention, community 
mediation and victim/offender reparation schemes in his analysis of prevailing 
discourses in the local governance of crime. The research project on sector 
policing for which the data discussed here was collected originated in a piece of 
research by Betsy Stanko (1991) on the role of the police in victim-oriented crime 
prevention strategies. The intention was to follow this work up by investigating 
how locally based home police beat officers could be enabled and encouraged to 
work with the victims of violent crime to reduce the risk of multiple victimisation. 
However, when it became clear that dedicated home beat officers might cease to 
exist as a result of the introduction of a new style of sector policing throughout 
the Metropolitan Police, it was decided - in conjunction with the London 
Borough of Islington who were funding the research and the chief superintendent 
on Holloway Division where it was due to take place - that the ambit of the study 
should be extended to look much more generally at the impact of sector policing 
on the relationship between the police and the public. 
Sector policing itself aimed to decentralise service delivery by redeploying all 
uniformed personnel- including personnel currently working on 'home beats' as 
well as shift or 'relief officers - on to small teams responsible for policing clearly 
demarcated 'sectors' within each of the MPD's existing police divisions. Beyond 
this the main principles of sector policing set out in guidance issued by the 
Metropolitan Police's Assistant Commissioner Territorial Operations can be 
summarised as being to: 
• Make the most effective use of resources 
• 'Own' and 'get ahead' of local problems by identifying and helping 




Encourage visible and accessible patrolling by known local officers 
Deliver a 'better quality service provided by officers 'enjoying the 
support and approval of local people - policing by consent' 
(Metropolitan Police, 1991a: 2, 5) 
Designed as a preliminary evaluative study of the implementation of sector 
policing on a single division, fieldwork for the research began on 1 st October 
1991, some 6 months before sector policing was introduced to Holloway on 6th 
April 1992, and continued into early February 1993.9 Though the project was 
directed by Betsy Stanko and was very much a collaborative effort, I collected all 
the data presented here. In the process I observed well over 200 hours of 
operational police work and more than 30 meetings of various bodies involved in 
police/community consultation. I was also able to observe a number of internal 
management meetings and spent several shifts in the divisional control room 
familiarising myself with the co-ordination of local police operations. 
Access and the perils of participant observation 
Research access to Holloway Division for the purposes of the original project was 
gained by Betsy Stanko. tO However, as Tim May (1993) has noted, access to the 
field for the participant observer is not a once and for all rite of passage but a 
continuous process of negotiation. These negotiations took place at two levels: 
formally with the duty or sector inspectors whose permission I always sought 
before beginning any observation and informally with the officer or officers I was 
accompanying or met. The first part of this process was quite straightforward. I 
simply made an arrangement to come in at a certain time with the relevant duty 
inspector who would then suggest a unit for me to observe. Occasional requests 
to observe a particular individual or unit or type of activity were never refused 
and, if inspectors attempted to 'steer' me towards officers who could be trusted to 
behave appropriately and 'say the right things', they either knew remarkably little 
about the people under their command or were far from unanimous about what it 
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was good for a researcher to be exposed to. In any event, once I was out on the 
street - or in the canteen - managers had no effective means of controlling what I 
saw or whom I spoke to. 
Gaining the trust of the rank and file officers I was observing presented a greater 
challenge. The respective advantages and disadvantages of what Gold (1969) has 
called 'complete participant' observation of the police undertaken by insiders 
such as Holdaway (1983) and Young (1991; 1993) and 'participant as observer' 
studies made by outsiders like Punch (1979a; 1985), Smith and Gray (1983), 
Hobbs (1989) and Fielding (1995) have been widely canvassed in the 
methodological literature (see generally: May, 1997: Chapter 7; and Jupp, 1989: 
56-63; 148-57). There can be little doubt that Young's (1991) 'practical 
policemen' have an enormous advantage when it comes to understanding the 
deeper meanings of the phenomena observed, although both he and Holdaway 
comment on the suspicion with which they - 'academic' police officers both -
were regarded by their colleagues. 'Analytic researchers' , as Young calls them, 
clearly have a lot of ground to make up before they overcome the police officer's 
ingrained distrust of the social scientist and can hope to begin 'piercing the 
protective shield' of the lower ranks (Holdaway, 1983: 5). 
While it is for the reader to make her own assessment of the extent to which I 
succeeded in observing and making sense of 'the backstage language of 
behaviour' (Goffman, 1984) of operational police work a number of factors 
seemed to worked in my favour. First there was the fact that, as a white, six foot, 
thirty-something with a slight northern accent and a studiously police-friendly 
wardrobe of smart casual (but neither too smart nor too casual) clothes, I looked 
and sounded (give or take round glasses and my non-participation in outrageously 
sexist banter) very much like the kind of ambitious young graduate officer that a 
'busy' inner city division like Holloway tended to attract.}} Moreover, at a time 
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when relations between 'management' (inspectors and above) and the 'shop floor' 
were strained almost to breaking point over the introduction of sector policing, I 
was able to make myself useful to both sides. To the lower ranks I was a neutral 
and reliably discreet conduit for their grievances. To their superiors I was a 
source of some relatively unvarnished home truths about how sector policing was 
playing with the 'troops'. Acting both as a sounding board for rank and file 
discontent and a confidant of managers hungry for feedback on how their plans 
were progressing was always a balancing act likely to end in a spectacular fall. 
Discontented constables and sergeants regularly asked me to endorse their 
complaints about 'manpower' shortages, the threat posed by sector policing to 
officers' safety and the insensitivity of management in breaking up the extended 
families that the reliefs or shifts had become. While making what I hoped were 
suitably sympathetic noises, I tried to avoid taking a clear stance on such highly 
contentious issues. Most officers respected my guarded neutrality with the 
notable exception of a long-serving home beat officer who, after one of many 
conversations about the subject, accused me of 'going over to the other 
[management] side on sector policing' by refusing to acknowledge that the system 
was unworkable within existing resource constraints.12 
For the most part therefore I followed Polsky's (1971: 126-7 quoted in Hobbs, 
1989: 11) advice, kept my mouth shut, and let my police informants do the 
talking. This - with one or two exceptions that seemed to have more to do with 
individual shyness than any reservation about talking to an 'outsider' - they were 
more than happy to do. It is hard to judge how successful I was in gaining the 
trust of the officers in whose company I walked and drove the streets of Holloway 
and how candid and natural they were in what they said and did in my presence. 
That I was able to gain the confidence of at least some of the officers I observed 
and talked to relatively quickly is indicated by the willingness - only four months 
into the fieldwork stage of the research - of one of the divisional collators to leave 
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me alone in his office with unrestricted access to the indices of suspects, motor 
vehicles and so forth that form the lifeblood of low-level police intelligence while 
he went off duty at the end of a shift. Divisional Intelligence Officers, to give 
them their official title, were responsible (amongst other things) for collating the 
often very detailed, if dubiously accurate, information about people of interest to 
the police and their activities that operational (eID and uniformed) officers 
thought might be of use to their colleagues. Their records and the raw material 
from which they were created represent a veritable minefield of potentially 
explosive material ranging - from what I gleaned during my sojourn in Holloway 
- from scurrilous gossip and scatological comment about local members of 
parliament to crudely stereotyped views on the lifestyles and criminal propensities 
of people from minority ethnic groups. No doubt the officer who left me poring 
over this material with a casual request that it I put the various books and card 
indices back where I found them would have been puzzled by my reaction to their 
contents. But the fact remains that he trusted me, an 'outsider', to make more or 
less whatever use I wanted of his records, the crownjewels of street-level police 
crime fighting. 
Another incident that makes me believe that I gained a measure of acceptance in 
the mysterious world of the police occurred when an acting sergeant at the wheel 
of a patrol car handed me his personal radio with a terse request to keep in touch 
with the controller while he set off in pursuit of a stolen car despite having neither 
the correct vehicle nor driver qualifications for chasing round residential streets at 
high speed. Then, on a third occasion I watched a constable hurl his heavy police 
regulation torch at the windscreen of an oncoming car (again stolen), only to be 
brought into an anxious conversation between the officer and a colleague about 
how the incident should be 'written up' to minimise the risk of the torch-thrower 
getting into trouble for unnecessarily endangering the life of the driver and other 
road users. 13 In the end I would like to think I became enough of a 'fan' (Van 
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Maanen, 1978) to establish a rapport with operational officers without falling prey 
to the 'seductive interest' of the police world (punch, 1979a: 16).14 Nor - as 
several invitations (only one of which I thought it politic to accept) to do some 
illicit 'after hours' drinking with senior managers in a well-known 'police pub' on 
a neighbouring division would suggest - did I allow that rapport to prejudice 
friendly relations with their superiors. 
Of course it was not only police officers with whom I came into contact during 
the research. Nor, therefore, was it only their 'natural' behaviour that my 
presence might contaminate. There were also the participants in the many 
community meetings I attended, and the victims, suspects, witnesses and 
members of the public dealt with by police offices I was accompanying, to 
consider. Once again it is impossible to be certain about the impact my presence 
may have had on what these people said or did. But here too it was probably 
minimal. It became standard practice at community meetings for the police 
officer (usually an inspector) to introduce me as 'a researcher from BruneI 
University' and explain that I was 'looking at sector policing'. This was 
invariably accepted without discussion. Meetings then proceeded - as far as I 
could make out - normally and without the participants appearing to give me any 
further thought. For them, the business they had come along to discuss was far 
too important for a lone individual sitting in a comer with a clipboard to constitute 
a distraction. As for people I encountered when I was observing patrol officers at 
work, most seemed to assume that, since I arrived with the police, I too was a 
police officer. IS This occasionally gave rise to some slightly comical 
misunderstandings with unsuspecting members of the public approaching me with 
enquiries about some arcane aspect of police procedure or to share some 
interminable tale of woe. Mostly however my ersatz police persona was a 
blessing. 
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Fieldnotes and confidentiality 
My approach to recording my observations varied according to the formality of 
the setting. In community and management meetings I took as full a 
contemporaneous note of proceedings as possible. I made no secret of the fact 
that I was making notes and sat quite openly recording what was said. In most 
cases I was able to check my notes against the minutes of the meeting thus 
achieving a degree of 'within-method triangulation' (Fielding, 1995: 47), 
although it has to be said that the typically stilted prose of such official records 
seldom captures the telling phrase or critical exchange that excites the 
ethnographer by illuminating his (or her) field of inquiry. Unlike Fielding (1995: 
50) and his colleagues however, I did not try to take notes in the presence of 
officers and/or the public in the unstructured setting of police operations. Nor did 
I resort to the 'weak bladder' device and adjourn to the toilet on more than a 
handful of occasions. Early experience of taking notes while observing control 
room operations convinced me that such intrusive manifestations of my status as 
an observer only made the inevitably slightly bizarre relationship between 
researcher and subject even more obviously freakish than it needed to be. 
Needless to say, officers were not naive enough to believe that I wasn't mentally 
noting what they were doing and saying. Indeed, a woman constable whose work 
in the control room I had openly 'noted' early in the research asked me some 
months later when I joined her on patrol in a panda car whether I was going to 
write down everything she said again. When I told her that I had given that up 
she replied, 'You'll just go home and write it all down instead', which, of course, 
was precisely what I did. 16 
The final issue to be dealt with here relates to how I propose to use and present 
the empirical data I collected in Holloway. As I have said, the main purpose to 
which I intend to put the empirical data in Chapter 8 is to illustrate some of the 
theoretical points made in earlier chapters. The incidents, conversations and 
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discussions that appear in this thesis are thus not intended to provide supporting 
evidence for immediately generalisable propositions about sector policing. 
However, unless otherwise stated, they are broadly representative of other similar 
records not all of which are referred to here (cf. Fielding, 1995: 49). In 
reproducing extracts from my notes, I have made no attempt to disguise the 
identity of the force or police division on which the research was conducted. 
Prior publication of a detailed report on the original study renders such 
dissembling otiose. Similar considerations apply to the naming of the individual 
sectors into which Holloway was divided. Beyond this, however, I have taken 
steps to protect individuals by giving pseudonyms to junior officers and referring 
to their seniors (inspectors and above) by their job title (,sector inspector', 'senior 
manager' and so on). Owing to the smaller number of senior officers this latter 
device affords them only limited protection but I am not aware that any of them 
suffered any repercussions from the publication of the original project report 
which contained similar - and occasionally the same - material. 
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Notes 
1 Stenning (1995: 3) argues that the 1980s can be thought of as 'a decade of 
accountability' throughout the Western world much as the 1960s are seen as one of 
'liberation' . 
2 See, for example, Hall (1985); Gilroy and Sim (1987); Hillyard and Percy-Smith 
(1988); and Norrie and Adelman (1989). Brake and Hale (1992) provide an often 
polemical overview of 'law and order' politics since Mrs Thatcher's first election victory 
in 1979. 
3 The literature is enormous, but see Marshall (1978), Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) and 
Brogden (1982) for early contributions to the debate. 
4 Loader (1994) makes precisely this point and goes on to develop a set of proposals for 
the democratisation of police governance that draws on the earlier work of Jefferson and 
Grimshaw (1984). 
5 Jefferson et aI, 1991: 2. 
6 Ibid: 2-3. 
7 See Young (1997: 485-6) for a recent exposition of the nature and form of crime using 
the 'square' as its main analytical device. 
8 Smith (1998) is probably the only recent work to deal with the constitutional position of 
the Metropolitan Police in any depth. 
9 A full report of the project and a discussion of some of the main findings are contained 
in Dixon and Stanko (1993; 1995). Some additional material was collected in March 
1993. 
1
0 After registering as a doctoral student in early 1992 I made no secret of the fact that the 
data I was collecting would be used as the basis both for an 'official' project report and a 
thesis and discussed my plans with numerous Holloway officers. 
11 The importance of 'looking the part' should not be underestimated as Hobbs (1989: 6) 
emphasises when he recounts being told off by his principal police informant that his 
choice of open-necked shirt, sleeveless sweater and corduroy trousers for a 'semi-formal 
non-police function' made him look like 'a fucking social worker'. 
12 A slightly different but related problem came about as a result of my decision to spend 
more, but not all, of my time on one of the three sectors into which Holloway was 
eventually divided. This tempted one of the inspectors on that sector to try to involve me 
in an oddly acrimonious dispute with colleagues on another sector. In the search for 
unflattering gossip about his rivals he asked me to confirm that a group of officers on 
their sector had been 'caught kipping' on night duty. As it happened, I knew nothing 
about the incident and was able to say so without fear of being discovered in an obvious 
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lie but the experience reminded me of the need for vigilance in preserving my distance 
from internal police disputes. 
13 It was eventually decided that the officers' notebooks would record that the driver 
'swerved' towards the pavement putting the torch-thrower in fear of his life. 
14 The risk of 'going native' is one of the perennial dangers of participant observation and 
was brought home to me with some force after a conference where I presented what I 
thought, perhaps rather naively, was an appropriately 'objective' and scholarly paper 
(Dixon, 1993) on rank and file reaction to the introduction of sector policing only to be 
lambasted by an experienced female police researcher in the audience for having 'become 
one of the boys' . 
15 Fielding (1995: 50) reports that he and his colleagues were also treated as police 
officers by default. 
16 In practice I wrote up notes in one of two ways. If at all possible, I wrote up a detailed 
set of notes immediately after I completed a 'block' of observations (usually an 8-hour 
shift in the case of police operations). On a few occasions when I was too tired after a 
'night shift' to commit detailed notes and reflections to paper I tried to construct a short 
aide memoire for myself by jotting down a series of headings fleshed out with short 




Consent, Coercion and Four Dimensions of 
Accountability 
The great strength of the Assistant Commissioner's guidance (1991a; 1991b; 
1991 c) is that it makes the renewal of the relationship between police and 
people, summed up in the notion of policing by consent, the main aim of 
sector policing. Its principal weakness is that, while policing by consent is a 
striking and time-honoured slogan, it leaves important questions about the 
meaning of consent and the nature of policing unanswered. What counts as 
consent? How is consent expressed? What are people being asked to consent 
to? Who exactly are the people whose consent is required? This chapter sets 
out to answer some of these questions, and to provide a theoretical framework 
for the discussion of sector policing and the reinvention of police 
accountability that follows. 
The first section of the chapter takes as its starting point recent debates about 
the nature of policing and what distinguishes those public officials we 
commonly think of as 'the police' from other individuals and institutions 
involved in ordering and regulating contemporary societies. This is followed 
by an investigation of consent and its place in a family of concepts in political 
theory such as legitimacy, consensus and compliance. Its relationships with 
members of an extended family that includes power, authority and, most 
important of all, accountability are also explored. Accountability as a means 
of achieving policing by consent is the focus of a final section that draws on 
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the preceding discussions of policing and consent to identify four dimensions 
of police accountability. 
Policing and the police 
One of the most striking features of recent writing about policing and the 
police has been a renewed interest in the nature of 'policing' as a social process 
involving not just 'the police', but a wide range of other individuals and 
organisations. This distinction between policing and what the police do has 
become so crucial to discussions about the role of the police that Robert 
Reiner (1994: 715-722) devotes a substantial part of an introductory essay on 
the police to pointing up the difference between the two. I He contends that the 
widespread assumption in contemporary societies that the existence of an 
organised police force is 'a functional prerequisite of social order' amounts to 
a form of 'police fetishism' that denies the historical (not to mention cultural) 
specificity of the conception of 'policing' as a specialised activity undertaken 
by the 'police' (Reiner, 1994: 715). Far from being the sine qua non of social 
order, the 'police' as a body of specialists in its maintenance are a feature of 
relatively complex modem societies, and the sophisticated division of labour 
which their existence implies. By way of contrast, 'policing' refers to a diffuse 
set of informal and formal control processes that appear whenever and 
wherever social order is threatened. These processes involve both surveillance 
for the purpose of detecting breaches of social order, and organisation of an 
appropriate response to any breakdowns that come to light. 
Dissatisfaction with police fetishism and the conflation of 'policing' with 'what 
the police do' seems to have two main sources. The first of these is the 
rediscovery by authors such as Stenson (1993) and Rawlings (1995) of the 
history of 'policing' before the advent of the 'new police'. Reviewing recent 
work on the rise of 'governmentality' and a science of police in eighteenth 
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century Europe, Stenson (1993: 376) argues that the term 'police' connoted 
not a 'repressive force' but a 'comprehensive, educative process that 
constitutes the social body as a context for civilised social conduct'. British 
thinkers of the period like Bentham, Colquhoun, and Adam Smith were also 
familiar with this broad conception of 'policing' as an enterprise crucial not 
just to the preservation of social order, but to all aspects of the regulation of 
early capitalist society (Reiner, 1992b: 762). Furthennore, even within the 
restricted field of activity commonly associated with the modem 'police' -
order maintenance, crime detection and law enforcement - the division of 
labour was rudimentary (Ems ley, 1996; Palmer, 1988; Hay and Snyder, 1989). 
The paradigm shift from policing as a general project of social regulation in 
which all responsible and right-thinking members of society should play an 
active part did not occur until around the turn of the century. And it was not 
until the early 1800s that the exclusion of the public from 'policing' and its 
reservation as an area of activity for a specialised body of state functionaries, 
gathered pace (Rawlings, 1995). 
The rediscovery of a history of 'policing' before 'the police' has been 
accompanied, perhaps prompted, by the rapid growth of alternative fonns of 
policing over recent years (Shearing and Stenning, 1983; South, 1988; 
Shapland and Vagg, 1988; Jones and Newburn, 1997a) leading to what 
Johnston (1992; 1993; 1996) describes as a renegotiation of the division of 
labour between the public and private sectors.2 Hoogenboom (1991) notes that 
traditional 'blue policing' is gradually being 'greyed' as police functions are 
dispersed to a cornucopia of regulatory bodies and private sector organisations 
with whom 'street cops' co-operate and share information on an infonnal, 
unregulated, but regular basis. Writing about policing and social control in 
contemporary urban America, Davis (1990) and Christie (1993) present an 
apocalyptic vision of the rampant privatisation of security, the progressive 
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destruction of public space accessible to marginal groups, and the gradual 
'industrialisation' of crime control. Summing up these developments, Reiner 
(1992b) and Bayley and Shearing (1996) suggest that they reflect profoWld 
structural changes taking place in the policing of late or post-modem societies. 
Meanwhile, beyond the academy, proposals for hiving selected police 
functions off either to other agencies or to a new breed of police known as 
'designated patrol officers' have met with predictable howls of anguish from 
police spokespeople warning of the dangers of 'two-tier' policing (Home 
Office, 1995; Police FoundationIPolicy Studies Institute, 1996; Police 
Federation, 1996). 
The state, the police and coercive force 
Against this background, it becomes both more important and more difficult 
(Johnston, 1992: 187-195) to pinpoint precisely what it is that distinguishes 
the public officials we conventionally think of as 'the police' from the growing 
number of other individuals involved in 'policing'. Yet in doing so it is 
possible to make out the essence of policing by the 'police', and why popular 
consent to it is so hard to win. The rust, and in many ways the most 
fundamental, distinguishing feature of 'the police' is their relationship with the 
state. Mike Brogden (1982) has argued that the standard accounts of the 
nature of the state - and by implication of the function of the police as a state 
agency - offered by political theorists as different as Weber, Dahl, Miliband 
and Poulantzas are less than satisfactory, tending either to assume the 
existence of an over-arching social consensus as the basis for police (and state) 
power, or to emphasise the role of the state in enforcing class rule without 
providing an adequate explanation of the relationship between the two.3 Less 
controversial is the prominence in Western political thought of the state's 
capacity to use or threaten to use coercive force in regulating society and 
upholding political order.4 Hobbes, for example, went so far as to contend that 
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'the state constitutes society through the power of command of the sovereign 
(set down in the legal system) and through the capacity of the sovereign to 
enforce the law (established by the fear of coercive power) (Held, 1989: 17-
18). Unlike Hobbes, John Locke did not believe that the coercive force 
wielded by an omnipotent state was needed to constitute society. He preferred 
a more restricted role for 'government' in preserving the 'life, liberty and 
estate' of free, equal, and independent citizens by monopolising 'the process of 
formulating, administering and enforcing laws' (Keane, 1988: 39-40). 
Bentham, James Mill, and the utilitarians went along with Locke in seeking 
strict limits on state power but argued nonetheless that the use of coercion to 
enforce duly enacted laws was justifiable in so far as those laws upheld the 
general principle of utility. 
But perhaps the clearest exposition of the centrality of the use of force in 
defming the modern state is contained in the work of Max Weber: 
Of course force is certainly not the normal or only means of the state 
- nobody says that - but force is a means specific to the state ... the 
state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by 
means of legitimate (ie. considered to be legitimate) violence. 
(Weber, 1972, quoted in Held, 1989: 40). 
Thus, as David Held (1989: 40) puts it, 'The modern state ... has a capability 
of monopolising the legitimate use of violence within a given territory ... ' 
largely through the agency of the 'state police' who are given a more or less 
exclusive franchise on exercising this monopoly power. 5 Hence, among the 
'web of agencies and institutions' which find their 'ultimate sanction in the 
claim to the monopoly of coercion' , the police have most to gain from the 
modern state's ability to arrogate to itself the exclusive right to the use of force 
(Held, 1989: 40). 
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This analysis leads on to a second distinguishing feature of 'the police' that 
emerges most powerfully from the work ofEgon Bittner. Rather than enter a 
sterile debate about the relative importance of 'law enforcement' and 'social 
service' as the essence of police work, Bittner (1975: 46, emphasis in original) 
argues that: 
[T]he role of the police is best understood as a mechanism for the 
distribution of non-negotiably coercive force employed in 
accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational 
. . 
eXIgencIes. 
In what has become a classic statement of 'the specific competence of the 
police' Bittner (1974: 35) makes the crucial point that, unlike other state 
agents who may on occasion exercise legitimate force, 
The policeman, and the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and 
required to deal with every exigency in which force may have to be 
used, to meet it. 
Thus, if their capacity routinely to exercise the state's monopoly on the use of 
legitimate force distinguishes 'the police' from private citizens (employed by 
private security frrms or acting under the auspices of their local neighbourhood 
watch, for example) undertaking 'policing' activities, it is the breadth of their 
mandate, and the sheer variety of the situations in which they may use 
coercion, which marks them off from other state agents who enjoy a more 
limited franchise. 6 
The idea that, in Bittner's (1975: 46) words, 'the mandate of the police is 
organized around their capacity and authority to use force' has become 
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something of a commonplace in the literature on policing (see Reiner, 1992a: 
142-3; 1997: 1007-8 for example). But this is not to say that it has gone 
unchallenged. Les Johnston (1992: 189) for example has argued that Bittner's 
emphasis on the capacity of 'the police' to use legitimate force as the principal 
franchisees of the state monopoly on its domestic use has had a blighting effect 
on the development of a more broadly based sociology of 'policing' . By 
implying that all 'policing' activity presupposes the existence of the right to use 
state-sanctioned coercive force Bittner's analysis has tended to obscure the fact 
that, on the one hand, the public and other state agents often coerce with the 
backing of the state's authority while on the other, corrupt 'police' officers 
may act without that authority. However, as Johnston (1992: 189, emphasis in 
original) himself concedes: 
[1]t is necessary to demarcate between the actions of sworn police 
officers and those of private individuals. There are clearly important 
differences between actions carried out with the authority of the state 
and those carried out without such authority - especially when 
coercion is involved. 
It is in making this demarcation between 'what police officers do' and other 
kinds of 'policing' that Bittner's observations are so pertinent. What makes 
'the police' unique is the intimacy of the sworn officers' connection with the 
state's monopolisation of legitimate coercion, together with the breadth of the 
mandate they are given in using or threatening force in all those situations that 
involve 'something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-w hich-
someone-had-better-do-something-now!' (Bittner, 1974: 30). Thus, as Carl 
Klockars (1985: 12) put it in another much quoted sentence: 
Police are institutions or individuals given the general right to use 
coercive force by the state within the state's domestic territory. 
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Heidensohn (1992: 72-3, emphasis in original) takes a slightly different line in 
criticising the elision of 'coercion' with the application of force, which, she 
argues, 'implies physique and hence policing by men '. She (1992: 73) 
describes Bittner's (1974: 35, emphasis in original) qualification that police 
work consists not of using force to solve problems but of 'coping with 
problems in which force may have to be used' as a 'cop out' since force 'thus 
becomes not the defming factor of policing but the limiting case, the exception 
that is meant, somehow, to prove the rule'. The point about the danger of 
eliding 'coercion' with brute force and therefore a male preserve is well made, 
but the underlying criticism of Bittner is unfair. The fact that coercive force is 
(or should be) the instrument of last resort scarcely invalidates the argument 
that its possession by 'the police', and their capacity to make state-legitimated 
use of it in an infInite variety of situations, marks them out from other 
'policers,.7 Moreover, if the authoritative use of coercive force is the 
distinctive feature of 'policing' by sworn police officers acting within the 
mandate they have been given by the state, then it is to the distribution and 
application of coercive force that the people are being asked to consent when 
one talks of 'policing by consent'. The discovery that the use of force is the 
pre-eminent feature of 'policing' by the 'police' and represents, therefore, the 
core activity to which the consent of the public is sought, has profound 
implications for police accountability and is one of the main themes of this 
chapter's final section. 
The power to exercise the state's monopoly on the use of legitimate coercive 
force confers awesome responsibilities on the police. The use of force is the 
most drastic form of action at the state's disposal and it is deployed by the 
police in the most controversial and sensitive areas of political and social life -
in regulating social conflict and setting and patrolling the boundaries of 
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acceptable behaviour. Decisions made by the police about the use of coercive 
force are crucial in detennining the social distribution of both the negative 
consequences that flow from coercive action and the benefits of state 
protection that flow from it. In using or threatening force to protect the 
integrity or freedom of one individual or group, it is almost inevitable that the 
police will have to compromise the autonomy of another. 
The police are arguably the central public service in a modem state. 
They are there to protect our essential freedoms and to do so have a 
monopoly over the legitimate use offorce" (Jones et ai, 1994). 
In societies emerging from long periods of political tyranny such as South 
Africa or the countries of Eastern Europe and the fonner Soviet Union, 
policing may extend what Braithwaite and Pettit (1990: Chap. 5) have 
described as 'dominion' by improving the life chances of the exploited, the 
marginalised and the disadvantaged. Alternatively it may contribute to the 
continued oppression of such groups by stifling political activity and acting as 
a brake on social change (Brogden and Shearing, 1993: 1-2). But, even in the 
very different conditions of a mature liberal democracy, the power of the 
police to distribute protection and coercion unevenly through society may be 
crucial in reinforcing (or reducing) the political, social and economic 
marginalisation of social groups ranging from organised labour (Fine and 
Millar, 1985; Green, 1991), to black people (Cashmore and McLaughlin, 
1991; McConville and Shepherd, 1992; Jefferson, 1993), women (Hanmer et 
ai, 1989), gay people (Burke, 1992), and political dissidents or 'subversives' 
(Bunyan,1977). As Robert Reiner (1992a: 4) has noted, the connection 
between politics and the police is no etymological fluke, for 'policing is an 
inherently political activity' involving judgements about the use of extreme 
measures in defining social morality and the limits of tolerable behaviour. 
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Consequently, popular consent to the use of force by the police has to be 
achieved over hotly contested political terrain in circumstances where the 
distribution of coercion will have far-reaching effects on the ability of citizens 
to play an active part in society. It is at this point that we have to return to the 
notion of consent and its use in the context of policing. 
Consent 
Winning and maintaining the consent of the people is a key problem for the 
liberal democratic state and its institutions. So it is entirely predictable that 
'policing by consent' has become something of a 'shibboleth' (pessimists might 
prefer chimera) in times of declining public confidence in the police (Reiner, 
1992a: 250).8 What is meant by 'consent' in this well-worn phrase is rarely 
explained however. And when an attempt is made to explicate the nature of 
consent in the context of the relationship between police and public, 
commentators come up with quite different answers. Mike Brogden (1982) 
for example characterises popular consent to policing in an advanced capitalist 
society such as Britain as constructed around an 'imaginary' relation between 
the police and subordinate social classes. In order to secure the consent of 
these groups, police activity is presented as serving general societal interests 
rather than those of the dominant social classes represented in a relatively 
autonomous local and central state.9 By way of contrast, the introduction to 
the Operational Policing Review (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990: 
Introduction: 4) adopts a much more benign view of the nature of public 
consent to 'traditional British policing' as meaning not 'acquiescence but a 
broad tolerance indicating a satisfaction with the helping and enforcement 
roles of policing' . 
Species of consent 
If nothing else, such divergent views demonstrate the need for the conceptual 
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thicket to be cleared before any sense can be made of the nature of consent, 
and its application to policing. To do this I want to return to the work of the 
political scientist David Held who begins his discussion of consent by locating 
it as part of a 'family' of potentially ambiguous concepts that includes 
consensus, compliance and legitimacy (Held, 1989: 101). In a passage worth 
quoting in full, he goes on to distinguish between seven different grounds for 
agreeing or consenting to something: 
1. There is no choice in the matter (following orders, or coercion). 
2. No thought has ever been given to it and we do it as it has 
always been done (tradition). 
3. We cannot be bothered one way or another (apathy). 
4. Although we do not like the situation - it is not satisfactory and 
far from ideal - we cannot imagine things being really different 
and so we 'shrug our shoulders' and accept what seems like fate 
(pragmatic acquiescence). 
5. We are dissatisfied with things as they are but nevertheless go 
along with them in order to secure an end; we acquiesce because 
it is in the long-run to our advantage (instrumental acceptance or 
conditional agreement/consent). 
6. In the circumstances before us, and with the information 
available to us at the moment, we conclude it is 'right', 'correct', 
'proper' for us as an individual or members of a collectivity: it is 
what we genuinely should or ought to do (normative agreement). 
7. It is what in ideal circumstances - with, for instance, all the 
knowledge we would like, all the opportunity to discover the 
circumstances and requirements of others - we would have 
agreed to do (ideal normative agreement). (Held, 1989: 101; and 
1987: 181-2). 
Having conceded that these analytically distinct types of consent tend to 
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overlap and combine in practice, he contends that ideal normative agreement -
though well nigh impossible to achieve in an imperfect world - provides a 
handy yardstick against which other less complete forms of acquiescence and 
agreement may be measured. to While Held uses this typology of consent to 
analyse the legitimacy of the entire British political order, it is equally helpful 
in making sense of the notion of consent when it is applied to the police as the 
main state agency charged with upholding that order. 
For example, McConville et al (1991: 92-95; and cf. Dixon, 1997: Chapter 3) 
have noted that the safeguards for suspects stopped and searched on the street 
provided in s. 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its accompanying 
Code of Practice (Code A) are routinely circumvented by police officers who 
succeed in obtaining suspects' 'consent' to a 'voluntary' search. They argue that 
the threatened use of coercive power by the police is crucial in 'constructing' 
this consent - a fairly unambiguous example of Held's first type of 'coerced 
consent' (Ct). But the fact that a citizen's consent to police action taken 
against her may be coerced, does not mean that her consent to the police as an 
institution, and its more general distribution of protection and coercion 
throughout society, has similar origins. If the suspect is regularly stopped and 
searched, her attitude at this institutional level may be one of pragmatic 
acquiescence (C4) or, at best, of instrumental acceptance (Cs) if in some way 
she believes that, in the long run, the positive effects of the protection the 
police provide to her in other ways serves to counterbalance the negative 
consequences of the actions taken against her. The type of consent to policing 
given by an individual or group depends on a wide variety of factors. These 
include: 
1. Whether 'policing' is taken to refer to a specific action or operation, 
to the pattern of policing in a given area, or to the existence and 
practice of the police as a social institution. 
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2. The individual or group's experience and knowledge of the police 
and the police use of coercive power both against them and on their 
behalf. 
3. The extent to which the individual or group feels committed to, or 
alienated from, the social norms and values that the police are 
perceived to embody and promote. 11 
In the chapters that follow, the focus will tend to be on the pattern of policing 
in a given area rather than on particular actions and operations, or the police as 
an institution. 12 But this is not to deny that the quality of consent at one level 
is likely to be affected by experiences and perceptions of policing at another. 
People who are frequently stopped and searched on the street, or feel that 
incidents they have reported have been ignored or handled insensitively, are 
likely to be more grudging in the consent they give to the overall pattern of 
policing in the area in which they live or work. 13 In any case, the very nature 
of police activity as the distribution of non-negotiable coercive force means 
that consent to policing 'cannot imply complete and universal approval' 
(Reiner, 1992a: 5). The most that can be expected is that coerced consent is 
restricted to those who are policed against in as limited a number of individual 
actions and operations as possible, while popular reaction to local patterns of 
policing, and the police institution itself, comes as close to ideal normative 
agreement as material conditions permit. 
Policing by consent 
Having established that the notion of consent is flexible enough to encompass 
everything from following orders under duress to free agreement given in 
conditions of perfect information, it is important to understand how these very 
different types of consent may be signified. Fortunately, Rod Morgan (1989a; 
1990) has subjected this aspect of 'policing by consent' to some detailed 
conceptual analysis. In the course of two important contributions to the debate 
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on policing by consent, he shows how it may be demonstrated 'contractually' 
in the form of legal and political consent or 'socially' as attitudinal and 
operational or procedural consent. In the first instance consent inheres in the 
fact that: 
The police are established, governed, regulated and empowered by 
statute. This body of law, approved by a democratically elected 
Parliament, ideally represents the will of the people. (Morgan, 
1989a: 218). 
This species of legal consent is complemented by political consent 
... realised through a delicately balanced mystery of influences 
brought to bear by politicians locally and nationally on what officers 
decide and on ex post/acto accounting by the police. (Morgan, 
1989a:218) 
For Morgan (1989a: 218-220; 1990: 85-89, 90-3), evidence of legal and 
political consent is thus to be fOWld in the workings - and shortcomings - of 
the doctrine of constabulary independence and the tripartite structure for the 
governance of the police. But this is only half the story. Attitudinal and 
operational or procedural consent - evident, respectively, in the level of 
public co-operation with the police and in police methods and tactics - must 
also be taken into accoWlt. 
Helpful though it is to disentangle the legal, political, attitudinal and 
procedural aspects of consent, and treat them all as ways in which consent to 
policing may be signified, the differences between consent in a social and a 
contractual sense are stark. The search for indicators of consent in public 
attitudes and policing methods is primarily an empirical inquiry - a matter of 
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surveying public opinion and observing policing practice. Arguments about 
the interpretation of the data may rage, but the validity of the procedure for 
collecting it is relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. 
Empirical techniques undoubtedly have their place in testing the degree of 
consent evident in the functioning of the legal and political processes of police 
governance, but these processes must also be understood and analysed as 
processes operating within a specific institutional framework. The doctrine of 
constabulary independence, the tripartite structure and so on are in themselves 
highly complex and deeply controversial. To question the workings of the 
institutions of police governance and legal regulation is to raise doubts about 
the democratic control of one of the most crucial agencies of the modem state. 
And to talk as Morgan does about regulation, empowerment, influence and 
accounting is to address not simply the presence or absence of consent as 
empirical fact, but the mechanisms and structures by and within which consent 
is manufactured in a liberal democratic political system predicated on the rule 
of law. In practical terms it may scarcely matter whether the phrase 'policing 
by consent' is used - as it tends to be in official police rhetoric - to characterise 
an ideal state of police/pUblic relations rather than to specify the institutional 
and organisational arrangements by which it may be brought about (Dixon and 
Stanko, 1995). But it must be important nonetheless to be clear about the 
distinction between ends and means. The legal and political dimensions of 
'consent' identified by Morgan are therefore best analysed as mechanisms for 
holding the police accountable for their actions, leaving the existence and 
qualities (according to Held's typology) of consent as an end to be assessed by 
the empirical investigation of public attitudes and police practices. 
If, to put the same point in less abstract terms, 'policing by consent' was the 
end which the Metropolitan Police hoped to achieve in implementing sector 
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policing (Metropolitan Police, 1991a: 2), then greater accountability would 
have to be the means by which it could be accomplished (Dixon and Stanko, 
1995). Used in this way to describe the state of relations between police and 
public at a particular time and place, the phrase 'policing by consent' takes on 
what Rod Morgan (1990: 87) himself has called 'the general normative sense 
of congruence between the values and actions of the police and the public they 
allegedly serve' .14 This of course brings us on to the main concern of this 
chapter - the notion of accountability, and how sense can be made of one of 
the most contested concepts in the lexicon of contemporary politics. 
Dimensions of accountability 
If accountability is a conceptual will 0' the wisp it seems prudent to begin with 
at least a vague idea of what to look out for before setting off in pursuit of it. 
The fust task therefore is to come up with a serviceable working definition of 
'accountability' - a project made considerably easier by Patricia Day, Rudolf 
Klein and Jon Vagg whose work can be used to derive the following 
proposition: 
Accountability refers to the quality of a relationship where one party (A) has a 
duty to report on, to explain, and/or justify her actions and decisions to 
another (B); and that duty arises because A has powers which are not 
originally hers but are in some way delegated to her by B. (Adapted from 
Vagg, 1994: 1; Day and Klein, 1987: 4) 
The object of such an accountability relation is to make sure that A's actions 
and decisions are broadly in line with (or, in the ideal case perhaps, identical 
to) those which B would have performed or taken if she had exercised the 
powers delegated to A directly rather than vicariously. IS In other words, if A is 
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accountable to B, the quality of that relationship should ensure that A's actions 
and decisions are in accordance or (to persevere with the tenninology used in 
the previous section) congruent with the values and priorities ofB. With this 
working definition in mind, the rest of this Chapter is devoted to identifying 
four closely interlocking dimensions of accountability relevant to the task of 
detecting changes in the conceptualisation of police accountability, and 
understanding how they may affect policing at local level. (The first of the 
questions under each of the following headings indicates the general line of 
inquiry to be pursued; the second frames the question in terms of the working 
defInition of accountability outlined above.)16 
1. Content: What kind of actions and decisions should the police (A) 
be held accountable for? What is the nature of the delegated powers 
that they exercise? 
2. Direction: Who should the police be accountable to? Who is the 
other party (B) to the accountability relation or relations in which the 
police are involved? 
3. Mode: What kind of account of their actions and decisions do the 
police have to provide? What kind of report, explanation and/or 
justification of their actions and decisions will satisfy B, and what 
does this suggest about the nature of the relationship between the 
police and B? 
4. Mechanism: How are the police held accountable for their actions 
and decisions? What institutional structures exist for holding the 
police to account for their actions and decisions to B?17 
Since I have already begun to address some of the issues raised by the first of 
these dimensions of accountability it makes sense to start detailed discussion 
with the content of police accountability. 
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The content of police accountability 
The conclusion of the discussion in the first part of this chapter was that the 
distinguishing feature of (public or state) police activity is the ability of 
officers - acting in a uniquely varied set of social situations - to threaten or use 
legitimate coercive force. It follows from this that decisions about the use of 
force form the core content of police accountability and, by their very nature, 
make the process by which consent to policing is negotiated between police 
and public peculiarly problematic since, wherever coercion is threatened or 
used, someone is policed against. In other words policing, as an essentially 
adversarial activity, creates its own opposition. Trying to involve those who 
are policed against in a process designed to provide consent for that activity, 
and ~us legitimise the use of force against themselves, presents obvious but 
not necessarily insuperable difficulties. Consent to the general pattern of 
coercion - even to particular instances of coercion - might, for example, be 
forthcoming if the benefits and burdens of the police use of force were evenly 
or - according to some generally agreed criteria - fairly distributed throughout 
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socIety. 
'Rough' and 'respectable' 
In reality of course, the social distribution of the use of force by the police is 
highly uneven with the result that significant sections of the population are 
policed against not just occasionally but regularly, and far more frequently 
than others (Singh, 1994). Research evidence on the police use of powers of 
stop and search reveals that the risk of coming into contact with the police as a 
target of this kind of coercive activity is closely related to a number of basic 
economic and social factors as well as differences in lifestyle and routine 
activities (Skogan, 1990; 1994).19 Thus, summarising his analysis of the 1988 
sweep of the British Crime Survey, Skogan (1990: 31) notes: 
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A clear picture emerges from the factors examined here: the police 
are more likely to stop and question young, single, unemployed 
Afro-Caribbean males. Having a record of past criminal encounters 
with police also put one at substantially greater risk of being 
stopped, as did going out frequently at night and driving a great deal. 
The consequences of this unevenness in the distribution of coercive activity 
are evident firstly in the higher levels of dissatisfaction with the police 
reported by those who have been stopped, and secondly in the corrosive effect 
which socially skewed patterns of street enforcement have on relations 
between the police and those sections of society against whom such action is 
taken (Skogan, 1990: 35, 43). Moreover, as Michael Keith (1993) amongst 
others has observed, police reliance on the use of force as a means of dealing 
with groups thought to be a threat to social order may also have an important 
spatial dimension.20 He describes how, during the 1980s, 'policing without 
consent' became institutionalised in three inner London neighbourhoods that 
became 'symbolic locations' in a protracted struggle between the police and 
black (African-Caribbean) people for the control of public space. 
The implications of all this for the accountability process are far-reaching. 
Individuals and social groups whose main experience of policing is being 
policed against have nothing to gain from participation in a process designed 
to manufacture consent for the police use of state-sanctioned coercion. On the 
contrary, as Beetham (1991: 93) has noted in a slightly different context, the 
participation of the relatively powerless in negotiating the policies adopted, or 
services delivered, by those who exercise power over them may in itself be 
taken as an expression of consent to their subordination. F or the routinely 
policed against to take part in such a process, they would need either to believe 
that the force used against them could in some way be justified, or that the 
police could be persuaded that the current patterning of its distribution was 
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wrong and should be changed. Since altruism or optimism of such a high 
order is rare, the effect of unevenness in the social distribution of the police 
use of force is to alienate targeted groups from the police and discourage them 
from taking part in any process aimed at holding the police accountable for 
their use of force. 
The effects of unevenness in the distribution of the use of force by the police 
are not restricted to the targets of coercive policing. They are also keenly felt 
by police officers themselves. A detailed account of why police coercion 
tends to be targeted on certain social and economically marginal sections of 
the population is beyond the scope of this work. But it is worth noting that the 
structural position of the police in a society riven by class, race, sex, and age 
divisions (to mention only the most obvious) is crucial to any understanding of 
their role in social regulation, and the sharply divergent ways in which rich and 
poor, black and white, male and female, and young and old are treated 
(Brogden et ai, 1988: Chapter 6; Reiner, 1993b; Chan, 1997}.21 It also 
provides an important clue as to how the police are likely to perceive potential 
participants in the accountability process. On this view, the main determinant 
of police practice is their role in reproducing structures that differentiate 
between, and disadvantage, people falling on the wrong side of the major 
social and economic fault lines that fracture modern industrial society. In 
order to make sense of their work as the fIrst line of defence against threats to 
the prevailing social order, police officers develop infonnal rationalisations, 
norms, and values that coalesce to form the occupational culture of the 
police.22 Central to this culture are a set of social typologies that infonn the 
day to day decisions (including decisions about the use of force) rank and file 
officers have to make in the course of their work. Constructed by the police 
around people's ability to create trouble, and fit in with the conservative 
middle class value system to which most officers adhere, these typologies are 
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only incidentally related to more sociologically informed distinctions of class 
and status. 
Although writers such as Reiner (1992a) and Holdaway (1983) have used the 
wealth of observational data available on police culture to identify some quite 
fmely drawn ideal types in the social pantheon (and demonology) of the police, 
the most fundamental and durable distinction remains that between the 'rough' 
and the 'respectable' (Reiner, 1978; Holdaway, 1983; Smith and Gray, 1985; 
and Young, 1991).23 Put crudely, these categories represent, respectively, 
those who are to be policed against and those for whom policing is done. Lee 
(1981: 53-4, quoted in Reiner, 1992a: 118) coined the term 'police property' to 
denote a category of people - skid row alcoholics, the unemployed or casually 
employed reserve army of labour, prostitutes, gays, members of deviant youth 
cultures and radical political organisations - that 'respectable' society has 
effectively turned over to the police to control using the uniquely coercive 
means at their disposal. And, having been entrusted with the regulation of 
these dissolute groups, police perceptions of them are adjusted accordingly. A 
member of a 'police property' group attempting to make use of a service 
provided by the police and get some policing done for rather than against her 
is thus likely to be given short shrift and treated as 'rubbish' - an irritant to be 
dealt with as quickly as possible (Smith and Gray, 1985: 349-50; Reiner, 
1992a: 119). 
Over-coercion and under-protection 
This raises another important point for - as Reiner, the Policy Studies Institute 
researchers, and successive sweeps of the British Crime Survey have 
suggested - 'rough', 'police property' groups are not only over-coerced but 
under-protected. Black people, for example, are disproportionately likely to be 
the target of various kinds of coercive policing (see Reiner, 1993b for a review 
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of the evidence).24 But the first comprehensive analysis of British Crime 
Survey data shows that they are also more likely than whites to experience 
criminal victimisation (Aye Maung and Mirrlees-Black, 1994). 
If, as classical liberal democratic theory in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke 
would have it, the citizen gives some measure of consent to the state's use of 
coercive power in regulating society, she expects a corresponding measure of 
social protection in return. Indeed it has been suggested that the occurrence of 
victimisation represents a failure on the part of the state to discharge its 
obligation to maintain law and order (Council of Europe Convention on 
Compensationfor Victims of Violent Crime, 1983, quoted in Zedner, 1997: 
603-4). Any attempt to fix the state with legal responsibility for compensating 
victims of crime has been firmly resisted in Britain, but even here the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme is based on 'notions of public responsibility 
and sympathy for the victim, suggesting that 'the state is not responsible but 
feels a sense of responsibility' (Walklate, 1989: 114). In any case, however 
the state's obligation to the citizen is characterised, it seems fairly clear that, 
for black people and other 'police property' groups, under-protection is as 
much a feature of their experience of policing as over-coercion. Unevenness 
in the distribution of the social benefits of police coercion thus provides 
another reason why their consent to the general pattern of policing may not be 
readily forthcoming. 
Summary 
Unevenness in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of the police use of 
force means that those social groups with the most experience of being policed 
against will tend both to exclude themselves, and to be excluded, from any 
process designed to hold the police to account for their conduct. The nature of 
the powers delegated to the police, and the content of the actions and decisions 
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they should be held accountable for, are such that large sections of the 
population may fail to take part in any process by which consent to policing is 
to be negotiated. Any account of the routine use of force against the 'roughs' 
is, thus, likely to be provided not to them but to 'respectable' society on whose 
behalf that force is used. This raises questions about the identity of the other 
party or parties to police accountability relations, and it is to this problem 
which I now tum. 
The direction of police accountability 
Adopting once again the terms used at the beginning of this section, the next 
set of problems to be addressed are to do with the source of the power to use 
force exercised by officers of the public police. In the working definition 
provided at the beginning of the Chapter, the other party to the accountability 
relation or relations in which the police (A) are involved was identified simply 
as B. Further explanation is now in order, not least because the issue ofB's 
identity has been thrown into sharp relief by the foregoing discussion of the 
content of police accountability. 
Immediate directions of accountability 
The first point to make about the direction of accountability is that, for most 
practical purposes, we are looking not at a single accountability relation 
between 'the police' as an amorphous social institution and B as a single, 
distinct, individual or institution to whom the police owe a duty to report on, 
explain and/or justify their actions and decisions. On the contrary, we are 
confronted by a multiplicity of accountability relations. These involve, on the 
one hand, individual police officers and identifiable groups of officers (vehicle 
crews, shifts, sector teams, police divisions, the Metropolitan Police, and so); 
and, on the other, a vast array of other individuals (police officers and public 
officials as well as ordinary citizens) and institutions entrusted with overseeing 
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public police work. A quick glance at some of the other parties to which 
officers at different levels may be individually and collectively accountable 
illustrates the complexity of the relations involved. Though subsumed within 
'B' in the working definition these other parties include senior officers within 
the police hierarchy, the courts, police authorities, the Home Secretary, the 
Audit Commission or National Audit Office, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, community/police consultative committees, lay visitors panels, 
pressure groups, tenants' associations, and the ordinary members of the public 
with whom the police come into contact in the course of their work.25 Nor in 
most cases is the accountability relation between the police (at whatever level) 
and any given manifestation ofB the end of the matter. Further accountability 
relations exist linking many of the individuals and institutions - such as senior 
officers, the auditing bodies, police authorities, and the Home Secretary (I will 
call them BI , B2, B3, Bn) - encompassed by B. Hence, while the beat 
constable's most obvious accountability relation may be with the sergeant or 
inspector in charge of his team or unit (BI), this is only the first link in a chain 
of such relations leading up through the command structure (B2, B3), to the 
Commissioner (B4), and, beyond the confines of the police organisation, to the 
Home Secretary (Bs). She may also become personally involved in other 
accountability relations, for example with the courts if she is prosecuted or 
sued, or with ordinary members of the public in providing a service to them 
either individually or collectively. 
General direction of accountability 
However, the sheer number and variety of the directions in which the police 
are immediately accountable must not be allowed to obscure the general 
direction in which all accountability relations must run. This is determined by 
the nature of the political order and, in a liberal democracy, it is 'the people' or 
demos (Bx) to which government and public services, including the police, are 
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finally accountable (Day and Klein, 1987; Jones et aI, 1994).26 To put it 
another way, while the police may be immediately accountable to many 
individuals and institutions, both the police and these intermediate bodies are, 
in a liberal democratic society, generally accountable to 'the people' . 
The association between particular forms of accountability and democracy -
and the special meaning and resonance that the phase 'democratic 
accountability' acquired during the police accountability of the 1980s - forms 
the main subject matter of subsequent chapters. All I want to do here is to 
sketch out the contours of liberal democracy as a political theory, and highlight 
some of the more significant problems that may crop up in using it as the basis 
for a critical analysis of police accountability. Debates about its principles and 
practice have absorbed political theorists for as long as something identifiable 
as liberal democracy has existed.27 Anything approaching a defmite and 
uncontroversial account is therefore hard to find. However, the following 
defInition - though doubtless open to criticism - raises most of the issues 
relevant to this discussion and has the considerable merit of being relatively 
conCIse: 
'Democracy' ... refers to the location of a state's power, that is, in 
the hands of the people, whereas 'liberal' refers to the limitation of a 
state's power. From this viewpoint, a liberal democracy is a political 
system in which the people make the basic political decisions, but in 
which there are limitations on what decisions they can make. More 
precisely ... this conception would be that a liberal democracy is a 
political system in which (a) the whole people positively or 
negatively, make, and are entitled to make, the basic detennining 
decisions on important matters of public policy; but (b) they make, 
and are only entitled to make, such decisions in a restricted sphere 
since the legitimate sphere of public authority is limited. (Holden, 
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1993; 17, emphasis in original). 
Several difficulties are immediately obvious here. For example, in the first 
limb of Holden's conception of liberal democracy: what is the significance of 
the distinction between positive and negative decision-making, and how are 
'basic determining decisions' and 'important matters of public policy' 
defmed? Important though these definitional questions are for the political 
theorist, the search for answers to them need not detain us here other than to 
observe that the social distribution of legitimate coercive force can hardly be 
conceived of as other than a vital matter of public policy about which, as a 
matter of principle, 'the people' should take the basic determining decisions.28 
Nor need we dwell on the details of liberal democratic political processes. 
But, having said that, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the 
implications of some of the principles identified or implicit in Holden's 
definition for a liberal democratic conception of accountability. 
Liberalde~ocracy 
The most important issue to be confronted concerns the notion of 'the people' 
as the location or source of state power in a liberal democracy. For political 
theorists, deciding on the appropriate territorial unit within which members of 
society are to count as 'the people' for the purposes of democratic functioning 
presents an immediate difficulty. Accepting the nation state as the relevant 
unit of analysis is an obvious solution, and will certainly suffice here.29 But 
this still leaves open the question of who is to count as 'the people' for the 
purposes of the democratic process within the territorial unit of the nation 
state. Who, in other words, stands behind the state as the source of its powers 
and its monopoly on the use of legitimate force? 
Again, theorists have debated the answer to these questions at some length, but 
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Bobbio's (1978: 17) view that, in a liberal democracy, 'the people' who take 
part in making political decisions consist of 'all citizens who have reached 
legal age without regard to race, religion, economic status, sex etc.' seems to 
come close to the consensus on the subject. The principle of universal 
suffrage for all but the very young and the mentally incapable is one of the 
hallmarks of liberal democracy, and enables us to draw a reasonably accurate 
portrait of 'the people' from whom the state, and state agencies such as the 
police, derive their power. 30 So, at the level of the nation state, the exclusion 
of the socially and economically powerless from political decision-making 
cannot be reconciled with the precepts of liberal democracy. Moreover, if we 
return to what was said towards the end of the previous section on the content 
of police accountability, it also seems safe to say that any exclusion of the 
disproportionately 'policed against' from the process by which the police are 
held to account for the use of their coercive powers would also be inconsistent 
with liberal democratic principles. As full citizens of the nation state, the 
policed against number among 'the people' who have delegated the power to 
use force to the police and should therefore be entitled to play an active part in 
the accountability process that relates to the use of that power. 
Modes of police accountability 
Having sketched in a framework for police accountability by examining its 
content and direction, we can move on in this and the following section to 
what most of the literature treats as the central issues of the debate. That is, 
the kind of account the police are under a duty to provide for their actions and 
decisions; the nature of the relationship between the police and those to whom 
they have to account; and the features of the institutional mechanisms that 
exist to make the accountability process work. Throughout what follows it 
will be important to bear the outcome of the preceding discussion in mind, and 
to remember that what we are looking at here are different methods of, and 
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mechanisms for, holding the police account to 'the people' on whose behalf 
they exercise the power to use force. The various modes and mechanisms of 
police accountability determine the nature and outcome of, and give effect to, 
the immediate accountability relations that form the links in the chain between 
police and people.31 But, in the final analysis, it is only as part of this general 
process of accountability that their effectiveness can be judged. The true 
beauty of the process of police accountability can only be appreciated through 
the eyes of 'the people' who behold it. 
Marshall's typology 
For the remainder of this section, however, I intend to do no more than provide 
an outline, and some preliminary discussion, of two well-known typologies of 
the mode of police accountability. The fIrst typology originates in the work of 
Geoffrey Marshall, a constitutional theorist with a particular interest in police 
governance. Marshall's delineation of two 'styles' or modes of accountability 
comes towards the end of a short review of developments in police 
accountability since the Police Act 1964 in which he concludes that 'many 
liberal democrats' would rather entrust civil liberties and the impartial 
administration of justice to chief officers of police than to elected politicians 
(Marshall, 1978: 61). To secure these ends, he argues that, even when 
'matters which vitally concern the public interest' are concerned, a 
'constitutional and administrative convention' is required to prevent partisan 
political bodies like police authorities from issuing direct orders to the police. 
Having arrived at this position, he contrasts a style of accountability consistent 
with such a convention (the explanatory and co-operative mode), with 'the 
familiar type of ministerial and political responsibility' that he calls the 
subordinate and obedient mode. According to Marshall (1978: 62) the 
difference between the two modes of accountability is that, where 
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accountability is in subordinate and obedient mode, the superordinate party (B) 
is able to exercise administrative control over, and to direct and veto, the 
actions of A. However, in the case of explanatory and co-operative 
accountability, B has no more than 'the capacity to require information, 
answers and reasons that can then be analysed and debated in Parliament and 
the press' . In other words, where the one is directive, prospective, and may 
require little more by way of an ex post facto accoWlt of A's conduct than 
presentation of satisfactory evidence that B' s wishes have been complied with; 
the other is permissive and almost exclusively dependent on A explaining and 
justifying what she has done after she has done it. 
Robert Reiner (1993a: 19; 1995: 92) has recently argued for a significant 
revision of Marshall's typology by the addition of a third, calculative and 
contractual, mode of accoWltability implicit in the then Conservative 
government's proposals for amendments to the 1964 Police ACt.32 Pointing in 
particular to the imposition of fixed term contracts and the use of performance 
assessment against objectives framed by central government, Reiner suggests 
that contractual obligations and crude calculations of achievement will replace 
explanation and co-operation as the basis for chief constables' relations with 
the Home Secretary. 
Morgan and Maggs's typology 
The second typology of modes of police accountability, offered by Morgan and 
Maggs (1985a), is very similar to the first, but adds a fourth mode to the three 
outlined above. Two of their three modes - termed steward and directive -
correspond with Marshall's explanatory and co-operative and subordinate and 
obedient styles of accountability. Thus, writing of the steward/explanatory and 
co-operative mode, they note that it seeks to emphasise the "account' rendered 
by one who exercises delegated responsibility' (Morgan and Maggs, 1985: 7). 
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Frequently adopted in accounting for expenditure, this mode involves what 
they call an 'audit approach' to a variety of other responsibilities and powers 
based on the duty of the steward (A) to provide a retrospective account, 
usually in writing, of how she has acted. Evidence of this approach to police 
accountability is provided by the duty of chief constables to produce an annual 
report about policing in their area (Morgan and Maggs, 1985: 8).33 They go on 
to remark that, were the directive/subordinate and obedient mode to apply to 
the external political control of policing, it would involve the 'control of 
police policy resting frrmly in the hands of democratically elected authorities' 
such as Parliament or local councils. On this model, it would be for elected 
representatives, acting consistently with a duty to uphold the law, to determine 
'general policing policy' with chief constables playing no more than an 
advisory role.34 Retrospective accounting would then be a relatively 
straightforward matter of the police reporting to their political superiors on 
how that policy had been implemented. 
Where Morgan and Maggs move beyond Marshall's typology is in adding 
what they call a partner mode to the steward and directive approaches. Like 
steward mode, partnership allows the police considerable discretion in policy-
making 'but stresses the importance of their being formally provided with 
information about the views of citizens' (Morgan and Maggs, 1985: 8). Here 
accountability is not just about the police accounting to political institutions 
(be they local or national) for powers and responsibilities delegated to them by 
the state acting on behalf of 'the people' as a whole: it is also about ensuring 
that police priorities are congruent with those of particular groups of people or 
'communities' upon whom the police are dependent for information and co-
operation in preventing and detecting crime. 
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Directive and steward 
Combining the typologies offered by Marshall (as developed by Reiner) and 
Morgan and Maggs leaves us with four modes of accoWltability. Adopting the 
latter's more concise terminology, and abbreviating Reiner's title for his 
emergent calculative and contractual approach, they can be characterised as the 
directive, steward, partner and contract modes. But what do they tell us about 
the range of possible types of accoWlt that the police may have to provide, and 
the nature of the relationship between the police (A) and the party to whom 
that accoWlt is to be given (Bn)? The fIrst two modes provide the sharpest 
contrast. AccoWltability in directive mode within a given accoWltability 
relation would involve the police in implementing decisions made by another 
party (Bn) to whom they are clearly subordinate.35 Any ex post facto 
explanation or justifIcation of their actions would then have to be couched in 
terms of those prospective non-police decisions. In steward mode, decision-
making would be left in the hands of the police and would itself become the 
subject of retrospective explanation and justifIcation when an accoWlt is 
rendered. Nor, in this mode, could it be said that the relationship between Bn 
and the police decision-maker involves the latter's subordination to the former. 
Looked at in this way, the directive and steward modes imply that distinctive 
kinds of accoWlt should be given, and suggest quite different relationships 
between the parties concerned. 
However the status of the other styles as distinctive modes of accoWltability is 
much less certain. It was suggested earlier that if Robert Reiner's reading of 
developments since 1993 is correct, the contract mode represents an attempt 
by central government to subvert constabulary independence by placing chief 
officers under the - albeit very general - direction of the Home Office. By 
prescribing objectives for every police force in England and Wales, the Home 
Secretary is making key decisions that would hitherto have been taken at the 
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level of the individual police force by its chief officer. 36 ill effect, orders are 
being issued with which chief constables must comply, and the accompanying 
panoply of short term contracts, performance related pay, and objective-linked 
targets are best seen not as the features of a new mode of accountability, but 
merely as the machinery needed to make chief officers accountable in the 
context of a subtly disguised directive mode of accountability. 
Morgan and Maggs's partner mode can be subjected to similar criticism. 
There too it appears that a new mode has been identified when, on closer 
inspection, the kind of account to be provided by the police, and the nature of 
their relationship with its recipient, is identical to that required in one of the 
other modes. When steps are taken to ensure that they are given information 
about citizens' views on policing priorities, no decision-making powers are 
redistributed from the police to any party with which an accountability relation 
already exists such as a police authority or the Home Secretary. Nor does the 
relative status of the police in any existing accountability relation they may 
have with the public change in any way. On reflection then the partner mode 
is no more than a refinement of the machinery employed to operate the 
steward mode. But this is not to say that the establishment of 'partnerships' 
between citizens and police may not create new accountability relations.37 
Whether they do create new relationships, and how the content, direction, 
mode and mechanism of those relations may be analysed, is considered in 
subsequent chapters. 
Summary 
To sum up then we can distinguish two modes of accountability. 38 In directive 
mode, the police (A) are under a duty to report on decisions they make and 
actions they take using delegated powers to carry out the orders of another 
party (Bn) issued in advance, and with which they are obliged to comply. The 
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adequacy of their report - and of any explanation or justification of their 
conduct that accompanies it - is judged in the context of the directions they 
have been given. The relationship between the police and this other party is 
clearly hierarchical, the relationship of a subordinate to a superior. In steward 
mode, no orders are issued in advance and - although the police (A) remain 
under a duty to report, explain and justify decisions made and actions taken 
using their delegated powers - criteria for assessing the adequacy of their 
account are.developed and agreed between them and Bn in the context ofa 
non-hierarchical relationship between parties of roughly equal status. 
Mechanism 
The final aspect of accountability I want to consider is the mechanism by 
which the police are made to account for their actions and decisions. Taken 
together, discussions of mode and mechanism have dominated the literature 
and I do not propose to attempt an exhaustive review here. A more detailed 
critical appraisal of mechanisms in London is contained in the chapters that 
follow. For the present, my intention is to do no more than sketch in the most 
prominent features of the network of individuals and institutions to which the 
police have to provide reports, explanations and justifications of their conduct. 
The literature on police accountability is replete with analyses of the 
mechanics of police accountability under a variety of headings. But here I will 
consider four interlocking and overlapping mechanisms - legal, political, 
public and professional-managerial - through which the police may be held to 
account for their actions.39 
Legal mechanisms 
The first and, to traditionalists, the only authentic mechanism for police 
accountability is the law. This is certainly not the place to discuss the many 
and various routes by which the criminal and civil courts may review police 
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actions and decision-making.4o What does need to be noted here is that the 
attention of both the courts and commentators has tended to focus on the way 
in which individual police officers have used or abused particular coercive 
powers of search, arrest, detention and questioning (Reiner and Leigh, 1994; 
Dixon, 1997; Smith, 1998).41 Only rarely have the judges been asked to 
consider the 'structural, institutional patterns of behaviour' (Stenning, 1995: 8) 
I am concerned with here. On the few occasions that they have been called 
upon to examine decisions taken by senior officers about operational priorities, 
the deployment of police resources and the enforcement or non-enforcement of 
specific provisions of the criminal law, the judges have fought shy of 
interfering in decisions they regard as falling within the discretion of the 
police. 
Over 30 years ago, Lord Denning MR pronounced chief police officers to be 
'answerable to law and to the law alone' in the landmark case of R v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn.42 Since then, 
however, neither he nor his fellow judges have shown any inclination to 
question chief officers' judgement short of an egregious abdication of their 
responsibility to enforce the law - something with which, as Robert Reiner 
(1995: 83) has noted, the judges never seem to be confronted.43 The result of 
this reluctance on the part of the courts to review high-level decisions about 
police priorities, and the deployment of resources to meet them over a police 
force area, is that the impact of legal mechanisms of accountability has, in 
practice, been restricted to decisions taken by individual police officers about 
the use of coercive force in particular situations. The accountability relations 
that do exist between the police on the one hand, and the criminal and civil 
courts (and quasi-judicial disciplinary tribunals) on the other, have thus tended 
to concern only relatively junior officers giving retrospective and explanatory 
accounts of their actions in individual cases. 
51 
Political mechanisms 
Mechanisms for the political accountability of the police consist of three quite 
different systems covering the 41 police forces outside London, the City of 
London Police, and the Metropolitan Police Service.44 The unique 
arrangements pertaining to the City need not be dwelt on here. Nor, since they 
form the subject matter of the next chapter, will I say anything for the moment 
about the governance of the MPS. The framework of the so called 'tri-partite' 
regime for the control of provincial police forces was established in its present 
form by the Police Act 1964, amended by the Police and Magistrates' Courts 
Act 1994, and is now contained in the Police Act 1996. 
Broadly speaking, the division of responsibility between the three parties is 
that local police authorities are obliged to 'secure the maintenance of an 
efficient and effective police force' for their areas while chief constables are 
charged with the 'direction and control' of those forces.45 The third 'leg' of 
the structure is the Home Secretary who has an impressive battery of powers to 
exercise 'in such manner and to such extent as appears to him to be best 
calculated to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the police' 
nationally.46 Both the merits of the system as a whole, and the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of its three constituent elements have been the 
subject of extensive debate both before, during and after the introduction of 
the 1994 reforms.47 To attempt to summarise, let alone resolve, the 
controversies that have surrounded the operation of the tri-partite system since 
1964 would occupy far more space than is available here. Suffice to say that 
the changes in the tri-partite system made in 1994 following the government's 
White Paper on Police Reform (Home Office, 1993) seem to have done little 
either to embolden local police authorities in their dealings with chief 
constables or to curb the growing influence of central government in local 
policing (Jones and Newburn, 1997b). Whether, in the longer term, the 
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reconstituted police authorities will use their planning and objective-setting 
powers under ss. 7 and 8 of the 1996 Act to assert themselves more forcefully 
remains to be seen.48 In the meantime, however, it seems that the power of 
chief constables to determine local police priorities with a minimum of 
interference from their new, more 'business-like', police authorities has been 
reinforced leaving what political control there is over policing outside London 
concentrated in the hands of central government (Jones and Newburn, 1997b). 
Thus, as Rod Morgan (1990: 87) commented almost a decade ago, it remains 
arguable (to put it no higher) that 'whereas de jure we have local police forces 
politically accountable locally, de facto we have a national police force locally 
administered' . 
Public mechanisms 
The third mechanism of accountability involves the police in reporting on, 
explaining and justifying their actions and decisions directly to members of the 
general public (Oliver, 1991: 25-6). Legal accountability links the police to 
the people indirectly through an elected legislature responsible for making the 
law to which the police may be held to account in the courts. Political 
accountability seeks to achieve a similarly indirect contact through elected 
local politicians and a government minister accountable to Parliament. In 
these instances, it is the legislators and councillors who are directly 
accountable to the public through the electoral process. 
Mechanisms of public accountability work in a very different way by cutting 
out these intermediate accountability relations and establishing contact 
between police and people directly at a local level. But those members of the 
public who do become engaged in public accountability mechanisms are not 
'the people' as a whole from whom the police ultimately derive their power to 
use legitimate force. And, though they may be part of the answer to problems 
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of police accountability and popular consent, local mechanisms of public 
accountability cannot be a solution in themselves. I want to postpone a 
detailed examination of what Rod Morgan (1987) has called 'the local 
infrastructure' of public police accountability until Chapter 7. Consequently, 
all I want to do here is to note that well established elements in this 
infrastructure include neighbourhood watch schemes (Bennett, 1990; 
McConville and Shepherd, 1992); panels of lay visitors to police stations 
(Kemp and Morgan, 1989); crime prevention panels (Jones et aI, 1994) and 
community and police consultative groups established under s.l 06 Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984.49 
In addition to these permanent bodies, a vast array of 'multi-agency' working 
groups and 'partnerships' covering matters such as racial attacks, domestic 
violence, juvenile justice and child abuse may bring the police into contact 
with members of the public (and professionals from other central and local 
government agencies) on a more ad hoc basis (Pearson et aI, 1989; Saulsbury 
and Bowling, 1991; Thorpe, 1994; Fielding and Conroy, 1994 and see 
generally Jones et aI, 1994, and Crawford, 1997). A case may also be made 
for regarding public attitude surveys, the media (Ericson, 1995) and the work 
of campaigning organisations (Hackney Community Defence Association, 
1992) as other still less formal, and often Wlwelcome (at least from the police 
point of view), mechanisms of public accoWltability. Indeed the exponents of 
'second generation' victimisation surveys claim that their assessments of 
public opinion can be seen as 'extending the democratic process and 
information available for public evaluation of the performance and behaviours 
of state agencies' (painter et ai, 1989: 4). Jefferson et al (1991: 7-8) have 
challenged this, arguing that, far from being 'democratic instruments' as left 
realists maintain, surveys of 'consumer satisfaction' with policing only serve 
to marginalise 'those who are to all intents and purposes disenfranchised from 
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a system in which they have no power to count as consumers'. In any case, 
however useful survey data and media reporting may be in informing public 
opinion about the police, I prefer to see them not as accountability mechanisms 
in their own right but as important sources of data for use by those involved in 
holding the police politically and publicly to account in more fonnal 
institutional settings. As for monitoring groups and other independent 'police 
watchers' (Jefferson, et al: 1988), I will return to their role briefly in Chapter 
4. 
Professional-managerial mechanisms 
The fourth set of institutions and procedures for holding the police accountable 
can be dealt with equally quickly. Embracing the duty to account to 'non-
political bodies ... concerned for the most part with matters such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, value for money and fairness to consumers' , Dawn Oliver 
(1991: 27) calls this final mechanism administrative accountability. Here, in 
the context of the police, it will be tenned professional-managerial 
accountability (or simply managerial accountability) since I want to use it to 
encompass not only the institutional machinery by which police forces account 
to external bodies charged with monitoring their perfonnance, but also to the 
way in which accountability works within individual forces. 
As Molly Weatheritt (1993: 25) has observed, interest in measuring police 
perfonnance has come about largely as a result of the concern of successive 
Conservative governments with what she describes as the 'value for money 
disciplines' of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, excellence and enterprise. 50 
Since this concern first manifested itself in the context of the police with the 
publication of a Home Officer Circular (114/93) on Manpower, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the police service, three bodies have become pre-eminent in 
attempts to measure the performance of the police against sets of clearly 
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enWlciated indicators relating to key areas of police work. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has a duty Wlder s. 54(2) 
Police Act 1996 to inspect, and report to the Home Secretary, on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of police forces. 51 The role of the Inspectorate has been 
dramatically enhanced in recent years (Reiner, 1992a: 242-3), and forces are 
now expected to submit data on a 'matrix of indicators' covering some 700 
topics. Apart from annual inspections of individual forces, HMIC also carries 
out what are known as thematic inspections on particular topics over a number 
of different forces. Whereas HMIC's authority stems primarily from the status 
of inspectors as experienced former (and, increasingly, future) chief officers, 
the second member of the triumvirate, the Audit Commission relies on the 
breadth of its expertise in promoting the '5 Es' throughout local government 
and the National Health Service. 52 Set up Wlder the Local Government and 
Finance Act 1982, the Commission has published a series of studies on the 
police since 1988. The main thrust of its work has been to introduce the 
management techniques of the successful private sector enterprise to the police 
service and it is now Wlder a statutory duty to draw up, and report annually on, 
indicators of performance for the police covering five key areas of operational 
police work: handling calls from the public, crime management (crime 
reduction, investigation and victim support), traffic management, public 
reassurance and order maintenance, and community policing. 
F oWlded in 1948 primarily as a staff association for chief police officers, the 
last of the three key 'professional-managerial' bodies, the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO), has become a key intermediary between the Home 
Office and the most senior ranks of the police. Indeed, so critical has its role 
in representing the 'professional interests' of the police service become that its 
representative (or 'trade union ') functions have recently been hived off to a 
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separate entity known by the acronym CPOSA (Chief Police Officers' Staff 
Association) (Barton, 1996: 9). That it was thought necessary to make such a 
clear distinction between the 'staff' and (largely Home Office fimded) 
'professional/policy-making' aspects of the old ACPO's fimction is a tribute to 
its success as a major player in the development of professional-managerial 
mechanisms of accountability and its status as 'a corporate and strategic 
policy-making body' (Savage and Charman, 1996a: 17). 
Together with the chain of accountability relations formed by the internal 
command structure of individual police forces, these professional-managerial 
auditors of police performance constitute a distinctive mechanism for 
obtaining accounts of how resources have been used in working towards stated 
objectives. But the accounts they obtain from the police also represent a very 
important part of the total stock of information available to the major 
institutions involved in the political accountability mechanism. Data on 
economy and efficiency from HMIC, the Audit Commission and ACPO, based 
on their various sets of indicators, appear to be intended for consumption not 
just by central government as the main source of fimds for local policing, but 
also for police authorities acting in their role as the 'champion of the 
consumers' of policing services (Flannery, 1992, quoted in Weatheritt, 1993: 
35). 
Accountability: some key issues 
Having considered four quite specific aspects of police accountability, it only 
remains to return to the working definition with which we started and 
highlight some of the more general problems of accountability which emerge 
both from the present discussion and from the work of Vagg (1994) and Day 
and Klein (1987) referred to earlier. 
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Information 
That working definition talked of what I have termed accountability relations 
arising out of a duty on the part of one (A) who exercises delegated powers to 
report on, explain, and/or justify her actions and decisions to another (B) by 
whom those powers are delegated. It is obvious from this - and the outline of 
the mechanisms of police accountability - that such a relationship cannot be 
sustained unless information about the use of those powers by A is 
communicated to B, ifnot by A herself then by some intermediary. The 
information provided may simply describe the actions A has taken, or attempt 
in some way to explain or justify them. But this is not all, because the 
information communicated must also be evaluated by B in order for her to 
judge whether A's use of her delegated powers has been satisfactory. 
Moreover, the existence of an accountability relation implies, as Day and 
Klein suggest, agreement between A and B about the criteria against which B 
is to judge A's performance. There are therefore at least three sources of 
disagreement between A and B which may arise in this process of 
communication and evaluation. The first possibility is that B may not have 
enough information to come to any sensible judgement about the acceptability 
of A's performance. The second is that, having been given enough data, and 
in spite of their agreement about the appropriate language of evaluation, B 
finds A's conduct to be unsatisfactory. And the third possibility is that A may 
contest the validity or applicability of the hitherto mutually agreeable 
evaluative criteria used by B in coming to conclusion about her (A's) 
performance. 
Whether such disagreements occur, and how, in whose favour, they are 
resolved, will depend on the distribution of information and power between 
the parties to the accountability relation (Vagg, 1994: 148; Day and Klein, 
1997: 237-9).53 This in turn is related to the visibility, to B and/or relevant 
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intermediaries, of the actions A takes in exercising her delegated powers. It 
need hardly be restated here that, as Joseph Goldstein (1960) observed almost 
40 years ago, police decision-making at the lowest levels of the bureaucratic 
hierarchy is both exceptionally wide and of peculiarly low visibility. Two 
further features of public policing reinforce this lack of transparency. First, as 
Day and Klein suggest - and notwithstanding recent trends towards 
civilianisation - public policing is delivered by a highly organised and unified 
occupational interest group well placed to control the flow of information 
about its activities. And, secondly - pace some of the bullish statements of 
stump politicians standing on a 'law and order' platform - it is extremely 
difficult confidently to relate inputs such as increased police numbers to 
desired outcomes such as a reduction in levels of reported crime or public 
feelings of security. Together these three factors - the invisibility of street-
level policing, its dominance by a single occupational group and the difficulty 
of relating inputs to outcomes - combine to give rank and file police officers a 
highly significant measure of control over what others know and are able to 
fmd out about their activities. 
Jon Vagg (1994: 148-52) adds another dimension to the transmission of 
information as the lifeblood of accountability. He draws attention to the 
importance of the way in which those involved in an accountability relation 
communicate with third parties. In essence he sees accountability as a 
communicative game that may be played in four ways depending upon 
whether there is an equal or unequal distribution of control over information, 
and whether or not there is collusion or co-operation between the parties in 
depicting their relationship to others (Vagg, 1994: 148). From this he argues 
that what he calls the 'pure rational bureaucratic model of accountability is 
played where there is an unequal balance of power and no collusion between 
participants. The mirror image of this abstract postulate is a co-operative form 
of 'symbolic accountability' where parties with equal control over information 
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collude with each other to present (to interested third parties) their essentially 
co-operative relationship as a suitably robust form of accountability (Vagg, 
1994: 148-9). 
In reality of course, as Vagg stresses, things tend to be less clear cut with 
players simultaneously engaged in games played by different sets of rules. But 
what is particularly valuable about his analogy is the potential disjuncture 
between the formal rules of the game being played by the parties to an 
accountability relation, how the game is actually played by them, and the way 
in which they choose to depict it and its outcome to third parties. Applying 
this analysis to the two ideal-type modes of police accountability discussed 
earlier, we can see that, though the formal status of the parties to an 
accountability relation may be based on equality (steward mode) or 
subordination (directive mode), this need not determine either how they 
behave in practice or choose to depict their conduct to others. So, particularly 
where accountability relations - for example between chief constable, police 
authority and Home Secretary under the tri-partite structure - are closely 
interwoven and inter-dependent, it should not be assumed that formal rules 
and differences of status will automatically translate themselves into the kind 
of daily interactions between the parties one might expect. Nor can it be taken 
for granted that the nature of a given accountability relation will necessarily be 
depicted with any accuracy to a third party with whom one of its participants is 
involved in a second accountability relation. 54 
Professionalism and complexity in the 'service-delivery' state 
Another - still more fundamental - issue raised directly by Day and Klein 
(1987), and at least implicitly by Jon Vagg (1994), relates to the direction of 
accountability for public services in the context of the modem welfare state. 
The difficulty here arises from two features of the contemporary service-
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delivery state: its complexity, and its dependence on 'professionals' who may 
claim that their authority derives not from powers delegated to them by the 
people but from their special knowledge, skills and expertise. 55 By claiming 
'professional' status, an occupational group may go on to assert the right of its 
members to account for their 'professional' conduct to their peers free from 
interference either by the public at large or lay people elsewhere in the state 
bureaucracy. To allow another source of authority to establish itself alongside, 
and almost inevitably in competition with, 'the people' would necessitate a 
major revision of the argument about the general direction of police 
accountability. Fortunately, this is unnecessary for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, although police officers are not averse to describing themselves as 
'professionals', there is little evidence to suggest that such claims are given 
much credence by the public in comparison to those of, say, doctors, dentists, 
solicitors, barristers, and accountants. Nor, as Day and Klein (1987: 113) 
observe, is the claim to 'professional' status as an expert member of a 
disciplined hierarchy (and thus to a concomitant degree of autonomy from 
accountability other than to a professional peer group) consistent with an 
assertion of constabulary independence based on the notion of the constable as 
a humble 'citizen in uniform'. Thirdly, it may also be contended that even if 
some special skill, knowledge or expertise in the use of force is allowed for, 
the fact remains that the power to use force of any kind is delegated by 'the 
people'. To say otherwise is to confuse a source of expertise on how force 
should be applied (the 'professional' peer group) with the ultimate source of 
the power to use coercion in the first place. Occupational peers may make a 
valuable contribution to holding police officers to account for how force has 
been employed, but deeper questions about whether it should have been used 
at all are not susceptible to purely technical judgements. They are 
quintessentially political question to be answered either by 'the people' 
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themselves or by those they have empowered to decide such matters on their 
behalf. 
The other main source of difficulty presented by the nature of the modem 
welfare state is its complexity and the number of overlapping and conflicting 
lines of accountability that run through it. The proliferation of different 
mechanisms of police accountability -legal, political, public, and professional-
managerial- is an example of this complexity, and the point need not be 
laboured here. However, it is worth noting that some of the greatest problems 
of accountability in relation to the police, like other public services, are to be 
found where responsibility for service delivery is split between the central and 
local arms of the state. Curiously enough, it is also the case that recent 
attempts to bring services closer to the people who use them by decentralising 
their delivery to the lowest possible level has only served to exacerbate the 
confusion for the analyst of accountability by creating additional lines of sub-
local accountability (see Bums et aI, 1994 for discussion of the wider 
implications of the decentralisation of local government services). What is 
more, as Day and Klein (1987: 247) warn, multiple lines of accountability 
'upwards' to local and national government, and 'downwards' to service users, 
may engender a kind of organisational schizophrenia among state agencies 
called to account at many different levels, and judged against diverse sets of 
performance criteria. Not for the last time we are left with the question of how 
those exercising powers delegated to them by 'the people' can reconcile their 
duty to account for their use to 'the people' as a whole while responding to the 
conflicting demands of highly differentiated local publics. 
Sanctions and redress 
One final issue that arises from Day and Klein's work and needs to be 
addressed here is the question of sanctions and redress. What, in other words, 
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can B do when A fails to render an adequate account of her use of delegated 
powers? They suggest (Day and Klein, 1987: 229) that for A to be 
accountable for her actions and decisions in its strongest sense, it must be 
possible for B, in the event of A's failure satisfactorily to account for her 
conduct, simply to revoke A's mandate. The penalty for A's breach of her 
duty to account is thus the loss of her delegated powers. Such extreme 
measures may be taken with some regularity in some accountability relations, 
but are most unlikely to be enforced in others. For example, voters can and do 
dispense with the services of local councillors and members of parliament at 
elections, but police authorities and Home Secretaries cannot get rid of chief 
constables with anything like the same facility. Revocability of mandate is too 
blunt an instrument to be used on a regular basis in most accountability 
relations and, where relations overlap and intersect, it may not be for anyone 
body or individual (as party B to a particular accountability relation) to wield it 
without the agreement of others. S6 
In these circumstances, recourse must be had to less bloody means of redress. 
F or example, steps may be taken to restrict A's mandate by hedging her use of 
delegated powers about with restrictions, and more or less explicit threats or 
promises about the use of powers of patronage may be made as an inducement 
to future good behaviour. More frequently still, the prospect of bad publicity 
and public embarrassment may be sufficient to ensure that the duty to provide 
adequate and satisfactory account is discharged. In any case, the nature and 
effectiveness of the sanctions available to B may provide useful evidence of 
the state of the underlying accountability relation and the ease with which 
information is communicated between the parties to it. 
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Summary 
The distinguishing feature of the public or state police is their ability to 
exercise the state's monopoly on the use of force within its territory in an 
unrestricted range of social situations. A state of consensual policing - the 
nirvana to which sector policing aspired - necessarily implies consent to the 
use of force. Achieving this is inherently problematic. Consent may be given 
to an institution, a set of institutional practices, or the actions of individuals on 
very different grounds. It may also be expressed in a number of ways. 
However, what may be termed ideal normative agreement provides a useful 
benchmark against which observable manifestations of consent may be tested. 
Specifically, it is suggested that consent to policing at the level of institutional 
patterns of behaviour implies broad congruence between the values, priorities 
and actions of the police and those of the people they serve. 
The process by which this congruence is achieved, and consent negotiated, is 
the process of accountability. This in turn consists of one or more 
accountability relations each involving a party under a duty to account for the 
use of powers delegated by another. The power delegated to the police is the 
power to use force and, in a liberal democracy, the ultimate source of this 
power is 'the people'. The police and 'the people' from whom they draw their 
power to employ coercion stand at either end of the process of police 
accountability linked by a series of overlapping and interlocking chains of 
accountability relations. Particular relations within these chains - and the 
police/people relation itself - may be analysed in terms of four dimensions of 
accountability: its content (decisions about the distribution of the use of force); 
its general (to 'the people') and immediate direction; its mode (directive or 




1 See also Reiner (1997: 1003-8). 
2 Johnston (1993: 771-3) provides a concise discussion of these developments which 
include, for example: private security firms undertaking patrols for residents in 
Bristol, Liverpool and elsewhere; the wholesale transfer of a statutory police force 
(The Port of London Constabulary) into the private sector; evidence of policing 
activity by citizen street patrols and vigilantes; and the proliferation of 'hybrid' 
police forces like the Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary, the Ministry of 
Defence Police, the British Transport Police and several municipal police forces on 
the margins of conventional public policing. 
3 Brogden characterises the competing models of the state as managerialist, pluralist, 
instrumentalist and structuralist. See Marenin (1982) for a provocative analysis of 
the relationships between the police, the state and class structure that avoids the 
crude instrumentalism of many other critical theorists. 
4 See Held (1989: Chapter 1, and Keane (1988: Chapter 2) for concise introductions 
to theories of the state, democracy and civil society. 
5 The second distinctive feature of the Weberian state is its territoriality. As the 
modem state's principal franchisee on the use of violence outside its territory, the 
army retains a residual role in aid of the civil power, though the military's evident 
shortcomings as domestic peacekeepers were among the reasons why the so-called 
'new police' were established in the first place (Reiner, 1992a: 28-9). The last 30 
years have of course seen the 'normalisation' of this role in the context of 'the 
troubles' in Northern Ireland (Hillyard, 1987). 
6 Customs and Excise, the Immigration Service and local authority social services 
departments are obvious examples of state agencies that may use legitimate force in 
certain contexts but lack the general mandate of the police highlighted by Bittner. 
7 The ways in which police officers (both men and women) can secure compliance 
from the people they police without resorting to the use of coercive force is discussed 
by Klockars (1985: 44-7) who identifies three other 'bases for control': authority, 
power and persuasion. 
8 See Reiner (1992a, Chap. 2) for a general account of the 'rise and fall of police 
legitimacy' over the last 130 years, and Skogan (1994; 1996) for British Crime 
Survey evidence indicating that the sharp decline in public confidence in the police 
detected by sweeps in the 1980s may have been arrested if not reversed in the early 
1990s. 
9 For a sophisticated discussion of the 'relative autonomy' of the state and the police 
in this context see Marenin (1982). 
10 For the purposes of this discussion, Held argues that the political order must fall 
into one of the last two categories (involving some degree of normative agreement) 
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before it can be said to be truly 'legitimate'. However he acknowledges that the fifth 
type of instrumental consent or agreement is ambiguous and may be interpreted as a 
weak form of legitimacy. For further discussion of the relationship between consent 
and legitimacy, see Beetham (1991). 
11 This last factor is more speculative than the others, but aims firstly to put consent 
to policing in its wider social context, and secondly to capture some of the dynamic 
qualities implicit in Held's typology where beliefs about the past (C2), knowledge 
and experience of the present (C4), and feelings about the future (Cs) influence the 
quality of consent. 
12 Stenning (1995: 8) and Reiner (1995: 75) both make similar distinctions between 
what the former calls 'individual actions, decisions or incidents' and 'institutional 
patterns of behaviour and contexts'. 
13 See Jones et al (1986), Crawford et al (1990) and Skogan (1990; 1994) for 
research evidence to this effect drawn from local and national surveys. 
14 Quite how consent in this sense fits in with the rest of Morgan's analysis is 
unclear, but the similarities between his formulation and Held's specifications of 
'normative' consent (types C6 and C7) are striking. Compare also Bayley's (1983: 
440( 146» view that, 'An accountable police force shall be taken to be one whose 
actions, severally and collectively, are congruent with the values of the community in 
which it works and responsive to the discrepancies when they are pointed out'. 
15 Cf. Reiner (1995: 77): 'The basic idea of accountability invokes the responsibility 
of those who exercise delegated or conferred powers and duties to render a reckoning 
of how they have performed' . 
16 Again Reiner (1993a: 6, emphasis in original) poses very similar questions in a 
slightly different way: 'What type of decisions do the police make, explicitly and 
implicitly, in exercising their powers? To whom should they be accountable for the 
different sorts of decisions? What type of accountability should they have to the 
relevant bodies? What mechanisms should be established to deliver effectively the 
appropriate type of accountability to such bodies?' For his part Stenning (1995: 5) 
argues that ' [A ]ccountability is about no more nor less than requirements to give 
accounts. It entails a set of normative prescriptions about who should be required to 
give accounts, to whom, when, how and about what. 
17 The first two of these four dimensions of accountability have been sadly neglected 
in much of the literature yet they are in many ways the most important since they 
provide the framework within which the others are set. 
18 I am thinking here of the normative or, at worst, instrumental forms of consent 
distinguished by Held and referred to earlier as Cs, 6 and 7. 
19 These findings are consistent with other research stop and search including, for 
instance: Willis (1983), Southgate and Ekblom (1984); Smith and Gray (1985); Jones 
et al (1986) and Crawford et al (1990). For discussion of the 'racial' dimension of 
these statistics see Reiner (1993b), Jefferson (1993) and Smith (1997). 
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20 Young (1991) and Singh (1994) make very much the same point. 
21 Most of the contemporary debate has concentrated on relations between the police 
and black (African-Caribbean and African) people. But, as Jefferson (1993) has 
pointed out, the construction of marginal social groups (the children of the Irish 
casual labouring poor, prostitutes, and more generally, the rough working class 
adolescent male) as 'criminal Others', and the target for especially coercive policing, 
dates back at least to the foundation of the 'new' police in the early nineteenth 
century. For further discussion of structuralist approaches to the fraught relationship 
the police and black people see also: Jefferson (1988; 1991). 
22 'Police culture' is not monolithic, not least because 'management' and 'street' cops 
perform very different functions and sharply contrasting work experiences, but the 
typologies and distinctions referred to here are among the core characteristics of the 
culture of the rank and file responsible for using force on the streets (Reiner, 1991; 
1992a: Chapter 3). 
23 Cohen (1979) and Jefferson (1993) put the phenomenon in its historical 
perspective. 
24 Smith's (1994) provocative intervention in the 'race and crime' debate raises some 
interesting questions about what is meant by 'disproportionate' in this context. What 
is important here however is, irrespective of whether the levels of coercion faced by 
black people are in some way 'justifiable' given their alleged over-participation in 
offending, their large-scale (and demographically disproportionate) involvement in 
the criminal justice system cannot be denied. 
25 Although the police do not have anything as formal as a legal duty to account to 
most of these individuals and institutions, they have some obligation to do so as a 
matter of political and social morality. These issues - the nature of the relationship 
between the police and B - will be taken up shortly and continued in the discussion 
of the various modes of accountability that follows in the next section. 
26 Curiously enough Vagg (1994: 1) adopts a position of studied agnosticism on this 
question. While he acknowledges that, on the face of it, the powers wielded by 
prison authorities in a democratic state must ultimately derive from the electorate, he 
goes on to suggest that other power bases such as professional expertise also exist. 
Precisely how any conflict between these multiple sources of authority can be 
resolved in a way that is consistent with liberal democratic theory is not altogether 
clear from his work. One way of resolving the conflict between accountability to 
one's professional peers and accountability to 'the people' in the context of a 
modern, and highly complex, service delivery state is suggested towards the end of 
this chapter. 
27 See Macpherson (1977: Chap. 1) for a brief history of the subject and a lucid 
discussion of what does, and does not, count as liberal democracy. 
28 See Holden (1993) for further discussion and elucidation. 
29 Unfortunately it may not be a wholly satisfactory solution in an era of increasing 
regional and global interconnectedness but it will have to do for present purposes 
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(Held, 1995). 
30 Individual nation states may also impose further restrictions on the right to vote in 
keeping with idiosyncrasies in their political cultures. The exclusion of peers from 
participation in national (but not local) elections in the UK is one example of such a 
restriction. 
31 Using the notation adopted earlier, the specific accountability relations can be 
shown as existing between A and B1, B2, B3, B4, Bn and, further up the chain, between 
say, B3 and B4, B4 and Bs and so on. Taken together, all these relations make up the 
accountability process linking A (the police) with Bx 'the people' . 
32 Some but by no means all of the government's proposals (Home Office, 1993; 
Sheehy 1993) were enacted in the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 and are 
now consolidated in the Police Act 1996. Since both the government's proposals and 
the 1994 Act were primarily concerned with the 41 provincial police forces outside 
London I will not go into the details of the changes here. 
33 This duty arises under s. 12 Police Act 1964 (now s. 9 Police Act 1996). 
34 The issues raised by this are taken up in the chapters that follow. 
35 I have deliberately avoided characterising these decisions as 'policy decisions' 
since controversy about the nature and status of policy-making, what counts as a 
'policy' , and whether 'policy' can be distinguished satisfactorily from 'operations' 
has long dogged the police accountability debate (Reiner, 1995: 76-7; and see, for 
examle, Jones et aI, 1994: 6-7; and Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987: 203-10 for 
contrasting definitions of police 'policy' and how it is made). The' decisions' 
referred to here might, depending on the accountability relation in question, concern 
anything from the acquisition of CS gas by a police force to its use on the street 
during a demonstration. 
36 The power to set objectives and performance targets for provincial police 
authorities is now contained in ss. 37 and 38 Police Act 1996. 
37 The contract 'mode' may also give rise to fresh accountability relations if, for 
example, new institutions are set up to monitor progress against police performance 
targets. But these too must be subjected to separate analysis as discrete 
accountability relations rather than mere adjuncts of existing relations. 
38 Day and Klein (1987: 34-7) draw a similar distinction between a strong version of 
'accountability', and a weaker version of what they call 'answerability'. 
39 This approach to disentangling the various mechanisms draws on Oliver's (1991) 
analysis of government in contemporary Britain. 
40 See Clayton and Tomlinson (1992) and Harrison and Cragg (1995) for detailed 
treatments of the law and procedure relating to criminal and civil proceedings against 
the police. 
41 The main legal remedies for police misconduct include criminal prosecution, civil 
actions for negligence and the intentional torts of assault and battery, false 
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imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The use of police powers is also subject to 
review at coroners' inquests and in the course of crimina] proceedings when 
prosecution evidence gathered by the police may be challenged under ss. 76 and 78 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The police complaints and discipline 
system provides an additional, if only quasi-legal, route for holding individual 
officers to account for their behaviour. 
42 [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 at 136. 
43 The most recent decision on the point is that of the Court of Appeal in R v Chief 
Constable of Sussex ex parte International Traders' Ferry Ltd. [1997] 2 All E.R. 65. 
See Reiner, Dixon (1995), Dixon and Smith (1997; 1998) and the next chapter for a 
more extended discussion of the case law and its implications. 
44 The term 'political accountability' is used here to denote those mechanisms which, 
in Oliver's (1991: 23) words, expose the police to 'politically motivated control [or] 
to public censure through elected institutions' such as the House of Commons or 
local authorities'. 
45 The relevant statutory provisions are now contained in ss. 6( 1) and 1 O( 1) 1996Act. 
46 Section 36(1) Police Act 1996. 
47 See, for example, Marshall (1965; 1978), Brogden (1977; 1982), Waddington 
(1984a), Loveday (1985; 1995; 1996), Oliver (1987; 1997), Reiner (1993a; 1995), 
Jones et al (1994) and Jones and Newburn (1997). 
48 Among the more politically controversial reforms introduced by the 1994 Act was 
the introduction to local police authorities of a new category of 'independent' (critics 
feared that they would turn out to be fifth columnists beholden to central 
government) members appointed from a short-list prepared by the Home Secretary. 
Together with 3 magistrates, the presence of 5 'independents' has reduced the 
number of elected local councillors on the typical 17 -member police authority to a 
bare majority of 9. 
49 Now s. 96 Police Act 1996. The extensive literature on community and police 
consultative groups is reviewed in Chapter 7. 
50 Weatheritt notes that the last two are more recent additions to what were originally 
the 'three Es'. What follows relies heavily on her excellent summary of the work of 
the bodies involved in promoting these objectives. Further discussion of some of the 
issues raised by the growing salience of managerial mechanisms of accountability is 
to be found in Chapter 7. 
51 The Metropolitan Police are not formally subject to external inspection by HMIC 
but, since the late 1980s, the Inspectorate has conducted external inspections of some 
aspects of its work at the invitation of the Commissioner. 
52 Technically the MPS is treated as part of central rather than local government. It 
therefore falls under the purview of the National Audit Office rather than the Audit 
Commission but in practice its performance is assessed using the same set of 
indicators if for no other reason than that comparisons with other large metropolitan 
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forces would be impossible without comparable data. 
53 All other things being equal, party B to an accountability relation operating in 
directive mode will be in a stronger position than if a steward mode prevails. But see 
below for further discussion of the related issues of control and sanctioning. 
54 Using the notation adopted earlier, if A and Bl are the parties to an accountability 
relation and B2 is a third party to whom Bl is in turn accountable for A's use of 
delegated powers, it would not be surprising, on Vagg's analysis, if A and Bl were to 
collude in preparing the account of their relationship and its outcome to be presented 
byBl toB2. 
55 See Ericson and Haggerty (1997) for a thought provoking but to my mind 
somewhat overblown characterisation of the police as 'risk management' 
professionals. 
56 See the procedure for the removal of provincial chief constables laid down in ss. 




Defining and Defending Operational 
Independence: Police Accountability in 
London 1829-1991 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the four-dimensional analysis of 
accountability presented in its predecessor to the Wlusual arrangements for the 
governance of the Metropolitan Police and then in the chapters that follow, to 
some of the more significant proposals for reform advanced during the 1980s. 
Much of the controversy about police accountability that came to dominate 
debates on policing during that decade tended to be two, or at best three, 
dimensional. Competing views on the appropriate mode, mechanism and 
(immediate) direction of police accountability were widely canvassed. 
Comparatively little heed was paid to the content of the actions and decisions for 
which the police were to be held to account. The general direction of 
accountability - from police to people - also became obscured in the fog of the 
battle over 'constabulary independence', 'community consultation, and 
'democratic control'. In the discussion that follows in this and the next two 
chapters, I will try to uncover the assumptions about the content and direction of 
accountability implicit in - to over-simplify somewhat - the traditional or 
conservative and critical or reformist approaches to the governance of the 
Metropolitan Police around which battle was joined in the 1980s. 
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The first part of this chapter traces the current constitutional position of the 
Metropolitan Police back to its foundation in 1829 and provides a short 
chronological account of the changes that occurred in its governance over the 150 
years to 1979. Particularly close attention is paid to developments in the all-
important relationship between the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and 
the Home Secretary in his role as the police authority for London since, as 
Lustgarten has remarked (1976: 34), 'it is the central axis around which revolve 
questions of political authority and independence'. In tracing the history of this 
relationship and the role of the courts in developing the notion of constabulary 
independence I divide the century and a half that separates the foundation of the 
Metropolitan Police from Mrs Thatcher's fIrst election victory into two distinct 
periods: the frrst characterised by the uncertain subordination of the 
Commissioner to the Home Secretary, the second by the latter's growing 
independence. The analysis of the position at the end of the second of these two 
periods provides essential background to the contest in the 1980s between 
traditionalists seeking to defend the constitutional status quo of the Metropolitan 
Police and critics eager to reform it in the interests of making the force 
'democratically accountable'. 
The framework of governance: the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 
The framework for governance of the Metropolitan Police is provided for in the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1829 (hereafter 'the Act'), s. 1 of which allows for 'a 
new police office' to be established for the metropolis and the surrounding 
district. It goes on to permit the appointment of two justices to carry out the 
duties of the chief officer of the force 
... together with such other duties as shall be herein-after specified, or as 
shall be from time to time directed by one ofRis Majesty's principal 
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secretaries of state, for the more efficient administration of the police 
within the limits herein-after mentioned ... 1 
The interpretation of this provision is no simple matter. However, Plehwe (1974: 
324) takes the view that, rather than giving the Secretary of State any general 
power of direction over how the Commissioner carries out his duties, it allows for 
additional functions to be given to him beyond those set out elsewhere in the Act. 
Yet he is also correct to say that 'there is room for doubt as to [the Act's] 
meaning' for there is nothing in the language of s. 1 to prevent a Secretary of 
State taking a more prescriptive approach. 
Section 5 is the other key provision of the Act. It states: 
The said justices may from time to time, subject to the approbation of 
one of His Majesty's principal secretaries of state, frame such orders and 
regulations as they shall deem expedient, relative to the general 
government of the men to be appointed members of the police force 
under this Act; the places of their residence; the classification, rank, and 
particular service of the several members; their distribution and 
inspection; the description of arms accoutrements, and other necessaries 
to be furnished to them ... and all such other orders and regulations, 
relative to the said police force, as the said justices shall from time to 
time deem expedient for preventing neglect or abuse, and for rendering 
such force efficient in the discharge of all its duties; ... 2 
Once again the language of the statute is less than clear. What precisely does 
'general government' in the context of the distribution, 'particular service' and 
equipment of officers, and the promotion of the force's efficiency mean? Must all 
decisions on such matters be approved by the Secretary of State and, if not, when 
may his agreement be dispensed with? Unfortunately, as a former Receiver 
73 
(parker, 1980: 328), has observed, 'There is in fact no comprehensive statutory 
statement of the extent to which the Home Secretary's authority extends over the 
Metropolitan Police'. The relationship between minister and chief officer so 
crucial to the governance of the country's largest police force has, consequently, 
been left to evolve not so much through the enunciation of clear legal or 
constitutional principles but as a matter of administrative practice and political 
convemence. 
Home Office control: 1829 - 1917 
The origins of these practices can be traced back beyond 1829 to the relationship 
between the Home Office and the salaried magistrates and proto-police of the late 
18th and early 19th centuries. Critchley (1967: 42-8), for example, notes that Sir 
Richard Ford, Chief Magistrate at Bow Street in the opening years of the 19th 
century, divided his time equally between the Home Office and his magisterial 
bailiwick and was always willing to act on the Home Secretary's directions in 
making the constables under his command available as spies and informers 
against enemy aliens. A similar overlap of responsibilities is evident in the case 
of one William Day, Home Office official who acted both as the Keeper of the 
Criminal Registers and the operational commander of what Critchley (1967: 43) 
describes as Britain's 'first uniformed police force', the Bow Street Horse Patrols. 
Summarising the position 'on the eve of the creation of the Metropolitan Police', 
he goes on to argue that 'a substantial corps of professional full-time officers' , 
numbering some 450 men, already existed 'under the direct control of the Home 
Secretary' (Critchley, 1967: 48-9). The idea of a police force under the direction 
of a government minister with more general responsibilities in the area of public 
order and national security was not, therefore, a new one.3 Precedents for the day 
to day conduct of relations between the Home Office, justices, and the police 
existed long before the 1829 Act and may even go some way towards explaining 
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why the Act is so unclear as to the relative status and authority of the 
Commissioner( s) and his/their immediate political master. 
Testing the relationship between Commissioner and Home Secretary 
As it happened the first major test of the relationship between the Commissioners 
and the Home Secretary was not long in coming for, in May 1833, they were 
instructed by the Home Secretary, Melbourne, to prevent a public demonstration 
from taking place at Cold Bath Fields in Clerkenwell.4 When the organisers of 
the National Political Union attempted to go ahead with the meeting, what Ascoli 
(1979: 105) describes as a 'running fight' ensued between police and 
demonstrators during the course of which an officer was stabbed and killed. 
When a parliamentary select committee enquired into the affair, conflicting 
accounts of the division of responsibility between the Home Office and Scotland 
Yard emerged. But, if Ascoli is to be believed, Melbourne gave detailed tactical 
instructions to the Commissioners: officers were to remain concealed unless and 
until an attempt was made to address the meeting whereupon it was to be 
dispersed and leading participants arrested. Other incidents chronicled by Ascoli 
show that the close involvement of the Home Secretary in the handling of the 
Cold Bath Fields protest was far from exceptional in the early years of the 
Metropolitan Police's existence. Melbourne and his successors were regularly, 
and personally, occupied with the day to day policing of London and the conduct 
of its police force. So, for example, in the October of the following year, 1834, a 
new Home Secretary, Duncannon, instructed the commissioners to dismiss two 
relatively junior officers (Ascoli, 1979: 108-9). A woman arrested for 
drunkenness had made an allegation of rape against one of them, an inspector, 
while the other, his superintendent, was accused of failing to take the report 
seriously. A grand jury had already rejected the allegations made against the 
officers, and both were, like Rowan, former soldiers and veterans of the Peninsula 
War. Yet on 6 November, the Commissioner had to write to the Home Secretary 
informing that the two men had been dismissed. According to Ascoli, 
75 
Dunncannon's main motive in pressing the issue seems to have been his eagerness 
to please the Chief Magistrate at Bow Street, Sir Frederick Roe, who, he claims 
(but cf. Emsley, 1996: 28) was pursuing a 'bitter personal vendetta' against the 
police. In any event Plehwe (1974: 321-2) shows that the direct intervention of 
the Secretary of State in this case was far from exceptional. Successive 
incumbents were closely involved in disciplinary matters and, on occasions, even 
went so far as to take the fmal decision about the dismissal of errant officers. 
Then in 1848 Ascoli (1979: 122) records that the then Home Secretary, Sir 
George Grey, acted swiftly to meet the threat of a Chartist demonstration in 
Kensington by swearing in no fewer than 15,000 special constables and ensuring 
that large numbers of regular officers were deployed to prevent protesters 
crossing the Thames. Eight years later Mayne, by then the sole Commissioner, 
was called upon to explain the nature of his relationship with the Secretary of 
State when he gave evidence to an official inquiry into disturbances in Hyde Park 
in July 1855. Speaking of the way in which the Home Secretary's wishes were 
communicated to him in the context of what, 100 years later might have been 
regarded as a purely 'operational' matter Mayne said: 
The Secretary of State hears what I have to say, and then gives his 
opinion; I sometimes get my opinion qualified, or sometimes we differ, 
and finally what the Secretary of State thinks fit is done. (Report of Her 
Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Alleged 
Disturbances of the Public Peace in Hyde Park on Sunday July 1 1855, p. 
240, quoted by Plehwe, 1974: 328).5 
'Spies in the camp' 
Further evidence of the vulnerability of the 19th century commissioners to 
political interference is apparent in the uncertainties created by the force's internal 
structure. For instance, in March 1878 following the so-called 'Turf Fraud' 
76 
scandal, Howard Vincent was appointed the Metropolitan Police's fIrst Director 
of Criminal Investigations (Ascoli, 1979: 148). Though nominally subordinate to 
the Commissioner, Henderson, Vincent was given 'carte blanche' within his new 
department and enjoyed direct access to the Home Secretary. His appointment 
coincided with skirmishing between the Commissioner and the Home Secretary 
over the role of the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police whom Ascoli (1979: 152-
3) accuses of acting as 'a Home Office spy in the Commissioner's camp'. 
A decade later, attempts by Henderson's successor, Sir Charles Warren, to assert 
his authority over the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the CID, and to curb 
the role of the Receiver, contributed to Warren's eventual resignation (Ascoli, 
1979: 162; Plehwe, 1982: 47-8). The immediate cause of his departure was 
Home Secretary Mathews's insistence that Warren adhere to departmental rules 
on clearing work for publication after the Commissioner had written a highly 
critical account of relations between the Home Office and his force for a 
magazine. But this represented no more than the fmal breakdown in what had 
become an irretrievably fractious marriage.6 What is instructive about Warren's 
brief tenure· as Commissioner is the debate it provoked about the relationship 
between the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office. Ever since his 
appointment in 1886 he had hankered after the greater freedom from ministerial 
and bureaucratic interference he had enjoyed as a military commander overseas 
(Emsley, 1996: 67). And, in his letter of resignation, the departing Commissioner 
continued to argue his case asserting that his duties, and those of his force, were 
covered by legislation while the Secretary of State '[had] not the power under the 
statute of issuing orders for the police force' (quoted by Plehwe, 1974: 326).7 
This interpretation was firmly resisted by the Home Office where the then 
Permanent Secretary, Godfrey Lushington, expressed the opinion that: 
... for practical everyday purposes the test of a Department being 
attached to the Home Office is whether it is subordinate to the Secretary 
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of State. It is in this sense that the Commissioner denies that the 
Metropolitan Police is a department of the Home Office and it is in this 
sense that I maintain it is ... (Memorandum, 9 November 1888, quoted 
by Pellew, 1982: 49) 
Speeches made by Mathews and his predecessor, Sir William Harcourt, in the 
parliamentary debate precipitated by Warren's resignation provide the clearest 
insight into official perceptions of the relationship between the Commissioner and 
his police authority. Mathews maintained that he, as Home Secretary, was 
ultimately responsible for the actions of the Metropolitan Police, but conceded 
that the intentions of Parliament in passing the 1829 Act had been: 
... to put the Police Force under the authority of the Secretary of State, 
and to hold him fully responsible, not for every detail of the management 
of the Force, but in regard to the general policy of the police in the 
discharge of their duty. (ParI. Deb. Vol. 330, 3rd Series, col. 1174, 
quoted by Plehwe, 1974: 327) 
If Mathews' words might have borne the interpretation that 'detail' was beyond 
the scope of the Home Secretary's authority, Harcourt suggested that 'it [was] a 
matter entirely at the discretion of the Secretary how far the principle of 
responsible authority [should] interfere with Executive action' .8 A sensible Home 
Secretary would be well advised to leave the 'detail' of' executive action' 
(whatever that might entail) to the Commissioner, but this did not mean that he 
lacked the power to intervene if circumstances or inclination demanded (plehwe, 
1974: 327). 
A police authority for London 
The same year, 1888, also saw the first major controversy about the merits of 
establishing a locally elected police authority for the Metropolitan force 
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(Lustgarten, 1986: 36; Emsley, 1996: 84-6).9 The occasion for this was the 
parliamentary debates on a Local Government Bill and the proposed creation of a 
London County Council (LCC). Radical opinion demanded that the LCC take 
charge of policing the capital with James Stuart, a Member from the East End of 
London claiming - in language almost identical to that of the Greater London 
Council (1983) almost a century later - that 
... there was no place in England where control of the police was 
more removed from the people than London, and there was no 
place in England where there was more dissatisfaction generally in 
connection with the police. (Hansard, CCCXXVll, 15 June 1888, 
col. 293, quoted in Emsley, 1996: 85) 
Meanwhile, in terms no less familiar to students of more recent history, 
Conservatives opposed such a move partly on the grounds that the 'imperial' 
functions of the force - protecting Queen and Parliament and preventing Fenian 
terrorist outrages - were regarded as properly the concern of central rather than 
local government. But also because they feared that a London County Council 
under the control of a Radical or Socialist majority might use the police for 
political purposes and tum the force against a weak government (Ems ley, 1996: 
86). The one thing neither side of the argument sought to dispute was the degree 
of control exercised over the Metropolitan Police by the Home Secretary. Indeed, 
to a leading Conservative commentator of the day, the Radical's call for a transfer 
of authority was reducible to the very simple question of 'whether the absolute 
control of the Metropolitan Police shall pass from the Secretary of State to a 
Council chosen by the electors of the Metropolis' (quoted in Lustgarten 1986: 
36).10 
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Into the twentieth century 
F or the remainder of the 19th, and well into the early years of the 20th century 
Home Secretaries continued to issue instructions to Commissioners on a wide 
range of issues. Among the examples cited by Plehwe (1974: 329-30) are 
directions on the police attitude towards whist drives, the use of agents 
provocateurs in 'inciting' the commission of crime, and the policing of public 
meeting and demonstrations. When violence occurred at a suffragette meeting in 
1911 Churchill blamed the police for failing to comply with (his) instructions to 
the effect that arrests should be at such events as soon as any lawful occasion 
arose. Then, in 1913, he become personally involved in drafting a letter to the 
organisers of the Women's Social and Political Union after it had been decided to 
ban one of their meetings. Nor, as Plehwe notes, was it unusual for the Home 
Office to be consulted about the conduct of individual cases and the police were 
occasionally instructed either to initiate proceedings or to take no further action 
against particular suspects. 
Summarising his painstaking review of the historical record, Plehwe (1974: 332-
3) concludes that, 
... during the nineteenth century and for some years thereafter the 
authority of the Home Secretary over the Metropolitan Police was 
regarded as unlimited, subject of course to the normal principle that 
public officers cannot be ordered to act unlawfully. 
Lustgarten (1986: 36) and Marshall (1978: 55) share this assessment of the 
administrative practice prevailing over the first 80 or 90 years of the Metropolitan 
Police's existence. Only Oliver (1987: 172) dissents from the prevailing view 
contending somewhat forlornly that the Metropolitan Police Acts of 1829 and 
1839 cannot be read as subjecting Commissioners to the Home Secretary 'in their 
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operational capacity as being responsible for law enforcement'. Whatever the 
merits of this as a piece of statutory interpretation, the historical evidence 
presented here clearly demonstrates that, as a matter of administrative practice, 
successive Home Secretaries had no compunction about meddling in 'operational' 
matters and showed little inclination to limit their 'direction' of the force to 
'administrative' matters as he (1987: 169) claims. This line of argument also has 
the distinct disadvantage of raising the perennially thorny problem of 
distinguishing between 'operations' or 'executive action' on the one hand and 
'administration' or 'policy' on the other. The unreality of making such a 
distinction even in the early days of Metropolitan Police governance is illustrated 
by Ascoli (1979: 112) who notes that Samuel Phillipps, Under-Secretary at the 
Home Office at the time of the force's establishment, soon realised how 
'administrative control could circumscribe the operational freedom of the 
Commissioners' and set about turning it to his advantage against Richard Mayne 
to whom he appears to have taken an instant, and fully reciprocated, dislike. 
Dimensions of accountability 
Applying the analysis presented in the previous chapter to the period before the 
First World War, it is abundantly clear that the relationship between the 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the Home Secretary was one of 
accountability. Even if Lushington's argument that the Metropolitan Police was 
no more than a sub-department of the Home Office, and its Commissioner little 
better than a presumptuous civil servant of the middle rank, was somewhat 
extreme, it is evident from the highly interventionist role played by successive 
Home Secretaries that the Commissioner was accountable for the use of the 
powers delegated to him and his officers to the Secretary of State. It is also the 
case that the decisions and actions that the Commissioner could be called to 
account for were not limited to matters of 'administration' or 'policy'. 
Exceptional though they may have been in the wider context of relations between 
81 
the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office, instructions on 'executive action' 
and 'operations' were, on occasion, both issued and obeyed (Plehwe, 1974: 329). 
Content 
Decisions about the use of coercive powers were not just approved, but taken, by 
the Secretary of State. It was a politician not a policeman who first banned the ill-
fated meeting at Cold Bath Fields, and then laid down the tactics to be employed 
in enforcing its proscription. Nor was it thought improper for a Home Secretary 
to insist upon the dismissal of relatively junior officers, and issue instructions on 
everything from the policing of whist drives to the use of agents provocateurs. 
Guidance was also given on when powers of arrest should be used at political 
meetings, and orders issued about instituting proceedings in individual cases. 
Although, As Bittner (1974; 1975) warns, police work extends far beyond the 
bounds of criminal law enforcement such activities still represent a prime 
example of the police use of the state's monopoly on coercive force. And what 
history tells us is that, from 1829 until well into the present century, the 
Metropolitan Police were directly accountable for their use of coercive force in 
enforcing the criminal law (by means of arrest, prosecution, etc.) to an overtly 
political authority. This accountability covered both the general pattern of the 
distribution of force in terms of the disposition of officers between different 
locations and functions, and the conditions under which it was to be used in 
certain critical situations. In other words, the content of the accountability 
relation between Commissioner and Home Secretary clearly extended, and was 
accepted by both parties as extending, to what I have suggested is the core content 
of police accountability, the use of legitimate coercive force. Furthermore, during 
this period at least, any attempt to delineate hermetically sealed spheres of 
responsibility for the two parties on the basis of a distinction between 
administration or policy and executive action or operations flies in the face of 
well documented administrative practice. 
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Direction 
It will be recalled that two aspects of the direction of police accountability were 
identified in the previous chapter and it was argued that, in a liberal democratic 
polity, the general direction of accountability must run from the police to 'the 
people' or demos. So far the discussion in this chapter has centred on the 
immediate direction of accountability running from the Metropolitan Police 
through the Commissioner to the Home Secretary. But this will not do. In the 
last chapter, the principle of universal suffrage was picked out as a hallmark of 
liberal democracy. Yet the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 predates the Great 
Reform Act of 1832 and it was not until some time after the end of the period 
under consideration here that women won the right to vote. Before 1914, the 
franchise extended to fewer than 60% of men or considerably less than one third 
of the total adult population. To all extents and purposes then the 19th century 
demos consisted of a small, if gradually expanding, minority of the total adult 
population. Judged against the standards of the late 20th century, one of the most 
fundamental pre-conditions for liberal democratic policing simply did not exist. 
The general direction of police accountability flowed not towards 'the people' of 
the national state as a whole but to a propertied male elite. 
However, within the confines of such a profoundly flawed 'democracy', the 
provisions of the 1829 Act were 'designed to ensure the maximum accountability 
that the political system was capable of constructing at the time' (Lustgarten, 
1986: 94; Bundred, 1982: 65). Early 19th century local government in the 
growing metropolitan area surrounding the City of London consisted of a 
patchwork of local vestries and parish authorities. 11 In Westminster, the justices 
of the peace retained considerable administrative powers in addition to their 
judicial functions (Ruck and Rhodes, 1970: 15; and, generally, Skyrme, 1991).12 
Given the lack of any other serviceable model of public administration it is hardly 
surprising that Sir Robert Peel simply adapted and formalised the existing system 
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of police governance established by the Fieldings and other members of the 
metropolitan magistracy almost 100 years before. Thus, in placing the new police 
force under the command of two sworn justices he anchored it to one of the few 
fixed institutional points in contemporary local government. 13 
From the justices the chain of accountability relations led back through the Home 
Secretary to Parliament and thence to the enfranchised elite who passed muster as 
'the people'. Here too, Lustgarten (1986) argues Peel did the best he could, given 
the unpromising institutional circumstances of the time. By subordinating the 
new police force to a Secretary of State responsible to Parliament he put in place 
the most effective mechanism for calling the police to account at his disposal. 
But this is to run ahead of the argument for a few words still need to be said about 
the modes of accountability operating during these early years of the Metropolitan 
Police. 
Mode 
In the ordinary course of events there can be little doubt that the accountability 
relation between Commissioner and Home Secretary operated in what I have 
called steward mode. No senior government minister - even in a more leisurely 
political culture than today's - could possibly have given constant attention to the 
minutiae of running a police force. Nor, one suspects, would they have wished to. 
Although Ascoli (1979) makes much of the tensions which existed between 
successive Commissioners and Home Secretaries (or, more importantly, their 
officials), the routine work of submitting orders and regulations for Home Office 
approval, drawing attention to potential problems, and reporting back on 
significant incidents and operations, continued without undue disruption. 
However, it is equally obvious that, particularly at moments of heightened 
political tension, Home Secretaries did not hesitate to assert their authority and 
shift their relations with the Commissioner into a more directive mode. Specific 
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and detailed instructions - not infrequently about apparently quite minor matters -
would then be issued and complied with. 
Throughout this period, both parties accepted, albeit grudgingly in the case of a 
headstrong Commissioner like Sir Charles Warren, that the relationships between 
police force and ministry, Commissioner and Secretary of State, were 
hierarchical. Frequent assertions of Home Office superiority were neither 
necessary nor desirable. It was rarely in the interests of either side to force an 
issue to a point where directions had to be given, and the structural subordination 
of the police to political authority spelled out. There may be some truth in the 
suggestion that a directive mode was more regularly adopted in relation to 
'administration' or 'policy'. But it was by no means limited to these areas and, in 
any event, the likes of Samuel Phillipps soon became adept at pulling 
'administrative' strings to circumscribe 'operational' independence. 
Mechanism 
Of the four mechanisms of police accountability only two need detain us here. 
Case law on the legal accountability of the Commissioner in the years before the 
First World War is sparse and only one, somewhat arcane, point relating to the 
Commissioner's status as a justice of the peace seems to have attracted judicial 
attention prior to the Court of Appeal's decision in Blackburn. 14 What was at 
issue was whether the principle that justices could be held criminally liable for 
neglect of their duty to suppress riots established in the cases of R v Kennett and R 
v Pinney also extended to the Commissioner(s) of the new Metropolitan Police. 1S • 
As it turned out, the question was never resolved although in R v Cunninghame 
Graham, Charles J made no secret of his views on the subject: 
[A] most serious responsibility was upon Sir Charles Warren [the then 
Commissioner], because he is a magistrate, and a magistrate mainly and 
principally responsible for the peace and order of the metropolis. If he 
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does nothing, and riots follow and mischief is done, houses wrecked and 
property stolen ... [h]e is criminally liable to the law ... [T]here can be 
no question about it that a magistrate is responsible for order in the 
district over which he has control, and if he lazily, or negligently, or 
stupidly, does not take the necessary step to preserve order he can stand 
in a criminal court ... to answer for his neglect of duty. 16 
Commenting on this case, Plehwe (1974: 325-6) speculates on the possible 
outcome of a conflict between this legal duty to prevent a riot from occurring and 
directions from the Home Secretary to the effect that a certain amount of disorder 
should be tolerated in, say, policing a public protest. Since the practice of 
swearing Commissioners in as justices was abolished under the Administration of 
Justice Act 1973 the point is of historical interest only. For present purposes it 
need only be noted that, until the frrst Blackburn case, the courts had not been 
called upon to consider either the constitutional status of the Commissioner, or to 
adjudicate directly upon the failure of an incumbent adequately to discharge his 
duties under the law. 
The second, political, accountability mechanism has been the focus of the 
discussion thus far. Enough has been said already about the all-important 
relationship between the Commissioner and the Home Secretary. The effect of 
restricted franchise on the make-up of the nineteenth century demos has also been 
noted: but what of Parliament, the link between the supreme executive authority 
and 'the people'? Here too the differences between the mid 19th century and late 
20th centuries are marked. In her study of the relationship between government 
ministers and Parliament, Diana Woodhouse (1994: 4) identifies individual 
ministerial responsibility as 'the constitutional mechanism by which Parliament 
claims to fulfil its functions of controlling and scrutinising the executive'. Peel's 
structure for the governance of the Metropolitan Police depended on this very 
mechanism to complete the subordination of the new force to a suitable (in 
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contemporary terms) regime of external direction and control. And, as 
Woodhouse (1994: 14) demonstrates, talk of individual ministerial responsibility 
to Parliament was more than empty rhetoric in the mid 19th century. The 
executive had not become so bureaucratised and unwieldy, nor Parliament so 
dominated by a rigid party system enforced by energetic whipping, that a minister 
would not have been expected to maintain close control over every aspect of his 
department's work, and to resign if he lost the confidence of the legislature 
(Woodhouse, 1994; Lustgarten, 1986: 94). The multitude of debates, questions 
and parliamentary inquiries referred to by Plehwe (1974) only serves to confirm 
how regularly and inquisitively the thoughts of the 19th century parliamentarian 
turned to the policing of the metropolis and its direction by the Secretary of State. 
At a time when the majority of the adult popUlation was disenfranchised, any 
institutionalised structure for improving what I have called the public 
accountability of the police would have been unthinkable. For the police formally 
to 'consult' the 'communities' they were, amongst other things, charged with 
controlling would have seemed a most peculiar notion to the functionaries, and 
members, of the social elite responsible for their governance. Moreover, as even 
such redoubtably 'cop-sided' (to use Robert Reiner's memorable phrase) police 
historians as Critchley (1967) and Ascoli (1979) concede, the police were so 
heartily and widely distrusted that they would have found few self-respecting 
citizens prepared to give them the time of day.I7 But this has not prevented the 
more orthodox writers from claiming that the police rapidly developed an abiding 
empathy with the public, largely it appears as a consequence of the shrewdness 
with which the fust Commissioners set about the task of recruitment. Thus, 
having quoted Peel's biographer Gash to the effect that care was taken to select 
only those 'who had not the rank, habits or station of gentlemen'; Critchley (1967: 
52) asserts that: 
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From that start, the police was to be a homogeneous and democratic 
body, in tune with the people, understanding the people, belonging to the 
people, and drawing its strength from the people. 
Others draw a rather different conclusion fonn the early recruitment practices of 
the Metropolitan Police. Brodgen (1987: 11), for instance, detects the parallels 
between colonial policing and certain features of 'Metropolitan policing' 
identified by Miller (1977). Notable among these are the recruitment of 'alien' 
patrol officers (from outside London in the case of the Metropolitan Police) 
reflected in the imperial policy of 'policing strangers by strangers'. It would 
therefore be rash to accept unquestioningly that Rowan and Mayne's approach to 
recruitment was motivated by a desire to achieve a degree of congruence between 
the social backgrounds and values of police and policed. But this is not to say 
that notions of policing based on the local negotiation of order between police and 
public are solely a product of the late 20th century enlightenment. For, as Jennifer 
Davis (1981: 81) has argued in comparing the policing of the Broadwater Fann 
estate in the 1980s with that of Jenning's Buildings, a notorious mid 19th century 
slum inhabited by the Irish poor and other casual workers: 
'[C]ommunity policing' is more properly seen as the continuance of a 
long tradition of English policing, which has recognized certain urban 
areas peopled by the poor and immigrants as de facto no-go areas, has 
sought to contain these areas by collaboration with individuals and 
groups who dominate informal networks of power and influence within 
them, and which has accepted this as the necessary price to be paid for 
the heavy-handed and biased policing of such groups outside. 
Ever pragmatic, the Victorian police can thus be said to have appreciated the 
utility of maintaining some rudimentary, infonnal and unsystematic mechanisms 
of public accountability.Is 
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As for the final mechanism of professional-managerial accountability it need only 
be noted that, while a militaristic rank structure, an emphasis on 'drill and 
discipline' and the appointment of former non-commissioned officers from the 
armed services to serve in its higher ranks, may well have contributed to the 
legitimation of the new police force, such devices do not sit comfortably with 
modem conceptions of management in the public services based on professional 
competence, personal appraisal and the assessment of collective performance 
against stated objectives (Reiner, 1992: 62-3, 77). To talk of professional-
managerial accountability in the sense in which it was used in the previous 
chapter would thus be to perpetrate a serious anachronism. 
Summary 
Considered in terms of content, direction, mode and mechanism, the most striking 
feature of the accountability of the Metropolitan Police before the First W orId 
War was therefore the force's subordination to the political authority of the Home 
Secretary. In practice this authority extended not only to the 'general 
administration' of the police, but also to 'operational' matters including the use of 
coercive force against particular individuals or in specific situations such as a 
political meeting or demonstration. The general direction of police accountability 
was toward a tightly restricted demos almost exclusively via a senior government 
minister individually responsible to Parliament. The critical accountability 
relation between Commissioner and Home Secretary routinely operated in 
steward mode, but both parties accepted that a more directive approach could and 
would be employed where circumstances demanded. 
Growing independence: 1918 - 1979 
If we accept Plehwe' s (1974) broad division of the history of the relationship 
between the Metropolitan Police and the Home Secretary into two analytically 
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distinct periods, the 60 years from the end of the First World War to the dawn of 
the 1980s were marked by increasingly strident assertions of police independence 
from political authority. The object of the following discussion is to show how 
relations between the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office - reflected in the 
administrative practices and public statements of politicians, civil servants and 
police officers - changed over this period. But fIrst I want to look at how the 
courts (in the Blackburn case referred to in the previous chapter) came to 
recognise constabulary independence as the cornerstone of police governance not 
just in the provinces where the Police Act 1964 entrusted chief constables with 
the 'direction and control' of their forces, but also in London where the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1829, though frustratingly opaque in its wording, had 
long been assumed to have left the Commissioner( s) to share that responsibility 
with the Home Secretary (Lustgarten, 1986: 65). 
Case law 
The first of three 'pre-Blackburn' decisions I will examine here is the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Glamorgan Coal Co. v Glamorgan Standing Joint 
Committee. 19 Coming right at the end of the period characterised by general 
acceptance of Home Office authority over the whole range of Metropolitan Police 
functions, it has, as Lustgarten wryly observes, been sadly neglected in recent 
years. The main importance of the decision is the stress laid by the Court of 
Appeal on the need for a provincial chief constable to gain the approval (either 
express or implied) of his police authority before entering into agreements for the 
supply of extra police officers under the mutual aid provisions of the Police Act 
1890 s. 25. 
[T]he chief constable is treated throughout as clearly subordinate to the 
statutory authority. His authority to enter into agreements is treated ... 
as delegated not original. [ ... ] The clear thrust of the Court of Appeal's 
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approach is the emphasis on the paramount authority of the Standing 
Joint Committee, the politically representative body, and the limited and 
derivative powers of the Chief Constable. The notion that the latter 
possessed an independent authority to direct law enforcement activities, 
or enjoyed 'operational' autonomy from his police authority, seems not 
to have entered anyone's head. (Lustgarten: 1986: 55) 
Since it was conventional wisdom that the control exercised by the Home 
Secretary over the Metropolitan Police was more extensive than that of any 
provincial police authority over its force, it seems inevitable that - had the courts 
been required to adjudicate on the distribution of authority between the 
Commissioner and the Home Secretary in 1916 - they would have confirmed 
contemporary administrative practice and adopted a similar approach to that of 
the judges in Glamorgan Coal Co. v Glamorgan Standing Joint Committee.2o 
The foundations of Blackburn: Fisher and Perpetual Trustee 
Unfortunately perhaps, the Glamorgan case appears not to have been drawn to the 
attention of the Court of Appeal in Blackburn where the later cases of Fisher v 
Oldham Corporation and Attorney Generalfor New South Wales v Perpetual 
Trustee Co. Ltd. were cited by Lord Denning as authority for his resounding 
declaration of the doctrine of constabulary independence?l In the fITst of these, 
McCardie J had to decide whether the defendant Corporation, acting through its 
Watch Committee, was liable in tort for the wrongful detention of the plaintiff, 
Mr Fisher, by Oldham police. He decided that they were not. 
I hold that the defendants are not responsible for the arrest or detention 
of the plaintiff. The police, in effecting that arrest and detention, were 
not acting as the servants or agents of the defendants. They were 
fulfilling their duties as public servants and officers of the Crown ... If 
the local authorities are to be liable in such a case as this as for the acts 
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of the police with respect to felonies and misdemeanours, then it would 
indeed be a serious matter and it would entitle them to demand that they 
ought to secure a full measure of control over the arrest and prosecution 
of offenders. To give any such control would, in my view, involve a 
grave and most dangerous constitutional change?2 
The case turned on the question of whether the Corporation and the police officers 
could be said to be in a master-servant relationship so as to render the former 
liable in private law for the tortious acts of the latter. McCardie J. based his 
decision on the common law view of the office of constable which suggested that 
a police officer was 'a servant of the State, a ministerial officer of the central 
power, though subject, in some respects, to local supervision and regulation.23 
Moreover, the consequences of holding the Corporation liable were too 
frightening to contemplate for, along with liability for the torts of police officers 
would come the incentive for Watch Committees to interfere with their routine 
law enforcement work by, in McCardie J's lurid example, directing that arrested 
felons be released. Such a constitutional outrage, he believed, could not be 
allowed. Taken at face value, the decision in Fisher did no more than exempt the 
local authority from liability in the private law of tort for the wrongdoings of 
police officers. But, in the hands of history and Lord Denning, it was also to be 
the start of a process that would engrave the doctrine of constabulary 
independence on judicial tablets of stone by raising the spectre of local political 
interference in the police use of their coercive powers of arrest and detention in 
individual cases. 
The next step down the road to Blackburn was taken by the Privy Council some 
25 years after Fisher in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual 
Trustee Co. Ltd .. 24 Once again the availability ofa private law remedy was at 
issue, and once again it was held that there was 
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· .. a fundamental difference between the domestic relation of servant and 
master [upon which the availability of the remedy of per quod servitium 
amisit depended] and that of the holder of a public office and the State 
which he is said to serve. The constable falls within the latter category. 
His authority is original, not delegated, and is exercised at his own 
discretion by virtue of his office: he is a ministerial officer exercising 
rights independently of contract. 2S 
In giving the judgement of the Judicial Committee, Viscount Simonds also 
endorsed McCardie J's analysis of the relevant case law on the office of constable 
and remarked on the constitutional dangers of describing police officers as the 
servants of their watch committees.26 
'Enter Mr Blackburn ,27 
Thus far judicial ruminations on the constitutional status of the police and the 
'original' nature of their authority and powers had been confmed to private law 
matters and, in Fisher, the a~tions and decisions of junior operational officers in 
respect of an individual suspect. It was not until the Court of Appeal's decision in 
Blackburn that the loose threads of the private law decisions in Fisher and 
Perpetual Trustee Co. were finally woven into the resplendent cloth of a public 
law doctrine of constabulary independence.28 The facts of the case were that, 
following a policy decision in April 1966 by the Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis, his officers had made no attempt to enforce certain provisions of the 
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963. The applicant, Mr Blackburn, sought a 
public law remedy by way of an order of mandamus directing the Commissioner 
to reverse his decision. By the time the application reached the Court of Appeal 
the Commissioner had undertaken to revoke his decision and had resumed 
enforcement action under the 1963 Act. Consequently, the court made no order. 
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But this did not prevent the case from establishing itself as the principal legal 
authority for the independence of the police from political control. The classic 
statement of the doctrine of constabulary independence is contained in the 
following much-quoted passage from the judgement of Lord Denning :MR.: 
The office of the Commissioner of Police within the Metropolis dates 
back to 1829 when Sir Robert Peel introduced his disciplined force. The 
commissioner was a justice of the peace specially appointed to 
administer the police force in the metropolis. His constitutional status 
has never been defined either by statute or by the courts. It was 
considered by the Royal Commission on the Police in their Report in 
1962 (Cmnd 1728). But I have no hesitation in holding that, like every 
constable in the land, he should be, and is, independent of the executive. 
He is not subject to the orders of the Secretary of State, save that under 
the Police Act, 1964, the Secretary of State can call upon him to give a 
report or to retire in the interests of efficiency. I hold it to be the duty of 
the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every chief constable, to enforce 
the law of the land. He must take steps to post his men that crimes may 
be detected; and that honest citizens may go about their affairs in peace. 
He must decide whether or not suspected persons are to be prosecuted; 
and if need be, bring the prosecution or see that it is brought; but in all 
these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. No 
Minister of the Crown can tell him that he must, or must not, keep 
observation on this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute 
this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The 
responsibility for the law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to 
law and to the law alone. That appears sufficiently from Fisher v 
Oldham Corporation and Attomey-Generalfor New South Wales v 
Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. 29 
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Lustgarten's (1986: 64-6) unforgiving analysis of this paragraph reveals it to be a 
catalogue of misapprehensions and obfuscation. Three points merit consideration 
here. The first thing to note is that the most cursory examination of the historical 
record of relations between the Commissioner and the Home Secretary is 
sufficient to refute the contention that no minister or police authority has the 
power to instruct the Commissioner as to his responsibility for law enforcement. 
As we have seen, successive 19th and early 20th century Home Secretaries, acting 
as the police authority for the metropolis, did so without courting any Wldue 
constitutional controversy. 
Secondly, there is the enormity of the logical leap from Fisher and Perpetual 
Trustee which 'had nothing to do with chief officers of police, nor with the kind 
of policy decision taken by the Commissioner', to the very different 
circumstances of Blackburn (Lustgarten, 1986: 65). Based on what he calls the 
'fallacy of the seamless web', this leap was accomplished by treating the decision 
of a chief officer to instruct the officers under his command not to enforce a 
provision of the criminal law (or to assign them to certain geographical areas or 
policing functions) as indistinguishable from that of an ordinary constable to 
arrest (or not to arrest) a particular suspect. It assumes that political control over, 
or interference in, the first type of decision is as obviously undesirable (and 
impractical) as it would be in the second. Lustgarten (1986: 13-5) illustrates how 
important it is to distinguish the two types of decision by quoting observations 
made by Lawton LJ in R v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Ex parte 
Central Electricity Generating Board where it was said that the Board's 
application for an order of mandamus requiring the Chief Constable to instruct 
police officers under his command to remove protesters from the proposed site of 
a nuclear power station 'showed a misconception of the powers of chief 
constables' . 30 Chief officers, Lawton LJ went on, 'cannot give an officer under 
command an order to do acts [such as arrest protesters] which can only lawfully 
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be done if the officer himself with reasonable cause suspects that a breach of the 
peace has occurred or is immediately likely to occur or an arrestable offence has 
been committed.' If, as Lustgarten puts it, the 'factual condition precedent' for an 
arrest does not exist, no lawful arrest can be made either on the instructions of a 
chief officer or a police authority, or on the undirected initiative of a constable. 
And the relevant factual condition precedent in the case of a decision to make an 
arrest is the existence in the mind of a police office of 'reasonable cause', and not 
the opinion of a chief constable (or a police authority) far removed from the scene 
(and therefore incapable of forming a judgement as to the likelihood or otherwise 
of a breach of the peace or the commission of an offence) of the desirability of 
arrests being made. The true significance of the decision in Blackburn was 
therefore the Court's treatment of private law rulings to the effect that neither the 
Crown nor a local police authority was in a 'master-servant relationship' with 
individual police constables as authority for the much larger proposition that 
ministers and local representatives should have no power to influence the 
decisions of chief officers (including, explicitly, the Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis) on matters such as the deployment of personnel and the general 
attitude to be taken by the police towards certain types of offending. 
The third and final point to note about the decision in Blackburn is that the 
independence of chief officers from the 'political' control of ministers and police 
authorities leaves them, in Lord Denning's ringing phrase, 'answerable to the law 
and to the law alone' .31 In another key passage that also deserves to be quoted in 
full, His Lordship explained this in the following terms: 
Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law, there are 
many fields in which they have a discretion in which the law will not 
interfere. For instance, it is for the Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis, of the chief constable, as the case may be, to decide in any 
particular case whether inquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest 
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should be made, or a prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide 
on the disposition of his force and the concentration ofhi resources on 
any particular crime or area. No court can or should give him direction 
on such a matter. He can also make policy decisions and give effect to 
them, as for instance, was often done when prosecutions were not 
brought for attempted suicide. But there are some policy decisions with 
which, I think, the courts can, ifnecessary, interfere. Suppose a chief 
constable were to issue a directive to his men that no person should be 
prosecuted for stealing goods less than £100 in value. I should have 
thought that the court could countermand it. He would be failing in his 
duty to enforce the law. 32 
In Blackburn itself it seems that, but for the Commissioner's undertaking to 
recommence enforcement action against gaming clubs, Lord Denning would have 
been minded to intervene.33 Salmon LJ would also have favoured making an 
order against the Commissioner. 34 He too attempted to elucidate the 
circumstances in which a policy of non-prosecution (or non-enforcement) could, 
and could not, be reversed by the courts. An instruction to the effect that no steps 
should be taken to prosecute housebreakers would be a clear breach of a chief 
officer's duty to enforce the law. A householder in the force area would be able 
to obtain an order of mandamus for its withdrawal. On the other hand, a policy 
decision not to prosecute, other than in exceptional circumstances, teenage boys 
for having sex with girls under the age of consent would be 'an entirely different 
and perfectly proper exercise of discretion' with which the courts would not 
interfere.35 In spite of Salmon LJ's bold attempt to justify the inviolability of the 
latter decision as giving effect to the intention of the legislature in changed social 
conditions, both his and Lord Denning's attempts to distinguish between the 
proper and improper exercise of a chief officer's discretion are based on nice 
judgements of social utility and public morality of the kind neither judges nor the 
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police are in the best position to make in a parliamentary democracy (Lustgarten, 
1986: 66; Greater London Council, 1983: paras. 126-7). 
The case law since Blackburn 
Since Blackburn was decided in 1968 the courts have shown little appetite for the 
task of making chief officers legally answerable for the exercise of their 
discretion. In 1973 Mr Blackburn returned to the Court of Appeal seeking an 
order of mandamus requiring the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to take more 
vigorous action against pornography under the Obscene Publications Acts 1959 
and 1964.36 Though appreciative of his zeal as a moral entrepreneur, and highly 
critical of the inadequacies of the existing legislation, Lord Denning MR felt 
unable to assist Mr Blackburn. 37 
In [Blackburn No 1] we made it clear that, in the carrying out their duty 
of enforcing the law, the police have a discretion with which the courts 
will not interfere. There might, however, be extreme cases in which he 
[the Commissioner] was not carrying out his duty. And then we would. 
I do not think this is a case for our interference. 
Undeterred by this rebuff, Mr Blackburn tried again only to be told by Lord 
Justice Lawton that his application was 'misconceived' in asking the court to tell 
the Commissioner how to do his job. 38 An order of mandamus might be made if a 
chief officer made no attempt to enforce the law at all. But otherwise it was up to 
him how he was to perform his duties. The intention of the statutes governing the 
Metropolitan Police was to leave the Commissioner to do his job as he thought fit 
subject only to the power of the Home Secretary to remove him ifhe was not 
doing it efficiently. Similarly, in the case of R v Chief Constable of Devon and 
Cornwall Ex parte Central ElectriCity Generating Board referred to earlier, the 
Chief Constable's decision not to comply with a request by the Board to remove 
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protesters from the possible site of a nuclear power station was held to be 'a 
policy decision with which ... the courts should not interfere' .39 
This line of authority received further endorsement in 1986 in R v Oxford Ex 
parte Levey where Lord Denning's successor as Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Donaldson, confirmed the readiness of the courts to intervene where a chief 
constable was failing in his duty to keep peace and enforce the law.4o However, he 
also maintained that chief officers had 'the widest possible discretion in their 
choice of methods to discharge that duty'. In the case before the Court there was 
no evidence that Chief Constable Oxford had failed to discharge his duty and it 
was not for the courts to review his methods. The most recent decisions in this 
area of the law are those of the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal in R v 
Chief Constable of Suss ex Ex parte International Trader's Ferry Ltd .. 41 The case 
arose out of a decision by the Chief Constable to limit the attendance of police 
officers at demonstrations against the export of live animals from the port of 
Shoreham. The applicants (ITF), who were involved in making the shipments, 
sought to have the decision quashed on the groWlds that it was a breach of the 
Chief Constable's duty to keep the peace and enforce the law and that, in so far as 
he had a discretion in exercising that duty, his decision was unreasonable 
according to the well-known principles enWlciated by Lord Greene MR in 
Associated Provincial Picture House v Wednesbury Corporation.42 Neither Court 
was sympathetic to these arguments. The Divisional Court took the view that, 
though other chief officers might have given greater weight to the fact that the 
applicants might be put out of business by a decision to restrict the police 
presence at the port, there was no evidence that the Chief Constable had abrogated 
his duty to keep the peace and enforce the law. The decision was not one that no 
reasonable chief officer properly exercising his discretion in discharging these 
duties could have reached. The Court of Appeal added that the situation was not 
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comparable to that faced by the Court in Blackburn and it would be 'a travesty' to 
describe the Chief Constable's actions as a decision not to enforce the law.43 
Thus ITF, like Mr Blackburn, the CEGB and Mr Levey before them, were sent 
away empty-handed and thus the long term effect of the decision in the first 
Blackburn case was to bestow a judicial blessing on assertions of police 
independence from 'political' control without committing the courts themselves 
to holding chief officers, including the Commissioner, answerable for anything 
but the most egregious failure to discharge their public duty. 
Administrative practice 
Dating the change in tenor of the administrative practice and political rhetoric of 
the Home Office in its dealings with the Metropolitan Police from assertiveness to 
diffidence cannot be attempted with any confidence. But it seems roughly to have 
coincided with the decision in Fisher v Oldham Corporation. So in 1937, the 
then Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, told Parliament that he had no authority to 
give instructions to the police about the circumstances in which arrests should be 
made for misconduct in Hyde Park.44 Against this must be set the claim of his 
predecessor, Simon, that he had ordered plain clothes officers to attend fascist 
meetings.45 However, subsequent statement by ministers suggest that, as the 
century wore on, Hoare's view of the proprieties of the relationship between the 
Home Office and the police came to dominate.46 Hence, writing in 1954, a 
distinguished former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, 
argued that, 
The Home Secretary cannot give orders to the Commissioner or to other 
members of the [Metropolitan Police] force with regard to their duty of 
enforcing the law; but he has some measure of responsibility for the 
executive action of the Commissioner. (Newsam, 1954: 45) 
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Like many such formulations, this description of the extent of Home Office 
authority is bedevilled with definitional problems: what is meant by 'executive 
action' as distinct from law enforcement; and precisely what measure of 
responsibility does the secretary of State have for such action whatever it might 
be? Support for Geoffrey Marshall's (1965: 54-5) view that ministerial denials 
of authority over the police were more a matter of administrative convenience and 
good manners than legal incapacity can be gleaned from a statement made in the 
House of Commons by a Joint Under-Secretary of State in 1957. 
F or the Metropolitan Police, it is a matter for the discretion of the 
Secretary of State as to how far, in discharging the duties placed upon 
him by Parliament, he should himself, through the Home Office, 
interfere with the executive action which is the responsibility of the 
Commissioner. In practice, in respect of administration and the 
maintenance of discipline, it is the Secretary of State's sphere to 
prescribe and enforce general principles, and the Commissioner's sphere 
to apply them to individual cases, subject only to his general 
accountability to the Secretary of State as police authority. (J E S Simon, 
quoted in London Strategic Policy Unit, 1987: 41-2). 
Here the area of 'executive action', within which the Secretary of State enjoys 
extensive legal competence limited only by bureaucratic tact and practical 
convenience, seems to extend to internal matters of administration and discipline 
rather than law enforcement although, as has been suggested earlier, this 
distinction is scarcely tenable in practice. 
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Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Police 
Evidence submitted to the Royal Commission on the Police (1962) only confuses 
matters still further. In his written submission the then Commissioner, Sir Joseph 
Simpson, stated that: 
[T]he secretary of State does not in practice interfere with the executive 
functions of the Metropolitan Police who enjoy the same independence 
of action and accept the same responsibilities in law as do their 
provincial counterparts. (1962: 1152, Minutes of Evidence, para 5.) 
He went on to say that the Home Office frequently suggested alterations to the 
orders and regulations forwarded for approval to the Secretary of State by the 
Commissioner thus exercising 'a control over the administrative policy of the 
force' .47 However, for Sir Joseph, this control over administration did not extend 
to 'executive functions' such as 'the ordinary day to day work of the policeman, 
his arrests, his summonses, whether people are to be proceeded against, all that 
sort of work' .48 'Individual or specific decisions' on these matters were taken at 
the discretion of the Commissioner and, as he understood the position, the 
Secretary of State neither presumed, nor had the power, to intervene in how that 
discretion was exercised.49 
Called to give oral evidence, the Commissioner was pressed on the distinction 
between 'general orders' and 'instructions' .50 The former, he said, were 'always 
submitted to the Home Office for approval' under section 5 of the Metropolitan 
Police Act 1829. Trivial changes to general orders were sent in batches and 
approval was a 'formality'. Their subject matter could range from changes in the 
establishment of a division to procedural guidance on the implications of new 
legislation or an important court ruling. By way of contrast, an instruction - for 
example on the attitude to motorists, or policy on the enforcement of the Street 
Offences Act - would not be sent to the Home Office for approbation though it 
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might well be the subject of some infonnal discussion and consultation between, 
perhaps, an Assistant Commissioner and a Principal at the Home Office. A Home 
Secretary would not 'take the initiative' by telling the Commissioner to issue an 
order, but he might draw a suggestion or complaint to the Commissioner's 
attention so that consideration could be given to amending general orders or 
issuing an instruction as appropriate. The Home Office's evidence to the Royal 
Commission adds nothing to this beyond the claim (in a section headed 
'parliamentary responsibility') that, in spite of his status as police authority, the 
Home Secretary could not be questioned on 'the discharge by individual police 
officers of the duties of the law enforcement which they perfonn as officers of the 
Crown.51 
Peering through the terminological fog created by inconsistencies in the use of the 
word 'executive' and the opacity of the distinction between 'general orders' and 
'instructions', it is just about possible to make out the contours of accepted 
administrative practice in the relationship between the Commissioner and the 
Secretary of State around the time of the Royal Commission. Whilst neither of 
the parties seems to have shown any enthusiasm for exploring the constitutional 
niceties of their respective positions, some unspoken consensus does seem to have 
been reached. So, at the risk of making clear what was left deliberately obscure, 
the following propositions seem consistent with both the Joint Under-Secretary's 
statement to Parliament in 1957 and the evidence presented to the Royal 
Commission: 
1. The broad principles to be adhered to by the Commissioner in the 
administration, regulation and discipline of the force are laid down by the 
Home Secretary. Under section 5 of the 1829 Act, the Commissioner 
formally submits general orders relating to these matters (and to 
procedures to be adopted in response to changes in the law) to the Home 
Office for approval. Their implementation and application in individual 
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cases is a matter for the Commissioner subject to some form of ex post 
facto answerability to the Secretary of State qua police authority and 
thence to Parliament. 
2. Instructions on the general attitude to be taken by officers in enforcing 
the law are issued by the Commissioner. They are not submitted to the 
Home Office for formal approval under section 5, but may be the subject 
of informal consultation between senior police officers and civil servants. 
Again, the Commissioner is answerable for the implementation of such 
instructions to the Home Secretary, and he to Parliament. 
3. Law enforcement decisions (about arrests, summonses and the initiation 
of criminal proceedings) in individual cases are strictly matters for the 
Commissioner and his officers. 
Even this restatement of the position cannot disguise the fact that the three types 
of decision shade into, and impact upon, each other. Individual law enforcement 
decisions may be for the Commissioner and his officers alone, but must be set in 
the context of instructions and procedures either approved by or discussed with 
the Home Office. 
In any event, the Royal Commission's final report concentrated on reforming the 
governance of provincial forces and had little to say about the Metropolitan 
Police.52 It accepted that the 'exceptional police responsibilities in London' 
required a 'unitary system' of central government control (Royal Commission on 
the Police, 1962: 70, para. 223). There were thus 'overriding advantages' in the 
Home Secretary remaining as police authority.53 The extent of the Commission's 
analysis of the relationship between Commissioner and Home Secretary was the 
trite observation that it was 'not the same as that between a provincial police 
authority and its chief constable' supported by the tantalisingly ambiguous 
assertion that, 
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Through his function of approving the orders and regulations for the 
government of the Metropolitan Police, the Home Secretary exercise a 
direct control over the executive work and administrative policy of the 
force ... (Royal Commission on the Police, 1962: 70, para. 224)54 
After the Royal Commission 
In the years following the Royal Commission, ministerial reticence in admitting to 
influence over the work of the Metropolitan Police became still more pronounced 
(Plehwe, 1974: 334). Parliament was told, for example, that the Home Office was 
unable to instruct the police to take action against vehicles without a road fund 
licence or, in sharp contrast to 19th century practice, to monitor the 'underground 
press'. Other statements suggested that changes in the disposition of the force -
such as the replacement in 1971 of police road safety teams in schools with a 
'strategic reserve' for traffic control- and the formulation of general policies on 
the treatment of different categories of offence and offender were under the sole 
control of the Commissioner 'in so far as they were not dealt with by general 
orders and regulations made under section 5 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829'. 
However, despite these increasingly broad and unequivocal assertions of the 
Commissioner's autonomy, ministers continued to provide information to 
Parliament, and submit to questioning, on matters - including the enforcement 
action taken by officers in particular cases - going well beyond the areas for 
which they claimed authority over the police. 
By the end of the 1970's it seems to have become settled administrative practice 
for Home Secretaries to leave all 'operational' decisions to the Commissioner. As 
Sir Robert Mark (1978: 145) put it, 
The commissioner's orders for the administration of the force are ... 
subject to the approbation of the Home Secretary, though in practice such 
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approval is rarely sought. Operationally, however, the commissioner, 
like a chief constable, is not subject to orders from anyone.55 
Though never clearly defined, 'operational' matters seemed to include not only 
the conduct of individual cases from arrest or summons through to prosecution 
but also decisions about the functional and geographical distribution of personnel 
and the determination of general policies on the enforcement measures to be taken 
under the criminal law against particular classes of offender . However, for the 
wily pragmatists involved in making them work, the great strength of these 
arrangements lay precisely in their informality and the lack of clear boundaries 
between the authority of the Home Secretary and Commissioner. Mark's 
successor as Commissioner, Sir David McNee (1983: 67) probably captured this 
as well as anyone when he wrote in his autobiography that, while there was 'room 
for dispute' about the precise scope of the Home Secretary's statutory and 
regulatory responsibilities for the Metropolitan Police - and the extent to which he 
should be kept informed about 'strategic plans for the force and about proposals 
for dealing with matters such as public disorder demonstrations and racial 
problems' - the resolution of 'this important constitutional issue' fundamentally 
depended on 'the personalities and good sense of the men in power; the Home 
Secretary and the Commissioner of the day' . 
Defending the status quo: the 1980s 
The Metropolitan Police and its Commissioner thus faced the assaults on their 
independence of the early 1980s in a position of considerable, indeed 
unprecedented, strength. The Court of Appeal's robust defence of constabulary 
independence from political control, its repeated unwillingness to interfere in the 
discretion of the Commissioner at the instigation of the tireless Mr Blackburn and 
others, and the carefully modulated ambiguity and flexibility of the day to day 
administrative practice suggested by Sir David McNee represented a formidable 
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legal and political redoubt from which to mount a defence of the constitutional 
status quo. In spite of its relative recent origin, and in the face of a veritable 
deluge of criticism, the operational independence of the Metropolitan Police was 
defended throughout the 1980s both by the police themselves and by the three 
Conservative governments elected in 1979, 1983 and 1987. 
The House of Commons held a series of debates on policing in the metropolis 
during the course of the decade, and the tide of Parliamentary questions, remarked 
upon by the Royal Commission and researched so assiduously by Plehwe in the 
early 1970s, continued to flow unabated. Yet neither debates nor questions 
provided a comprehensive and readily decipherable account of the intimate 
workings of the relationship between the Commissioner and Home Secretary. At 
the end of a tumultuous decade for the Metropolitan Police, the status and 
respective spheres of authority of the two major players were not noticeably 
clearer than they had been at the beginning. In 1991, much as in 1979, their 
relationship remained a constitutional enigma elaborately wrapped in an 
administrative mystery. But it would be wrong to dismiss the 1980s as a decade 
devoted solely to criticism of the status quo and misleading to suggest that 
nothing new was revealed about the workings of the CommissionerlHome 
Secretary relationship. So, before attempting to apply my four dimensional 
analysis to the developments in the accountability of the Metropolitan Police 
since the end of the First W orId War I want to spend some looking at how the 
constitutional status quo - interpreted and practised so as to emphasise the 
operational independence of the Commissioner - was defended both inside and 
outside the parliamentary arena. 
The case for the defence in Parliament 
The most important indication of how Home Secretaries conduct their relations 
within the loose statutory framework provided by sections 1 and 5 Metropolitan 
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Police Act 1829 came in a series of written answers by a junior Home Office 
minister, Douglas Hogg, in 1986. Asked about the Secretary of State's use of his 
powers to direct the Commissioner under sectionl for the more efficient 
administration of the force, he replied: 
Neither [the Home Secretary] nor his two immediate predecessors have 
found it necessary to exercise their powers under section 1 by issuing 
specific formal directions to the Commissioner. But the finance and 
manpower code which came into force on 1 July this year, contains 
general provisions about the limits of the Commissioner's delegated 
authority on certain manpower and personnel matters. Beyond that, there 
have been regular discussions with the Commissioner of the day in 
which our views on matters of policing have been made clear. Since 
1982, the Commissioner has set out his plans for the year ahead in a 
strategy report, which has required our approval. (HC Deb, Vol 105, 6th 
series, col 24) 
Questions and answers 
A second question, also from the Labour MP, Tony Banks, elicited further 
information about the 'administrative procedure' for the approval of force orders 
and regulations. According to Mr Hogg, 'police orders' on 'a wide range of 
subjects concerned with the management of the force and policing practices' are 
issued twice weekly and approved internally 'by the senior police officers 
responsible for the items included in the orders' .56 However amendments to the 
standing orders for the force contained in 'general orders and regulations' require 
Home Office approval under s. 5 Metropolitan Police Act 1829 and are dealt with 
by its police department on the Home Secretary's behalf. Once approved, they 
too 'are promulgated in police orders'. Quite what all of this means, or was 
supposed to mean, is unclear. 57 A summary of the contents of orders issued in 
May 1983 provided by the Minister reveals that matters as various as 'crime', 
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'colorado beetles' and 'a radio programme of interest' were covered. But nothing 
is said about their status and whether they constituted amendments to standing 
orders for which the prior approval of the Home Office would have been 
obtained. 58 
Other answers to questions put to ministers by Labour MPs in the 1980s also 
contribute something to our understanding of the relationship between politician 
and policeman at the heart of police governance in London. For example, in 1983 
the then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, had this to say about his willingness 
to answer questions about police operations: 
It has been the practice of successive Home Secretaries, after consulting 
the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, to report to the House 
appropriately on operational matters of major public interest affecting the 
Metropolitan Police; but questions relating to the day-to-day operations 
of the force are for the Commissioner. (HC Deb, Vol 36, 6th series, col 
312) 
This statement seems to confirm Plehwe' s (1974) impression that ministers are 
prepared to be questioned on 'operational matters' over which they deny any 
direct or overt authority, but only in undefmed circumstances where they are of 
'major public interest' .. 
Some indication of how this works in practice may be gleaned from ministerial 
responses to questions on specific police operations. For example in 1987 the 
Home Office minister, Douglas Hogg, was prepared to give the indefatigable 
Tony Banks not just an estimate of the additional cost of policing demonstrations 
outside the South African Embassy in Trafalgar Square over the two months 6 
May to 5 July, but details of the total number of people arrested and charged as a 
result of the operation. 59 He was also able to confirm that departmental officials 
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would 'have discussions as necessary with the Metropolitan Police about the 
arrangements for the policing and protection of diplomatic missions, including the 
South African Embassy' .60 However, a week later under questioning from 
another Labour MP, Richard Caborn, Mr Hogg refused to say whether the 
Commissioner had consulted the Home Office before introducing special 
'directions' for policing outside the embassy.61 Invited to instruct the 
Commissioner to withdraw his directions, Mr Hogg simply said, 'No. This is an 
operational matter for the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis'. These 
exchanges demonstrate two things. Firstly they underline once again how direct 
orders are eschewed in favour of informal discussion as the basis for relations 
between the Home Office and the police. And secondly they show the extent to 
which ministers are prepared to go in providing information (supplied to them by 
the police) to Parliament about the conduct of operations for which they disclaim 
any formal responsibility. 
Policing London: a special case 
Underlying these debates in the early and mid 1980s was a growing feeling of 
dissatisfaction on the Labour benches with the continued status of the Home 
Secretary as police authority for the Metropolitan Police, and the consequent 
exclusion of locally elected politicians from any direct involvement in its 
governance. The broad contours of the controversy can be seen in the speeches 
made by the Home Secretary and his Labour Shadow, Roy Hattersley, in the fIrst 
of the set-piece debates on London's policing which were to become a regular 
feature of the Parliamentary calendar. Opening the debate in February 1983, Mr 
Whitelaw based his case for maintaining the constitutional status quo on two key 
factors which distinguished the Metropolitan Police from its provincial 
counterparts and made its affairs 'a special interest of Parliament and of the 
House [of Commons], and therefore of the Home Secretary' .62 These were its 
'national role' (for example in anti-terrorism work) and, more importantly, 'the 
sheer size of the metropolis and the fact that a great burden of work falls on the 
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police because of its capital city functions' .63 According to Mr Whitelaw they 
lifted the task of policing and its supervision 'to a different level from that 
experienced elsewhere'. It would be wrong to divide up and parcel out the 
supervision of local policing, capital city responsibilities and national functions to 
different supervisory bodies: 
Major constitutional change in political responsibility for policing the 
metropolis would certainly confuse, and eventually erode, the role of the 
House as the form in which major issues of policing the capital should be 
addressed. (HC Deb, Vol 38, 6th series, cols 29-30) 
The import of this remarkable piece of self-effacement on the part of the Home 
Secretary is to exaggerate the significance of Parliament as the principal player in 
the supervision of the Metropolitan Police and to reduce his own role as police 
authority to something akin to an honest broker between the force and the House 
of Commons. Having thus defended the status quo as the necessary concomitant 
of the unique character of metropolitan policing and the need for it to be subject 
to the scrutiny of Parliament, Mr Whitelaw moved on to the offensive: 
The Government's policy recognises ... the need for greater local 
involvement in local policing [to be accomplished by the establishment 
of borough community/police consultative groups], without opening up 
the dangerous prospect of political control over operations, 
masquerading in the disguise of greater accountability. (HC Deb, Vol 38, 
6th series, col 30) 
For Mr Whitelaw - as for the police themselves - the prospect of a locally elected 
police authority for London was no more than a thinly disguised attempt to 
politicise policing summoning once again the awful spectres first raised a century 
earlier in the debates on the Local Government Bill of 1888, and then again in the 
1930s by McCardie J in Fisher v Oldham. 
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From the Labour front bench Mr Hattersley too was keen to belittle the role of the 
Home Secretary in determining the policies of the Metropolitan Police. His 
purpose in doing so was not to point up the proximity of the relationship between 
the police and Parliament as Mr Whitelaw had sought to do, but to draw attention 
to the autonomy enjoyed by the Commissioner in deciding force policy. This, he 
said, was becoming increasingly unacceptable in the light of 'disquiet about the 
performance of the Metropolitan Police' and 'the growing demand for genuine 
democratic control over the police and policing policy in London' .64 It was 
totally unreasonable to expect a senior government minister with many other 
onerous responsibilities to 'keep intimate control of the organisation and running 
of the police in the metropolis' .65 An elected police authority would be able to 
pay more detailed attention to London's policing. It would also - and herein lay 
the main thrust ofMr Hattersley's argument - make the police more effective: 
The hard fact is that ... London has more policemen than have the 
provinces, spends more on the police than do the provinces, and is less 
successful in catching, prosecuting and deterring criminals than is 
anywhere else in the country. I and the Labour party believe that that is 
because the Metropolitan Police are more remote from the people that 
they serve than any of the provincial forces. (He Deb, Vol 38, 6th series, 
col 34) 
The solution to the problem was 'to convince the people that they control the 
police force through their elected representatives' .66 The right relationship 
between police and people in London would only be achieved by allowing local 
representatives 'to decide what is best for their area'. In the ensuing debate, 
backbenchers on both sides of the House inveighed against their opponents' views 
in suitably robust terms. One Conservative member accused the Greater London 
Council of seeking to 'gain political control of police operations' through its 
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campaign for' democratic accountability'. A Labour speaker countered by asking 
what the difference was between locally elected councillors, whom the 
Conservatives liked to brand as 'politically motivated', and as he put it, 'a 
politically motivated Home Secretary'. 67 
The case for the defence: the academy and the police 
In contrast to - and conceivably because of - the success with which the 
constitutional status quo was defended by successive Conservative 
administrations throughout the 1980s, academic and police commentators 
sympathetic to the existing arrangements contributed remarkably little of note to 
the debate. Only three interventions will be mentioned here.68 
Marshall and independence by convention 
The frrst line of defence I want to look at was put forward by Geoffrey Marshall 
(1978; 1986) who, despite his long-standing scepticism about the legal origins of 
the doctrine of constabulary independence laid down by Lord Denning in 
Blackburn felt constrained to argue that the police should remain immune from 
external political influences 'not as a matter of law but as a matter of 
constitutional and administrative morality' (Marshall, 1986: 142). His only 
ground for defending police independence - extending to general matters of law 
enforcement policy in addition to decisions on particular cases - as a 
constitutional and administrative convention seems to have been a profound 
pessimism about the probity of the representatives and executives through whom 
democratic control is exerted and, by implication, in the integrity of the 
contemporary democratic process itself.69 Rather than place responsibility for the 
direction of policing - even at the level of general policy - in the hands of venal 
and self-interested party politicians, Marshall believed that the liberal democrat's 
best hope of upholding civil liberties and preserving impartial justice lay in the 
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creation of a body of conventional rules restricting politicians' scope for 
intervention in police operations (Marshall, 1986: 144).70 
Lustgarten (1986: 166-70) has subjected this position to a characteristically 
coruscating assault. He argues that Marshall both overstates the deterioration in 
ethical standards in British politics and administration and fails to acknowledge 
that the police are no less prone to venality and corruption than other public 
servants. Moreover, he suggests that there is no logical reason why Marshall's 
faith in the 'enlightened despotism' of professional administrators should be 
limited to policing: why, Lustgarten asks, not simply jettison the democratic 
process across the whole field of public administration? But, devastating as 
Lustgarten's criticisms of the empirical underpinnings and political implications 
of his argument are, Marshall is surely right to point to some of the difficulties 
implicit in local democratic control of policing. In particular heed must be paid to 
his warnings about the dangers of uncontrolled majoritarianism and the risk of 
sharply contrasting patterns of law enforcement emerging from the different 
policy preferences of local politicians (Marshall, 1986: 145). 
Oliver: equity, integrity and expertise 
A similar vein of cynicism about politicians and the operations of the normal 
democratic process - at least at local level - is evident in the work of the second 
author I want to consider here, Ian Oliver (1987). Writing from his (then) vantage 
point as a serving chief constable (of the Central Scotland Police) and a former 
senior officer in the Metropolitan Police, Oliver shared Marshall's enthusiasm for 
the operational independence of the police from local 'party political' interference 
and suggested that it ought to be protected 'as part of the unwritten constitution 
which is capable of amendment only in Parliament' (Oliver, 1987: 237). In 
essence Oliver's case for maintaining the constitutional guarantees on police 
independence rested on the need for equity, integrity and expertise in the field of 
law enforcement and order maintenance. In his view it was the police, and the 
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police alone, who display these qualities. To place them under the control of 'any 
person or group that could be perceived to be party politically motivated' would 
compromise the principle of equality under the law, and expose the process of law 
enforcement to manipulation by politicians seeking electoral advantage. 
Furthermore, decision-making in the area of law enforcement is too delicate and 
complex a matter to be entrusted to those lacking the 'considerable amount of 
training and understanding ... necessary for it to be exercised properly and fairly'. 
The weaknesses in this position are similar to those in Marshall's. The fairness, 
integrity and expertise of police officers are taken as read - as is the immanent 
partiality and corruption of local politicians. Quantities of evidence of police 
inequity, venality and incompetence are blithely ignored. His strictures on the 
sectarian motivation of local politicians are not extended to national figures such 
as the Home Secretary whose relationship with the Metropolitan Police is treated 
as constitutionally unproblematic - though regrettably lacking in unambiguous 
statutory definition (Oliver, 1987: 173 -80). When it comes to notions of legal 
universalism Oliver, like Marshall, is correct to identify a problem for proponents 
of local 'democratic accountability' to address, but wrong to imply that police 
independence provides any, let alone the best, means of upholding the rule of law 
principle of equal treatment. Again volumes of research gainsay any suggestion 
of consistency over place and time in the 'independent' exercise of police 
discretion.71 
Waddington and the impermeability of police practice 
The third academic defence of constabulary independence is in many respects the 
most interesting. Though his main constitutional argument against democratic 
governance of the police - the quasi-judicial nature of police decision-making -
has been effectively demolished first by the House of Lords in Holgate-
Mohammed v Duke and then by Lustgarten (1986: 163-4), Waddington's (1984a) 
approach is more sociologically sophisticated than either Marshall's or Oliver's.72 
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His (1984: 35) first argument is that research on the police from a 'sub-cultural 
perspective' has demonstrated the 
, ... extent to which any policy emanating from senior officer levels is 
mediated, even subverted, by ordinary police officers who must actually 
perform much of their work beyond direct supervision. ' 
Therefore simply establishing some kind of 'democratic control' over the police 
organisation will not necessarily affect rank and file practice to any significant 
extent. Moreover, Waddington (1984a: 34) suggests, the demand-led, incident-
driven, nature of much police work would leave even the most industrious and 
determined 'police committee' with little room for manoeuvre in readjusting 
police priorities and altering patrol officers' 'pattern of contact' with the pUblic. 
Citing evidence of rank and file subversion of organisational policies is of course 
a dangerous path for a partisan of police autonomy to take since it suggests that 
operational police officers are not so much independent as out of control. Nor 
would one necessarily wish to endorse Waddington's solutions to any perceived 
lack of accountability in the oversight of policing. 73 But both points are well 
made nonetheless. Simply expanding the role of locally elected representatives in 
determining policing policies may well not be sufficient to effect observable 
changes in police practice in the face of a multitude of other more immediate 
influences on rank and file behaviour while the scope for altering work patterns 
dictated to a large degree by spontaneous demand from the public may indeed be 
severely circumscribed. As we shall see in the chapters that follow these are 
serious issues for all those interested in changing operational practice whether 
they be advocates of local 'democratic accountability' or proponents of 
'community' or 'problem-oriented' policing. 
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Summary 
Arguments in favour of the constitutional status quo advanced by its 
parliamentary, academic and professional supporters can thus be seen to operate 
at several levels. At their most rarefied, they were founded upon the basic liberal 
democratic principle of equality before the law which demands that the impartial 
administration of a set of universally applicable legal rules may safely be 
entrusted only to a body of highly trained and disinterested professionals isolated 
from the potentially venal and self-interested (ifnot actually corrupt) influence of 
local politicians. Nor, according to Waddington's sociological critique, did the 
empowerment of an elected 'police committee' represent a viable means of 
achieving the transformation of police practice sought by its supporters. Such 
general arguments of principle and practicality in favour of constabulary 
independence were intended to be of general application. Yet the special position 
of the Metropolitan Police and its relationship with an elected 'party politician' , 
the Home Secretary, tended to be treated as unproblematic - often it seems on the 
dubious grounds that, as a national figure, he could be trusted to transcend the 
sectional interests so perversely represented by local politicians. Finally, for 
Home Office ministers and Conservative backbenchers called upon to defend this 
relationship politically, the sheer size of the metropolis, its status as a capital city, 
and the national functions undertaken by its vast police force, all provided sound 
enough reasons for retaining the Home Secretary as police authority for the 
Metropolitan Police, and a direct link between police and parliament. 
New dimensions: developments in accountability 1918-1991 
Some critical comments of the theoretical implications and empirical weaknesses 
of these arguments have already been made and my next task is to look in more 
detail at the various assaults launched on the constitutional status quo by its 
political and academic opponents. But before turning to these critiques I want to 
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stop for a moment to examine the accountability of the Metropolitan Police as it 
developed from the end of the First W odd War to the dawn of the 1990s and the 
era of sector policing in terms of the four dimensions of police accountability 
identified in the previous chapter. 
Content 
Characterisations of the kind of actions and decisions for which the Metropolitan 
Police should be legally and, more controversially, politically accountable have 
changed subtly but perceptibly over the years since the end of the First Wodd 
War. A succession of ever more opaque, confusing and contradictory distinctions 
between 'administration', 'executive action' and 'law enforcement' were 
deployed by Home Office ministers (and retired civil servants like Sir Frank 
Newsam) and the Commissioner to mark out the boundaries between their 
respective areas of responsibility. The Willink Royal Commission signally failed 
to clarify the position and, by the late 1970s an equally imprecise and 
unsatisfactory distinction between 'policy' and 'operations' was in regular use by 
ministers reporting to Parliament. Meanwhile, the judges were engaged in the 
protracted process of evolving a 'doctrine of constabulary independence' which, 
in Lord Denning MR's version, purported to leave the Commissioner free from 
political interference by the Home Secretary (or, a fortiori, any locally elected 
body) in discharging his 'law enforcement' duties subject only to the power of the 
courts to intervene where a 'policy decision' could be deemed a total dereliction 
of duty. 
Apart from being hopelessly imprecise the various administrative and judicial 
attempts to delineate areas of exclusive and/or shared responsibility for the 
Commissioner and the Home Secretary, also fail to acknowledge the inter-
dependence of 'administration', 'executive action', law enforcement', 'policy' 
and 'operations' - however those terms might be defined. Recalling that the 
power to use legitimate coercive force is the core content of police accountability 
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provides some much-needed balm for this rash of obfuscation. The first point to 
make is that, just because situationally contingent decisions to apply coercive 
force (in the form of stop, search, arrest or detention) are made by individual 
officers acting in particular cases, it does not follow that the pattern or social 
distribution of coercive force (and protection) is not influenced by decisions of a 
very different kind about how resources should be deployed and laws enforced. 
On the contrary, the social distribution of the use of force is determined at various 
levels within the police organisation and the process by which that determination 
is made cannot be broken down into hermetically sealed sub-processes involving 
either 'administrative' or 'executive' action, or 'policy' or 'operational' decisions, 
before being subjected to different regimes of external political accountability. 
But this is not to say that police decision-making is a 'seamless web' either. 
Although the core content of decisions taken about the deployment of officers and 
the interpretation and enforcement of the law affect the social distribution of 
coercion and protection, they are taken in a very different context to those street 
level decisions that the courts have been at such pains to protect from political 
interference. The true justification for excluding this second type of decision 
from the control of political authorities and senior officers alike is, as Lawton LJ 
and Lustgarten have noted, to do with the factual conditions precedent for the 
lawful exercise of coercive powers, and not the characterisation of the decision to 
use them as amounting to 'law enforcement' rather than 'administration' or 
'operations' rather than 'policy'. If the aim is to make the police accountable for 
the power to use coercive force delegated to them by 'the people', this analysis 
suggests that different mechanisms of accountability may indeed have to be used 
at the various levels of decision-making. But it also implies that those levels must 
be identified in a way that acknowledges their interdependence and identifies 
decisions that only the police are in a position to take with more precision than the 
crude distinction between 'policy' and 'operations' provides. 
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But these criticisms of how the law and administrative practice of police 
governance developed in the metropolis after 1918 should not obscure the 
important fact that, even for those seeking to defend constabulary independence, 
the centrality of coercive powers to the police function was never an issue. Sir 
Joseph Simpson's definition of the 'executive functions' of the police officer in 
terms of her arrests, the persistent use of the term 'law enforcement' to denote 
that area of police work which should not be subject to any political authority, and 
the distancing of Home Office ministers and their officials from 'operational' 
matters involving the use of force against demonstrators, illustrate the naturalness 
of this association between the police and the adversarial use of coercive force. 
What was misunderstood or misrepresented by those responsible for operating 
and defending the existing constitutional dispensation was not the essentially 
coercive content of police work and police accountability, but the significance of 
decisions taken in a wide variety of contexts, and by officers at all levels of the 
organisational hierarchy, to its social distribution. It was not until the 1980s and 
the rise of' community policing' that the focus of accountability on the coercive 
content of policing began to blur as the organisation's mandate broadened into the 
provision of a more diffuse range of 'services' .74 
Direction 
Both the general and immediate direction of Metropolitan Police accountability 
changed little between 1918 and 1989. The chain of accountability relations 
linking police and people via Commissioner, Home Secretary, and Parliament was 
maintained. Periodic reforms of local government in London, including the 
creation and abolition of the Greater London Council, left the basic structure of 
governance put in place by the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 intact. 75 Only three 
developments are worthy of note here. The first of these was the eventual 
extension of the franchise to all adult men and women and the consequent 
reconstitution of the demos as something more than a wealthy gentlemen's club.76 
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If nothing else was achieved during this period, the introduction of universal 
suffrage alone represented an important advance in the (liberal) democratisation 
of policing. 
Much less significant in the overall scheme of things was the attempt by the then 
Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, to take some of the heat out of the debate 
about accountability which raged in the early 1980s by suggesting that the critical 
relationship was not between him or his department and the Commissioner on the 
one hand and Parliament on the other, but between the police and the House of 
Commons. By thus emphasising the special relationship between the 
Metropolitan Police and the nation's elected representatives the Home Secretary 
sought to trump demands for the greater involvement of local politicians in 
London's policing. The third development, police/community consultation, was 
also a product of the 1980s and represented the formal establishment under s. 106 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 of an accountability relation 
between the police and 'community representatives' at borough level. Further 
comment on these latter two developments will be reserved for the section on 
accountability mechanisms at the end of this chapter. 
Mode 
The distinction between 'administration', 'executive action' and 'law 
enforcement' or 'policy' and 'operations' also complicates the task of discerning 
the mode of accountability prevailing between the Commissioner and Home 
Secretary. The growing eagerness of Home Office ministers to talk up the 
autonomy of the police is another source of difficulty. To what extent did public 
assertions of independence reflect substantive changes in administrative practice? 
As a result, the general remarks made here can only be provisional and probably 
reflect the position pertaining in the 1970s and 1980s more accurately than that of 
the 1920s. 
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For the purposes of this discussion let us accept the arbitrary distinction made 
between different categories of decision and kinds of action and take 'law 
enforcement' or 'operations' (arrests and so forth) as denoting one end of a 
continuum of police decision-making and 'administration' or 'policy' (such as 
fmancial and establishment matters) as the other. All the evidence suggests that, 
as far as matters of 'administration' or policy' have been at issue, accountability 
to the Home Secretary may occasionally have slipped into directive mode but, 
even on questions of 'high policy' and strategic planning, it seems unlikely that 
late 20th century Home Secretaries and their officials can have taken as close an 
interest in the Metropolitan Police as Peel and his immediate successors did more 
than a century earlier. 77 In so far as a hierarchical relationship between 
Commissioner and Home Secretary was acknowledged in the area of 
'administration' or 'policy', the iron first of Home Office 'direction' seems to 
have remained discreetly cloaked in the velvet glove of 'consultation' and 
'negotiation' . 
At the opposite ('law enforcement/operations') end of the continuum, however, 
the steward mode appears to have dominated in recent years. But - if for no other 
reason than the need to answer parliamentary questions - Home Office ministers 
have had to be kept informed about operational matters deemed to be of major 
public interest. In most cases this would have involved the Commissioner 
responding to ex post facto requests for information. Yet, such was the flexibility 
of administrative practice, astute Commissioners would doubtless have taken the 
precaution of advising the Home Office of any controversial measures in advance, 
and been guided by the department's reaction before proceeding. Official 
statements by both police and politicians suggest that, in the ordinary course of 
events, the Home Secretary rarely issued specific 'directions' to the 
Commissioner, particularly in the area of 'law enforcement' or 'operations'. 
Moreover, if Lord Denning's dicta in Blackburn are accepted as defmitive, a 
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Commissioner would have been free to ignore any such directions in any case 
since he alone is responsible for enforcing the law. In the absence of any 
enthusiasm on the part of ministers to issue 'directions' as to the conduct of police 
operations, Mr Douglas Hogg's description of the background to the policing of 
the South African House demonstrations in 1987 is probably fairly typical of the 
balance struck between pre-emptive consultations and ex post facto accounting in 
regard to 'operations'. 78 As for the Home Secretary's relationship with 
Parliament, a clearer example of accountability in steward mode - with Members 
seeking, ex post facto, information about, and explanations of, decisions taken by 
the police and/or Home Office ministers - would be hard to fmd. 
Mechanism 
Lord Denning MR.' s judgement in Blackburn contains, as we have seen, the most 
authoritative statement on the legal accountability of the Commissioner in 
discharging his duty to enforce the law. Though Marshall (1978: 59; 1986: 141) 
amongst others has cogently argued that his and Salmon LJ's remarks on the point 
are strictly obiter, Lustgarten's (1986: 67) and Reiner's (1995:83) view that they 
have become definitive is amply borne out by the recent decisions in International 
Trader's Ferry Ltd.. Blackburn and the cases involving provincial chief 
constables that followed it up to and including ITF graphically illustrate the 
extremely limited scope of the legal accountability provided for by Lord Denning 
when, in liberating the Commissioner and his fellow chief officers from the 
control of ministers and police authorities, he proclaimed them 'answerable to law 
and to law alone'. 
We have also seen how the political mechanism of accountability in general, and 
the accountability of the Commissioner to the Home Secretary in particular, 
continued to operate throughout the period largely on the basis of mutual trust and 
consensus. The combined weight of answers to parliamentary questions 
ministerial statements, evidence to the 1962 Royal Commission and the 
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observations of eminent insiders provides us with some important insights into the 
workings of this relationship and the mix of advice, consultations, discussions, 
briefings, reports, and guidance that occupied the two bureaucracies - police and 
Home Office - on a daily basis. Yet the relationship remained profoundly 
enigmatic. If transparency is a virtue in the conduct of democratic governance, 
the political accountability of the Metropolitan Police through its Commissioner 
to the Home Secretary stands condemned. By 1991, over one hundred and sixty 
years of administrative practice and judicial interpretation had done nothing to 
resolve the ambiguities evident in the Metropolitan Police Act 1829. In 
consequence, the most that can be said about the functioning of the relationship 
between Commissioner and Home Secretary between 1918 and 1991 is that it 
continued to function, adapting itself to changed political realities and, throughout 
the 1980s, to a sustained assault on its suitability as a mechanism for democratic 
oversight of London's policing. 
The other main institutional player in the political mechanism was, of course, 
Parliament and we have seen how its significance was promoted by Home 
Secretary William Whitelaw in the heat of the accountability debate of the early 
1980s. But to what extent was Parliament capable, through the Home Secretary 
and the Commissioner, of effectively calling the Metropolitan Police to account? 
In answering this question, it has to be conceded at the outset that the series of 
debates on 'policing in the metropolis' initiated by Mr Whitelaw himself in 1983, 
did provide Members of Parliament with an unprecedented opportunity to discuss 
the way in which the Commissioner and the Home Secretary discharged their 
responsibilities.79 But, having said that, it is doubtful whether they can have had 
much impact on policing policies given that they were generally held on Fridays 
and attended (despite the significant 'national functions' of the Metropolitan 
Police) only by a relatively modest number of members representing London 
constituencies. Moreover, though the Home Secretary himself tended to open the 
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debate, it was also common practice for him to leave the House long before it 
concluded - invariably without a vote being taken. Outside these set piece 
debates answers to parliamentary questions continued to be the most important 
source of information about 'operational matters of major public interest' despite 
ever more vehement ministerial denials of responsibility for such matters. Once 
again however, it is doubtful whether the concerns ofMPs reflected in 
parliamentary questions, and any public debate that resulted from ministerial 
replies, had a significant impact on policing policies and practice. Much the same 
can also be said of the extra-parliamentary meetings which took place at various 
times in the 1980s between the Home Secretary, the Commissioner and the 
Receiver of the Metropolitan Police on the one hand; and, on the other, MPs 
representing London constituencies, leading members of the various London local 
government associations such as the Association of London Authorities (ALA) 
and the London Boroughs Association (LBA) and representatives of local 
authorities precepted by the Metropolitan Police. 
Such doubts about the effectiveness of Parliament in holding Home Secretaries to 
account for their conduct as the police authority for London are reinforced if one 
considers the relationship in the wider context of the constitutional convention of 
ministerial responsibility. Since its heyday towards the middle of the 19th century 
Parliament's powers to hold ministers to account have been on the wane 
(Woodhouse, 1994: 14). Large parliamentary majorities, stricter Whipping by 
government and opposition parties, and the exponential growth of government 
and its associated bureaucracy have all contributed to the growing dominance of 
the executive, while ministers themselves grapple with vast departmental briefs 
without adequate specialist support (Oliver, 1991; Woodhouse, 1994). As a 
consequence, Woodhouse (1994: 298) argues, it has become increasingly difficult 
to maintain that the doctrine of ministerial responsibility at the heart of the 
accountability relation between Home Secretary and Parliament does more than 
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provide a 'facade behind which the government can hide, safe in the knowledge 
that Parliament lacks the constitutional integrity to offer a sustained and effective 
challenge' .80 
The principal developments in the remaining, public and professional-managerial, 
mechanisms of accountability will be traced in subsequent chapters when I 
consider the evolution of community consultation, consumerism and 
managerialism as aspects of police accountability and assess their respective 
contributions to sector policing. 
Summary 
The broad thrust of the analysis presented here has been that by the 1980s when 
the controversy about the accountability of the Metropolitan Police was at its 
height, the core content of that accountability, the legitimate use of coercive force, 
had not been seriously questioned. But it had become thoroughly obscured by a 
welter of arbitrary distinctions between 'administration', 'executive action', law 
enforcement', 'policy' and 'operations'. Rhetorically at least, the mode of 
operation of the main political mechanism of accountability through the 
Commissioner to the Home Secretary and Parliament, and thence to the 'people' 
of the nation state, largely depended on the flexible application of these 
distinctions. In practice, the steward mode had come to dominate with all thought 
of direction dismissed as inappropriate to the operation of a highly ambiguous 
statutory regime by mutual consent in all but the most extreme situations. For 
their part, the courts had sought to protect the police from political direction in all 
matters of 'law enforcement' from the use of powers of arrest in individual cases 
to the geographical and functional distribution of police personnel. In place of 
'political direction', the judges had offered the possibility of 'answerability to the 
law' only to prove themselves unwilling to interfere in chief officers' discretion 
whenever they were called upon to do so. Thus by the early 1990s the 
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Metropolitan Police enjoyed an historically unprecedented degree of autonomy 
from legal and political control. 
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Notes 
1 The title of Commissioner was formally given to the justices (Charles Rowan and 
Richard Mayne) some ten years later (s. 4 Metropolitan Police Act 1839). The number of 
commissioners was reduced from two to one under ss. 1 and 5 Metropolitan Police Act 
1856. Since 1973 the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners have ceased to be 
sworn in as justices of the peace (s. 1(9) Administration of Justice Act 1973). See Parker 
(1980) and Oliver (1987) for further details of the technicalities, and below for a brief 
discussion of the legal implications of the Commissioner's status as a justice. The Police 
Act 1964 s. 62 and Sch. 8 (preserved by s. 103 Sch. 9 Police Act 1996) provide that the 
Commissioner, though not a 'chief constable' , is nonetheless a chief officer of police for 
the purposes of the Act. 
2 References to justices in the Act have effect as references to the Commissioner by virtue 
of the Administration of Justice Act 1973, s. 5, Sch. 1, Pt. IV, para. 10(2). The Secretary 
of State may also make regulations to the government, administration and conditions of 
service of the police under the Police Act 1996 s. 50-53. 
3 See Rawlings (1995) for a more general argument against the tendency in police 
historiography to attribute greater significance to 1829 and the foundation of the 'new 
police' than the historical record appears to justify. 
4 See Critchley (1967: 55), Plehwe (1974: 327-8), Ascoli (1979: 104 -6) and Emsley 
(1996: 29). 
5 The slightly more detailed account of the original incident given by Ascoli (1979: 127-
8) has Home Secretary Palmerston 'instructing' Mayne to ban a protest meeting against a 
Bill on Sunday Trading. Attempts to enforce the ban led to violent confrontations 
between the police and some 40,000 demonstrators. The press accused Mayne of high-
handedness but Ascoli, loyal as ever to the Metropolitan Police, claims that the inquiry 
'established beyond argument that the decision [to ban the demonstration] was that of the 
Home Secretary'. 
6 See Plehwe (1974: 326--7), Pellew (1982: 47-50), Lustgarten (1986: 35-6) and Emsley 
(1996: 67) for accounts of the confrontation between Warren and the Home Office. 
7 Lustgarten (1976: 35) notes, however, that even the imperious Warren felt that 
something as ostensibly 'operational' as offering a reward (for information leading to the 
'Jack the Ripper' murders in Whitechapel) required Home Office approval. 
8 ParI. Deb. Vol. 330, 3rd series, col. 1162-3, quoted by Plehwe (1974: 327). 
9 Emsley (1996: 85) also records that, as early as 1869, delegates from the London 
vestries had petitioned the Home Secretary about entrusting a degree of control over the 
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Metropolitan Police to a 'representative board' modelled on the borough watch 
committees springing up outside London. 
10 The source for both Lustgarten's quotation and Emsley's assessment of the 
Conservative case for resisting local control of the Metropolitan Police is an article by H. 
Evans in Contemporary Review, LV (1889), 445-61. I need hardly add that the 
Conservatives won the day, thus 'saving' the Metropolitan Police from local political 
control for more than a century. 
II It was not until 1855 that a Metropolitan Board of Works was set up to take over some 
responsibility for matters such as drainage, sewerage, cleansing and street lighting. As 
we have already seen, a London Country Council along the lines of authorities elsewhere 
in the country was not established until the Local Government Act 1888. Something 
resembling the modem structure of local government in the capital was completed only in 
1899 with the creation of 28 metropolitan boroughs by the London Government Act of 
that year. See generally Ruck and Rhodes (1970: 12-20). 
12 Skyrme (1991: 76) classifies the duties of the 18th and early 19th century justice under 
no fewer than nine headings. These ranged from their judicial duties at Quarter Sessions 
through - for a small minority of metropolitan justices - police administration to 
responsibility for highways, licensing, enforcing the game laws, and dealing with 
vagrancy and the poor. 
13 Unfortunately, as Ascoli (1979: 94) observes, the 1829 Act was unclear about the 
status and authority of the new justices in relation to the other magistrates and parochial 
authorities that continued to have responsibility for administrative functions overlapping 
those of the 'new police'. 
14 [1968] 2QB 118. The authorities relied on in Blackburn, Fisher v. Oldham 
Corporation [1930] 2KB 364 and Attorney-Generalfor New South Wales v. Perpetual 
Trustee Co. [1955] AC 457, did not directly concern the Metropolitan Police. 
15 (1781) 5 Car. & P. 282; (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 947. 
16 (1888) Cox CC 420, 422. The prosecution of Mr Graham and his co-accused arose out 
of the disturbances in Trafalgar Square on November 1887 which the Commissioner, 
Warren, was widely criticised for mishandling. The judge's comments on Warren's 
liability for any neglect of duty were therefore strictly obiter. See Smith (1998) for a 
discussion of the much more extensive case law concerning neglect of duty by individual 
police officers and R v Dytham [1979] QB 722 for a recent example of a police officer 
being convicted of the common law offence of misconduct in a public office. 
17 How long the near universal excoriation of the police persisted is controversial. 
Reiner's (1992: 49) 'neo-Reithian' account dates their acquisition of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the respectable working class from the 1870s. But see Cohen (1979) for an 
example of how pockets of disorganised working class resistance persisted well into the 
20th century. 
18 The nearest late 20th century equivalent is the notion of 'organic' accountability 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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19 [1916] 2 KB 206. The short facts of the case were that the Chief Constable of 
Glamorgan had asked the plaintiff coal companies to house and feed police officers from 
other forces supplied to him under mutual aid agreements purportedly entered into by 
him on behalf of the defendant Standing Joint Committee. The Committee subsequently 
refused to reimburse the plaintiffs for the cost of billeting the extra officers. It was 
argued on their behalf that they had not authorised the Chief Constable to enter into aid 
agreements with the supplying police forces and were therefore not liable to the plaintiffs 
for the cost of accommodating the officers supplied. 
20 The greater control exercised by the Home Office over the Metropolitan Police was 
still acknowledged more than 40 years after the Glamorgan case by the Willink Royal 
Commission on the Police (1962: para. 224; and Minutes of Evidence: 4096 and 4101). 
21 [1930] 2 KB 364; [1955] AC 457 
22 Ibid. at 377-8. By the Police Act 1964 s. 48(1) (now s. 88 Police Act 1996) chief 
constables were made liable as joint tortfeasors for the torts of their officers. Damages 
were made payable out of the police fund (s. 48(2) Police Act 1964, now s. 88(2) Police 
Act 1996). 
23 [1930] 2 KB 364 at 371 and see Mackally's Case (1611) Co. Rep. Pt. IX 65b, 68b; 
Coomber v. Justices o/Berkshire (1883) 9 App. Cas. 61, 67. He also referred to Stanbury 
v Exeter Corporation [1905] 2 KB 838 (a case about the status of an inspector of sheep's 
diseases where the court had drawn an analogy with the police) and the Australian case of 
Enever v The King (1906) 3 CLR 969 where it was held that a constable acting as a peace 
officer exercised an original authority to which the general law of agency had no 
application. Lustgarten (1986: 56-61), Marshall (1965: 23-4, 37-8) and Smith (1988: 
436) all provide rigorous critiques of McCardie J's reasoning, his use of the relevant case 
law, and apparent ignorance of a key statutory provision requiring constables to obey the 
orders of the Watch Committee (s. 7 County and Borough Police Act 1856). 
24 [1955] AC 457. 
25 Ibid. at 489-90, per Viscount Simonds. The case concerned a claim for compensation 
for the loss of services and other expenses incurred by the Attorney-General as a result of 
injuries caused to a police officer by one of the respondents' negligent driving. 
26 Ibid. at 479 
27 The heading is borrowed from Lustgarten (1986: 62). 
28 [1968] 2 QB 118 
29 Ibid. at 135-6 
30 [1982] QB 458 at 474 
31 This is the point referred to briefly in the previous chapter's discussion of legal 
mechanisms of accountability. 
32 [1968] 2 QB 118 at 136 
33 Ibid. at 138. 
34 Ibid. at 144. The third judge, Edmund Davies LJ expressed no clear view. 
130 
35 Ibid. at 139. 
36 R v Commissioner o/Police o/the Metropolis Ex parte Blackburn (No.3) [1973] QB 
241. 
37 Ibid. at 254. Phillimore and Roskill LJJ were equally reluctant, in the latter's words, to 
'presume to tell [the Commissioner] how to conduct the affairs of the Metropolitan 
Police' . 
38 R v Commissioner 0/ Police o/the Metropolis Ex parte Blackburn (No.4). The Times, 
March 7, 1980. 
39 [1982] QB 458, at 472 per Lord Denning MR. 
40 The Times, 1 November 1986. Mr Levey applied for judicial review of the Chief 
Constable's alleged adoption of a policy for policing the Toxteth area of Liverpool 
whereby officers not posted to a special 'Toxteth section' were prohibited from entering 
the area without prior authorisation. 
41 [1995] 4 All ER 365 and [1997] 2 All ER 65. 
42 [1948] 1 KB 223. In the alternative the applicants argued that the decision amounted to 
measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on exports between 
member states contrary to Article 34 of the EC Treaty. For detailed comment on this 
aspect of the decision see Barnard and Hare (1997) and, more generally, Dixon (1995) 
and Dixon and Smith (1997; 1998) 
43 [1997] 2 All ER 65 at 78 per Kennedy LJ. 
44 HC Deb, Vol. 325, 5th series, col 1359 quoted by Plehwe (1974: 333). 
45 HC Deb, Vol 314, 5th series, col 1620-1 quoted by Plehwe loc. cit. 
46 See the references listed by Plehwe, loc. cit. 
47 Royal Commission on the Police (1962: 1153, Minutes of Evidence, para. 10) 
48 Ibid.: 1181, Minutes of Oral Evidence, para. 4180. 
49 Ibid.: 1153, Minutes of Evidence, para. 10. 
50 Ibid:, 1173-4, Minutes of Oral Evidence paras. 4089-4100. 
51 Ibid.:Home Office Memorandum of Evidence: 6, para. 50. This lack of control over 
the actions of individual officers has not deterred successive Home Secretaries from 
answering parliamentary questions about such matters (Plehwe, 1974: 333). 
52 The only substantive recommendation was that provision be made for confidential 
consultation between the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police and the local authorities of 
the Metropolitan Police District before the force's financial estimates were presented to 
Parliament (op. cit.: 70, 144, para. 223 and recommendation 37). 
53 Loc. cit. 
54 A footnote to this passage refers to the written evidence submitted by the 
Commissioner which, as has been pointed out above, appeared to exclude the possibility 
of control in 'executive matters'. Since it is unlikely that the Commission can have 
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intended to refer to Sir Joseph's evidence in this context only to contradict it, one can 
only assume that any conflict stems, once again, from ambiguities in the word 
'executive' . 
55 Parker (1980: 329), a former receiver of the Metropolitan Police who served with 
Mark, paints a similar picture: 'Home Secretaries have been prepared to give Parliament 
information over a very wide range of activities, but they have been at pains, when 
necessary, to make clear the limitations placed on their responsibilities and that 
operational matters are for the Commissioner. Nevertheless, in practice, matters of great 
public and political interest, such as public order and community relations, are 
necessarily the subject of discussion between the Home Secretary or his senior officers 
and the Commissioner and his senior officers, and there is a dialogue which is of value to 
both sides' . 
56 HC Deb, Vol 105, 6th series, cols 25-6. 
57 See Chapter 5 for critical discussion of the LSPUs (1987) interpretation ofMr Hogg's 
remarks and their implications for an elected police authority for London. 
58 The Minister also revealed that approximately 2,000 orders per annum (or more than 5 
a day) were issued during the years 1979-86. 
59 HC Deb, Vol 119, 6th series, cols 211-2. 
60 /bid.: Col 212. 
61 HC Deb, Vol 119, 6th series, cols 614. 
62 HC Deb, Vol 119, 6th series, cols 29. 
63/bid, loc cit. According to Mr Whitelaw the burden of 'capital city' work included 
protecting foreign embassies, the seat of Parliament and government, policing national 
demonstrations and London position as a focus of major international crime. 
64 HC Deb, Vol 38, 6th series, col 31. 
65 /bid.: Col 36. 
66 /bid.: Col 38. 
67 Ibid.: Col 38-9. 
68 In addition to the scholarly writings discussed here see also Regan (1991) for some 
entertaining political knockabout at the expense of the 'new Left' in local government 
and the meagre successes of 'police monitoring' . 
69 In Marshall's view, such a convention would - though not legally binding - have the 
effect of modifying the law by making the undesirability of police committees or 
government ministers 'issuing instructions' in matters of law enforcement explicit in 
administrative practice. 
70 Lustgarten (1986: 168) notes that, in his original 1978 formulation, Marshall put 'chief 
constables' forward in place of the more impersonal normative structure referred to here 
and observes that they amount to the same thing since the practical effect of the 
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conventions Marshall suggests would be to leave wide discretionary powers in the hands 
of chief officers (Marshall, 1978: 61; 1986: 144). 
71 Foster (1989) provides a particularly striking example of how policing styles and law 
enforcement practices can vary markedly between two apparently similar inner city 
police areas. 
72 [1984] AC 437 where (at p. 443) Lord Diplock characterised a police officer's power 
of arrest under s. 2(4) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (cf. S. 25 Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984) as 'an executive discretion expressly conferred by statute upon a 
public officer' (emphasis added). 
73 Considerable reliance is placed on a return to the highest standards of personal and 
professional conduct backed by a rigorous system of internal discipline and a Standing 
Judicial Commission on police practice. 
74 As will become clear in subsequent chapters (if it is not already) I do not believe that 
'law enforcement' is a useful way of characterising the police function. Nor do I want to 
argue that the police routinely apply coercive force to achieve their ends. All I am trying 
to suggest here is that even as the accountability of the Metropolitan Police was being 
reinvented in other ways, there was - at least until the early 1980s - little sign that those 
resisting its 'democratisation' believed policing to be about much more than fighting 
crime and maintaining public order - precisely the spheres in which adversarial contact 
with the public and the use of coercive force are most likely to occur. 
7S The most important reforms of the system established by the Local Government Act 
1888 took place in 1963-5 when 87 local and regional authorities including the London 
County Council were replaced by the Greater London Council, the Inner London 
Education Authority and a total of 32 London boroughs. The GLC was then abolished in 
March 1986. 
76 The Representation of the People Act 1918 ended the complex system of property 
qualifications that restricted the adult male franchise. The Act also gave the vote to 
certain categories of women over the age of 30. However, it was not until the 
Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act of 1928 that the franchise was 
extended to all women over the age of21. The current minimum voting age of 18 was 
introduced by the Representation of the People Act 1969. See Rawlings (1988: 73-7) for 
a concise historical account of the evolution of the parliamentary franchise. 
77 The then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw's, request that the incoming 
Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Newman, provide him with a preliminary report outlining his 
plans for the Metropolitan Police provide one example of Home Office intervention at the 
most rarefied strategic level. When Mr Whitelaw eventually came to present the 
proposals to Parliament he said that they had been 'thoroughly discussed' with the 
Commissioner and announced that he had asked Sir Kenneth to give particular attention 
to 'four main areas' in drawing up his report (HC Deb, Vol 38, 6th series, col 23). As a 
matter of interest, these areas were 'the present high level of crime, including street crime 
and burglary, with an emphasis on crime prevention in conjunction with other agencies'; 
'the maintenance of public order'; 'community involvement and the need for good 
relations with the ethnic minorities'; and the 'organisation and structure of the force' with 
a view to achieving a degree of decentralisation'. 
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78 The possibility, even desirability, of close political involvement in certain highly 
sensitive operations cannot be excluded as Oliver (1987: 177) concedes. He argues, for 
example, that 'operational responsibilities' might be shared between a Commissioner and 
a Home Secretary if a member of the Royal Family or the ambassador of an important 
ally were kidnapped. He cites the former Commissioner, Sir David McNee's (1983: 146-
67) experience of handling the Iranian Embassy siege in 1980 as a precedent for such a 
departure from normal practice. However, even in situations of such extreme political 
and diplomatic delicacy he maintains that the ultimate responsibility for preserving law 
and order must remain with the Commissioner (Oliver, 1987: 178). 
79 The occasion for the more or less annual debates that took place in the 1980s tended to 
be the publication of the Commissioner's Annual Report. The fact that Mr Whitelaw 
initiated, and his Conservative successors continued, with the debates and the promotion 
of Parliament as the only legitimate democratically elected forum for discussion on 
London's policing, may not have been entirely unconnected with their eagerness to resist 
the demand for local representative bodies. 
80 In terms of the five levels at which Woodhouse believes the convention currently 
operates, Home Office ministers have tended to accept no more than what she terms a 
'reporting' or 'informatory' responsibility in respect of Metropolitan Police 'operations'. 
Answers to Parliamentary questions - for example on the South Africa House 
demonstrations referred to earlier - routinely begin with the stock phrase, 'I understand 
from the Commissioner that ... '. On other matters, a higher level of 'explanatory' 
responsibility has been accepted with Home Office ministers providing an account of 
their own or their department's approach to broader questions of 'policy', for example in 
the course of debates on the Commissioner's annual report. Instances where the highest 
levels of 'amendatory' or 'sacrificial' responsibility have been assumed by the Home 
Secretary are rare indeed - a notable recent example of the former being the appointment, 
under section 32 of the Police Act 1964, of Lord Scarman to inquire into the policing of 
Brixton following the disturbances of April 1981. The same Home Secretary's survival 
in the face of press (but not Opposition) demands for his resignation when an intruder 
was found in the Queen's bedroom at Buckingham Palace in 1982 illustrates the degree 
to which the 'sacrificial' accountability expected of 19th century ministers was no longer 
thought relevant to the conduct of their late 20th century counterparts. 
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The State, the Police and Coercive Force: 
Police Accountability and its Critics in the 
1980s 
Criticism of the constitutional position of the police in the 1980s came from 
commentators with quite different theoretical and political perspectives. The aim 
here is to consider the broad thrust of the reforms to 'police accountability' 
suggested by these critics of the status quo, and to look at the theoretical 
underpinnings of their proposals. For the sake of clarity, this chapter analyses 
four main theoretical perspectives that developed in the 1980s: liberal democratic 
constitutionalism; left realism; critical interventionism; and socialist justice. 
These labels are slightly crude and some simplification of what are often 
sophisticated positions will be necessary in the exposition and analysis that 
follows.} 
By no means all of the critical literature under these four headings deals with the 
unique constitutional position of the Metropolitan Police in any depth. But 
detailed proposals for the reform of police governance in London were put 
forward in the 1980s by the generation of municipal socialists that took control of 
the Greater London Council and several London boroughs in the early 1980s. 
While the minutiae of the structure and composition of the new police authorities 
advocated by the GLC (1983) and the alternative schemes drawn up by the 
London Strategic Policy Committee (LSPC) (LSPU, 1987) and the Association of 
London Authorities (ALA) are of no more than passing historical interest, the 
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thinking behind them will be examined with some care in the next chapter. 2 
Chapter 5 also brings the discussion down to a more local level and gives a brief 
account of how the debate played itself out in the London Borough of Islington 
through the deliberations of the Council Sub-Committee responsible for policing 
issues. Finally, the competing critiques and proposals presented in the two 
chapters will be reviewed in a concluding discussion making use of the four 
dimensions of accoootability identified earlier. 
Liberal democratic constitutionalism 
The paradigm that I will call liberal democratic constitutionalism makes a 
convenient starting point for an analysis of the 1980s' critical literature on police 
accoootability. Its two main exponents - academic lawyers both - were prepared 
to take on the apologists for the status quo on their own terms by arguing that the 
existing arrangements for police governance were incompatible not with some 
alternative political philosophy opposed to the precepts of liberalism and wedded 
to a very different conception of popular control, but with the ideological and 
constitutional ooderpinnings of liberal democracy itself. Thus Laurence 
Lustgarten (1986: 1) begins his book on police governance by remarking on the 
prominence of conceptions of 'liberty, democracy, social order and the rule of law' 
in debates on the constitutional role of the police in Britain. Having surveyed the 
critical position occupied by the police in an adversarial system of criminal justice 
he goes on to conclude that: 
They enjoy a unique dominance within the institutional structure of law 
enforcement. In a liberal society, this degree of coercive authority prima 
facie calls for vigilant external control. Yet the police in England are 
subject to fewer constitutional, legal and political restraints than in 
virtually any other Western democracy. This paradox is the signal 
feature of the problem of police governance. (Lustgarten, 1986: 9) 
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Ug/ow and liberalism 
Steve Uglow (1988:1) too is concerned with what he calls 'constitutional policing' 
according to rule of law precepts of 'fairness'. His concern is to 'spell out the 
implications of liberal ideas for policing - to examine the problem how to develop 
a fmnly grounded constitutional police force' (Uglow, 1988: 138). Of the two, 
Uglow's is the more general and explicitly liberal analysis.3 His starting point is a 
concern with what he calls the 'propriety' of policing and two important points 
emerge from his discussion. The first is the view that the availability and use of 
physical force is one of four critical elements determining the mode or tactics of 
policing: 
The threshold at which physical force is used by the police makes certain 
constitutional realities explicit. The State has delegated to the police the 
right to use force in civil society - no other violence is regarded as 
legitimate. (Uglow, 1988: 11) 
His second point is about the significance of adherence to the rule of law in 
establishing the legitimacy of the state, and a governmental agency such as the 
police that stands directly between the state and the individual, and he argues that 
a 'liberal' assessment of the police must begin by scrutinising not just the strict 
legality of their conduct, but also its 'fairness' according to broader notions of 
natural justice (Uglow, 1988: 16). 
Uglow (1988: 29) believes that, by the late 19th century, the police had succeeded 
in establishing themselves among the middle and 'respectable' working classes as 
the 'constitutional symbol' of the state's legitimacy - the embodiment not of the 
executive power of a class-interested state, but of the rule of law to which 
government and police alike were subordinated.4 However, over the course of the 
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1960s and 1970s, he suggests that the ability of the police constable to represent 
the values of a liberal polity has been threatened by the transformation of key 
characteristics of her 'service' function. These changes are the result of significant 
increases in the legal, human and technical resources available to the police and 
include the reduction in local influence over policing, the gradual replacement of 
foot by motorised patrol, and a higher level of surveillance over, and intervention 
in, the lives of individual citizens. Nor, Uglow (1988: 38, 138) believes, has this 
trend towards social illiberalism been reversed in the 1980s despite (or, some 
would argue, because of) the relish with which liberal values have been espoused 
in the economic sphere. Central to this process is the diversity and ineffectiveness 
of existing systems of public accountability - the media, the law, the Home Office 
and local police authorities - through which some form of public 'explanation or 
justification' of policing may be obtained (Uglow, 1988: 114-6). 
The remedy for this, Uglow (1988: 137) maintains, lies in a reassertion of liberal 
values in policing. By this he means a return to the essentials of 
'constitutionalism': the formal insulation of political from economic power by 
democratic mechanisms; the separation of legislative, executive and judicial 
powers; and the idea that the promotion of the common weal flows from the 
maximisation of individual freedom in economic and social life. Applied to the 
police, these principles require a service that is both independent of government 
and accountable to the people (Uglow, 1988: 141): 'constitutional' policing must 
be independent, neutral and reactive. To this end, the freedom from 'national 
political control' implicit in the 19th century legislation on the police, and 
endorsed by the Royal Commission in the 1960s, must be maintained. Residual 
ministerial influence over the police must be made more accountable to 
Parliament and 'genuine authority' must be given to local police authorities within 
the tri-partite structure in order to counterbalance the powers of chief constables 
and the Home Secretary (Uglow, 1988: 143). Police authorities should have a 
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right 'to specify policy priorities', but would not necessarily be given the power 'to 
control day-to-day operations'. Neutrality, Uglow suggests, must be imposed 
from outside the police if the pernicious effects of 'cop culture' are to be 
minimised. Invigorated local police authorities, more searching parliamentary 
scrutiny and a greater willingness on the part of the courts to 'police the police' are 
seen as the most fruitful means of eliminating partiality in the policing of 
industrial disputes and political demonstrations, and in ensuring that the dignity of 
the individual is respected without variation 'according to his racial, social and 
economic traits' (Uglow, 1988: 144-5). Uglow's (1988: 145) final call is for 
minimal, 'reactive', policing. Fairness demands that an 'open-ended' occupation 
like policing is limited: 'Intervention should occur only in response to the 
committing of a criminal offence or breach of the peace or the immediate 
apprehension of one of these'. Preventive policing must be justified according to 
the seriousness of the anticipated offence, the risk of it occurring, and the policing 
methods used (Uglow, 1988: 147). With these three elements - independence, 
neutrality and reactivity - in place, Uglow (1988: 148) hopes to construct the 
'constitutional corral for the office of constable' essential in policing a liberal 
society. 
Lustgarten and democracy 
Lustgarten (1986) presents a considerably more detailed and subtle critique than 
Uglow.5 He also tends to favour the 'democratic' at the expense of the 'liberal' in 
his interpretation of liberal democratic constitutionalism and wishes to place 
police governance in the context of the constitutional principle that 'those who 
exercise the power of the state are subject to effective democratic control, perhaps 
supplemented by judicial control' (Lustgarten, 1986: 161). But he also shares 
many ofUglow's assumptions and concerns. For example, he too accepts that the 
police 'possess a virtual monopoly of legitimate violence in the name of the 
political order', and that 'independence' and 'accountability' are important 
principles in justifying the use of that coercive force (Lustgarten, 1986: 161-3).6 
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And, like Uglow he also believes that the 'regime of control' to which the police 
are subject must ensure 'that everyone, regardless of social or economic condition, 
ethnic origin or political belief, be treated equally'. 
Where he differs from Uglow is in his explanation of the sense in which policing 
must be untainted by popular control.7 
The decision to investigate, arrest and charge a particular suspect must 
remain wholly a matter for the judgement of the officer in charge of the 
case and aware of all the relevant facts. (Lustgarten, 1986: 164) 
Thus no political body, or police commander, can be allowed to usurp the power 
vested in the individual constable, personally aware of the facts, to make an arrest 
or carry out a search on the statutory basis of 'reasonable suspicion'. 8 But, aside 
from such decisions about individual citizens, Lustgarten (1986: 171) argues that 
'democratic governance may encompass policies of the greatest breadth to matters 
of the most specific detail,.9 Compared with Uglow's equivocations about the 
scope for police authority control over 'policy priorities' but not 'day-to-day 
operations', Lustgarten's formulation has the dual advantage of being both 
relatively unambiguous and compatible with the more perceptive expressions of 
judicial opinion on the scope of political and managerial control of police 
decision-making. 
Moreover, Lustgarten goes on to spell out a series of safeguards for democratic 
governance by elected bodies including the imposition of a statutory duty on 
police authorities to enforce the law subject to supervision by the courts according 
to established principles of administrative law. to This would be in addition to the 
power of the courts to intervene in cases where a chief officer - and by analogy a 
police authority placed under a similar duty - flatly refuses to discharge his 
obligation to enforce the law (the Blackburn safeguard) and other administrative 
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law preswnptions restraining elected political bodies from arrogating to 
themselves the discretion of the constable in possession of the factual knowledge 
required to decide the action to be taken in respect of individual citizens 
(Lustgarten, 1986: 174-5).11 By way of institutional reform Lustgarten (1986: 
178-9) nominates wholly elected local police authorities as the main vehicle for 
democratic constitutional police governance subject to oversight by central 
government to ensure that basic hwnan rights are respected, and minimum 
standards of technical competence maintained. He also suggests that a new 
Ministry of Justice, shorn of the 'repressive' responsibilities of the Home Office, 
and equipped with an expressly 'libertarian' brief, should be asked to perform 
these centralised supervisory tasks and take control of the so-called 'national' 
functions of the Metropolitan Police. 12 
The final point to note from Lustgarten's analysis is his treatment of two of the 
more intractable problems of police governance: the balance to be struck between 
local and central control, and the intersection between external and 
organisationally imposed norms and the 'occupational sub-culture' of the police 
officers whose behaviour those norms are designed to affect. On the first of these, 
he presents a typically lucid account of the philosophical and practical arguments 
made on either side of the 'localism/centralism' debate (Lustgarten, 1986: 177-8). 
But he never directly addresses the objection to local democratic control- raised 
by Marshall (1986: 145), Oliver (1987: 235) and Smith (1987: 64) - that 
decentralised decision-making about the distribution of coercion and protection is 
inimical to ideals of universality and consistency in law enforcement and the 
administration of justice rooted deep in liberal democratic thinking on the rule of 
law. Reserving the power to prescribe minimum standards of service and protect 
the rights and needs of local minorities to some central authority goes some way 
towards overcoming the difficulty but may not end the argument to the 
satisfaction of all those who contend that the consistent enforcement of a 
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universally applicable body of criminal law is a fundamental tenet of liberal 
democratic consitutionalism. 
Lustgarten's (1986: 179-181) approach to the problem of police culture is also 
slightly unsatisfactory. He notes Waddington's (1984b) reservations about 
attempting to democratise policing in the face of rank-and-file subversion only to 
doubt their empirical validity and express exasperation at the underlying 
phenomenological rule-scepticism of Waddington's position. Neither of these 
arguments is especially convincing. Empirically, Lustgarten's case is based on 
work about improvements in relations between the police and African-Americans 
achieved largely as a result of the transformative powers of progressive police 
chiefs spurred on by a growing black middle class. I3 The American example does 
give some cause for optimism, yet the weight of evidence presented by successive 
studies on the introduction of innovative policing styles suggests that the 
subversive inclinations of front line police personnel should not be 
underestimated (Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987; Irving et aI, 1989; Fielding et al 
1989; McConville and Shepherd, 1992; Dixon and Stanko, 1993). 
Then, to counteract Waddington's rule scepticism, Lustgarten deploys arguments 
about the permissiveness of the legal framework in which the occupational culture 
develops and comes to dominate police practice derived from the structuralist 
critique of criminal justice advanced by Doreen McBarnet (1981). This is an 
unfortunate piece of eclecticism for a liberal democratic constitutionalist since the 
essence of McBarnet's (1981: 167) case is that the 'rhetoric of law in capitalist 
society', extolling the principles of 'legality and the rule of law', is negated by 
deep structures of economic inequality. Her conclusion that the legal system 'can 
reproduce the ideology of justice while denying it', and allow 'the state through 
law [to] give class-based ideas 'the form of universality', simply cannot be 
reconciled with Lustgarten's - still less Uglow's - apparent faith in the rule of law 
142 
and the principles of liberal democracy. In any event, Lustgarten (1986: 181) is 
eventually forced to admit that 'the relative autonomy of bureaucracies from their 
ostensible masters is one of the intractable realities of modern government' 
leaving the question of whether locally elected police authorities might be able to 
confront that reality with any hope of success tantalisingly open. 
Left realism 
Left realism emerged as a distinctive criminological paradigm from the 'new 
criminology' of the 1970s (see Taylor et ai, 1973; 1975). Its theoretical 
foundations thus lie outside the liberal democratic tradition that informed the 
positions of both constitutional conservatives and critics like U glow and 
Lustgarten. Yet left realism also represents a significant break in the Left's 
thinking on everything from the aetiology of crime to the impact of criminal 
victimisation and policing. 14 This is not the place to attempt a restatement of the 
tenets of left realism. But it would be unwise to take the left realists' contribution 
to the police accountability debate of the 1980s entirely out of context, not least 
because of the central place given to the reaction to offending by the police and 
other state agencies in understanding the nature of crime and defining the scope of 
'realist' criminological inquiry. 
[C]riminology must embrace the totality of the criminal process: it must 
be true to its reality. And this reality must include the offender, the 
victim, informal social control, and the state (eg. policing). These are the 
four dimensions of criminology. (Jones et ai, 1986: 3, emphasis in 
original)15 
Four features of left realist criminology are of special relevance here. The first is 
its evolution in the highly competitive market for criminological theory and 
policy prescription that emerged in the 1980s and persists into the 1990s (Downes 
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and Rock, 1995). This has resulted in a characteristically polemical style of 
presentation where the virtues of left realism are contrasted with the manifest 
inadequacies of, in various contexts, 'administrative criminology', 'liberal 
constitutionalism', the 'market model', 'right realism', and, with the added asperity 
to be expected when old friends fall out, 'left idealism,.16 The effect of this has 
often been to exaggerate differences between left realism and these other schools 
of thought while masking the significant measure of agreement between them 
about the need for change in policing and the general direction that reform should 
take. Having said that, there can be little doubt that left realism is distinctive in its 
search for the aetiology of crime in the relative deprivation and political 
marginalisation of significant sections of contemporary society, particularly in the 
inner cities. Left realists also stress - supported by evidence from their trademark 
empirical device, the local victimisation survey - the seriousness and 'reality' of 
the problem of crime for the most deprived and marginal sections of the working 
class, for women, and for ethnic minorities. I7 A fmal insight of importance here 
is the left realists' insistence on the intra-class nature of most criminal 
victimisation. 
Taylor and a 'practical socialist criminology' 
This then is the general criminological thinking behind the left realist view of 
police accountability. The next task is to take a look at that view as it unfolded in 
three key texts. The fITst of these is a book by Ian Taylor on Law and Order that 
appeared in 1981 as part of a series with the subtitle, Arguments for Socialism. 
Though never explicitly 'realist', this book was intended to be a turning point in 
the Left's theorisation of, and attitudes towards, policing and the police. Taylor'S 
(1981: 204) purpose was to make the case for democratic control of the police as 
part of the 'thoroughgoing democratisation' of the British state and its institutions 
demanded in an earlier book by Tony Benn (1980). Taylor saw the 
democratisation of policing as a way of opening a vital institution 
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... to the influences and demands of organised social interests ... who 
experience the state primarily as a bureaucratic and impersonal agency (a 
part of a disciplinary apparatus, run by an unidentified 'them', rather than 
as part of 'our' community). (Taylor, 1981: 205) 
Progress, he argued, was urgently needed in devising a 'practical socialist 
criminology'. One element of this would be an end to the Left's 'agnosticism' -
short of some future socialist society - on questions of policing; and an 
engagement with widespread popular (and especially 'respectable' white working 
class) support for hard and profoundly anti-democratic 'fire-brigade' policing as a 
response to 'real' problems of street crime and youth disorder (Taylor, 1981: 150-
1). With the demands for effective social defence of women and black people in 
particular continually frustrated by the inability of the existing 'state police' to 
meet their needs, the challenge for the Left was to create a service capable of 
doing so 'in a divided and pluralistic society' (Taylor, 1981: 154). 
Having drawn attention to this defect in the intellectual armoury of the Left, 
Taylor eschewed the temptation to fill it. His book sets out no clear programme 
of reform for policing. But it does suggest some of the themes that were to 
dominate the more self-consciously left realist, and assertively policy-oriented, 
works to come. So, for example, he (1981: 155) condemns the shift from peace-
keeping 'via the maintenance of close personal relationships with particular 
localities' to policing 'at one remove from the locality' based on high mobility and 
'massive technological support'. 
[The police institution] has been drawn increasingly into fire-brigade 
forms of policing, in which specially trained units (like the [Metropolitan 
Police Special Patrol Group]) act, like the army, to enforce a state (rather 
than a particular, local) definition of order. 
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These criticisms of centralism, 'fire-brigading', militarism, and 'high technology' 
reverberate through the left realist work that was to follow and give rise to their 
emphasis on localised 'consensual' policing. Taylor also engages with the 
problem of 'community' as the basis for a new style of policing and the 
democratisation of accountability. After giving short shrift to deluded 
celebrations of 'community' in the atomised social worlds of the new towns and 
high-raise estates built to replace old working class urban neighbourhoods, he 
argues that the task for socialist politics is to salvage 'some sense of specific class 
and community interest' from the chaos (Taylor, 1981: 156). This too is a 
challenge taken up in later left realist writing. 
Finally we have a call to open up 'the political space' created by the contradiction 
between 'the technological and political logic' of contemporary state policing and 
'the popular demand for policing as a defence of community' (Taylor, 1981: 157). 
Here, presaging once again the arguments of left realists to come, Taylor offers a 
cautious endorsement of moves by the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
(AMA) to have non-elected magistrates removed from provincial police 
authorities, and of Jack Straw MP's attempt to give those authorities additional 
powers to control general policing strategy in their area by means of a private 
member's bill introduced in Parliament in March 1980.18 Taylor's (1981: 158-9) 
justification for supporting such 'fundamentally liberal' demands harks back to his 
'idealistic' past, and underlines the importance of his book in the metamorphosis 
of new criminological thinking on the police into 'left realism' on the one hand, 
and 'critical interventionism' and 'socialist justice' on the other. Achieving the 
degree of accountability envisaged by Jack Straw and the AMA would, he 
concedes, leave the problem of the 'equal enforcement of law' in a bourgeois 
society characterised by 'the unequal relations of capital and labour, men and 
women, black and white' unresolved. Bringing the police under a liberal regime 
of democratic control would not in itself 'bring about a socialist social order'. But 
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it would - and this is where Taylor's position is infonned by his old 'idealism' _ 
serve to problematise existing policing practices and their mismatch with the 
needs of 'different publics'. 
Left realism and the democratisation of local policing 
Some of Taylor's themes were taken up in two seminal left realist texts in the mid 
1980s: What Is To Be Done About Law and Order? and Losing The Fight Against 
Crime (Lea and Young, 1984; Kinsey et aI, 1986).19 The first point to note about 
these books is that the left realist case for democratically accountable policing is 
built around a series of untested and ultimately highly questionable assertions 
linking the ineffectiveness of increasingly 'military' styles of policing to the 
public's alienation from the police and consequent unwillingness to provide them 
with the infonnation they need to win the fight against crime. 
The starting-point [for a new structure of local police accountability] is 
our assumption of the inextricable relationship between accountability, 
public support and efficiency. Without accountability the vicious circles 
... of declining flow of information to the police from the public and 
declining police efficiency cannot be broken. For it is only through the 
accountability of the police to the local political system that public 
confidence in them can be increased, and with it, the flow of information. 
(Kinsey et ai, 1986: 175) 
To put matters right, and secure an effective police response to the 'real' social 
problem of crime experienced by working class people (attested to by the findings 
of their 'second generation' local victimisation surveys), the realists argue that the 
public must be prepared to provide more infonnation about crime to the police. 
And this, they assert, will only happen when the police are made democratically 
accountable to local people. The problem with this argument is that it is based 
almost entirely on wishful thinking. Each of the following propositions - essential 
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to the realist case - about (to use a favourite 'realist' term) the aetiology of 
working class community safety may conceivably be true, but the realists provide 
no evidence to support their assertions, or for believing that every link in the 
causal chain will hold good in the way they suggest. 
1. Popular influence over local police policy-making will nurture public 
confidence in the police. 
2. Greater public trust will increase the flow of information about crime 
to the police. 
3. This will improve crime clear-up rates and make the police more 
'efficient' . 
4. More efficient policing will reduce levels of working class 
victimisation.2o 
If their instrumental 'accountable policing is efficient policing' argument was all 
the left realists had to say on the subject, 'What is to be done?' and 'Losing the 
fight' could be passed over without more ado. But it is not, and what I want to 
focus on here is the way in which Kinsey, Lea and Young deal with some of the 
most serious objections to the local democratisation of policing. 
The fIrst of these objections refers to the risk of partiality if control over policing 
is to pass into the hands of powerful, but not necessarily representative, local 
interest groups, and connects it with the difficulty (identifIed by Ian Taylor 
amongst others) offmding a functioning 'community' to 'consent' to local 
policing. Lea and Young's (1984: 237) solution to this problem is 
characteristically bold and lies in the potential for even the most socially 
heterogeneous and apparently disorganised groups of people to function - given 
the right conditions - as effective political 'communities'. In essence they argue 
that, rather than wait for a politically responsible entity to emerge from the social 
diversity of the typical urban neighbourhood before establishing decentralised 
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structures of popular decision-making, institutions of local democracy must be 
constructed so as to allow the hitherto politically inchoate 'community' to develop 
itself into a body capable of controlling local policing (Lea and Young, 1984: 
238-9)?1 
But this does not dispose of the 'partiality' objection entirely, and for the rest of 
Lea and Young's reply to it we must go on to consider their rebuttal of a second 
counter argument: the claim that policing is a technical matter best handled by 
professionals unhindered by the constraints of democratic process. On this view, 
the rapid development of police technology, a growing reliance by individual 
forces on national police services, and 'the unique role of the police as the 
enforcers of law' all require that police managers discharge their responsibilities 
without interference from lay people lacking the necessary training and expertise 
(Lea and Young, 1984: 241). In response, Lea and Young observe that the 
'professionalisation' of ineluctably political decision-making is a familiar 
bureaucratic device. They also suggest that 'technological' policing - and the 
insidious militarism that goes with it - is neither necessary nor (recall their 
argument about the impact of public alienation on police efficiency) desirable. 
Police enjoying the consent of local people would not require the same level of 
technical back up, nor rely so heavily on national support services. 
But what of the argument that only suitably trained and assertively 'professional' 
decision-makers unbeholden to vulgar opinion are capable of ensuring, as the rule 
of law requires, that 'an individual committing a particular crime stands an equal 
chance of being prosecuted for it irrespective of where he or she commits that 
crime' (Lea and Young, 1984: 241)? To meet this objection, they call for the 
creation of the office of Crown or Public Prosecutor to iron out 'any substantively 
unjust inconsistencies in enforcement between different police force areas' 
(Kinsey et ai, 1986: 182). Independent both of the police and local democratic 
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control - and working within the legislatively defined 'range of illegalities' that 
the police are obliged to combat - prosecutors would take the final decision to 
institute criminal proceedings 'not only on the strength of evidence in particular 
cases, but on the desirability of public funds being spent on particular classes of 
offence' (Kinsey et ai, 1986: 181-2; and cf. Lea and Young, 1984: 244).22 
However, with responsibility for the consistent application of national criteria on 
prosecution safely vested in a Public Prosecutor, the left realists believed that 
discretionary law enforcement by the police short of a decision to prosecute 
should be subject to local democratic control by a system of elected police 
authorities.23 According to their proposals, non-elected magistrates would be 
removed from existing authorities set up under the Police Act 1964 and replaced 
by co-opted 'police representatives' (Kinsey et ai, 1986: 176). The key function of 
these reconstituted authorities would be to produce a general policing strategy 
containing - in addition to standard information about resources, recruitment and 
appointments - a 'crime profile' for the area detailing 'the types of crime from 
which different sections of the local community are suffering', an outline of 'the 
general methods whereby the police are to deal with crime', and criteria to be used 
in deciding when certain types of operation (such as surveillance) may be used, 
and how the police will respond to calls for assistance (Kinsey et ai, 1986: 178-
9).24 The main restriction on authorities' powers would be their inability 'to give 
the chief constable directions in any individual case' (Kinsey et ai, 1986: 179). 
Unfortunately the scope of this limitation is left unexplained and it is unclear how 
the 'any individual case' formula would fit with Lustgarten's much more precise 
specification of the limits on a police authority's powers of direction based on the 
dicta of Lawton LJ in the CEGB case referred to earlier. 
For the left realists then the role of local police authorities constituted through the 
normal process of representative democracy, and acting as 'the public voice of 
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policing policy' would be to set broad parameters for the police (Kinsey e/ ai, 
1986: 176)?5 But, within those parameters, the prime instigators of police action 
should be the public themselves: 
[C]rime must be investigated by the police with the public initiating 
action at two levels. First, at the collective level, the local police 
authority must establish, through the democratic process, the general 
guidelines for the exercise of police discretion and the priorities for the 
area. Second, at the individual level, the public shall request police 
assistance. Here the decision to involve the police in a particular matter, 
in by far the majority of cases, is best left to those immediately 
concerned. (Kinsey et aI, 1986: 190) 
Although Kinsey et a/ (1986: 189; 193) candidly admit that 'policing is, by its 
very nature, coercive' what they describe as their theory of 'minimal policing' is 
intended to do three things. Firstly to control the police use offorce. Secondly, 
to focus their attention on the 'fight against crime'. And thirdly to circumscribe 
the exercise of police discretion by hedging it about with guidelines from an 
elected police authority and ensuring that, in most cases, police action is not self-
initiated (or 'proactive' as the jargon would have it) but taken only in response to 
a call for assistance from a member of the pUblic.26 
The final counter-argument to democratised policing dealt with by Lea and 
Young is that - given the move towards 'community policing' initiated by Lord 
Scarman - conditions of close co-operation between police and people can be 
created without 'politicising' policing and creating unnecessarily formal 
representative institutions. Their answer to this is quite straightforward. They 
agree that the central aims of Scarmanite 'community policing' and their own 
brand of democratically accountable policing are similar - re-establishing popular 
consent, increasing the flow of information from the public to the police, and 
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halting the drift towards militarisation are shared objectives. But, they argue, one 
crucial difference between the two approaches remains. Under Lord Scarman's 
regime of community policing, built around the community constable and local 
consultation, communities and their representatives are unable to control the 
activities of the police in the sense of having the 'right to decide local policing 
policy' (Lea and Young, 1984: 247).27 The disadvantage with such arrangements, 
as Lea and Young rightly observe, is that they are most likely to succeed in areas 
where 'the police and the community already share quite articulated conceptions 
of the nature and priorities of the policing process', and to fail in those 
neighbourhoods where popular resistance to the police is widespread. It is in this 
more inhospitable environment, they argue that the need for local democratic 
institutions with real powers is most pressing if non-existent urban 'communities' 
are to develop into viable, and genuinely representative, political entities capable 
of influencing police decision-making. 
It should be evident from this necessarily abbreviated survey of the left realist 
position on police accountability that, though brought up in a 'critical' tradition 
unsympathetic to the liberal democratic paradigm, Kinsey, Lea and Young go to 
considerable lengths to meet objections inspired by very much the same 'rule of 
law' principles (to do with neutrality, independence and consistency) espoused by 
U glow and Lustgarten. In doing so they deal - with varying degrees of success -
with such important issues as the scope for democratic control of police decision-
making, the subtle 'democratic' influence over police activity wielded by 
individual members of the public in demanding police assistance, the institutional 
changes needed to make local democratic accountability work, and the crucial 
developmental role reformed police authorities and liaison panels might play in 
reviving feelings of political community amid the social dislocation and economic 
deprivation experienced by working class people particularly in the inner cities. 
But their work also has significant shortcomings. Leaving aside the criticisms of 
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their main argument for democratic accountability made earlier, neither of the 
main left realist texts of the 1980s makes any serious attempt to explain how 
democratically determined local priorities should be transmitted to operational 
police officers, or what steps might be taken to ensure that, once communicated, 
they are adhered to.28 Nor for that matter do their proposals for a national 
prosecuting authority succeed in deflecting the criticism that local accountability 
may result in sharply divergent patterns of law enforcement up to the point of 
prosecution. 
Critical interventionism 
The third main current of critical thinking about police accountability in the 1980s 
is to be found in the work of a group of academics-cum-activists that included 
Paul Gilroy, Paul Gordon, Phil Scraton and Joe Sim. Teasing a consistent 'critical 
interventionist' position from Scraton's (1985) early review of The State of the 
Police and the essays contained in his subsequent (1987) edited volume of 
'readings in critical criminology' is a task to be undertaken with some 
circumspection since neither text provides anything approaching the kind of 
systematic critique of constabulary independence mounted by Lustgarten (1986) 
or Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984). Nor is any alternative conception of 
accountable policing clearly delineated. So, if the following exposition lacks 
something in coherence, it is largely because Scraton and his colleagues never 
attempted to pull there often somewhat disparate arguments together in a 
systematic fashion. 
Critical interventionism is grounded in an explicit rejection of the main claims of 
liberal democracy about the consensual basis of the state and its institutions 
including the law, the courts and the police. Thus Scraton (1987: 180) challenges 
the assumption that the state and the administration of justice are impervious to 
'the influence of specific economic interests' and questions whether the mere 
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existence of an electoral process based on a universal adult franchise is enough to 
invest government and legislation with the legitimating force of 'the will of the 
people'. He also doubts the asswnptions made under the rubric of 'the rule of law' 
about the fairness and impartiality of enforcement action taken by the police and 
other state agents, and impugns their supposed role as "neutral arbiters' geared to 
the settlement of aberrant conflict in an otherwise smooth-running system'. 
Scraton (1987: 181) and his fellow interventionists are profoundly sceptical about 
the existence of any overwhelming social consensus in a patriarchal, post-
colonial, capitalist society, and deny both the neutrality and legitimacy of the 
bourgeois state. They question the ability of its agents to transcend the conflict 
endemic in a social formation fractured by divisions of class, race and gender. 
For Scraton, the British state and its institutions are the outcome of a long history 
of social and political struggle in the context of gross inequalities in 'the political 
and economic structures of production and reproduction'. The rule of law, so 
crucial to liberal democratic notions of justice, is little more than an ideological 
confidence trick whereby the existence of real economic, political and social 
inequalities are denied in the formally disinterested and impartial processes of 
enforcement and adjudication. 
Thus the police, like the courts, operate primarily to defend and service 
existing social relations (of patriarchy, of advanced capitalism, of 
neocolonialism) and established property rights and to manage conflict 
by force when it cannot be contained through the formalised political and 
ideological procedures of negotiation. (Scraton: 1987: 181) 
The dissatisfaction of the critical interventionists with the asswnptions of liberal 
democracy is complimented by their frustration with the epistemology of value-
free social science. They believe that, like other applied social scientists, 
criminologists must work explicitly and self-consciously within the social, 
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political and economic context of their time. In this respect they see themselves 
as part of a new wave of thinkers, liberated from the stultifying orthodoxies of 
structural functionalism by developments in labelling and critical theory in the 
1960s and early 1970s, and wedded to 'an interventionism with real commitment 
to the powerless in the context of an unjust and inequitable social order' (Sim et 
aI, 1987: 10).29 
Their continuing commitment to an uncompromisingly critical perspective on the 
state and its institutions, and to working with the powerless - women, black 
people, Irish nationalists, prisoners and so forth - inevitably brought the critical 
interventionists into conflict with the adherents of less radical schools of thought 
on contemporary policing. Notable amongst their opponents were the left realists 
and those within or close to the police service who believed that improvements in 
relations between the police and at least some of the policed could be achieved 
without disturbing the existing constitutional arrangements. Indeed their 
disagreements with the left realists and supporters of versions of 'community 
policing' such as John Alderson, Lord Scarman and Sir Kenneth Newman are 
helpful in gaining an understanding of the development of critical interventionist 
thinking on the police. 
Critical interventionism and left realism 
Like rival siblings squabbling over the legacy of a rich but absent-minded parent, 
the interventionists and the left realists spent most of the 1980s grappling both 
with each other, and with the critical criminological tradition in which they had all 
been raised. Smarting from Jock Young's remarkably successful efforts to set up 
what they saw as a '[left] idealist straw man' (Sim et aI, 1987: 39), the critical 
interventionists riposted with an attack on the unreality of Young's (and his 
collaborators') prescriptions for police accountability. Thus Sim, Scraton and 
Gordon (1987: 46) lambaste the left realists for their belief that a 'new-found 
accountability will ensure that the vicious circle of alienation' between police and 
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policed is broken. They accuse them of a multitude of sins: of under-estimating 
the complexity and bitterness of the relationship between the police and important 
sections of the black, Irish and working class communities; of providing no clue 
as to when the flow of information to the police that this new accountability is 
intended to encourage began to dry up; of failing to explain how that flow is 
related to the crime rate and hence to public confidence in the police as 
'crimefighters'; of assuming, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, that 
police activity has an effect on the amOllllt of crime experienced by the public; of 
exaggerating the salience of crime as a source of popular concern by over-reading 
the results of their own local crime surveys; and finally of prioritising the 
'crimefighting' function of the police against 'the historical evidence which shows 
that the police have been a force against rather than a service for working class 
people,.30 The interventionists' fmal point - and in m~y ways their most 
conclusive - was that the enactment of the realist reform programme was almost 
entirely dependent on the electoral success of a political party - namely the 
Labour Party - that, even in opposition, was incapable of moving the terms of the 
debate on policing off the 'very terrain on which the law and order debate has 
been constructed and developed by the right and state spokespeople' (Sim et aI, 
1987: 54). 
Critical interventionism and reformism 
Advocates of 'community policing' and 'community consultation' stand similarly 
accused of ignoring the history of the police in Britain. So Gordon (1987: 122) 
argues that their brand of reformism seeks to return to a mythical consensual 
tradition at odds both with the revisionist police histories of writers such as 
Robert Storch (1981) and more recent evidence of a 'hot war' between the police 
and black people, for example in the Handsworth area of Birmingham (John, 
1970). Far from providing a palatable antidote to the creeping militarisation of 
British policing, Gordon argues that the kind of community policing' espoused by 
Alderson (1979) and Scarman (1981) amounts to a concerted effort by a coercive 
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state institution to penetrate civil society and mobilise welfare agencies and 
already privileged 'communities' behind policies of social exclusion, 
marginalisation and control directed against those perceived to be a threat to 
social order. According to him, such tactics complement rather than contradict 
the dominant ethos of 'hard', reactive, policing by attempting to improve the 
intelligence gathering capability upon which it relies, and building public support 
for the institution charged with carrying it out. As an integral part of this 'soft' 
policing strategy, initiatives like neighbourhood watch and 'community policing' 
have the dual purpose of diverting attention from demands for genuine police 
accountability and co-opting sections of the population to the task of policing. 
The politics of policing 
Although, as was suggested earlier, no defmitive statement of the critical 
interventionist perspective on police accountability is possible, the rough outlines 
of their position can be discerned. Like the Weberian liberal democrats they are 
not, the critical interventionists believe that coercion or violence is the distinctive 
stock in trade of the police as a state institution. However, consistent with their 
rejection of rule of law ideology and liberal democratic assumptions about the 
consensual basis of the state in an advanced capitalist society, they maintain that 
the use of violence by the police (whether in the form of 'legal' reasonable force 
or 'illegal' brutalities) is skewed in its distribution in a more or less systematic 
way (Gilroy and Sim, 1987: 87-8; Scraton, 1987: 180). As a result, certain social 
groups - black people, animal rights and peace activists, strikers, gays, and Irish 
nationalists, the 'rough' or marginal working class, to name but a few - are 
consistently targeted for police action taken in defence of an unjust and 
inequitable social order. In short: 
Policing is a profoundly political process. Police work entails the use, 
often in a very arbitrary way, of violence and coercion. (Gilroy and Sim, 
1987: 79) 
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The heart of the problem lies not in the evident injustice of 'aberrant' repressive 
laws or isolated cases of police misconduct, but in the nature and form of the legal 
process itself which allows 'legality and illegality [to] become part of the same 
institutional structure' (Gilroy and Sim, 1987: 87).31 To believe, as the left has 
tended to do, that police misconduct is both rare and 'technically illegal' is 
dangerously naive, revealing a failure on the one hand to acknowledge the 
experience of the victims of police malpractice and, on the other, to appreciate 
that 'the effect of law on police practice at street level is permissive rather than 
restrictive' (Gilroy and Sim, 1987: 89-90). 
Law in general offers no formula for calculating police priorities or 
practical guidelines as to what, for example, patrolling officers ought to 
do. Instead, legal powers which were framed with the control of 
particular street populations in mind, become a unified resource with 
which officers are able to legitimate any course of action they engage in. 
(Gilroy and Sim, 1987: 90) 
Treating police accountability as an 'exclusively administrative and institutional 
use', and reducing police reform to a technical problem to do with the creation of 
'a framework of legal safeguards capable of inhibiting the deviant urges of the 
force's bad apples', is thus sadly misguided. It is not, the interventionists suggest, 
the absence of particular legal constraints that matters but the permissive nature of 
the legal process within which those formal prohibitions are set and its ability to 
reinforce the real inequities of an unjust social order by eliding them in a process 
of enforcement and adjudication legitimated by the rhetoric of impartiality, 
neutrality and consent. Within this permissive framework, the interventionists 
argue, the police operate with a degree of autonomy that is virtually unique 
among state institutions. At chief officer level this autonomy has been won, by 
the routine assertion (by the police) and acceptance (by successive governments) 
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of the need for 'operational independence' in detennining policies and priorities. 
Further down the hierarchy the constable on the street enjoys even more latitude 
in exercising a 'professional discretion' in law enforcement. In practice this 
discretion is informed by an occupational culture that writes 'whole areas, and 
therefore the people in them ... as 'scum, 'niggers' or 'slags" (Scraton, 1987: 154). 
Scraton (1987: 153-4) contends that the police have taken advantage of their 
political autonomy and professional discretion 'to prioritize and interpret laws 
selectively towards differential enforcement' following 'a well-established 
tradition in the surveillance, regulation, and control of 'target' individuals, groups 
and communities'. During the 1980s the selection of , targets' for such differential 
enforcement 'reflects a clear coincidence of interests' - based on the values of a 
narrow, intolerant and fundamentalist conservatism - between a new breed of 
'political' chief officers, representatives of the rank and file articulating the 
familiar nostrums of the occupational culture, and Conservative administrations 
under Mrs Thatcher bent on pursuing socially divisive economic policies and 
harrying opponents demonised as 'the enemy within' (Scraton, 1987: 154). The 
convoluted conspiracy theories beloved of the left are not for Scraton and his 
colleagues. So, for example, the events of 1985 - the policing of the coal dispute, 
the Stonehenge 'Peace Convoy', a student demonstration against Home Secretary 
Leon Brittan's appearance at Manchester University, and disturbances in Brixton, 
Handsworth and Tottenham - are seen not as evidence of some devious plot 
between the Thatcher government and the police. Rather they are taken to 
exemplify conflict arising out of a specific economic, social and political 
conjuncture in which an increasingly autonomous state institution charged with 
the social distribution of coercive force mobilised itself to perform its historic role 
of defending a social order buckling under the pressure of economic neo-
liberalism. 
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Alternatives: monitoring and self-policing 
Given the scale of their disillusionment with the police, and their rejection of the 
naive reformism of the left realists, the critical interventionists are left with little 
scope for suggesting alternative systems of accountability short of the radical 
transformation of society that would right the manifest injustices of capitalism, 
patriarchy, and institutionalised racism. This is a bind of which they are only too 
aware, and the texts referred to here are littered with exhortations to engage with, 
and challenge, the state and its institutions, by presenting alternative accounts of 
their actions. As Gilroy and Sim (1987: 88) put it at one point, pessimism about 
the justice to be obtained from existing legal processes 'is not an argument for 
retreat from conflicts in and around the courts'. Where other critics demand the 
'democratisation' of police governance and put forward often quite detailed 
proposals for reforming police authorities, arranging for consultation on local 
policing priorities, and so on, the interventionists restrict themselves to 
recommending a series of tactics to be used in campaigning on the police. 
Three devices are seen as essential: organisation, demands and criticism. The first 
of these refers to the long-term interventionist aim of promoting conceptions of 
crime and wrongdoing which compete for popular allegiance with those that 
originate from police practice' (Gilroy and Sim, 1987: 101). Identifying such 
norms where they connect with a capacity for self-policing is an important task 
smce: 
Socialists must began [sic] to affirm and extend the belief that people are 
able to regulate their own community space and protect their lives and 
property without lapsing into vigilantism. (Gilroy and Sim, 1987: 102)32 
To be effective, work towards the goal of popular self-policing, must be combined 
with 'demands on the police and carefully documented criticism of their failures 
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and political stances' (Gilroy and Sim, 1987: 102) generated by what, in his earlier 
work on the police, Scraton (1985: 175) describes as 'the consistent, detailed 
monitoring ... of police policies and practices'. As with much else in critical 
interventionist writing, the interface between the practical activity of monitoring -
in the form of unofficial ad hoc inquiries into specific events or issues and the 
more protracted work of investigating the routine operations and practices of the 
police - and the tactics of self-organisation, demands and criticism is not entirely 
clear. But Scraton's view of the main requirements for successful police 
monitoring gives some indication of how it may promote self-organisation and 
lead to demands and criticism being made of existing police practice. For 
example, the experience of 'community self-defence' gained by monitoring groups 
working with black people in east London, the 'application of pressure' on the 
police to prioritise hitherto neglected problems of racist attacks and male violence 
against women, and the development of alternative media accounts of police 
activity all relate with some degree of specificity to the interventionist tactics 
expounded by Gilroy and Sim.33 
Churlish though it seems to carp at so broad and fundamental a critique it has to 
be said that there are obvious gaps and discontinuities in the arguments of the 
critical interventionists and many important questions are left unanswered. So, 
for instance, while Sim et al (1987: 39) are at pains to distance themselves from 
the crass reductionism that mars much Marxist writing on crime, law and the 
state, they never clearly articulate their conception of the relationship between 
patriarchy, institutionalised racism and the late capitalist mode of production on 
the one hand, and the nature and functions of the state, the law and the police on 
the other. Much is made of the permissive legal framework within which the 
police operate and of their (relative) autonomy from other state institutions, but 
we are left uncertain as to whether the development of constabulary independence 
is a matter of historical accident or the outcome of some Machiavellian political 
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design (and, if the latter, whose). Order maintenance, social control, and the use 
of coercive force in the suppression of political opposition rather than the less 
controversial task of 'crimefighting' are presented - using, both historical evidence 
and contemporary research on police activity - as the core tasks of the police. But 
no explanation is offered for the apparent enthusiasm, over most of the last 100 
years, of substantial sections of the working class for the police and their efforts 
to defend the person and property, not just of the privileged and powerful, but of 
people like themselves.34 Indeed this raises a further unexplored problem in the 
interventionist position because, though they repeatedly condemn the police for 
over-coercing and under-protecting the powerless in a patriarchal, racist, and 
class-ridden society, and vigorously contest the consensual nature of the 
prevailing social order, they are all too frequently guilty of talking about 'black', 
'Irish' and 'working class' communities as if shared experiences, attitudes or 
interests can be assumed to exist within these aggregations despite all they 
themselves have said about the deeply and multiply fractured nature of 
contemporary society. Nor, finally, is their route to a socialist salvation marked 
out with any certainty. Vigilantism is an obvious danger to be encountered along 
the road to a self-policed society, but how is it to be avoided? We are not told. 
Then again, what exactly is meant by 'self-policing'? Is it to be taken literally as 
contemplating an end to the social division of labour in the field of social control? 
Or would some form of self-organised policing involving the employment of 
outsiders under effective 'community' control- even a suitably reconstructed 
public police force - be compatible with the interventionist ideal? 
Socialist justice 
As one might expect of authors who acknowledge debts to the work of Gramsci, 
Foucault and Althusser in a study of beat policing (Grimshaw and Jefferson, 
1987), Tony Jefferson and Roger Grimshaw's (1984) approach to police 
accountability is by some way the most erudite in its philosophy and bold in its 
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engagement with democratic theory. Rather than attempt a detailed exposition of 
their position here I want to concentrate on two closely related aspects of what 
they have to say about police accountability and how it might be reconstructed on 
more democratic lines. 
Operational policy and the doctrine of constabulary independence 
The fIrst of these is the critique they offer of the doctrine of constabulary 
independence and its application to the 'operational policies' of chief constables, 
which they defme as relating to 
... the execution of the 'unique' police role with respect to law 
enforcement, crime prevention, and the preservation of public order and 
safety ... (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984: 65).35 
At chief officer level, they suggest, 'constabulary independence ... poses the 
question of accountability as the problem of discretion in general matters of law 
enforcement' whereas, at the level of constable, it concerns discretion in 
particular law enforcement situations' (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984: 62, 
emphasis in original). At this higher level, chief officers form their operational 
policies in the social context of three 'audiences': a legal audience incorporating 
institutions such as the courts, police authorities and the Home Secretary to whom 
they have a duty to answer; a democratic audience in the shape of the local 
community or 'the policed'; and occupational audiences consisting of their peers 
in other forces and the junior officers under their own command.36 But this does 
not mean that the three 'audiences' are equally influential since the necessary 
concomitant of the doctrine of constabulary independence is that policy-making 
takes place within 
... a framework fundamentally structured by law in relation to which a 
range of occupational options are available. To successfully enter the 
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debate on police policy, democratic representatives must mount their 
case in legal-occupational terms in order for their criticisms to be 
deemed 'legitimate,.37 
In other words, the effect of the independence doctrine is to guarantee the pre-
eminence of the 'legal' and 'occupational' audiences by ensuring that 
'democratic' demands are deemed legitimate only if they are articulated within 
legal-occupational parameters. 
Turning to the doctrine itself, they argue that it is conventionally justified with 
reference to the need for impartiality in law enforcement which, in the case of 
chief officers charged with the general duty of upholding the law, implies that 
they must act with equal vigour against all offences committed in their area. Yet, 
as Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984: 141-2) observe, total enforcement is a practical 
impossibility within prevailing constraints of time and resources. As a result, 
chief officers are left with the delicate task of selecting which laws to enforce and 
when to enforce them without reference to any 'external' direction or influence 
since the independence doctrine insists that the law must be their only guide and 
proscribes any reliance on 'democratic' sources. Or, as Jefferson and Grimshaw 
(1984: 142, emphasis in original) put it 
The principle of accountability to law is simply not applicable to the 
general responsibility of chief constables for upholding the law. That is 
to say that operational policy matters [relating to the selective 
enforcement of law] necessarily fall outside the scope of the principle. 
Having thus established that chief officers cannot be accountable to law for their 
operational policy decisions, Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984: 143-8) move on to 
consider how chiefs fill the void left by the doctrine of constabulary independence 
by devising their own policies of selective law enforcement. They identify five 
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strategies that police commanders might adopt ranging from a straightforward 
'maximalist' policy aimed at making optimal use of available resources to improve 
detection rates for all reported offences, through attempts to prioritise the 
enforcement of certain 'central' provisions of the criminal law, to strategies 
predicated on the application of 'common-sense' or intuitive judgements about 
'the public interest' . 
The next stage of their analysis - a review of four sets of proposals for inserting a 
measure of popular control into this policy-making process - is crucial in linking 
Jefferson and Grimshaw's critique of the legal status quo based on the doctrine of 
constabulary independence to their own system of accountable policing. The first 
two options - calls for existing public authorities to flex what institutional muscles 
they have to exert greater control over policies of selective law enforcement, and 
attempts to secure a ruling from the courts to the effect that chief constables must 
act in accordance with the 'democratic' wishes of their police authorities - are 
quickly dismissed for misunderstanding the meaning of the Police Act 1964 and 
ignoring the solidity of post-Blackburn judicial support for constabulary 
independence in 'operational' matters.38 It is only when they move on to consider 
the possibility that police authorities could be given the power to issue policy 
directions to their chief constables, as Jack Straw MP and the GLC among others 
proposed, that Jefferson and Grimshaw engage with what they regard as the key 
problem confronting all proposals for 'democratic' police reform - the potential for 
conflict between principles of legal universalism and local democracy. 
They (1984: 153) maintain that the distinction Straw and the GLC attempt to 
make between responsibility for general policing policies to be vested in 
democratic representatives, and for particular policing operations which, they 
agree, should remain in the hands of chief officers, is no more than 'a device for 
shelving the problem of the appropriate provinces of democracy and law without 
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actually resolving it,.39 What happens, for example, when a local majority, 
represented in the 'general' police policy-making process by a democratically 
elected police authority, expresses the wish that a particular law is not enforced? 
[I]f the democratic representatives ignore the fluctuations of public 
opinion and recognise only the consistency of law, they will be open to 
the same charge that has been levelled against chief officers under the 
present system i.e. that, in attempting to follow only the demands of legal 
duty and avoid the influence of community opinion, they are 
undemocratic. (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984: 153) 
And what of the chief officer asked by his or her police authority, on the strength 
of a local democratic mandate, not to enforce a certain law as a matter of general 
policy? 'The law' to which chief officers are accountable requires that 'the law' as 
a set of universally applicable rules is upheld. Yet the general policy of the local 
police authority which the chief must also follow prohibits enforcement of 
particular provisions to which a majority of local people do not assent. For 
Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984: 153), conflict between principles of legal 
universalism (enshrined in the duty of chief officers to uphold 'the law') and local 
democracy (reflected in the ability of elected representatives to adopt a policy of 
selective non-enforcement in accordance with the wishes of their constituents) 
... cannot be resolved by separating particular operations from general 
policy and assigning the first to the representative of law and the other to 
the representative of democracy. 
The fourth set of proposals for increasing popular control of policing dealt with 
by Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984: 154) shares this 'contradictory aim of making 
democracy supreme over, yet still dutiful towards, law'. In essence, this last 
approach seeks to replace the bureaucratic device of an elected police authority 
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with a more diffuse and participatory form of 'community control' involving the 
citizen in moulding 'his own destiny through direct political action' (Hain, 1979: 
23). 
The kernel of Jefferson and Grimshaw's critique of existing constitutional 
arrangements is not that the principle of an independent constabulary impartially 
adhering to the letter of the law is incompatible with democratic theory. On the 
contrary, they acknowledge that the law - a set of universal rules promulgated by 
an elected legislature - is itself a legitimate form of authority within a democratic 
state. Their objection is, rather, that the independence doctrine compels chief 
officers to formulate a general policy for upholding the law without reference to 
any democratic authority at all. Universal enforcement is a chimera, yet the law 
provides no guidance as to how more selective policies are to be framed, while 
constabulary independence effectively insulates chief constables from local 
democratic opinion articulated, for instance, by police authorities. Moreover they 
contend that proposals for reform along the lines put forward by Jack Straw and 
the GLC are also flawed because they fail to resolve the potential conflict 
between, on one hand, the general (legal) duty to uphold the law imposed on chief 
officers and the new police authorities the reformers propose and, on the other, 
the (democratic) duty of such authorities to reflect the will of the electorate by 
ordering their chief officers not to enforce particular provisions of that general 
law. 
A socialist conception of public justice 
According to Jefferson and Grimshaw, what is lacking in both the existing 
arrangements for police governance under the doctrine of constabulary 
independence, and the reform proposals of Jack Straw and the GLC, is a 
consistent, and consistently 'democratic', basis for the formation of operational 
policies of selective law enforcement. Their solution to this problem is the second 
aspect of their work that I want to consider here, and it begins with their belief 
167 
that for policing, or any other governmental practice, to be democratic it must also 
be just. And to be just, policing must 'guard the common rights and interests of 
all' (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984: 155). That is, it must be founded on some 
conception of public justice or 
... [ a way] of thinking about how all citizens within a democracy can 
have their interests in the legal operations of the police recognised; about 
how all individuals as democratic citizens may gain a 'fair' share of the 
limited police attention available. (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984: 157, 
emphasis in original).40 
In achieving this they reject an 'individualist', liberal democratic, conception of 
public justice based on notions of formal equality that ignore real disparities in 
areas of social life such as the distribution of property or opportunities to acquire 
it where arrangements are treated as 'involuntary'. In its place, they argue for 
policing to be grounded in a 'socialist' vision of public justice that aims to 
achieve substantive equality between citizens and takes cognisance of skewing in 
the distribution of wealth ( and power) in a capitalist society. Instead of seeking 
merely to equalise what they call 'offender' and 'victimisation' rates across 
different social groupings on the assumption that such 'voluntary' social activities 
as 'offending' or 'being a victim' can be isolated from inequalities in 'involuntary' 
relationships to do with wealth and the ownership of property, they argue that, 
... in order to realise equality before the law, it is necessary to be aware 
of the existence of inequalities in social relationships not characterised 
by choice and compensate them/or them. (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 
1984: 163, emphasis addedtl 
Policing based on a socialist conception of public justice would thus allow 
decision-makers to compensate for the fact that the aflluent are better placed to 
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defend themselves by attempting to reduce rates of victimisation among poorer 
people (relatively disadvantaged by inequalities in the involuntary sphere of 
property ownership) not just to but below those pertaining among the well-off. 
By the same token, it would also be justifiable to lower the proportion of poor 
people acted against as offenders in recognition of the more limited 'choice' they 
have in 'deciding' to break the law. 
What this means is that by recognising the inequalities perpetrated by 
involuntary social arrangements and their connection with other areas of 
social life, socialist justice is also able to recognise that the social impact 
on victims of particular offence categories is unequal, as are the social 
conditions of offenders (for particular offences or offence categories). 
(Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984: 163, emphasis in original) 
Alternatives 
Jefferson and Grimshaw's critical dissection of the constitutional status quo and 
their advocacy of a socialist conception of public justice as the lodestar of 
operational police policy-making lays the foundations for their own alternative 
system of democratic police accountability. This comprises two distinct packages 
of reforms: one fairly conventional and aimed at improving what they (1984: 172-
3) call 'the judicial sphere of accountability'; the other more innovative and 
intended to bridge the gap between the non-elected 'judicial office' of constable 
and the elected 'executive offices' of Rome Secretary and police authority.42 The 
first package encompasses plans to establish an independent prosecuting 
authority, extend suspects' rights, improve the investigation and resolution of 
official complaints and provide for new methods of testing evidence gathered by 
the police. 
The second involves the election of a network of locally-based public 
commissions placed under a duty to uphold the law and charged with interpreting 
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the general legal duty of the police in those cases where no complainant exists and 
the law itself does not provide unambiguous guidance as to the action it would be 
appropriate for the police to take. To inform their policy-making and the 
instructions they issue to chief officers on matters of law enforcement policy and 
the conduct of particular operations, commissions would be expected to canvass 
all shades of opinion on policing but have special responsibility for uncovering 
the large areas of 'unvoiced and suppressed' need ignored under the present 
system of accountability. They would also be required to adopt - and publicly 
declare - definitions of public justice to guide their deliberations, and to consider 
petitions from citizens who 'consider themselves to stand unequally before the 
protective and controlling aspects of the law upheld by the police'. 43 Questions 
about the scope of commissions' powers to instruct chief officers and the legality 
of the guidance issued by them would ultimately be for the courts to resolve, 
while the problem of local discrepancies in enforcement policies and practice 
would be minimised by holding annual conferences of the commissions to work 
out model resolutions and recommended statements of policy for adoption locally. 
Parliament would also be in a position to amend legislation in the light of regular 
reports received from the commissions.44 
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Notes 
1 The work considered here is only part of a voluminous literature on accountability 
dating from the late 1970s and 1980s. For a range of other views see: Hain (1979, 1980), 
Levenson (1981), Brogden (1982), Baldwin and Kinsey (1982), Christian (1983), 
Spencer (1985) and Downes and Ward (1986). 
2 The LSPC was set up by nine Labour-controlled London boroughs to continue some of 
the policy initiatives of the GLC following the latter's abolition in March 1986. The 
ALA was the local authority association for all Labour-controlled councils in London 
throughout the height of the 'police accountability' controversy. 
3 See Chapter 2 above for the tension between 'liberalism' and 'democracy' within the 
liberal democratic tradition. 
4 Uglow (1988: 30) defends this position from the charge that the 'independence' and 
'neutrality' of the police and the law are chimeras by quoting E P Thompson's famously 
trenchant statement on the ideological nature of the rule of law which ends, 'If the law is 
evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimise nothing, contribute 
nothing to any class's hegemony ... The law may be rhetoric, but it need not be empty 
rhetoric.' 
5 See Smith (1988) for a stimulating review of Lustgarten's book. 
6 Lustgarten argues that the principles of independence and accountability must 
themselves be justified in the light of a Rawlsian conception of a just social and political 
order whereby 'rational persons would agree that [within the contours of that order] they 
would willingly be subject to those whose material interests were radically different to 
their own'. 
7 Throughout his discussion Lustgarten (1986: 161) assumes that 'the mandate of the 
police is the executive task of enforcing crimina] law'. His principal ground for doing so 
is that, while the historical and social function of the police may sensibly be seen in terms 
of 'order maintenance', this is accomplished 'by the discretionary invocation of legal 
powers'. For his purposes then 'policing may be equated with law enforcement'. 
8 This is the point so perceptively made by Lawton LJ in the CEGB case referred to in 
Chapter 3. 
9 See Lustgarten (1986: 172-3) for examples of the kind of policing decisions he believes 
can properly be left to elected representatives. 
10 Principally the test of reasonableness laid down in Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223. 
11 The idea that chief officers' decisions should not be 'Wednesbury unreasonable' seems 
to have been accepted at least in principle by both courts in the International Trader's 
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Ferry Ltd. case discussed in the previous chapter and at greater length in Dixon and 
Smith (1998). 
12 See Chapters 3 and 5 for further discussion of the 'national' functions of the Met and 
the problems they posed for advocates of democratic accountability in London. 
13 The studies cited by Lustgarten were carried out by Rossi et al (1974) and Sherman 
(1983). 
14 The development of left realism can be traced in the work of Jock Young and his 
associates to the early 1980s. In addition to the works cited in the text, see Young (1981; 
1986); Mathews and Young (1992); Young and Mathews (1992) and, for a concise up-to-
date statement of the left realist case, Young (1997). 
15 In a later formulation, Young (1997: 485) lists 'formal control' as one of four 
'definitional elements' of crime and continues thus, 'Realism ... points to a square of 
crime involving the interaction between police and other agencies of social control, the 
public, the offender and the victim'. 
16 The liberal constitutionalist model of policing assailed by the left realists in the 1980s 
is that adopted by proponents of the status quo rather than the critical position adopted by 
U glow and Lustgarten. Some observers have commented that the left realists' taste for 
political polemic has led them to create a' [left] idealist straw man' that bears little 
resemblance to the 'critical interventionism' of those they castigated for their alleged 
'idealism' (Sim et aI, 1987, and see below). 
17 See Kinsey (1985); Jones et aI, 1986; Painter et al (1989); Crawford et al (1990) for 
surveys done on Merseyside and in the London boroughs of Islington and Hammersmith 
and Fulham. 
18 Mr. Straw's Bill took some care to distinguish between general strategy issues (e.g. the 
emphasis to be given to particular kinds of police work) over which a police authority 
would exercise control, and operational decisions (e.g. the response to particular calls and 
the deployment of officers on individual cases) where they would not. The AMA's 
proposals were contained in a series of papers on the police published in November 1982 
as Policies/or the Police Service (cited in Spencer, 1985: 113-5). 
19 See also Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) for an influential empirical study advocating 
consensual policing as the only model appropriate in a democratic society. 
20 The empirical basis for this instrumental argument for police accountability is virtually 
non-existent. The first Islington Crime Survey (Jones et aI, 1986: 139-145; 151-155) 
included questions on public willingness to co-operate with the police and on 
respondents' views on who should control local policing, but the two sets of findings 
hardly support the bold claims made by Kinsey and his colleagues for democratic 
accountability as the sine qua non of detective efficiency and public safety. 
21 In his admirable study of liberal democracy, C B Macpherson (1977) contrasts John 
Stuart Mill's 'developmental' model first with the earlier, and more typically liberal, 
model of 'protective' democracy, and secondly with later ideas of what he calls 'pluralist 
elitist equilibrium' and 'participatory' democracy. The essence of the developmental 
model implicit in Lea and Young's proposal is that democracy, and democratic political 
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institutions, are critical to the personal self-development of the individual in society or, in 
the words of J S Mill to the 'advancement of community ... in intellect, in virtue, and in 
practical activity and efficiency' (quoted in Macpherson, 1977: 47). 
22 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) set up under the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985 only partially meets these requirements. For instance, the public interest criteria 
used by the CPS in deciding to prosecute once an initial test of evidential sufficiency has 
been met hardly allow for the use of Kinsey et aI's, much more general criterion 
regarding the desirability of public funds being used for the prosecution of entire 
categories of offence. 
23 According to Kinsey et al (1986: 183), 'national' functions such as anti-terrorist work 
should be overseen by a Standing Committee of the House of Commons. Their argument 
in favour of the inevitability and desirability of discretionary law enforcement is a 
pragmatic acknowledgement of the requirements of justice and effectiveness given the 
open texture of legal rules, resource scarcity and the impossibility of total enforcement 
(Kinsey et ai, 1986: 166-7). 
24 Authorities would also be under a duty to inform and educate the public on policing 
policies, to oversee crime prevention activities like neighbourhood watch, appoint chief 
officers and act as the complaints authority for their area (Kinsey et ai, 1986: 176-9). 
25 To assist authorities in this task Kinsey et al (1986: 180-1) advocated a network of 
community liaison panels based on the model recommended by Lord Scarman (1981) in 
his report on the Brixton Disoders and given legislative effect in s. 106 Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The model and its implication are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 7. 
26 See Kinsey et al (1986, Chapter 9) for a thorough exposition of 'minimal policing: the 
theory and practice of a democratic force'. 
27 Community policing and its implications for accountability are discussed at length in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
28 Their conveniently ambivalent attitude towards the cultural norms of the police rank 
and file is neatly illustrated in Losing The Fight Against Crime where they proudly, and 
no doubt correctly, claim that their emphasis on crime control and law enforcement 
activity (at the expense of 'social work' functions and other forms of 'pre-emptive' 
policing) 'will accord with the gut-level response of many police officers concerning 
what is 'police work' only to state less than a dozen pages later (apropos of the cavalier 
attitude of the police towards domestic disputes) that 'we cannot accept the police's 
working definitions as the criterion for what should be done (Kinsey et ai, 1986: 196-1, 
205). 
29 This commitment to intervene in the contemporary politics of 'law and order' is no 
empty rhetoric. Apart from the police, prisons, Northern Ireland, violence against 
women, and institutionalised racism are also identified as key areas for critical 
intervention and the authors make numerous references to the various ways in which they 
and like-minded scholars have sought to contribute to 'building alternative accounts' of 
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the operation of the state and its institutions since Mrs Thatcher's first election victory in 
1979 ( Sim et ai, 1987: 10-39). 
30 Sim et al (1987: 46-48) emphasis in original. Many of these criticisms echo those 
suggested by my discussion of left realism's 'accountable policing is efficient policing' 
position in the previous section. 
31 Gilroy and Sim (1987: 88) rely here on the work of Doreen McBarnet (1981) in 
problematising the legal form and suggesting how 'the production, preparation and 
presentation of evidence does not match up to the rhetoric of justice'. Hence, for example 
a supposedly impartial legal process, adhering to the sacred principles of the rule of law, 
is able to privilege the 'official' account of events leading up to the arrest of a suspect. 
Reconstructed by police officers in the appropriate discourse of legality and procedural 
propriety, such an account is sufficient effectively to ensure that any attempt by the 
defendant to describe what really happened is viewed by the court as entirely beside the 
point. Incidentally, Gilroy and Sim (1987: 88) also take issue with E P Thompson's 
(1975) much-quoted assertion that the rule of law is an 'unqualified human good' on the 
grounds that 'the level of abstraction at which it functions makes its kernel of truth banal', 
and because it exaggerates the significance of formal legal rationality in circumstances 
where it is so readily dispensed with in the greater cause of order maintenance and social 
control. 
32 Cf. calls for 'community control' advanced, for example, by Hain (1979) and discussed 
briefly below. 
33 These aspects of monitoring are taken from Scraton (1985: 175) where he also stresses 
the importance of identifying 'police behaviour and attitudes as an institutionalised form 
rather than as the personal responses of individuals', the 'provision of practical help and 
support to victims of crime and also to victims of police violence or harassment' and 'the 
development of accessible information and public education programmes geared to the 
turning of 'cases into issues". 
34 See Cohen (1979) for a well-known illustration of police success in winning the 
confidence of the urban labour aristocracy around the tum of the century. 
35 More specifically, they refer to policies regarding such 'operational' matters as the 
deployment of personnel and equipment between functions and to particular operations, 
the operation of disciplinary procedures, and the routine institution (prior to the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985) of proceedings against offenders. These 'operational 
policies' are contrasted with what they call 'administrative policy' decisions about the size 
and structure of the force and the equipment available to it in respect of which they argue 
chief constables enjoy no more independence than any other manager of a public 
organisation (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984: 62). 
36 Ibid.: 66-7. 
37 Ibid.: 82. 
38 Ibid.: 148-50. 
39 It will become clear from the discussion in the next chapter that, on this point at least, 
Jefferson and Grimshaw's characterisation of the GLC's proposals is not entirely fair. 
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40 They distinguish a conception of public justice (essential if a chief constable or police 
authority is to justify policies of selective enforcement while discharging a general duty 
to uphold the law) from principles of individual justice - 'the fair or impartial application 
of the law in individual cases' - sufficient for the purposes of the beat constable dealing 
with particular offences and incidents. 
41 A purely individualist conception of public justice would require the police, for 
example, to equalise residential burglary victimisation rates by giving more attention to 
offences committed against relatively deprived, and 'over-victimised', inner city housing 
estate residents at the expense of those taking place in the more affluent suburbs. The 
same logic would also demand that equal amounts of police time be devoted to inquiries 
involving 'known criminals' and other suspects in cases where the former's record bears 
no relation to the matter in hand. 
42 Like Waddington (l984a), Jefferson and Grimshaw see police officers as discharging a 
quasi-judicial function. As was noted in the previous chapter this is no longer tenable in 
the light of the House of Lords decision in Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] A.C. 437 
(Lustgarten, 1986: 163-4). 
43 Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984: 178). They resist the temptation to make the adoption 
of an explicitly socialist conception of public justice a legal requirement. 
44 Whether this provides a complete answer to objections to local democratic 
accountability on the grounds that it leads to the subversion of the principle of equality 
before the law and the institutionalisation of a low level form of 'justice by geography' is 
debatable though one may surmise that Jefferson and Grimshaw would see such 
variations, stemming from the decisions of locally elected commissioners working to an 




Revolution or Reform: The Rise and Fall of 
Municipal Socialism 
In 1888 the newly created London County Council (LCC) passed a motion calling 
on the government of the day 
... to take an early opportunity of supplementing its scheme of Municipal 
Government for London by transferring the management of the civic 
police to the council (quoted in Bundred, 1982: 66). 
This proved a vain hope, and almost a century later, the Labour Party manifesto 
for the 1981 elections to the LCC's successor authority, the Greater London 
Council (GLC), was still promising that: 
A Labour GLC will campaign for a police authority consisting of elected 
members of the GLC and London boroughs to have control over the 
Metropolitan and City police. (quoted in ibid.: 72). 
Over the intervening years little progress had been made in insinuating locally 
elected representatives into a position of influence in the governance of the 
Metropolitan Police. 1 Informal annual consultations on the Metropolitan Police 
precept and expenditure estimates had taken place between the Receiver and two 
London borough treasurers since 1949, but the capital had been excluded from the 
reform of police governance effected by the Police Act 1964. By the late 1970s 
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dissatisfaction with the performance and financial management of the 
Metropolitan Police was growing and even a Conservative administration at 
County Hall was moved to call for the GLC to be given 'a strategic role in the 
maintenance of law and order' (Bundred, 1982: 71). To this groundswell of local 
political opposition to the continued financial independence of the police, the 
incoming Labour administration added the zeal of the new municipal socialism 
and, within two years of its election, the GLC published a detailed consultation 
paper on the 'democratic control of the police in London' (GLC, 1983).2 
TheGLC 
To set the scene, the GLC's paper begins with a dissection of the 'crisis' gripping 
policing in London: a crisis marked, it says, by widespread public distrust of the 
police, by corruption and the abuse of police powers, by a bloated and over-
centralised bureaucracy, by the routine over-coercion and under-protection of 
black and other ethnic minority people, and by mounting concerns about the 
apparent ineffectiveness of the Metropolitan Police in carrying out its basic task 
of preventing and detecting crime (paras. 8-12). This is followed by a similarly 
unsparing diagnosis of the inadequacies of the existing arrangements for police 
governance in London. While elected representatives could be trusted to defme 
issues and formulate policy for the delivery of education, housing and personal 
social service they were excluded from any formal role in the formulation of 
policing policies. Decisions about whether to take a child into care or not could 
safely be taken 'beneath the umbrella of democratic control', but in the case of 
policing 
... it is an unelected Commissioner who prioritises the various policing 
functions ... despite the fact that policing seeks to regulate the behaviour 
of citizens and that this function is ostensibly discharged in the public's 
name. (para. 29) 
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As long as the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 remained in place, the only 
external influences on the Commissioner and his Policy Committee were the 
Home Secretary and a few high-ranking civil servants in his Police Department. 3 
Although the precise nature of the relationship between the two was unclear (para. 
89), the GLC accused successive Home Secretaries of lacking a local interest in 
London's policing and allowing the Commissioner too free a hand in conducting 
his force's affairs (para. 7). Nor was the GLC impressed with the legal alternative 
to this antiquated system of political accountability. The cumulative effect of 
case law from Blackburn to Ex parte CEGB had been to render meaningless the 
courts' power to intervene in the Commissioners' exercise of his discretion in 
discharging his duty to enforce the law (para. 130).4 Managerial controls were 
also lax because of excessive centralisation and the inability of senior managers to 
maintain control over police practice on the streets (para. 113). Succinctly put, 
the GLC's case was that the existing arrangements for the governance of the 
Metropolitan Police were undemocratic, opaque, and had allowed the force to 
develop into an unaccountable bureaucratic leviathan. 5 
Underlying this critique of the nuts and bolts of police governance in London 
were some significant contributions to the wider debates about accountability 
examined in the last two chapters. So, for example, the GLC argued that the 
practical impossibility of total enforcement, and the consequent inevitability of 
police discretion, made the insertion of locally elected representatives into the 
process of police decision-making a necessity. But they also acknowledged the 
difficulty that senior commanders experienced in directing their own officers 
under the existing arrangements for police governance and concluded that: 
... a local police authority which merely replaced the Home Secretary 
would not be in a position to have a significant influence on the 
behaviour of officers on the ground. It could, given the necessary legal 
178 
powers, control force policy and ensure that standing orders and 
instructions were in accord with that policy, but it would have no way of 
ensuring that those policies were implemented uniformly across such a 
large police force. (para. 120) 
When it came to examining alternatives to the radical reforms it put forward, the 
GLC's paper was scathing in its criticism of the tri-partite structure established for 
provincial forces by the Police Act 1964 and roundly rejected it as a model for 
change in London (paras. 16 and 78). Also dismissed was any question of 
limiting the powers of an elected police authority to matters of 'policy' leaving 
'operational' decisions to be taken by the Commissioner and his subordinates.6 
Indeed, the paper goes to some lengths to expose the artificiality of distinguishing 
between a 'policy' decision to focus, say, on street robbery rather than burglary 
and 'operational' decisions about the deployment of personnel required to achieve 
such an objective (para. 81). In reality, the GLC argued, 'all operational decisions 
are potentially 'policy' issues'. If police functions had to be categorised, it was 
preferable to distinguish between 'administrative, procedural and personnel 
matters' on the one hand, and policy and operations on the other (para. 145). 
Proposals for change 
Ultimately however the analysis presented in the discussion document was but a 
preamble to the authority's proposals for a new police authority for London 
(PAL). Their plans may be summarised as follows:' 
1. A new two-tier authority should be established consisting entirely of 
elected councillors with as much power as possible devolved from 
the London-wide strategic level (in effect the GLC's own Police 
Committee) down to borough-level committees (paras. 223-4). 
2. A statutory duty to enforce the law would be imposed on the new 
PAL alone (para. 164). 
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3. Police officers and civilian personnel would become employees of 
the authority enjoying similar terms and conditions of service to 
other local government officers, including the right to join a trade 
union and take an active part in political activities (paras. 165-7) 
4. Responsibility for routine policing and for taking decisions in 
emergencies would be delegated to the police by the PAL within 
boundaries set by statute and in accordance with the authority's 
priorities (paras. 139, 154) 
5. The PAL would retain 'ultimate control of all decisions relating to 
deployment and policing methods' including the right to intervene 
in the conduct of individual operations such as the policing of a riot 
(paras. 152-4).8 
These proposals clearly entailed the abrogation of the doctrine of constabulary 
independence. Indeed they represented nothing short of a revolution in police 
governance and, to counterbalance the shift in power from police to police 
authority, the GLC suggested a number of safeguards. 
Safeguards 
The first line of defence against an overweening, or simply corrupt, authority lay 
in the substance of the GLC' s own proposal that police officers should become 
local government employees subject to the direction of elected representatives. 
Local authorities were well accustomed to prioritising the work of employees 
such as social workers, environmental health officers, and surveyors upon whose 
professional judgement they depended for the performance of duties imposed on 
the authority by statute. Hence, 
The ultimate control by the police authority over policing should not 
involve any diminution in the professional status of a police officer or the 
importance attached to hislher judgement, (para. 155) 
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Local politicians would be no more capable of influencing the decision of a police 
officer to make an arrest than of meddling in the decision of a social worker to 
make a child the subject of a place of safety order. The legality of both decisions 
depended upon the personal, situational, judgement of the individual employee be 
she police officer or social worker. It was not, and nor would it ever be, for the 
authority to involve itself in 'cases relating to individuals' (para. 151) where the 
use of a statutory power was made contingent upon a particular factual assessment 
having been made by the individual responsible for exercising that power. 9 Thus, 
in the case of a potential riot it would be permissible for the PAL to direct the 
police how to handle the disturbance by prescribing the number of officers to be 
deployed and the tactics and equipment to be used. But it would not be possible 
for it to interfere in the 'cases of individuals arrested in the context of [that] 
policing operation' (para. 152). There could be no question of the authority 
conducting its own enquiries and thus either prejudicing police investigations 
following an arrest or acting in contempt of court where a matter had become sub 
judice (para. 150). 
Should these internal safeguards fail to work, significant external controls on the 
new authority's powers would come into play. The courts would be responsible 
for ensuring that the authority discharged its duty to enforce the law, and the 
Home Secretary would retain the right to prescribe national minimum standards 
of efficiency under the supervision of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC). Finally the GLC, like many of the academic reformers whose proposals 
were considered in the last chapter, suggested that responsibility for conducting 
criminal prosecutions should be transferred from the police to an independent 
prosecution service as recommended by the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure (1981) (para. 133) and, more originally, proposed an elaborate system 
for maintaining the confidentiality of police records. 
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The London Strategic Policy Committee 
Three years after it published its discussion document on a new police authority 
for London the GLC was abolished. But its work in several important areas, 
including policing, was continued by a group of nine Labour-controlled boroughs 
that combined to form the London Strategic Policy Committee (LSPC). Within a 
year of the LSPC's formation its Police Sub-Committee published a set of revised 
proposals for reforming police governance in London under the title, Police 
Accountability and A New Strategic Authority for London (LSPC, 1987).10 
The abolition of the GLC and the other metropolitan councils in March 1986 
compelled the LSPC to rethink some of the more radical ideas espoused by its 
predecessor. In fact its paper began by stating that its proposals were to be 
considered not as an element in legislation designed to alter the constitutional 
status of the police, or to effect changes in the powers and duties of provincial 
police authorities, but 'in the context of a Parliamentary Bill to create a multi-
purpose strategic authority for London' (LSPU, 1987: 6). Politically contentious 
reforms of police governance nationally, and the statutory replacement of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, were seen as the second stage of a 
process to be initiated by the creation, with cross-party support, of a new strategic 
authority for London in the early days of an incoming Labour administration at 
Westminster. 11 Thus, while the LSPC did not abandon the revolutionary 
aspirations of the GLC in the field of police governance, it was compelled to 
concede that their realisation would be postponed for some time after the election 
of a Labour government. 
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Continuity 
The many compromises forced on the LSPC following abolition must not be 
allowed to obscure the consistency of much of its thinking with that of the GLC. 
For example, the LSPC's paper, like the GLC'S, set out a series of pre-conditions 
for the establishment of a new police authority for London. These included the 
transfer of national police functions either to the regions or to a national agency, 
and the incorporation of the City of London into a police area coterminous with 
the boundaries of a new strategic authority.12 It also followed the earlier 
document in contemplating 'a two-tier partnership authority comprised wholly of 
elected representatives' . 13 At first tier level a police committee consisting of 
about 30 members of the new strategic authority would have responsibility for 
'London-wide policy and functions'. 'Local policing issues' would be left to the 
lower tier level and those boroughs that had not already done so would be 
required to establish an ordinary committee of the council to deal with police 
matters. As the GLC had done before, the LSPC justified its advocacy of a 
de centralised two-tier structure as the only means of ensuring that a new authority 
could get to grips with the 'often local and mundane' policing issues of concern to 
the public. 14 A strategic authority, it was argued, could hardly be expected to 
have either an interest in, or specific knowledge of, concerns about levels of 
police patrol expressed by residents on a single council housing estate. Boroughs 
were also in the best position to coordinate action at neighbourhood level between 
the police and council services. 
Another key feature of the GLC's proposals to be carried over into those of the 
LSPC was the exclusion of ' individual cases' from the purview of the new 
authority. IS Unfortunately the scope of this exclusion was not explained as 
thoroughly by the LSPC as it had been by the GLC. Would, to use the latter's 
example, the authority envisaged by the LSPC be prevented from issuing 
prospective directions to the Commissioner and his operational commanders 
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about the tactics and equipment to be used in policing a riot (or, more realistically, 
a demonstration with potential for public disorder) on the grounds that it 
constituted an 'individual case'? Or would that restriction apply only to the cases 
of individual demonstrators arrested at the scene as the GLC had suggested? The 
answer is not clear and is a mark perhaps of the uncertainty surrounding the 
degree of control over operational decision-making the new police authority 
might have in the light of some of the LSPC' s more far-reaching revisions of the 
GLC's plans. 
Change 
By far and away the most significant of these revisions was the LSPC's suggestion 
that, rather than sweep away the independent office of constable and install a new 
strategic authority as the direct employers of police and civilian personnel, the 
first step of an incoming Labour government should simply be to transfer to an 
elected body the existing responsibilities of the Home Secretary as police 
authority for London under the Metropolitan Police Act 1829.16 It will be recalled 
that the GLC had rejected the possibility of merely replacing the Home Secretary 
with a locally elected authority on the grounds that its powers under the 1829 Act 
would not enable it to have a significant influence on officers' behaviour on the 
ground.17 Accepting a straightforward transfer of authority - even as a first step in 
democratising police governance in London - thus represented something of a 
climb down by the LSPC. However, in an attempt to minimise the scale of the 
retreat, the LSPC went to great lengths to talk up the extent of the Home 
Secretary's powers under the 1829 Act praying in aid 'a host of respected legal 
authorities' for the proposition that 'the Home Secretary's ability to give directions 
to the Commissioner has never seriously been challenged (LSPU, 1987: 41).18 
Summarising the Committee's views on the 19th century legislation and 
subsequent developments in case law and administrative practice, the paper stated 
that: 
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... the Home Secretary can direct the Commissioner as Commissioner 
and not as a constable. The Commissioner is required to comply with 
directions under the terms of the 1829 Act and constables are in turn 
required to obey the Commissioner's instruction. In this process no 
constable is instructed without a specific and clear statutory authority. 
Whatever the common law doctrine of constabulary independence 
dictates, this statutory authority takes precedence. (LSPU, 1987: 43 ).19 
And from this, the LSPC concluded that 
... the statutory and procedural framework which exists would allow for 
the expansion of [their] interest, should a future police authority wish to 
take a more active role in the direction of Metropolitan Police affairs. 
(LSPU, 1987: 46-7) 
There is no doubting that this is a seductively well presented and legally 
ingenious case. But, in practical terms it was a dead letter from the outset. As has 
been argued above, the LSPC' s is only one of several plausible interpretations of 
a venerable statute drafted to meet constitutional and administrative conditions 
quite different to those of the late 1980s. More importantly, any attempt by an 
elected police authority to take a more assertive role in the direction of the 
Metropolitan Police in the febrile political atmosphere of 1987 would have led to 
a serious breakdown in the collaborative relationship fostered by successive 
Home Secretaries and Commissioners. From there, recourse would have had to 
be to the courts where the judges would surely have interpreted the Metropolitan 
Police Act 1829 in way that was consistent with the common law doctrine of 
constabulary independence developed by the courts over the course of the half 
century since Fisher. Thus, notwithstanding the LSPC's strictures on Lord 
Denning's remarks in Blackburn, it is hard to believe that the courts would have 
been prepared to accept the novel interpretation of the Act offered by a radical 
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police authority, bent on bringing the police under some form of local democratic 
control, to what, following the decisions in Blackburn Nos. 3 and 4, Ex parte 
CEGB and Ex parte Levey had become settled law on the insulation of chief 
police officers' decision-making from 'political' interference. On balance then, 
the LSPC's confidence that an elected police authority could use the statutory 
powers of the Home Secretary to issue directions to the Commissioner and, 
through him, to influence police behaviour on the streets seems misplaced. But 
the fact that such a proposal could be entertained, and built up with such 
painstaking care in the face of the GLC's scepticism about its efficacy, speaks 
volumes for the awkwardness of the LSPC's position following the abolition of 
the only authority capable of taking immediate and direct control of operational 
policing. 
Having acknowledged that merely replacing the Home Secretary with an elected 
body would have to suffice pending a more extensive reform of police governance 
throughout England and Wales, the LSPC went on to explain and accept the 
consequences of that concession in the form of further revisions to the GLC's 
grand plan. So it was suggested that the new authority would employ neither the 
police nor civilian staff (LSPU, 1987: 10). The former would continue to revel in 
the independent office of constable, while the existing status of the latter as 
employees of the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police would be preserved 'under 
the direction of the London-wide police authority.20 
Limiting a new authority to indirect influence over the police via the 
Commissioner under the 1829 Act powers also had repercussions for the GLC's 
policy of decentralisation. Although, as we have seen, the LSPC was committed 
to establishing a two-tier authority, it was astute enough to recognise that the need 
for decentralisation conflicted with the reality of the Met's rigidly hierarchical and 
bureaucratic organisational structure.21 However desirable it might be to devolve 
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responsibility for setting police priorities and overseeing operations to the 
boroughs, it was simply not feasible to do so when the only purchase an elected 
police authority, acting solely within the tenns of the 1829 Act, would have on the 
Met would be at the apex of the organisation in the fonn of directions issued to 
the Commissioner: 
Clearly a local commanding officer cannot be answerable to both a 
Commissioner and to a local police committee. Thus under any scheme 
for accountability which related to the present structure of the Met, local 
borough police committees would have formally largely a monitoring 
and reporting function. The introduction of any major decentralisation of 
control over policing would have to wait until a second stage when a 
change in the status of police officers from that of constable to local 
government officer may be considered and put into effect. (LSPU, 1987: 
18, emphasis in the original) 
Under legislation giving a new authority powers 'in relation to the Commissioner 
but not in relation to lower ranks which are under the command of the 
Commissioner', second tier borough police committees would be limited to 
approving orders, regulations and appointments for their local areas.22 They 
would also enjoy rights of consultation on budgetary and establishment issues, 
major policy decisions, and the arrangements to be made for obtaining the views 
of the community under s. 106 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, though 
the paper implies that decisions on such matters would, of necessity, be taken at 
the London-wide leve1.23 Another key role for borough committees as part of a 
new strategic authority would be to 'undertake a police monitoring and research 
role' independent of their activities as part of the police authority, but funded from 
the council's budget. 24 
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By conceding that replacing the Home Secretary with an elected authority would 
severely limit the scope for decentralising decision-making on policing, and 
giving much greater prominence to the need for independent research and 
monitoring activities to continue to be funded by a new authority, the LSPC 
tacitly accepted the enormity of the concession it had made in agreeing to confine 
a locally representative authority to working within the rickety framework of the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1829 . Yet its commitment to the more radical project 
outlined in the GLC's discussion document remained. Political necessity dictated 
that its proposals should be directed, in the short term at least, towards the 
creation of an elected strategic authority for London. But this did not mean that 
the long term goal of demolishing constabulary independence and asserting 
democratic control over police operations at the borough level had been forgotten, 
still less abandoned. 
Municipal socialism in one borough: the case of Islington 
The influence of the Labour Party's new municipal socialists on local government 
in London was not limited to the Greater London Council, and the borough 
elections of 1982 led to the installation of radical administrations in several town 
halls across the capital (Keith and Murji, 1990). Islington was in the vanguard of 
this movement, and the Council moved quickly to push the issue of police 
accountability to the top of the political agenda.2s 
Less than two months after the May elections, and some nine months before the 
GLC published its discussion document on a new police authority for London, 
Islington Council's Policy Committee established a Police Sub-Committee with 
the stated purpose, amongst other things, of advocating 'democratic accountability 
of the police to the local community' .26 It was acknowledged that achieving 
democratic accountability would require legislative change and the status of the 
new sub-committee was to be reviewed at the end of the municipal year the 
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following May.27 But these were among the few notes of caution sounded in terms 
of reference that committed the council to taking an active interest in virtually 
every aspect of police policy and practice. Thus, the committee was to 'examine 
and make recommendations' not only on policing in the borough of Islington but 
also on 'matters concerning the metropolis as a whole or being of national 
concern' .28 It was 'to seek to influence police policies and decisions on 
operational matters' and to promote 'greater public understanding of policing 
issues' .29 In short, the purpose of the committee was 
To be the means of communication between the community (through its 
elected Council) and the Police and to work towards the improvement of 
policing in the borough, the better prevention of crime and the 
strengthening of relations between the police and the community.30 
Support for the GLe 
Spurred on perhaps by its somewhat precarious status, the Sub-Committee sought 
to consolidate its position with a flurry of activity. Reacting to proposals in the 
Queen's Speech of November 1982 on establishing a statutory framework for 
consultation between the community and the police, the committee stressed the 
importance of its own existence as a means of developing genuinely democratic 
forms of control over the police.31 Later in the same month it noted that the 
Metropolitan Police was the 'only force in England where there is no direct form 
of accountability' and deplored the London boroughs' inability to influence either 
the level or composition of police budgets.32 
It should be evident from what has been said thus far that the Committee shared 
many of the GLC's concerns and priorities including the financial accountability 
of the Met and the need for locally elected representatives to become more closely 
involved in operational decision-making. In the first flush of the Labour left's 
municipal successes, members' support for the GLC never seemed less than 
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wholehearted. When, early in 1983, the Conservative-dominated London 
Boroughs Association (LBA) warmly welcomed a series of meetings about 
policing in the capital involving the Home Secretary and representatives of local 
authorities in the Metropolitan Police District, the Police Sub-Committee in 
Islington passed a resolution deploring the initiative. The discussion of such 
strategic matters was 'the province of the GLC' .33 Then in April of the same year 
it applauded the pUblication of the GLC's proposals for a new police authority for 
London 'as they would allow greater local autonomy and a closer liaison between 
the police, the Council and the community.34 Two years later the Home Secretary 
was sharply criticised for failing to announce the kind of far-reaching proposals 
for the re-organisation of the Met advocated by the GLC.35 The committee saw 
this as further evidence of the inadequacies of the existing system of police 
governance in London and reaffirmed 'the need to press for local democratic 
accountability of the Metropolitan Police'. Soaring crime figures were also 
interpreted as strengthening the case for greater accountability and a thorough 
audit of police effectiveness. 36 
Distance, doubts and left realism 
The reasoning behind this linkage of prophylactic impotence with the lack of local 
democratic accountability surfaced again some time later when the outcome of a 
discussion on an internal policy review undertaken by the Met was minuted thus: 
The Sub-Committee recognised the need for the public to have 
confidence in the police but felt that this could only be achieved if they 
were responsive and sensitive to local needs. Thus accountability would 
lead to increased confidence in the police and would enable policing to 
be carried out more effectively. It was stressed that the Council's wish 
for police accountability was not simply a desire to take control but 




This minute is worth quoting at some length not simply because it illustrates the 
Committee's acceptance of the largely untested assumptions at the heart of the left 
realist case for greater accountability, but also for the almost apologetic tone of 
the last sentence.38 Already, it seemed, an increasingly pragmatic Committee was 
beginning to distance itself from the unabashed radicalism of the GLC by basing 
its claim to influence police decision-making not on points of democratic 
principle but on the less politically contentious foundations of bureaucratic 
efficiency. 
Less equivocal evidence of local unease with the GLC's position only began to 
emerge after the Council's abolition in March 1986. Although Islington was one 
of the nine Labour-controlled London boroughs responsible for establishing the 
LSPC, it was not long before members of the borough's Police Sub-Committee 
became restive. Post-abolition plans for a new strategic authority to replace the 
GLC were soon afoot with Islington favouring proposals put forward by the more 
broadly based Association of London Authorities (ALA) to those of the LSPC. 
At a meeting in January 1987, the LSPC's consultation paper on police 
accountability (LSPU, 1987) was noted in a somewhat cursory fashion and a 
further report requested from the ALA for consideration at the committee's next 
meeting.39 Members of the Committee also expressed concern at the apparent 
overlap between the functions of the ALA and the LSPC and complained of the 
'waste of resources' that resulted from the unnecessary duplication of effort.40 
The ALA's document duly appeared on the committee's agenda on 5 March 1987 
in the form of a 'second working draft' of a report by the Association's Police 
Policy Adviser. Entitled A Strategic Police Authority for London, the report 
focused on four aspects of the campaign for local accountability: the case for an 
elected police authority for London; two options for the political composition of 
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that authority; the role of the boroughs in relation to policing; and, finally, the 
powers and duties of the new body.41 The arguments advanced by the ALA in 
support of an elected police authority for London were familiar. The 
inadequacies of the present arrangements for police governance both inside and 
outside London were rehearsed once again: and the 'principle' of local democratic 
oversight and control asserted (paras. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.7). Much was made of the 
status of the police as a 
... public service paid from the public purse, in daily contact with the 
public and whose action or inaction affect not only the quality of life of 
the citizen but their very liberty. (para. 1.7.) 
And, still more pertinently, as 'unavoidably the most important coercive arm of 
the State' (para. 1.8.). But fresh claims were also advanced for the unique ability 
of an authority made up of experienced local politicians, and elected on a clear 
popular mandate, to cope with 'bureaucratic obstructionism' and carry through the 
changes in 'organisation, practices and behaviour that are necessary for the Met. 
Police' (paras. 1.11. and 1.10.). New too was the suggestion that 
... the lack of a clearly defined locus standi for the local authority in 
regard to policing matters constitutes an impenetrable barrier to mutual 
co-operation between the police and local government agencies no 
matter how much goodwill exist [sic] on either side. (para. 1,12.) 
Once again the tone of this passage is one of sorrow at missed opportunities for 
mutually advantageous co-operation between local government and the police. 
The contrast with the angry denunciations of discriminatory and oppressive police 
practices contained in the GLC's contribution to the accountability debate is 
marked. 42 
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The ALA's proposals 
The modesty of the ALA's wish for some standing in the affairs of the capital's 
policing compared to the GLC's desire to take control of it by making police 
officers the servants of local government was also reflected in the former's 
proposals for the composition of a new strategic authority. Familiar calls for a 
wholly elected authority and the rationalisation of police and local government 
boundaries were mixed in with a significant revision of the GLC's plans for a two-
tier authority with as much power as possible devolved down to the second tier of 
borough police committees. Both the ALA's alternatives for constituting a new 
authority contemplated a single tier body (the London Police Authority or LPA). 
The only choice on offer was between a committee made up solely of members of 
the new strategic London Regional Authority (LRA) and a joint committee 
composed of LRA members sitting together with nominees from the boroughs 
(para. 3.2.). Apart from nominating members to sit on the LPA under the second 
of these schemes, second tier police committees were to have little more than 
consultative powers on London-wide policing policies, together with a residual 
right to require local police commanders to provide information and reports on 
matters of concern to them at borough level (para. 4. 1). Without abolishing the 
independent office of constable as the GLC had proposed, neither the LSPC nor 
the ALA were able to find a meaningful role for the borough police committees 
their member authorities were anxious to maintain. Yet it was only the ALA who 
were prepared finally to efface the GLC's commitment to a decentralised system 
of police governance by arguing for a police authority with a single strategic tier 
on which borough representatives would, at best, form a permanent minority. 
The powers and duties proposed by the ALA for its new police authority were 
also noticeably more limited than those of either the GLC or the LSPC. Thus its 
main responsibilities were couched in terms of providing an 'efficient police force' 
reminiscent of the function of a provincial police authority within the much-
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ridiculed tripartite structure, and of issuing 'strategic goals for the use, deployment 
and objectives of the Metropolitan Police' (paras. 5.3. 1. and 2.). Read in 
conjunction with the legal restrictions to be placed on the authority's powers to 
intervene in the 'police handling of specific cases' and matters deemed sub judice 
or involving national secwity, it seems highly improbable that the ALA could 
have envisaged an elected police authority involving itself in operational decision-
making - if necessary at the level of the individual incident - as the GLC had 
explicitly intended (paras. 5.2 and 5.4). Though the wording of the report is 
masterful in its ambiguity, it seems to suggest that elected politicians would 
confine their interest to what the GLC had described as administrative, procedural 
and personnel matters leaving all but the broadest questions of policy and 
operations to the police. In any event, the committee endorsed the ALA's 
proposals as a sound basis for a 'democratic police authority for London' and 
expressed support for the creation of a joint committee of regional authority 
members and borough nominees (the second of the two options put forward by 
the ALA) as the preferred approach to constituting the new LPA.43 A more 
detailed report on the structure of the authority was requested but seems never to 
have been prepared. 44 
Pragmatism and consensus 
June 1987 brought a third consecutive election defeat for Labour at the hands of 
Mrs Thatcher and plans for a new strategic authority for London were frustrated 
once again. In Islington, ritual incantations of the need for an elected police 
authority in the capital continued to feature sporadically in the minutes of the 
Police Sub-Committee for some time thereafter. For example, after a discussion 
on value for money and the Metropolitan Police precept early in 1988, the 
Committee reiterated its support for such an authority and called for more detailed 
information to be provided to boroughs on how the money levied from their 
ratepayers was spent. 45 More frequently however, apparently promising 
opportunities to labour the point were spurned and debates about the lack of 
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public confidence in the police in London, and on the policy implications of the 
second Islington Crime Survey (Crawford et aI, 1990), passed off without 
reference being made either to the lamentable state of police governance in the 
capital, or to the case for a democratically elected local authority.46 
It was not until the year before another general election - with a change of 
government again eagerly anticipated by Labour activists in local government -
and only six months before sector policing went 'live' on Holloway Division, that 
Islington's Police and Crime Prevention Sub-Committee (as it then was) revisited 
the issue of police accountability. The occasion for this was the appearance of the 
second draft of a detailed, and soberly phrased, report on the composition, 
functions, powers and structure of a police authority for London prepared by the 
ALA's Police Policy Adviser and the Principal Research Officer in the 
Committee's own Support Unit.47 In an unapologetically party political preface, 
the Chair of the Sub-Committee, Councillor Derek Sawyer, claimed that the 
argument for an elected police authority had been won. Such an authority, he 
argued, was generally accepted as 'desirable, necessary and inevitable' not only by 
'the thinking echelons of the police service' but also by usually hostile sections of 
the press.48 Opposition to the idea had become the preserve of 'the sillier 
sections of the Conservative Party buttressed by the die-hard elements of the 
Home Office mandarioncracy [sic]'. Then, in a passage that illustrates the 
increasingly apolitical and managerialist tone of local Labour politicians' 
pronouncements on police accountability since the rise of municipal socialism, 
Sawyer concluded: 
This document should finally bammer the nails down in the coffin of the 
gross canard that the Labour Party wants political control of the police. 
Democratic accountability of the police is about quite different things. 
Fiscal control, prioritisation of objectives, dialogue through elected 
members between the police and the public and restoring confidence in 
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the Metropolitan Police and through that, an improved performance 
against crime. 
So, by the early 1990s in Islington, the OLC's concerns with financial discipline 
and police effectiveness in the prevention and detection of crime had become 
central to the case for an elected police authority. High-minded references to 
democratic principles, rank injustices in the distribution of coercion and 
protection, and the urgent need to curb corruption and the abuse of power had 
been replaced at the forefront of the arguments for reform by the dull 
instrumentalism of technical efficiency. All that remained of the GLC's calls for 
democratic control of London's policing was the offer of elected representatives' 
assistance in facilitating confidence-building discussions between the police and 
the public. 
The detailed proposals outlined in the main body of the report provided further 
evidence of the scale of the retreat. The political background to its production 
seems to have been the publication of a policy document confirming that an 
incoming Labour government would create a directly elected Greater London 
Authority (OLA) with responsibility for a number of strategic functions. As far as 
policing was concerned, the report before the sub-committee sought to outline the 
aims and functions of such an authority in terms 'little different from the 1964 
[Police] Act for provincial forces' .49 In discharging its general responsibility for 
'the maintenance and guidance of an efficient police service for London', the 
authority would have the power to determine budgets and issue precepts, call for 
reports and/or briefings on any subject, and provide strategic guidance on overall 
objectives and practices. 50 Although it would be responsible for overseeing 
recruitment, training and promotion within the Metropolitan Police Service and 
act as employer to all police and civilian personnel in regard to their employment 
and pension rights 'the operational independence of the constable under the law 
would be maintained'. 51 The authority would also be 
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... prohibited from enquiring into the [sic] individual criminal 
investigations with the exception of allegations of police corruption and 
serious misconduct. 52 
As for the composition of the authority, the report did no more than note the 
Labour Party's preference for a small body of about 30 directly elected members 
with no provision for the nomination by, or co-option of, additional members 
from borough councils. S3 
From revolution to reform: Islington 1982-91 
Islington's Police Sub-Committee had travelled a long way by 1991. In 1982 it 
had been happy to endorse the GLC's plans for operational control of the police to 
be vested in a wholly elected, and radically decentralised, police authority. It 
could contemplate with equanimity, even enthusiasm, the metamorphosis of the 
holders of the ancient and independent office of constable into the humble 
servants of local government. It had subscribed to the view that the Metropolitan 
Police was an unaccountable and over-grown bureaucracy to be brought to heel 
by accomplishing a peaceful revolution in police governance. Nine years, and 
two general election defeats later, Labour's leaders in local government felt 
compelled to adopt a more pragmatic stance. Having associated itself with the 
GLC's excoriation of the tripartite system in the early 1980s, the Islington 
committee of the early 1990s found itself supporting proposals for an elected 
police authority with responsibilities all but indistinguishable from those of its 
provincial counterparts. Gone too were the commitments to decentralisation and 
to wresting control of operational policing from unaccountable police 
commanders and anonymous Home Office bureaucrats. The new model police 
authority of 1991 was to be a centralised strategic authority, a democratically 
elected honest broker between the police and the public, and a duly deferential 
purveyor of modest opinions on the broad sweep of policing policies for London. 
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The mutation of a generation of radical municipal socialists into sober pragmatists 
was not unique to Islington but typical of the 'new realist' revisionism espoused by 
Labour politicians in local government throughout London and the rest of urban 
Britain.54 Although the commitment to replacing the Home Secretary with a 
locally elected body remained, it was obvious by 1991 that the high tide of 
municipal socialism had ebbed leaving Islington's Police Sub-Committee, the 
ALA and the upper reaches of the Metropolitan Police hierarchy, in broad 
agreement on a set of proposals for reform that would change the form of police 
governance while leaving the substance of operational policy-making firmly in 
the hands of still assertively autonomous police commanders. 
A critical view of police accountability 
What emerges from the 1980s literature on police accountability - from academy 
and town hall alike - reviewed in this chapter and the last is an apparently 
shapeless mass of arguments and counter-arguments advanced by critics 
committed to irreconcilable theoretical positions and constantly changing political 
agendas. Where concrete plans for reforming police governance either in London 
or more generally are presented they teem with seemingly incompatible 
proposals. Yet, by applying the four dimensional analysis of police accountability 
I outlined in Chapter 2, it is possible to give some coherence to what the critics 
had to say and to draw from their work some important insights into how and why 
police accountability came to be reinvented in London. 
Content 
Irreconcilable though their positions may seem, there was in reality a substantial 
measure of agreement between liberal democratic constitutionalists, left realists, 
critical interventionists and socialist justice theorists about the core content of 
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police accountability. None of the authors considered in Chapter 4 would have 
dissented from the view that public policing is inextricably linked with the 
distribution of the state's monopoly on the use of legitimate coercive force. 
Though writers from the various schools might have characterised the state in 
very different terms and disagreed about the degree to which the distribution of 
force was skewed, more or less explicit references to policing as the domestic 
delivery of state-sanctioned coercion were a feature of critical work throughout 
the 1980s. Policing styles might vary from the immanently militaristic to the 
falteringly consensual, but no one seemed in any doubt that the stock in trade of 
the police was the actual or threatened use of coercive force. 
Writing from within the liberal democratic tradition, Lustgarten and Uglow both 
regarded the delegation of the state's domestic monopoly on the use of coercive 
force to the police as a critical factor in determining their constitutional status and 
establishing the need for vigilant external controls. Indeed U glow and the left 
realists were so eager to minimise the occasions on which force might 
legitimately be used that they wanted to restrict the police to a purely 'reactive' 
role. In doing so they hoped to outlaw 'police-initiated' coercion by limiting the 
scope of policing to responding either to actual or 'immediately apprehended' 
criminal offences and breaches of the peace (Uglow, 1988), or to calls for 
assistance from the public (Kinsey et aI, 1986). 
What the critics could not agree about was the point at which control over its 
distribution ought to be taken out of the hands of the police themselves and given 
over to a democratically constituted external authority. For the first generation of 
reformers like Jack Straw MP, the AMA (cited in Spencer, 1985: 111-5) and 
Baldwin and Kinsey (1982: 110-1, 116), the solution was to restrict the powers of 
wholly elected police authorities to deciding' general policing policies' - such as 
policing priorities, the functional and geographical distribution of personnel and 
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resources, and the kind and amount of technical equipment to be provided - for 
their areas. Beyond this, Mr Straw sought to protect the operational independence 
of chief officers in conducting particular operations and dealing with individual 
cases by allowing them to delay implementation of an authority's decision and/or 
to appeal to the Home Secretary against their instructions if the authority had 
exceeded its powers (Spencer, 1985: 112). The left realists and their collaborators 
at the ALA seemed to accept the validity of the distinction between 'policy' and 
'operations' in seeking to prevent police authorities from giving directions in 
'individual' or 'specific' cases, though the ambit of the restriction was never made 
entirely clear. Uglow (1988) also believed that police authorities should have no 
influence over day-to-day operations. To the rest of the critics, however, the 
distinction was untenable: 'operational' decisions should be informed by 'policy' 
and 'policies' formulated and revised in the light of operational experience. 55 Nor 
could a line be drawn between a 'policy' decision to prioritise street robbery rather 
than burglary and 'operational' decisions about mounting and resourcing 
initiatives directed at apprehending street robbers as opposed to burglars. 
Even if the critics tended to exaggerate the difficulty of distinguishing between 
'policy' and 'operations' in principle, they were right to warn of the dangers of 
using such contestable terminology in delimiting the scope for external control of 
police decision-making. In place of the 'policy/operations' distinction both 
Lustgarten and the GLC favoured the extension of what the former called 
'democratic governance' to every aspect of police policy and operations. For 
them, the uninhibited exercise of police discretion should be limited to 'the cases 
of individuals' where no one but a police officer personally aware of the facts 
could be in a position to form the suspicion required for a lawful arrest or search 
to be made. If Lustgarten and the GLC had had their way, an elected police 
authority in London would have been able not only to adopt a policy on the 
policing of demonstrations generally but to issue instructions based on that policy 
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as to how particular protests were to be handled. By setting limits to the number 
of police officers deployed and the tactics and equipment they were authorised to 
use, the authority might legitimately have sought to influence both the likelihood 
of disorder occurring and the police response to it. They might even have been 
able to insist that there should be no police presence at a given demonstration 
whatsoever subject only to the courts' power to intervene if such an instruction 
could be shown to amount to a breach of the authority's general duty to enforce 
the law. The use of the highly coercive power of arrest would thus have been 
brought under the control of an elected police authority up to, but not beyond, the 
point at which a decision had to be taken as to the existence of the factual 
conditions precedent needed for the lawful use of that power against an individual 
suspect. 
Direction 
There are few explicit references in the critical literature to 'the people' as the 
ultimate source of authority for the police use of coercive force, though both 
U glow and the GLC from their very different political standpoints made the point 
that the police regulate social behaviour in the public's name and must account to 
the public for their conduct. But this is not to say that the other critics would have 
seen accountability as flowing anywhere but in the general direction of the demos. 
On the contrary, they all shared a belief that the existing arrangements for police 
governance were insufficiently inclusive, and failed to give large sections of the 
population any effective influence over how they were policed. From a 
fundamentally liberal democratic perspective Lustgarten could call for a regime of 
control that ensured equal treatment for all. But for critics standing outside the 
liberal democratic tradition, the reality of contemporary policing was to be seen in 
the relative over-coercion and under-protection of the poor, the 'rough', the 
powerless and the marginalised. As Ian Taylor argued, it was important to 
problematise police practices by subjecting them to a more effective system of 
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liberal democratic control. But it was also vital not to forget that even-handed law 
enforcement in conditions of material inequality would not be sufficient to 
guarantee equality of outcome in the social distribution of coercion and 
protection. In the uncompromising view of the critical interventionists, the police 
had long ceased to serve 'the people' as a whole and had assumed an increasingly 
prominent role in fighting 'the enemy within' in defence of an unjust social order. 
In short the critics' position was that the reality of policing and its governance in 
the 1980s failed to live up to the rhetorical commitments of liberal democratic 
theory. Instead of accounting to the demos from whom their authority stemmed, 
their constitutional status allowed them a large degree of autonomy. In so far as 
the police were held to account, the relative impotence of local police authorities 
(or, in the case of London, the total absence of such an authority), the 
inadequacies of the consultative arrangements recommended by Lord Scarman, 
and the reticence of the courts all combined to exclude the socially marginal, the 
economically disadvantaged and politically powerless from any effective 
influence over policing. The most important immediate directions of 
accountability were thus not to popular representatives at either local, force or 
national level but within the police bureaucracy itself and thence to a central 
Government primarily concerned with the mobilisation of the state and its 
agencies in defence of sectional social interests. 
F or the critics, the remedy for this lay in the democratisation of policing at a local 
level by purging police authorities of their non-elected magisterial membership 
and extending their power to include the determination of at least some aspects of 
policing policy. (In London of course this programme necessitated not just the 
reinvigoration of local democratic control but the creation of an entirely new 
institutional structure to replace the Home Secretary as police authority for the 
metropolis.) Localism - the notion of a police force accountable to elected 
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representatives working to establish and maintain what Taylor called 'particular' 
definitions of order - was a feature of critical work throughout the 1980s. Yet the 
tension between, on the one hand, such particUlaristic definitions of order and 
local mechanisms of , democratic' control of the police and, on the other, the idea 
of law as a set of universally applicable rules and principles to be applied equally 
within the territory of a sovereign state was never far beneath the surface. How, 
to pose the problem another way, could accountability by means of reformed 
police authorities and liaison panels to sub-national fractions of the demos be 
reconciled with accountability to the people as a whole through the agencies of 
the nation state: the law, the courts, the Home Secretary and Parliament? And 
how could the differential enforcement of supposedly universal legal prohibitions 
and standards of behaviour be squared with the principle of equality before the 
law? If democratic localism became a reality, policing by geography could not be 
far behind. 
The short answer to these questions was that the degree of autonomy granted to 
the police under the existing arrangements so robustly defended by critics of 
democratic localism such as Marshall and Oliver already gave chief officers 
ample room for moulding the policing style of their force in accordance with their 
own predilections and priorities. One only has to recall the careers and public 
pronouncements of John Alderson and James Anderton as chief constables of 
Devon and Cornwall and Greater Manchester respectively or, at a still lower level, 
Janet Foster's (1989) ethnographic study of differences in policing at 
neighbouring inner London police stations to appreciate the force of this 
argument. If differential enforcement is indeed a problem it is a product of 
localism and decentralisation rather than 'democracy'. But to point out that the 
social distribution of coercion and protection varies from place to place under 
conditions of relative police autonomy does not deal with the underlying 
difficulty posed by any system of police governance that seeks to make the police 
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accountable immediately to local fractions of the demos (usually constructed as 
'the community') as well as generally to all citizens of the nation state. 
The solutions offered to this problem by the critics tended to begin with a 
pragmatic acceptance of the potential for conflict between competing sources of 
democratic authority. Implicit in their position was the belief that, short of total 
enforcement, it was inevitable, indeed desirable, that patterns of coercion and 
protection would vary from neighbourhood to neighbourhood in accordance with 
the needs of local people and their conceptions of order. To the critics, there was 
no need to homogenise styles or patterns of policing provided three conditions 
were met in respect of the decisions underlying such local variations. Firstly, 
those decisions had to be taken publicly by elected authorities in the form of 
reconstituted local police authorities assisted by more locally based consultative 
groups or liaison panels. Secondly, decisions would have to meet minimum 
standards prescribed by a properly accountable national authority, such as a 
minister subject to the rigorous scrutiny of a parliamentary select committee. 
And, thirdly, whatever was decided must not amount to a nullification of the 
larger democratic will expressed in law and enforceable in the courts. To back this 
up, several critics also advocated the establishment of a network of public 
prosecutors, independent both of the police and police authorities, whose function 
it would be to prevent inconsistencies in police enforcement action feeding their 
way through into the higher reaches of the criminal justice system. Only 
Jefferson and Grimshaw undertook the more ambitious task of outlining both an 
institutional structure for the local democratisation of policing in the form of 
elected public police commissions and a conception of public justice for those 
commissions to refer to in deciding how to direct chief officers in their selective 
enforcement of the criminal law. 
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Mode 
The mode in which the police were to be held to account under the proposals put 
forward by the critics was rarely discussed directly. But the language used to 
describe the relationship between their reformed police authorities and the police 
can only be read as implicitly directive. Authorities were seen as asswning 
'control' over policing policies- and, in the more radical accounts, specific 
operations as well. The left realists, for example, talked of democratically 
constituted local police authorities and liaison panels 'deciding' policing strategies 
for their areas based on local crime profiles. Of course giving control over 
policing to elected representatives entailed the abrogation of the doctrine of 
constabulary independence as enunciated by the courts, but neither the left realists 
nor most of their contemporaries took the next logical step of seeking the 
abolition of the office of constable and the conversion of police officers into 
servants of local government. Only the GLC dared go that far by calling for 
police authorities alone to be given a statutory duty to enforce the law leaving the 
police themselves - stripped of their original authority as holders of the office of 
constable - clearly responsible to local government for the use of powers 
delegated to them by elected representatives. 
The critics might have disagreed about whether democratic control should be 
restricted to questions of 'policy' or be extended to 'operations', and differed about 
the need for the police to become servants not of the law but of local government 
if local democratic control of policing was to be achieved. But there can be little 
doubt that, within the particular area of responsibility reserved to them, the critics 
expected elected representatives to take prospective decisions, to issue 
instructions to police commanders and to direct them as to how to perform their 
duties. They would no doubt have anticipated that authorities and liaison groups 
would want to maintain good relations with local police commanders and act on 
their advice. But it was clearly for these popular bodies to decide key questions 
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of policy, for them to establish local policing priorities, and perhaps even, on 
occasion, for them to direct how critical operations should be handled. Without 
necessarily wishing to make the police the servants of local government, the 
critics intended to subordinate them to elected representatives and to have them 
explain and justify their actions not in terms of their own professional judgement 
and discretion but against criteria framed for them in advance through the 
democratic process. 
This is not to say that the relationship between police and police authority would 
be entirely directive. All the critics accepted that there were large areas of police 
decision-making where it was either impractical or undesirable for elected 
representatives to have such a role. Even on the most radical accounts, 
committees of local politicians would not manage routine police operations, if 
only for reasons of practicality. Most operational decisions would continue to be 
taken by individual police officers on the basis of situationally contingent 
judgements made, and where appropriate reported on, by them and/or their 
supervisors within a framework of policies and procedures laid down by elected 
representatives and senior police managers. The cases of individuals would be 
handled exclusively by police officers and certain restrictions would be imposed 
on the ability of police authorities to monitor, let alone interfere in, their progress. 
Mechanism 
As with much of the literature on police accountability, the 1980s critics aimed 
most of their analytical fire and reforming zeal on the mechanisms of police 
accountability. The various critiques of existing institutional structures and the 
different sets of proposals for reconstructing them along more democratic lines 
have already been discussed in some detail. All that remains to be done here is to 
pick out the main features of the critical debate starting with the legal and political 
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mechanisms of accountability, and the interaction between them, that formed the 
centrepiece of critical writing in the 1980s. 
Legal and political 
While some observers - notably the left realists and their allies in local 
government wasted little time on the law, the likes of Lustgarten, Jefferson and 
Grimshaw and the GLCILSPC went to some trouble to demolish the legal basis 
for constabulary independence, expose the inadequacy of law as a guide to police 
decision-making, and identify the shortcomings of the courts as the guardians of 
the public interest in the equitable distribution of coercion and protection. For 
their part, the critical interventionists insisted that the permissiveness of the legal 
framework within which the police operated deprived the law and its institutions 
of any great utility in either holding the police to account for their actions or 
guiding police practice. Unfortunately, having so effectively undermined the law 
and legal institutions as mechanisms for police accountability, the critics made no 
serious attempt to suggest what might be done to put things right. Aside from 
recommending some improvements to the police complaints process, their 
purpose in pinpointing the shortcomings of the courts and the law as means of 
holding the police to account was not to make good the deficiencies in existing 
legal mechanisms of accountability. Rather it was to dismiss them almost entirely 
in favour of other, more immediately 'democratic', political and public devices.56 
Of these mechanisms, the reconstitution and re-empowerment of local police 
authorities generally, and the creation of an elected police authority for London in 
particular, absorbed most critical attention. Several authors were also unhappy 
with the Home Secretary's lack of accountability to Parliament for the way in 
which he discharged his national functions and suggested that a special select 
committee of the House of Commons might be set up to review his 
performance. 57 Hence the critics' response to the inadequacies of the law as a 
means of holding the police to account was to improve political mechanisms of 
control at local and national level by democratising police authorities, enhancing 
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their powers, and making the Home Secretary more open to Parliamentary 
scrutiny in discharging his responsibilities for the police service as a whole. 
Public 
Critical treatment of public mechanisms tended to start - and in some instances 
end - with a condemnation of police/'community' consultation as a politically 
mischievous and practically useless attempt to undercut demands for genuine 
accountability. The main point of difference amongst the critics was whether the 
Scarmanite liaison panels and consultative groups were worth reforming. The left 
realists believed that they were and could be reconstituted in order to playa part 
alongside police authorities in a democratised system of local police governance. 
But to the critical interventionists, the panels represented the institutionalisation 
of community policing and should be resisted as an attempt by the state and its 
agencies to penetrate civil society and mobilise the support of privileged 
communities in support of processes of social marginalisation, exclusion and 
control. Their preferred form of unmediated public accountability was 
independent police monitoring aimed at documenting the biases inherent in 
contemporary police practice and promoting popular systems of self-regulation. 
But perhaps the most important contribution of the critics was to problematise the 
idealised notions of 'community' on which existing mechanisms of consultative 
public accountability were based. Ian Taylor was among the first to question 
whether functioning political communities capable of active participation in 
police governance were to be found in the fractured social formations 
characteristic of many inner city neighbourhoods where the need for direct 
contact between police and public in non-adversarlal contexts was greatest. The 
critical interventionists feared that, far from making the police more accountable 
to all their local publics, the forms of public accountability advocated by liberal 
reformers like John Alderson and Lord Scarman would only exacerbate existing 
inequalities in the distribution of coercion and protection. Police-defined 
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'respectability' would become a pre-condition for participation in a consultative 
process that would be used to lend legitimacy to 'hard' policing and lead to the 
further marginalisation of the socially disadvantaged and politically powerless. 
Professional-managerial 
Since the main thrust of their arguments was the politicisation of police 
accountability, it is not surprising that the critics did not have very much to say 
about what I have called professional-managerial mechanisms concerned, for 
most of the 1980s at least, with the technical efficiency of the police. Charges of 
incompetence - reflected in low clear-up rates, for example - were often used by 
the critics to belabour the police, but only the left realists and their associates in 
local government tried to justify their arguments for greater political and public 
accountability as a pre-requisite for improvements in police effectiveness. For 
other critics, the only significance of professional-managerial mechanisms was as 
media for the transmission of directives from democratically constituted external 
bodies to the front-line officers responsible for operational policing. To the extent 
that police authorities and other bodies operating in the political arena might be 
unable to oversee day-to-day policing, managers would have to take responsibility 
for ensuring that their policies and priorities were followed and their instructions 
complied with. Ifrank-and-file subversion of the kind predicted by Waddington 
was to be kept in check, it would fall to police managers to hold their officers to 
account on behalf of their political masters. Lustgarten for one was less than 
sanguine about the feasibility of curbing the relative autonomy of the police 
bureaucracy and bringing operational practice more firmly under external 
'democratic' control. But, having recognised the difficulty he chose not to offer a 
solution. Only the OLC sought to address it directly by decentralising both 
political and managerial decision-making to borough level, and turning the police 
into local government officers exercising authority delegated to them by a locally 
elected body. 
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A piecemeal approach 
The abiding problem with the critical appraisals of police accountability 
considered here and in the previous chapter was that they tended to see the 
democratisation of policing coming about principally, if not exclusively, through 
the agency of elected police authorities. There were occasional attempts at 
combining more democratic forms of political accountability, with improvements 
to other mechanisms - most notably by municipal socialists faced with the very 
practical task of making a new police authority for London work. The GLC 
believed de centralised management within the Metropolitan Police was vital to its 
plans for a two-tier police authority, and the LSPC saw financial support for 
public police monitoring as a key function of a new strategic authority for 
London. The left realists wanted public accountability to be improved by giving 
local consultative committees decision-making powers. But none of the critics 
were able to look beyond proposals for some degree of coordination between 
police authorities and liaison panels or monitoring groups. The possibility of 
creating an integrated system of police governance incorporating all available 
mechanisms for holding the police to account appeared to get lost in the fog of the 
battle for greater political accountability. 
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Notes 
1 See also Chapter 3 above. This short discussion is based on Steve Bundred's (1982) 
account of the fate of demands for local accountability in London between 1829 and 
1981. Bundred himself was Vice Chair of the OLC Police Committee between 1981 and 
1984. 
2 Unless otherwise stated all references in this discussion of the OLC's proposals are to 
this paper by paragraph number. See Oyford (1985) and Lansley et al. (1989) on the fate 
of municipal socialism, and Panitch and Leys (1997) on the 'New Left' in the Labour 
Party. From the right of the political spectrum, Regan (1991: 9) provides a dyspeptic 
account of the municipal socialists' attempts to 'destroy or transform the political and 
economic system in Britain [by] tackling one of its most fundamental bastions, the 
police' . 
3 The Policy Committee was the 'inner cabinet' of senior officers thought by the OLC to 
be responsible for the strategic direction of the force and consisting at the time of the 
Commissioner, his Deputy and four Assistants (para. 88). 
4 [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 and [1982] Q.B. 458 and see above, Chapter 3, for further discussion. 
S Surprisingly little is made in the OLC's indictment of the existing dispensation of the 
'taxation without representation' argument advanced so forcefully by Bundred (1982: 59-
60). 
6 The distinction between 'policy' and 'operations' had been much debated at the time of 
the 'Straw bills' on democratising and increasing the powers of provincial police 
authorities (para. 77). This is an aspect of the OLC's position to which Jefferson and 
Grimshaw's (1984, and see the previous chapter) pay too little attention in their 
discussion of its proposals. 
7 The LSPU's (1987: 9) summary of the OLC's proposals is not very faithful to the 
original. 
8 According to the OLC, two main pre-conditions would have to be met before these 
reforms could be implemented (paras. 17, 19, 168-82). Firstly, the boundaries of the 
Metropolitan Police District (MPD) would have to be made coterminous with those of the 
OLC by making some relatively minor changes to the borders of the former on London's 
periphery and, more controversially, by amalgamating the City of London force with the 
Met. Secondly the so-called 'national functions' (relating to national institutions such as 
the monarchy and the diplomatic corps, and the provision of support services to other 
forces) of the Metropolitan Police would have to be devolved as far as possible to 
individual forces and/or regional groups of forces. Oenuinely national functions could 
then be passed over to a national police agency. 
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9 Cf. the remarks of Lawton LJ in Ex parte CEGB [1982] Q.B. 458 and the comments of 
Lustgarten (1986: 13-5) referred to in previous chapters. 
10 Unless otherwise stated all quotations in the ensuing discussion are from this 
document. The LSPC boroughs were Camden, Eating, Greenwich, Hackney, Haringey, 
Islington, Lambeth, Lewisham and Southwark. 
11 As it turned out of course, Labour sustained its third successive defeat at the hands of 
Mrs Thatcher's Conservatives in the general election of June 1987. 
12 LSPU (1987: 7,62-3). The LSPC also argued for the command structure of the 
Metropolitan Police to be rationalised to accord with borough boundaries and facilitate 
local accountability. The repeal of key pieces of legislation on police powers including 
the Public Order Act 1986 and Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 
was also recommended as 'ancillary' to the changes advocated in the report. 
13 Ibid: 16. 
14 Ibid: 17. 
15 Ibid: 47. 
16 Ibid. 26 
17 See the passage from para. 120 of the GLC's discussion document quoted above. 
18 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the relevant statutory provisions and of the 
authorities cited by the LSPC in support of their broad interpretation of the powers likely 
to be available to an elected successor to the Home Secretary including statements in the 
House of Commons by Home Office ministers in 1957 and 1986 and the report of the 
Willink Royal Commission on the Police (1962). 
19 The legal basis for this argument was as follows: the Home Secretary is empowered to 
give directions to the Commissioner, who is not required to be a constable, under s. 1 
Metropolitan Police Act 1829. Section 4 of the same Act requires constables to obey the 
Commissioner's lawful instructions. These statutory provisions take precedence over the 
remarks of Lord Denning MR in Blackburn regarding the constitutional independence of 
the Commissioner from the executive - remarks that, in the view of the LSPC, were 
'fundamentally wrong' . 
20 LSPU (1987: 48). It was also anticipated that a somewhat lavish establishment of 
some 150 staff would be needed to service the new authority itself. 
21 Ibid.: 17-18. 
22 Ibid.: 59. 
23 Ibid.: 59-60. 
24 Ibid.: 60. The ordinary staff of the new police authority would have to work closely 
with the police and it would, therefore, be important 'to maintain a separate research and 
monitoring capacity which would be in a position to take an objective view of police 
activities' . 
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25 Other authorities widely identified with the 'New Left' in London were the boroughs 
of Lambeth, Brent, Hackney and Camden. Their radicalism extended far beyond policing 
and represented a comprehensive rejection of the policies of. the first and second Thatcher 
administrations on a variety of social and economic issues. 
26 Police Sub-Committee, London Borough of Islington, Minute 2(b), 17 June 1982. This 
and the following quotations are taken from the terms of reference of the Police Sub-
Committee recommended by the Council's Policy Committee on 15 June 1982 and 
adopted by the new Sub-Committee itself two days later. The passage quoted here is 
from para. 2. 
27 Minute 2(a) and terms of reference para. 2. As it turned out, the Committee survived a 
review of its activities in May 1983 and was still functioning - after several changes of 
title and political direction - a decade later to commission and discuss the research on 
which part of this thesis is based. 
28 Terms of reference para. 3. 
29 Terms of reference para. 4 and 9. 
30 Terms of reference para. 2. 
31 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 28, 11 November 1982. The proposals for statutory 
consultation finally emerged as law in s. 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984. 
32 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 46, 29 November 1982. The series of annual meetings 
initiated in 1949 between the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police and two borough 
treasurers to discuss the police precept was rightly regarded as a forum for the 
transmission of information rather than an occasion for substantive discussion of either 
the level of the precept to be levied or how the money raising should be spent. 
33 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 54, 17 March 1983. 
34 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 73, 5 April 1983. 
35 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 231,8 January 1985. 
36 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 89, 5 July 1983. 
37 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 362, 19 September 1985. 
38 It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the nub of the realist argument was 
that the police cannot control crime effectively without the co-operation of the public and 
that this will only be forthcoming where people trust the police because they have some 
say in police decision-making. Close co-operation between leading left realist thinkers 
and the Council was a feature of developments in Islington throughout the latter part of 
the 1980s and into the 1990s (Keith and Murji, 1990). The clearest evidence of this 
collaboration, and the influence academic left realism had on the political trajectory of 
the local authority, is provided by the Islington Crime Surveys, conducted by research 
teams from Middlesex Polytechnic led by Jock Young (Jones et a/ 1986; Crawford et ai, 
1990). 
39 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 118,5 January 1987. 
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40 Ibid.: Minute 136. 
41 A Strategic Police Authority for London: Second Working Draft, Report by Walter 
Easey, Police Policy Advisor, para. 3.2 (appended to the Report of the Police Committee 
Support Unit: A Strategic Police Authority for London, Islington Police Sub-Committee, 
5 March 1987, Agenda Item 8). All references to the ALA's proposals hereafter are to 
the text of a discussion paper attached to this second draft report 
42 See McLaughlin (1994: Chap. 6) for an account of similar developments in the 
campaign for police accountability in Manchester following the abolition of the 
metropolitan county councils along with the GLC in March 1986. 
43 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 160, 5 March 1987. 
44 There was no further minuted discussion of the substance of proposals for a police 
authority for more than four years by which time, as we shall see, the political 
environment had changed once again. 
45 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 323, 3 March 1988. 
46 Police Sub-Committee, Minute 12, 18 June 1990. The contrast with the reception 
given to the findings of the first Islington Crime Survey (Jones et aI, 1986) four years 
earlier is obvious. On that occasion, the committee had noted that the survey findings 
'reiterate the need for a democratically elected police authority' (Minute 432(t), 6 March 
1986). 
47 These two officers, Walter Easey and Trevor Jones, had been the authors of the ALA 
discussion paper considered by the Islington Police Sub-Committee in 1987 and of a 
short covering report to that Committee recommending that the ALA's proposals be 
accepted. Jones was also among the co-authors, along with Jock Young, of the 'left 
realist' reports of the first and second Islington Crime Surveys. Unlike the earlier ALA 
report, the document before the Police and Crime Prevention Sub-Committee in 1991 
had, according to the Chair's preface, no official status beyond that of 'an internal Labour 
Party discussion document' (Chair's Report: A Police Authority for London (Second 
Draft), Preface, Islington Police and Crime Prevention Sub-Committee, 3 October 1991, 
Agenda Item A7(vi)). 
48 The evidence cited in support of these claims included the recent report of the 
Operational Policing Review (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990), reports emanating 
from an internal Metropolitan Police consultation exercise known as the Commissioner's 
Conference, a letter from the then Acting Commissioner, John Smith, to The Guardian, 
and favourable news and editorial coverage of discussions between the ALA and the Met 
on the former's proposals for an elected police authority in both The Guardian and in the 
normally unsympathetic pages of the Evening Standard. 
49 A Police Authority for London (Second Draft), para.3.l. 
50 Ibid. paras. 3.1 and 4.1-3. 
51 Ibid. paras. 3.3 and 3.8. 
52 Ibid. para. 5. 1. 
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S3 Ibid. paras. 2.1-2. The options being considered for electing members of the GLA were 
either one member per borough (yielding 32 members) or three or four per Euro-
constituency (yielding 27 or 36 members). The remainder of the report is taken up with 
details of the organisational structure of the authority and its secretariat. 
S4 See Keith and Murji (1990) for a similar analysis of the transformation of the local 
politics of policing in Islington and the Labour Party nationally; Dixon (1991) and 
McLaughlin (1994) for changes in Ealing and Manchester respectively; and Downes and 
Morgan (1997) for trends in law and order politics generally. 
ss See Spencer (1985: Ill) and Downes and Ward (1986: 30) in addition to Lustgarten 
(1986), Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984) and the GLC (1983). 
S6 Smith (1988: 439) makes precisely this point in relation to Lustgarten's proposals. 
57 See Baldwin and Kinsey (1982: 284) and Spencer (1985: 120-1) for details. 
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6 
Reinventing Accountability: The Community 
Policing Tradition 
In the introduction I did no more than sketch in the broad outlines of sector 
policing. The aim of this chapter and the next is to consider the framework for the 
new style of policing set out in the guidelines issued by the Assistant 
Commissioner in more detail, and in the wider context of its origins and 
development as a 'community-based' approach to policing (Metropolitan Police, 
1992: xiv). The main focus of attention in both chapters will be an analysis of 
how sector policing relates to the four dimensions of accountability picked out in 
Chapter 2. What, in other words, are sector (or community-based) police being 
held to account for? Who are they held to account by? What kind of control is 
exercised over them? What is the nature of the institutions and processes through 
which their accounts are given? Answers to these questions will be sought first in 
this chapter's examination of sector policing in the round and its place in the 
miasma of philosophies, strategies and tactics that have attracted one of the many 
labels in which the words 'community' and 'policing' are combined; and then, in 
the next chapter, in relation to four core elements or themes evident in the theory 
of sector policing. My intention throughout is to explain how the theory of sector 
policing both entails and illustrates an often subtle but nonetheless radical 
reconceptualisation of police accountability. 
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Sector policing: 'community-based' policing for the 1990s 
The impetus for a style of policing that could be at once 'consistent' across the 
sprawling Metropolitan Police District yet 'flexible enough to take account of 
local needs' (Metropolitan Police, undated a) seems to have come from a report on 
the corporate identity of the force presented to its Policy Committee in August 
1988 by consultants Wolff Olins (1988: 3).1 Under the title, A Force for Change, 
this document led to the establishment of the PLUS Programme by the then 
Commissioner, Sir Peter Imbert (Metropolitan Police, 1989a). Launched in April 
1989, PLUS committed the force to arriving at a position: 
... where there is an accepted Metropolitan Police style of policing 
which can be adjusted to local conditions, making the best use of the 
people and time available. (Metropolitan Police, 1989a: 4) 
The task of translating this commitment into a new style of policing became 
Component Four of PLUS and the team entrusted with examining the deployment 
of front line police officers 'in the community' reported towards the end of 1990 
(Metropolitan Police, 1991 d: 4). The principles of 'the new policing style' that 
was to become sector policing were approved by senior management in Policy 
Committee during November 1990. Although work was continuing on the details 
of the new policing style, the Commissioner's report for 1990 signalled that the 
'standard pattern' of operational deployment was about to come to an end. Instead 
of operational officers on divisions being roughly equally divided between three 
8-hour shifts irrespective of fluctuations in workload, new arrangements would 
give dedicated teams of officers round-the-clock responsibility for geographical 
areas within their divisions and allow managers to match the availability of staff 
more closely with demand for police services (Metropolitan Police, 1991 d: 69). 
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The glossy four page 'flier' for sector policing issued for public consumption 
elaborates on the Commissioner's explanation of the motivation behind the change 
from traditional 'relief policing (Metropolitan Police, undated a). Citing the 
recently completed Operational Policing Review (Joint Consultative Committee, 
1990), Sector Policing: What is it? lists a series of factors that the public wants 
taken into account in designing a local policing strategy including such potential 
incommensurables as 'officers on the beat' and 'fast response'. It goes on to 
describe the reactive, demand-led, time-based and resource-inefficient system of 
relief policing and how it fails to provide the 'continuity of approach' and local 
knowledge needed if police officers are to 'develop a sense of responsibility for 
identifying persistent problems or 'finding solutions to them'. By not making the 
best use of the force's 'most valuable resource' (its people) the existing system is 
rendered incapable of meeting the needs of the public and must be replaced. 
In its place, What is it? promises that the new style of sector policing will: give 
people 'a greater say in the policing of their area' by allowing local sector 
inspectors to set their own priorities 'in consultation with the community'; give 
every uniformed police officer responsibility for a defined geographical area; 
make these sector officers responsible for identifying and solving problems; and 
match the hours they work to the needs of the neighbourhoods they serve. In short 
It is a policing style which will not only meet the needs of Londoners but 
will greatly enhance the quality of the service they receive. 
(Metropolitan Police, undated a) 
The idea that geographical responsibility, community co-operation, problem 
solving and the more efficient use of resources will lead by various, often 
circuitous, routes to increased popular 'influence' over local policing is taken up in 
the Assistant Commissioner's Guidelines. In accordance with the overriding 
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principles of force-wide 'consistency' and local 'flexibility', the core elements of 
sector policing are set out in three short guides containing 'as little prescriptive 
instruction as possible' (Metropolitan Police, 1991 a: 8; 1991 b; 1991 c).2 Assistant 
Commissioner Hunt's foreword to the Guide for Divisional Management Teams 
stresses the benefits of a 'consistent Metropolitan Police style of policing ... 
flexible to local circumstances' that 'encompasses the spirit of PLUS' and to which 
'the principle of a local service delivered by locally based officers remains 
fundamental' (Metropolitan Police, 1991 a: 2). By 'devolving authority to the 
appropriate level and making the most efficient use of resources' sector policing 
'makes managers accountable for achieving results'. 
These then are the principles of sector policing. But before I look in greater depth 
at the four themes or core elements of the new style that emerges from What is it? 
and the Assistant Commissioner's guidelines, I want to consider sector policing in 
the round as a programme of reform that draws its philosophical underpinnings 
and strategic vision from notions of what has become known as 'community 
policing,.3 
Community Policing 
To attempt any kind of analytical synthesis of the vast literature on community 
policing is impossible within the confmes of this piece of work. Since the first 
studies of innovative approaches to police patrol began to emerge from the United 
States in the mid 1970s (Sherman, et ai, 1973; Kelling et ai, 1974; Boydstun and 
Sherry, 1975) the literature, particularly from North America, has burgeoned to an 
alarming degree. From the mid 1980s a succession of influential theoretical 
exegeses, empirical evaluations and critical commentaries started to appear 
(Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Sparrow et a/1990; 
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Friedmann, 1992; Weisburd and Uchida, 
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1993; Rosenbaum, 1994). With the possible exception of John Alderson's 
Policing Freedom in 1979 the debate in Britain has lacked the messianism of 
some of the work emanating from the other side of the Atlantic and the literature 
though substantial, is slightly less extensive (but see Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982: 
Chap. 8; Weatheritt, 1983, 1986; Waddington, 1984b Gordon, 1987; Ekblom, 
1986; Willmott, 1987 for early contributions and Bennett 1994a, 1994b for 
reviews of subsequent developments). 
, 
About the only thing to emerge with any clarity from over a quarter of a century of 
work and disputation is that community policing, as the American editors of a 
seminal volume of essays on the subject put it, 'means many things to many 
people' (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988: xiii). This lack of any 'suffocating 
orthodoxy' in the application of community policing is hailed by some as a hugely 
beneficial stimulus to theoretical and programmatic creativity (Moore, 1992, 
1994). On this view, community policing becomes a cavernous 'circus tent' in 
which all manner of weird and wonderful acts perform (Wycoff, 1988). Others 
rail against its use as a 'brand name' that, like Spar, 'gives a common identity to a 
diverse range of independent concerns' (Smith, 1987: 54). Opinions have also 
diverged about whether, as its proponents believe, it is a new philosophy 
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990: 7) and/or organisational strategy (Kelling 
and Moore, 1988: 24) for contemporary police. Or whether, depending on one's 
taste in metaphors, it is no more than 'a contrapuntal theme: harmony for the old 
melody' of professional crime control (Manning, 1988: 28) and 'another attempt to 
put old wine into new bottles' (Bayley, 1988: 226). Standing back from the fray 
for a moment has allowed two of the more perspicacious observers to remark on 
the political malleability of community policing. This allows it to be 'spun' to 
appeal to both liberals and conservatives (Crank, 1994) or rationalised to accord 
with otherwise incompatible social imperialist, social democratic, conservative 
realist and neo-liberal models of crime control (Stenson, 1993). 
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Many descriptions of community policing begin by contrasting it with the style of 
policing ('professional' or 'reform era' in the US, 'relief in the UK) it is intended to 
replace (see Kelling and Moore, 1988; Sparrow et ai, 1990; Fielding, 1995).4 
Another popular device is to state the philosophy of community in the form of a 
series of (ten in each case) declarations (Alderson, 1979) or principles 
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). Alternatively, or sometimes additionally, a 
more empirical approach is taken and the contours of community policing are 
highlighted in terms of the programmes, projects and tactics advocated or 
undertaken in its name. Thus Smith (1987: 57-8) detects three broad themes and 
six elements or features in contemporary British theory and practice, and Bennett 
(1994a: 113) six models of community policing. Most ambitious of all is Bayley 
(1994: 105) who uses data collected in five countries, including the US and 
Britain, to identify four elements in the practice of police departments that have 
broken with the past to take the challenge of crime prevention seriously. Tagged 
with the inevitable acronym, CAMPS, they are 
• Consultation with communities about their security needs and police 
assistance required in meeting them. 
• Adaptation of organisational structures to allow local operational 
commanders greater decision-making powers. 
• Mobilisation of public and private non-police agencies and 
individuals. 
• Problem-solving to ameliorate the conditions generating crime and 
insecurity. 
Developments in Britain 
In Britain, the popularisation of community policing is usually attributed to the 
career (as Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall) and writings of John Alderson 
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(1979; 1982; 1984), although earlier initiatives such as Unit Beat Policing with its 
emphasis on multi-functional teams of officers being assigned to a particular area 
or beat were informed by some of the principles that were to become associated 
with community policing (Weatheritt, 1986, Chap. 6; 1988).5 Alderson's (1979) 
conception of what he called 'democratic communal policing' was, in Stenson's 
(1993) phrase, an unashamedly 'imperialist' project: 
[A] newer philosophy of policing is required in which policing is not 
only seen as a matter of controlling the bad but also includes activating 
the good. (Alderson, 1979: 38) 
As moral leaders, the police 'must penetrate the community in a multitude of 
ways in order to influence its behaviour from illegality and towards legality'. 6 
Along with this commitment to moral entrepreneurship went 'declarations' calling 
for greater co-operation between the police and other public agencies, for less 
reliance on the use of force and the criminal process as solutions to problems of 
crime and insecurity, and for the creation of 'villages in the city' policed by trusted 
and familiar local officers. When swathes of urban Britain were wracked by riots 
in the early 1980s, the time for Alderson's ideas seemed to have come. In his 
report on the disorders of April 1981, Lord Scarman (1981: paras. 5.44-5.54) saw 
the 'image of the Home Beat Officer or the friendly bobby-on-the-beat' as 
epitomising 'policing with the active consent of the community'. He 
recommended that the Metropolitan Police review the role of permanently 
assigned Home Beat Officers to promote their integration into the organisational 
mainstream, and that ordinary operational officers be given more opportunities to 
develop relations with the communities they policed in non-conflict situations. 
Commenting on the need to avoid the 'oppressive' presence of large numbers of 
police officers unknown to the community in areas such as Brixton, he maintained 
that: 
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The solution ... lies in an approach to policing ... which marries the work 
of Home Beat and operational police officers, achieving the effective co-
ordination of their activities in a single policing style based on small 
beats regularly patrolled by officers normally operating on foot. 
(Scarman, 1981: para. 5.51) 
Influential though Alderson's evidence to Scannan appears to have been (Reiner, 
1991: 105), his views did not go unchallenged. Taking Alderson to task for 
misrepresenting and idealising the history and traditions of British policing, 
Waddington (1984b: 95) for example, wrote that: 
'Community policing' is a romantic delusion, not for the 'world we have 
lost', but for one we never had. It harks back to a harmonious idyll, 
where the police were everyone's friend. It was never thus, and it is 
unlikely that it ever will be. 
Early reviews of community policing programmes on the ground were generally 
pessimistic. After examining five patrol initiatives in various forces around the 
country, Mollie Weatheritt (1986: 26) came to the much-quoted conclusion that 
the 'incidence of policing success tends to be in inverse proportion to the rigour 
with which policing schemes are evaluated'. In another well-known study, Brown 
and lIes (1985: 18) found that even so-called 'community constables' with 
permanent beat assignments spent as little as 5 hours a week on 'community 
involvement' activities. However, despite these critical notices, and the personal 
animosity that its progenitor came to inspire amongst senior police officers 
following his evidence to the Scarman enquiry, the dominant philosophy of the 
higher echelons of the service gradually became 'a broad community-oriented one' 
with 'its roots in the ideas of John Alderson' (Reiner, 1991: 214).7 
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That the development of sector policing was informed by the philosophy of 
community policing, and sought to adopt many of the programmes with which it 
had become associated, should be evident - notwithstanding any reluctance on the 
part of the Commissioner and his colleagues to advertise the fact. If it is not, 
compare the following account of the main elements of community policing with 
the outline of sector policing with which this chapter began. 
• A renewed emphasis on permanent beat officers as a central element 
of policing. 
• An emphasis on the prevention of crime, and the pursuit of other 
objectives such as dealing with mental illness, by police working in 
partnership with other agencies. 
• Consultation with the community combined with decentralisation 
and the devolution of power within police organisations. 
• A greater emphasis on police-initiated activity rather response to 
calls from the public. 
• Stress on the responsibility of the community as a whole for the 
prevention C)f crime and disorder. (Smith, 1987: 57-8) 
But what do the debates about the philosophy, organisational strategy and tactics 
of community policing tell us about the contribution the introduction of such a 
style of policing may make to accountability? Let us take each of the four 
dimensions of accountability in turn. 
Content 
Like many advocates of community policing, Alderson (979: 11) readily 
acknowledged that 'the police are instruments of the legal coercive power of the 
State'. Some even go as far as to make highly coercive tactics of 'aggressive order 
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maintenance' (Kelling, 1987), 'street justice' (Sykes, 1986) or 'ass-kicking' (Wilson 
and Kelling, 1982) the central plank of conservative (Crank, 1994) or conservative 
realist (Stenson, 1993) variants of community policing (Mastrofski, 1988: 48). 
But for the most part, community policing theorists have tended to take a broad 
view of the police mandate and urge parsimony in the use of force. They 
emphasise the role of the police in dealing with a more diffuse range of 
troublesome behaviours than is covered by narrow and more traditional 
constructions of the police mandate in terms of 'crime' and 'law enforcement,.8 To 
match the wide array of social problems that such theorists believe community 
police should be concerned with, they want officers to consider a range of 
solutions that goes far beyond the formal, legalistic responses offered by the 
criminal justice system. What is more, they argue that the police should see 
themselves not as the sole suppliers of 'law and order' but rather as co-producers 
of social peace, good governance and harmonious communal life along with other 
public and private organisations, the institutions of civil society and the 
communities they serve. 
Now, as Egon Bittner himself would have been the first to concede, this is entirely 
consistent with what is known about what the public actually call upon the police 
to do. Unfortunately in an otherwise meritorious attempt to demystify the nature 
of police work and encourage them to take a less inflexible approach to achieving 
the goals society sets them, community policing theorists have only succeeded in 
remystifying the unique social fimction of the police. By drawing attention to the 
wide range of social issues with which they are called upon to assist, community 
policing draws a veil over the unique coercive capacity, and corresponding 
incapacities, police bring to the resolution of those issues, and for which they 
must be held to account. Carl Klockars (1988: 140) makes precisely this point 
when he suggests that 
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· .. 'community policing' is best understood as the latest in a fairly long 
tradition of circumlocutions whose purpose is to conceal, mystify and 
legitimate police distribution of nonnegotiably coercive force. 9 
Klockars argues that the core cultural aspiration of modem democratic societies is 
both to live in peace, and to maintain it by peaceful means. This aspiration must 
be reconciled with the socially necessary existence of an institution, the police, 
'with a virtually unrestricted right to use violent ... means to bring certain types of 
situations under control' (Klockars, 1988: 157). In an attempt to square the circle, 
he suggests that such societies must wrap the exclusive right of their police to use 
coercive force up in 'concealments and circumlocutions that sponsor the 
appearance that the police are either something other than what they are or are 
principally engaged in something else'. 
Thus the contribution of the community policing tradition to police accountability 
is generally negative since it is only by keeping sight of the core content of their 
accountability that the special difficulties it presents can be addressed. In so far as 
the rhetoric of community policing confuses the activities of the police with their 
social function it risks putting a 'harmonious sounding gloss to an activity that is 
instead about the imposition of a nonconsensual definition of order by methods 
that in the end may only be successful because they are backed by the threat of 
resort to force' (Weatheritt, 1988: 173). 
Direction 
Weatheritt's point takes us straight on to the second dimension of accountability, 
its direction. The accountability of the police is such a critical issue because their 
core activity, the use of coercive force, tends to be distributed unevenly among 
social groups. To the extent that society is stratified or differentiated, so will the 
police use of force tend to bear down more heavily on some than on others 
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(Smith, 1987: 63). This tendency, it will be recalled, was one of the reasons why I 
have argued that the general direction of police accountability should be to the 
demos. However, the attitude of community policing theorists to the direction of 
police accountability is no less confusing than their conception of its content. For 
example, Alderson (1979: 11) has written that: 
The police are the servants of ... citizen power. It is of vital importance 
that the police should see their power in this light; that it is a vicarious 
form of authority. 
Yet Crawford (1997: 275) is right in detecting a strong current of anti -statism in 
the current vogue for appeals to 'community' and a corresponding tendency to 
promote 'community' as the source of police authority and legitimacy at the 
expense of society as a whole. 10 When supporters of community policing identify 
the 'political will of the community' as the basis for defining the 'order' that the 
police should intervene to maintain, it is incumbent on them to define what they 
mean by 'the community' and how it in turn can be identified (Mastrofski, 1988: 
48 commenting on Kelling, 1987). 
But discerning precisely what such appeals to community - either in policing, or 
any of the other fields of social policy in which they are made (Willmott, 1984; 
Crawford, 1997: 44-5) - amount to is extremely difficult when, as one eminent 
political scientist has observed, 'writers who call on community often expound a 
cause when they should have attempted to explore a meaning' (plant quoted in 
Nelken, 1985: 239). In the community policing context 'community' is usually 
defined, if oIily by implication, in strictly territorial terms. 11 The geographical 
thrust of many such schemes, including sector policing, makes it almost inevitable 
that spatial proximity is taken as a proxy for the existence of shared interests, 
histories and institutions deemed essential in more demanding accounts of 
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'community' (Currie, 1988). Herein lies one of the principal difficulties with 
purely territorial definitions of community and any kind of social policy-making 
that relies on them. For it almost goes without saying that in the less than utopian 
(if not yet utterly dystopian) conditions of late 20th century inner city life, it is 
highly improbable that proximity can be used in this way. 
The problem of social heterogeneity 
Unlike the idealised village communities of Alderson's (1979: 187) imagination 
where 'sympathetic proximity' leads to a communal order based on 'shared 
values', the people who live, work or recreate within even relatively small urban 
areas will be differentiated by age, class, sex, ethnicity and a host of other factors 
that impinge on their collective ability to speak with one voice on matters of 
social policy, and especially on one as inherently divisive and adversarial as 
policing (Smith, 1987: 63). Communities that do appear to have an unambiguous 
collective will enforced by strong informal systems of social control are likely to 
be those where there is little crime and policing is uncontroversial. But even here 
the 'collective will' and the norms and social practices associated with it 'may not 
reflect consensus, but only the political or cultural dominance of one group over 
others less well organized or connected' (Mastrofski, 1988: 50). Any residual 
consensus that may exist in the typically heterogeneous social milieu of the late 
modem city about the unacceptability of ' serious crime' (homicide, rape and other 
violent offences), and the measures that should be taken in response to it, soon 
evaporates when downscale disorders, nuisances and incivilities are considered 
(Mastrofski and Greene, 1993: 90; Crawford, 1997: 162). 
The search for 'community' 
Few community policing theorists are so dull as to believe that well-organised, 
unified and harmonious communities are commonplace and all the police have to 
do is to search them out and act in accordance with the precepts of their collective 
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social morality. Solutions to the real problems of communal heterogeneity and 
dissent vary. The most popular way out of the dilemma created by the real 
absence of 'community' is to look to crime as an antidote to anomie (Skolnick and 
Bayley, 1986: 214). Where territorial communities are disorganised and divided, 
crime becomes in Alderson's (1979: 191) terms, the spur to create 'villages in the 
city'. 
Since most people who live in cities, whether well-to-do or not, are on 
occasions victims of fear and apprehension, if not of crime itself, and 
since all are potential victims, there is likely to be considerable interest 
in neighbourhood activity designed to reduce crime. 12 
Unfortunately this superficially attractive solution to the problem of community 
mobilisation soon unravels on closer inspection. Apart from the questionable 
assumption that intra-communal agreement can be reached about what constitutes 
'crime' (or, and still more problematically, 'disorder') the strategy also implies that 
the threat posed is an external one. The possibility that danger may come from 
within the social fortress of the community in the form of 'private' violence or 
white collar crime, or that its own sub-cultural values may be criminogenic or 
'disorderly' is not entertained still less addressed (Crawford, 1997). As numerous 
critics (Nelken, 1985; Buerger, 1993: 112-3) have pointed out, community 
policing's focus on social conflict in the form of crime and disorder as a unifying 
force seems almost perversely illogical. Indeed by 'justifying the bifurcation of 
the police clientele into those who merit special police protection and those who 
do not' (Mastrofski, 1988: 57) crime is possibly the worst possible issue around 
which to construct open, tolerant and inclusive communities (Crawford, 1997: 
274). Its implications for socially just and accountable policing are equally 
alarming since only the 'law-abiding' and respectable 'deserve input into the police 
process' (Tirojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990}.13 
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Another route out of the theoretical impasse created by the empirical absence of 
functioning communities is favoured by advocates of problem-oriented policing. 14 
Ignoring 'physically defined' communities (Wycoff, 1988: 106) in preference for 
communities of interest centred on finding solutions to local problems, problem 
oriented policing takes a pragmatic view of the complex and shifting social 
networks to which people belong. For Goldstein (1990: 26), the leading scholarly 
exponent of problem-oriented policing, 'communities are shifting groups, defined 
differently depending on the problem that is addressed'. He is uninterested not 
only in defining community systematically but also in 'amorphous' police efforts 
to construct and maintain a relationship with it. 
[T]he initial objective [of problem solving policing] is to deal with a 
specific problem. If, in exploring the problem, the police conclude that 
it could be eljminated or significantly reduced by some form of 
community involvement, they then set out to bring about such 
involvement. (Goldstein, 1990: 24) 
Used in this sense, the tenn 'community' connotes no more than an ephemeral 
social construct brought into being either by the random coincidence of individual 
interests or police activism and can hardly fonn the foundations for a functioning 
and politically coherent civil society. Moreover, according to Goldstein (1990: 
70), the all-important, and logically prior, task of identifying problems requires 'a 
careful blend of community initiatives, the willingness and ability of the police to 
listen, and responsible use of the knowledge and expertise that the police develop'. 
Problem identification is thus predominantly a matter for the police and, although 
they are counselled to be aware of the 'multiple social interests in problems', he 
gives no hint as to how such interests should be prioritised or reconciled 
(Goldstein, 1990: 40-1). 
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Summary 
In sum then, promoting the 'community' as the source of police authority at a local 
level makes it easy to lose sight of the demos as the ultimate source of their 
legitimacy. Accountability to geographically defined fractions of 'the people' can 
then be mistaken for accountability to 'the people' as a whole. And, once the 
reality behind the rhetoric of 'community' is analysed, what emerges is a social 
entity that is either non-existent, incoherent or artificial. Attempts to overcome 
these difficulties by the long-term mobilisation of communities around crime or, 
more temporarily, in the search for solutions to particular social problems are 
beset with difficulties. Lurking in the background is the danger that, in switching 
the immediate direction of accountability towards the community, the generality 
of accountability to the demos will be forgotten and the determination of police 
policies and practices become vested ever more firmly in the hands of powerful 
and well-organised local elites with whose interests those of the police - perennial 
enforcers of social respectability - most readily coincide. Is By both obfuscating 
the content of police accountability and eliding its general direction community 
policing thus has 
Mode 
... an important part to play in the legitimation of coercive policing, it is 
a mobilisation of the 'silent' majority around increases in the powers and 
autonomy of the police. (Rawlings 1985: 86) 
There is little in the community policing literature that directly addresses the 
mode in which 'community police' are to account for themselves. Certainly the 
language of consultation', 'partnership' and shared responsibility for preventing 
crime and maintaining social order implies that the autonomy of the police must 
be circumscribed if they are to respond to the priorities of the community: 'the 
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[community police officer's] agenda is influenced by the community's needs and 
desires, not just the dictates of the department' (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 
1990: 12). To the extent that it gives outsiders even the most precarious grip on 
local police policies, community policing threatens the power of the police 
organisation - as Fielding (1995: 84) demonstrates in recounting the fears of an 
inspector about liaison meetings becoming a Trojan horse for left wing 
councillors seeking 'control' of the Police: 
This relief inspector's immediate translation of public consultation into 
the spectre of political control suggests how challenging the community 
policing function, with its emphasis on discretion, is to the customary 
practices of the organization. The idea that consultation could afford 
sectional interests scope to exert influence, rather than simply offering 
police a chance to manipulate public opinion, challenged the inspector's 
fundamental understanding of police accountability. 
To police officers unaccustomed to giving any account of police action, the 
insertion of any outside force into policy-making is a new, and not altogether 
welcome, experience. 
But the degree of disturbance felt by the police is as much a product of 
organisational paranoia as the seriousness of the threat community policing poses 
to their autonomy. What it suggests is not the sudden imposition of local 
community (still less 'political')16 control of the police, but rather a strictly non-
hierarchical relationship in the nature of an exchange or bargain between equals: 
[It] provides a quid pro quo, with the [community police officer] saying 
to people in the beat area: If you provide information and assistance, in 
exchange you receive an opportunity to have input into the police 
priorities in your community. (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990: 12) 
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There is no sense here of the police being directed by the people from whom their 
authority is derived. The community has no right to influence local policing. Any 
input into police priorities depends on local people discharging their obligations to 
provide support and assistance. Any diminution of organisational autonomy is 
conditional upon the community's active participation in the joint enterprise of 
policing. 
In North American terms, proponents of community control in the 1960s and early 
1970s had envisaged a strong oversight fimction for the community in the context 
of an adversarial relationship between the police and the policed. In contrast to 
this quite directive model, community policing 
... offers instead a vision of shared values, a "co-productive" 
relationship' , most often characterized as a partnership in which 
communities offer input, advice, and guidance to police while working 
hand-in-hand to carry out strategies to fulfil their mutual objectives. 
Whereas community control advocates wanted to decentralize the 
governing authority or "control" of the police, community policing 
advocates want the community to serve in an advisory capacity only ... 
(Mastrofski and Greene, 1993: 86) 
Though talk of 'influence', 'input' and 'consultation' may offend police sensitivities 
and threaten the strong version of organisational autonomy to which they tend to 
subscribe, community policing offers local people a seat at the table when police 
priorities are being decided, but no guarantee that their voices will be heard. It 
offers a mode of accountability characterised by friendly discussion and 
explanation between equal partners rather than an opportunity for 'the community' 




Little attention is paid to legal mechanisms for holding the police to accoWlt in the 
literature on community policing. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, as 
we have already seen in the discussion of the content of police accoWltability, 
theories of community policing tend to stress the limited use of the formal legal 
powers associated with 'enforcement', and to encourage the wider use of discretion 
in pursuit of a broader social mandate. The effect of such a shift in emphasis is to 
reduce the opportunity for legal (and political, public and bureaucratic) review of 
police action since, as Joseph Goldstein (1960: 543) observed almost 40 years 
ago, decisions not to invoke the criminal process 'are generally of extremely low 
visibility and consequently are seldom the subject of review'. Moreover, 
'aggressive order maintenance' versions of community policing call for the police 
to take firm action to control behaviours, such as roller-skating on pavements or 
the public consumption of alcohol, that are not strictly illegal (Kelling, 1987). 
The authorisation for police intervention to curb these awkward anti-social-but-
legal activities is sought not in law but the 'political will of the community' (see 
Mastrofski, 1988: 61-2). Indeed, some of the most bullish advocates of this type 
of community policing have gone so far as to argue that the benefits of 'street 
justice' controlled by executive and legislative means outweigh the risks of 
allowing the police to operate Wltrammelled by court action (Sykes, 1986).18 
Waddington (1984:b) and Smith (1987) draw attention to a still more fundamental 
aspect of the problematic relationship between the law, its principles and 
institutions on the one hand, and the precepts of community policing on the 
other.19 Smith (1987: 64), for example, notes that the idea that policing should be 
decentralised and responsive to the needs of local communities appears to conflict 
with the nature of the law as an 'impersonal, universal, and as far as possible, 
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consistent' normative structure.20 None of this is to say that theories of 
community policing seek to render legal mechanisms of accountability 
inoperative. Alderson (1979: 58) for one continued to see the common law and 
the right of the citizen to take action against the police as a safeguard against 
overbearing officialdom. Community policing does not demand the complete 
effacement of the law and its institutions as a mechanism of accountability. But it 
does imply 'a readjustment in the balance between "laws and men'" in holding the 
police to account for their actions: 
In brief, advocates of community policing propose that greater weight be 
given to the "men" part of the equation - couched in terms of 
community" . Correspondingly, the bonds of formal law and 
bureaucratic rule must be loosened to allow police policies and practices 
to be guided by community norms and sentiments. (Mastrofski and 
Greene, 1993: 80) 
Political and Public 
The attitude of community policing theorists to formal political mechanisms of 
accountability has to be divined in much the same way as their approach to legal 
institutions. The subject is rarely addressed directly and then mainly in relation to 
how community policing differs from other styles of policing. F or example, 
several North American writers trace the evolution of policing through three 
historical eras (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Sparrow et aI, 1990). In the ftrst of 
these the nascent police departments of urban America were subject to the malign, 
and not infrequently corrupting, influence of City Hall. In the second period, a 
more legalistic 'professionalism' became commonplace as the police sought to 
insulate themselves from local politicians. For these commentators community 
policing - the dominant style of the third and current period - represents a reaction 
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against the suffocating over-regulation that curbed the creativity of front line 
police officers during the 'professional' or 'reform' era. 
But the replacement of the rule-book that held officers in thrall under 
professionalism does not signal the return of elected officials (mayors and local 
legislators) to positions of power and influence in policing. On the contrary, the 
widespread implementation of community policing programmes has marginalised 
them still further as 'the community' is inserted into the vacuwn in police 
governance created by the relaxation of formal legal and bureaucratic controls 
(Mastrofski, 1988: 66; Mastrofski and Greene, 1993: 86). To accomplish this 
police departments have had to institutionalise their interactions with civil society 
by persuading local organisations to take part in regular meetings and take on 
many of the tasks that might otherwise have fallen to elected representatives. So, 
in one of the most detailed studies of a large-scale community policing initiative 
yet to be published, Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 110 and Chap. 5) report that 
people from a wide range of neighbourhood organisations took part in 'beat 
meetings' convened by police implementing the Chicago Alternative Policing 
Strategy to 'exchange information, identify and prioritize local problems, [and] 
develop strategies to address them'. 
Similarly, in Britain, proponents of community policing like John Alderson (1979: 
59) have firmly resisted anything that smacks of 'political control' of policing on 
the grounds that: 
[E]ven in democracies police can be abused by being made to serve the 
narrower political purposes of those occupying political office for the 
time being. 
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Here too the creation of a statutory framework for consultation with the police has 
led to the promotion of 'the community' as a more amenable and disinterested 
participant in the local governance of policing, largely at the expense of elected 
representatives.21 Thus, on both sides of the Atlantic, community policing is 
J anus-faced, appearing at one and the same time to 'politicise' the police by 
involving them more intimately than ever in the diagnosis, management and 
resolution of inter- and intra-communal conflicts, and to distance them still further 
from officials elected through the formal political processes of representative 
democracy. Wherever community policing has been popularised, informal and 
public mechanisms of accountability based on consultation between the police and 
sections of civil society have been promoted at the same time as 'traditional 
channels of political input [with] formal responsibility for the police' have become 
(or remain) blocked off, ostensibly as a defence against police corruption and 
partiality (Mastrofski, 1988: 66). 
Professional-managerial 
At fIrst blush, the call by advocates of community policing for the voluminous 
rule-books of the professional or reform era to be dispensed with suggests that the 
managerial mechanism by which operational officers are held accountable within 
the police organisation will become less signifIcant in the governance of 
community police than the external influence of the people they serve.22 On 
closer examination however it is evident that what theorists are proposing is a 
change in the subject matter of managerial accountability rather than any 
reduction in its salience. Whereas the 'centralized command-and-control 
bureaucracies' of , reform' era policing were concerned with ensuring that 
operational officers complied with departmental procedures regulating 
enforcement of the law, community police and their line managers operating 
within 'decentralised professional organizations' should be called to account for 
what they achieve in resolving community problems (Moore, 1992: 100). 
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Community policing thus aims to shift the focus of managerial accountability 
from means to ends or, to use the language of evaluation research, process to 
impact. Front line officers and their locally-based supervisors and managers are 
given more scope for creativity, initiative and the use of discretion by devolving 
responsibility for setting goals and devising ways of meeting them to the lowest 
possible level. But their superiors are also expected to hold them stringently to 
account for what they achieve against these self-set standards. 
The move away from the strict procedural controls imposed on street level 
officers during the 'professional' era is by no means risk-free. Devolving 
command responsibility, encouraging adaptability and initiative and allowing 
greater freedom of action carries with it expanded opportunities for slackness, 
mismanagement, corruption, and the abuse of discretion (Bayley, 1988: 234-5). 
Supporters of community and problem oriented policing as diverse as Wilson and 
Kelling (1982) and Goldstein (1987) freely acknowledge these dangers. Their 
answer is to appeal to the norms of good conduct internalised by police officers 
during the 'professional' era as a bulwark against impropriety and indolence 
(Wilson and Kelling) and to recommend that community policing programmes 
should only be implemented in those police organisations where self-discipline 
and conformity with the law are the rule (Goldstein). The inconsistency of relying 
on the legacy of a version of the 'professionalism' they reject to ensure that 
probity is maintained in the era of community policing has not gone unnoticed 
(Mastrofski, 1988: 56-61). It suggests that shifting the focus of managerial 
accountability from the means to the ends of policing may only be possible where 
more traditional mechanisms of external (legal and political) and internal 
(procedural) accountability have successfully penetrated, and been absorbed into, 
the norms of the occupational culture. Or, to put the same point in the terms used 
by the PSI researchers (Smith and Gray, 1985: 441-2), where 'inhibitory rules' 
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imposed on operational officers from 'outside' have become internalised and form 
the 'guiding principles of their conduct' . 
Organic 
Apart from the comparatively well established - or at least familiar - mechanisms 
of legal, political, public and professional-managerial accountability, many 
theories of community policing also appear to appeal to a fifth way in which the 
police may be called to account for their actions by the pUblic. This mechanism 
depends on the 'intimacy' that advocates of community policing hope will develop 
between police officers on permanent assignment to beats, or other clearly defmed 
geographical areas, and the community they serve (Kelling and Moore, 1988: 21). 
Consultation between police and community is intended to contribute to this 
intimacy, but it is also clear that its development is not limited to such 
institutionalised mechanisms of public accountability. Alderson (1979: 162), for 
example, argues that, where constables work alone on their own beats, they will 
tend to acknowledge some definition of their role by the neighbourhood being 
policed. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990: 19) also make a virtue out of 
'direct, daily, face-to-face contact' between community police officers and the 
people they encounter on their beats: 
The goal is to involve [community police officers] so deeply in the life 
of the community that the officers feel responsible for what happens in 
their beat areas, and the people who live there learn to trust them and 
work with them - and hold them accountable for their successes and 
failures. 
What these writers seem to be suggesting is that the greater visibility and 
accessibility of officers permanently assigned to patrol certain areas, particularly 
on foot, will bring them into regular contact with local people over an extended 
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period of time. They seem to have in mind what may (with due apologies to 
Durkheim) be termed a mechanism of organic accountability binding 
geographically responsible police officers to the neighbourhoods to which they are 
assigned by means of regular personal interaction with members of the public. It is 
hoped that this continuity of contact with the public will - quite apart from any 
involvement in institutionalised pubic consultation - sensitise officers to 
communal norms, make their actions more congruent with local values, and 
provide the people with whom they interact an additional mechanism by which 




1 I return to the fact that sector policing originates in a report by a firm of management 
consultants brought in to advise on the 'corporate identity' of the Metropolitan Police in 
the final section of the next chapter. 
2 Further evidence of the light managerial touch with which sector policing was to be 
implemented is provided by the skeleton staffing of the headquarters branch that acted as 
a 'clearing house' for good practice (Dixon and Stanko, 1993: 13-4). As of March 1992, 
TO 15 as it was known had a staff complement of four. 
3 The Commissioner's description of sector policing as a 'community-based policing 
style' in his Annual Report for 199112 (Metropolitan Police, 1992: xiv) is one of very few 
explicit reference to sector policing as a form of 'community policing' I have been able to 
fmd. The apparent reluctance to connect it with the dominant police reform movement 
of the last 20 years and the Commissioner's use of the euphemism 'community-based 
policing' when the link is made is perhaps indicative of a wish on the force's part to 
distance itself and its new policing style from the controversies surrounding community 
policing more generally. In what follows I take the rhetoric, form and content of sector 
policing to be of a piece with 'community (-based and -oriented) policing' despite the 
Commissioner's coyness. 
4 Fielding notes that, in the British context, 'much of the distinctiveness of community 
policing is established by contrast to relief policing' both in the literature and in police 
thinking. 
5 It is worth noting, as Davies (1989) reminds us in her comparative study of policing in 
Tottenham in the 1980s and Kensington a century earlier, that the negotiation of local 
norms with 'problem communities' suggested by community policing theory goes back a 
very long way indeed. 
6 Alderson (1979: 39). 
7 Much of the distaste for the term 'community policing' and the efforts made by the 
Commissioner and other chief officers to distinguish their philosophies from it may be 
attributable to Alderson's personal unpopularity with his former colleagues (Reiner, 
1991: 110). 
8 This has not always prevented the operational officers charged with putting the theory 
into practice from interpreting it in a way that is consistent with their own priorities and 
taking advantage of the opportunities it provides for intelligence gathering and so forth to 
achieve conventional 'crime control' ends by new 'community-oriented' means (Fielding, 
1995). 
9 Legalisation, militarisation and professionalisation are earlier examples. 
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10 Both Crawford (275-8) and Smith (1987) also warn of the danger of sidelining the 
state as the only institution capable of distributing resources equitably between localities 
and supporting the local institutional development of those areas most in need of 
revitalisation. 
11 This does not prevent convenient Jumps' being made to other senses of 'community' 
such as communities of interest or attachment when the need arises (Willmott, 1987; 
Smith, 1987: 63). 
12 A view with which Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990: 92) would concur: 'The issues 
of crime, fear of crime and disorder within any geographic community offer police their 
best and most logical opportunity for unifying people in ways that help rebuild that 
traditional sense of community [of interest],. 
13 The quotation is from their first principle of community policing. 
14 See the next chapter for further discussion on 'problem oriented policing' and 'problem 
solving'. 
15 See Crawford (1997: 200-1) for an excellent sUmmary of the dangers of (re)creating 
social cohesion through 'community' in the context of crime, its prevention and policing. 
16 See below for discussion of the relationship between mechanisms of political and 
public accountability in theories of community policing. 
17 The following discussion of community policing's treatment of the mechanisms of 
police accountability is fairly brief and draws mainly on the American literature. Further 
analysis of developments in Britain is contained in the next chapter when I consider the 
origins and significance of the four core elements of sector policing. 
18 Mastrofski (1988) warns that such a cavalier attitude significantly understates the 
significance of the law as a remedy for police misconduct and a brake on the dominance 
of politically powerful local elites. 
19 See also Bayley (1988: 231-2) writing from a North American perspective. 
20 See Chapter 3 for Waddington's (1984a) use of the same point to counter calls for the 
police to become 'democratically accountable' to locally elected representatives. 
21 The development of community/police consultative groups under s. 106 Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
22 On the hoped for demise of management-by-manual see, for example, Kelling and 




Reinventing Accountability: Elements of 
Sector Policing 
In the last chapter I picked out four elements or themes identifiable in the 
theory of sector policing presented in What is it? and the Assistant 
Commissioner's guidance (Metropolitan Police, undated a; 
1991a;1991b;1991c). I then moved on to consider sector policing in the 
context of the more general, often North American literature, on the family of 
policing initiatives widely, if somewhat unhelpfully, known as community 
policing. This chapter returns to those four elements - geographical 
responsibility, problem solving, community consultation and new 
managerialism - and considers each of them in turn, firstly as they are 
presented in the official guidance and then as they have been applied and 
tested in practice, particularly but not exclusively in Britain prior to the 
implementation of sector policing. As before, the theoretical possibilities and 
practical development of these elements are seen mainly through the prism 
provided by the dimensions of accountability outlined in Chapter 2. 
Geographical responsibility 
As the words 'sector policing' imply, the allocation of responsibility for 
policing specific geographical areas within existing divisions to locally based 
teams of officers is central to the new style of policing. By splitting divisions 
up into smaller areas under the overall control of an identifiable commander 
(known as a sector inspector), and having them policed 24 hours a day by 
groups of officers led by team sergeants, sector policing promises to provide 
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the public with a local service delivered by local providers (Metropolitan 
Police, 1991a: 2). Officers well-known on their sectors will provide 'high 
visibility policing' while the status of sector inspectors as their 'operational 
commanders' will ensure 'continuity of approach' and iron out the kind of 
inconsistencies in police response that foment 'mistrust and confusion' in the 
community (Metropolitan Police, 1991 a 2, 6). Sectors should, as far as 
possible, be self-sufficient in dealing with their own problems. Squads 
dealing with drugs or motor vehicle crime should be called upon only as a last 
resort and operate strictly in response to sector requests for specialist help 
(Metropolitan Police, 1991 a:S). Setting priorities and objectives for local 
policing - and being held to account for performance in meeting those 
objectives - will be a matter for operationally autonomous sector inspectors 
after consultation with the local community (Metropolitan Police, 1991 b: 1-2). 
Advice on how divisions should be divided up into sectors 'of appropriate size 
and number' is kept to a minimum. But the guidance does suggest that a 
'divisional profile' containing information on geographical features, ward 
boundaries and regular policing commitments such as football matches should 
be drawn up, together with a thorough analysis of workload to identify busy 
times of the day and days of the week (Metropolitan Police, 1991c: 2-3). As 
for the process of drawing lines on the map to delineate the new sectors, the 
Assistant Commissioner advised that: 
The main intention of Sector Policing is to identify the many 
individual communities that together make up the division, and then 
develop local policing strategies to reflect their problems and 
concerns. Too many sectors will create difficulties of co-ordination 
and administration whereas with too few individuality is lost. 
(Metropolitan Police, 1991c: 4). 
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Origins 
The idea that small teams of police officers should take responsibility for 
meeting as many of the police needs of a particular area as possible can be 
traced back at least as far as the 1960s and the introduction of unit beat 
policing (Sherman et ai, 1973: xiv; Weatheritt, 1986: Chap. 6). Under unit 
beat policing a multifunctional team - including detectives as well as area beat 
and mobile patrol officers - was expected to live in, take responsibility for, and 
get to know the residents of a designated area. Presented by the Home Office 
as a way of both increasing police effectiveness and improving relations with 
the public, unit beat policing yielded distinctly mixed results. While its 
introduction allowed the police to respond to incidents faster and carry a 
heavier workload, research revealed little evidence of teamwork by the various 
functional groups (Comrie and Kings, 1975). Less sympathetic observers 
condemned its reliance on motorised patrols for distancing the police from the 
public and encouraging elitist attitudes and behavior (Weatherit, 1986: 96 
citing Baldwin and Kinsey (1982: 97) and Manwaring-Wright (1983: 23). By 
the early 1980s, the pressure for the return of foot patrol had become 
irresistible. 
Team Policing 
Another neighbourhood-based style of policing known as team policing was 
introduced in a number of American cities - and parts of several others -
following the urban riots of the 1960's (Sherman et ai, 1973). In what they 
admit is a sometimes subjective 'reportorial account' of seven of these 
schemes, Sherman and his colleagues (1973: xv, 4-5) identify three key 
elements in team policing. Two of these - achieving 'geographic stability' of 
patrol by assigning teams of officers to small neighbourhoods on a permanent 
basis and maximising communication between team members and the 
community in order to promote co-operative peacekeeping and the 
identification of local problems - are also central to sector policing. 
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To deliver on these commitments, team policing depended on a number of 
organisational supports: 'unity of supervision' for team members by a single 
local commander; greater flexibility in policy-making at lower levels in the 
police hierarchy matched by increased accountability for outcomes; delivery 
of a full range of policing services by local teams supported, but not pre-
empted or dominated, by specialists; and the combination of patrol and 
investigative functions in single police units (Sherman et aI, 1973: 5-6). 
Again, the first three of these 'supports' are instantly recognisable in the 
design of sector policing, as indeed was the assumption that a local police 
team would come to belong to its neighbourhood and 'take its shape in 
response to neighbourhood conditions' (Sherman et aI, 1973: 73). Admirable 
in theory, team policing proved difficult to implement and only partially 
successful in those places where elements of the program were put into effect. 
'True neighbourhood teams' with 'special, positive give-and-take relationships 
with their communities' did emerge in some cities, and over half the police 
departments scrutinised by Sherman and his collaborators (1973: 74) were 
able to find a cadre of leaders capable of supporting rather than controlling the 
teams of officers for which they were responsible. But patrol styles remained 
stubbornly conventional and, in 5 out of the 7 police departments studied, 
teams spent almost 50% of their working time out of their designated areas. 
Even if they had not been elsewhere for so much of their time, the researchers 
believed it would have been difficult enough for officers to develop 'area 
knowledge' since the 'neighbourhoods' to which they were assigned were too 
big. l Subverted by middle managers jealous of the authority devolved to 
more junior team leaders and ordinary patrol officers, confounded by the 
pressure felt by dispatchers to react to calls for service promptly - if need be 
by pulling team members off their areas - and lacking any clear differentiation 
between the role of team police and regular patrols officers, the 
implementation of team policing either failed to produce a new patrol style or 
did not happen at all.2 
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Patrol experiments 
Despite the vilification of unit beat policing in the early 1980s the idea of 
geographical responsibility leading to increased police/public contact that lay 
behind both it and team policing survived and continued to stimulate 
innovations in the organisation of police patrol and several of the early British 
experiments were reviewed by Mollie Weatherwitt (1986). The results were 
mixed. At Chelmsey Wood in the West Midlands, for example, a programme 
of 'structured' patrol of designated areas by resident beat and foot patrol 
officers was implemented with some success. But the time officers actually 
spent on their areas declined, the visibility of policing did not improve and 
there was no evidence that officers had developed a better knowledge of local 
people and their problems (Weatheritt 1986: 37-42). A 'zonal policing' 
project on the Peckham division in the Metropolitan Police was equally 
inconclusive (Turner, 1987: 18).3 Patrol personnel were divided between 
traditional reliefs doing shift work and zonal officers responsible for 
'community contact' and patrolling on foot on flexible hours. Some 
improvement in the crime clearance rate - attributed to an increased flow of 
information from the public - was offset by a 'drop in local knowledge' among 
officers redeployed on to zones from smaller home beats. Levels of 
community contact generally were judged to have fallen since zonal officers 
did not know what was expected of them, and felt unwelcome on areas too 
large to foster the kind of links enjoyed by conventional beat officers. 
Neighbourhood Policing 
By some way the best documented, most influential and thoroughly evaluated 
of the policing experiments of the 1980s was the introduction of 
'neighbourhood policing' in a total of six police areas across two forces.4 
Neighbourhood policing was an attempt to meet the challenge of rising crime 
and disorder by promoting 'community-helping' activities by ordinary 
uniformed officers and reversing the trend to increasingly specialised policing 
(Turner, 1987: 1). It originated in a closely argued paper by two serving 
police inspectors, Ian Beckett and James Hart, who contended that, if the 
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police made 'helping behaviour' (rather than legalistic, reactive interventions) 
their core activity, crime and disorder rates would decline as people responded 
to and learnt from the police (Irving et aI, 1989: 2-3). In a novel application of 
socialleaming theory (Bandura, 1973), they argued that police officers in 
everyday contact with the public should provided people with a model of pro-
social helping behaviour. Stripped of academic discussion and its original 
experimental methodology, Beckett and Hart's somewhat grandiose theory 
was broken down into a series of programme elements capable of evaluation. 
They included geographical responsibility, the alignment of duties with 
demand, community building and consulting, participative management and 
improved operational information systems. 
Both the internal (Turner, 1987) and external (Irving et aI, 1989) evaluations 
of neighbourhood policing yielded disappointing results. Turner could 
discover no evidence of a consistent or sustained reduction in levels of crime, 
disorder or fear of crime at the experimental sites. The only evidence of 
positive external effects at any of the London sites was found at Brixton where 
he thought high levels of community-police contact were probably attributable 
to the 'aftermath' of the Scarman report rather than the impact of 
neighbourhood policing.5 The alignment of duties with demand was limited to 
those sites (Brixton and Surrey) and units where some degree of geographical 
responsibility was introduced.6 Elsewhere, tampering with duty rosters and 
the shift system was fiercely resisted. Of the various programme elements 
only participative management was judged to be an unqualified success.7 
Geographical responsibility was implemented in various guises and led to 
improved relations with organised community groups in most places, but not 
to any additional contacts with the general public. 8 
As with their presence on the street, police community involvement 
has a low visibility. Community groups are only a small part of the 
community at large and tend to be formed from a limited number of 
people. Connections with the majority of people are thin. Even in 
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law-abiding areas, most want the police to be available when needed 
but unobtrusive at other times. Individual community-helping 
behaviour by the police does not make a wide impact. (Twner, 1987: 
15, para. 63 (vi)) 
Where, as in Brixton, geographically responsible neighbourhood units were 
created, permanent beat officers covering smaller areas continued to make the 
most substantial contribution of community contact work.9 More generally, 
only a small minority of the public were touched by the changes and, where 
positive steps were taken to bring the police closer to the 'organized' 
community, they were 'of questionable advantage to police/public co-
operation,.10 Resistance to the introduction of geographical responsibility 
coalesced around the claim that extra personnel were needed if area-based 
teams were to be sufficiently robust. Summarising his findings on 
geographical responsibility, Turner (1987: 28, para. 125) counsels that it 
should not be forced on to areas but implemented only 'where a particular 
feature is identified that seems suitable'. For their part, Irving et al (1989: 
207) conclude from both their own in-depth study ofNotting Hill, and 
Turner's evaluation of all six sites, that implementation of the main elements 
of neighbourhood policing either did not happen within the planned period or 
failed to conform to the programme design. 
Estates policing and Total Geographic Policing 
In spite of these apparently discouraging conclusions, both the forces involved 
in neighbourhood policing remained confident that some form of geographical 
responsibility was the way ahead. Surrey Constabulary believed that Turner's 
evaluation had ignored the more positive aspects of neighbourhood policing in 
the Surrey sites and decided to retain key elements of the package, including 
the deployment of front line officers to geographical teams rather than time-
based shifts. I I Following a favourable internal evaluation of the programmes -
including the alignment of personnel to demand and continuity of duty on 
discrete geographical areas - in place at Addlestone and Camberley, what 
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became known as total geographic policing or TGP was extended across the 
force in September 1989. 
Progress in the Metropolitan Police District was more hesitant. Initially at 
least, Turner's advice about targeting geographical policing seems to have 
been taken to heart, and some of the principles of neighbourhood policing are 
evident in the development of 'estates policing' programmes on certain large 
urban housing schemes (Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 1987: 5, 
32). By the end of 1988, the Commissioner (Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis, 1989b: 14) was able to report that more than 200 officers were 
part of 'dedicated estates policing projects'. Two years later a 'significant 
reduction in crime, and notable improvements in the quality of life' of estate 
residents were being claimed for the programme (Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis, 1991d: 12); and in 1992 it was annOlUlced that the principles 
of policing would 'form the key elements of our Sector Policing style' 
(Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 1992: 9). Thus, though no formal 
evaluation of estates policing appears to have been completed, the programme 
served to keep the principle of geographical responsibility, central to both 
neighbourhood and sector policing, alive in the MPD between 1987 when the 
former was wound down and 1991 when the latter emerged from the 
deliberations of the team working on component four of PLUS. Indeed, so 
popular had geographical policing become by the end of the 1980s, that 
Bennett and Lupton (1990, cited in Bennett, 1994a: 111) found that it was 
operating in more than a quarter of police forces in England and Wales with a 
similar proportion carrying out some form of estates policing. 
Community constables 
However the most common application of the principle of geographical 
responsibility throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s was the deployment of 
officers (known generically as community constables or, depending on force 
nomenclature, as home, permanent, resident or area beat officers) to 
designated beats with the object of getting to know their area, making contact 
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with members of the local community and generating good police/public 
relations (Brown and Des, 1985; Bennett and Lupton, 1992). By the late 
1980' s, more than 1 in 7 officers in the Metropolitan Police - and almost 1 in 
5 in the provinces - were assigned as community constables (Bennett and 
Lupton, 1992: 171-2). But, as Brown and nes (1985: 18) found in their study 
of community constables in five forces referred to in the previous chapter, the 
simple fact of deployment to permanent beats did not mean that very much 
routine contact between police and public was going on. Far from gaining a 
sense of communal values and priorities by the osmotic process predicted by 
the theory of geographical responsibility, they detected an aimlessness in 
much of community constables' activity. Ethnographic research by Grimshaw 
and Jefferson (1987: 172) also suggested that regular contacts between 
resident beat officers (RBOs) and members of 'their' local community were 
restricted to 'respectables' and systematically excluded the 'toe rags' most 
frequently subjected to adversarial policing. Moreover, finding out about local 
problems did not figure in the top five reasons given by RBOs for initiating 
public contact. 
Research clearly indicates that geographically responsible community 
constables do tend to have more contact with the public than their colleagues 
on shift (see Fielding et aI, 1989: 53; and Horton, 1989: 39, for example). But 
there is little evidence to suggest that even when a single (or, at most, two) 
officers are permanently deployed on quite small geographical areas, they 
either spend enough time in those areas, or devote sufficient attention to 
interacting with all sections of the local population, to absorb complex 
communal values and become attuned to what may often be conflicting local 
priorities. Some form of geographical assignment may therefore be a 
necessary condition for increased police/public interaction, but the research 
reviewed here, together with a recent pilot study of the approachability of 
police officers patrolling alone and in pairs, suggests it may be very far from 
sufficient (McKenzie and Whitehouse, 1995).12 The very high rates of 
community contact that seem necessary to achieve marked improvements in 
251 
public satisfaction with the police (a not implausible proxy for greater 
congruence between the values and priorities of local officers and the 
population they serve) have been registered in one experimental programme 
(Bennett, 1991). But they were only achieved by making resident contact and 
continuity of police presence the sole objectives of teams of officers too large 
to be sustainable under normal operating conditions.13 
Experiences of geographical responsibility 
Apart from the difficulties encountered in implementing and evaluating the 
more ambitious programmes such as team and neighbourhood policing, these 
experiences of geographical responsibility suggest that, as a core element of 
sector policing, it is likely to make only a limited contribution to greater police 
accountability. The evidence reviewed here indicates that the process of 
osmosis by which officers assigned to specific geographical areas are 
supposed to absorb communal values has been inadequately theorised. The 
continuity and range of public contacts needed to make organic accountability 
a reality have proved difficult to achieve under normal operating conditions. 
Evidence of greater sensitivity among patrol officers to communal norms 
detected, for example, by Fielding (1995) has generally been a feature of 
schemes involving the deployment of individual community constables to 
small beat areas rather than teams of officers to larger areas or sectors. 
Rhetorical commitments to a broad problem-solving or community-helping 
mandate have either proved impossible to implement (Turner, 1987; Irving et 
aI, 1989) or have been contradicted by empirical evidence of a programmatic 
emphasis on information and intelligence gathering connected to more limited 
crime control goals (Weatheritt 1987; Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987; 
Fielding, 1995). 
Beckett and Hart's bold attempt (in the original neighbourhood policing 
thesis) to side step the definitional problems associated with the concept of 
'community' by focusing on 'neighbourhoods' with distinct histories and 
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shared, and identifiable, social characteristics ran up against familiar 
difficulties (Irving et aI, 1989). In the empirical absence of social 
homogeneity within the areas for which they were responsible, 
'neighbourhood' (and other geographically responsible) police officers reacted 
to the complex networks of often mutually antagonistic psycho-social 
communities of interest with which they were confronted by tending to 
concentrate their efforts to make contact with the public on organised and 
respectable sub-groups and individuals (Turner, 1987; Irving et aI, 1989; 
Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987). People perceived to be 'rough' or 'deviant' 
were simply excluded from officers' attempts to form relationships based on 
consent. In those instances where accommodations were reached between 
area-based police and the better organised and more respectable fractions of 
the local populace, the research literature suggests that the dominant mode of 
communication has been what Irving et al (1989: 210) describe as 
'proclamation' rather than consultation. On Notting Hill Division, for 
instance, they found that dialogue with non-establishment, non-professional, 
community organisations was only contemplated where the organisation was 
seen to be in a position of considerable power and could not be ignored. 
Genuine collaboration implying a degree of mutuality and equality was rarer 
still. In sum then, as Greene and Mastrofski (1993: 95-6) have written, 
geographically responsible policing ensures that: 
The police retain decision-making authority but decision-making 
within the department is decentralized so that lower-level 
commanders and supervisors are given the flexibility to respond to 
local conditions. 
Pro blem-solving 
Geographical responsibility is closely linked to another element of sector 
policing - the early identification and prompt solution of local problems. 
Continuity of contact through holding teams of uniformed officers and their 
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immediate operational commanders responsible for policing specified areas 
will allow them to build better relations with the local community, identify its 
concerns more quickly and gain crime intelligence (Metropolitan Police, 
1991a: 5). In return., the Assistant Commissioner's guidelines anticipate that 
the public will come to know and trust 'their' sector officers with the result 
that neighbourhood problems will be nipped in the bud: 
Rather that just responding to recuning symptoms police [will be] 
able to get ahead of ... problems to identifying the underlying causes 
of them. 
Instead of merely 'reacting' to the demands for police assistance they create, 
sector policing promises to put in place ' a more considered, logical and 
systematic approach' to addressing problems 'in close conjunction with the 
community' (Metropolitan Police, 1991a: 2). The key to this transformation 
of local policing from reacting to symptoms to solving problems lies, the 
designers of sector policing would have it, in giving operational officers the 
sense that they' own' the problems of the communities they serve 
(Metropolitan Police, 1991 a: 5). With geographical responsibility will come 
the knowledge that 'their problem today will be theirs tomorrow, and so on 
until finally resolved'. Fixed with the 'ownership' of sector problems, teams 
will have the incentive they need to co-ordinate their efforts 'because only in 
this way can certain persistent problems be dealt with' (Metropolitan Police, 
1991b: 2). 
Origins 
The idea that substantive community problems consisting of a cluster of 
'similar, related or recurring' incidents should be seen as the principal units of 
police business is closely identified with work of the American police scholar 
Hennan Goldstein (1990: 66; and see also 1979; 1987; 1996). For more than 
twenty years he has argued that 'problem-oriented policing' represents a more 
realistic and constructive way of thinking about what people expect the police 
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to do. His concern is neither with 'crime fighting' as the goal of policing nor 
with 'law enforcement' as the means of achieving it, but rather with the impact 
the police have on the underlying causes of the whole range of troublesome 
events and behaviors they are called upon to deal with. According to 
Goldstein (1996: 7), problem-oriented policing is 'a way of thinking about the 
police job ... [with] some b~aring on all aspects of police operations'. The 
conscientious identification and analysis of community problems, and the 
development and evaluation of 'tailor-made' solutions to them captured in the 
form of the four stage SARA (scanning, analysis, response and assessment) 
process fIrst used in Newport News, Virginia, is central to the enterprise (Eck 
and Spelman, 1987a: 42-51). But, as Goldstein (1996: 1) has been forced to 
point out, problem-oriented policing is not reducible to 'a simplistic four step 
process for dealing with problems that, unattended, repeatedly require police 
attention'. To do so is to 'trivialize' it and ignore the significant changes in 
every aspect of police organisation - including supervision, recruitment, 
training and performance evaluation - that are required if the primary goal of 
improving the capacity of the police to solve community problems is to be 
achieved (Goldstein, 1996: 7). 
At least part of the reason why problem-oriented policing has been 'so diluted, 
corrupted, and trivialized on implementation that some ... efforts bear no 
relationship to the original idea, (Goldstein, 1996: 9) is due to the adoption of 
'problem-solving' as both a goal and a standard technique of community 
policing (Bayley, 1994: 105, 111-5; Bennett, 1994b, 229). At a practical level, 
this development presents no difficult since, as Goldstein himself (1987: 15) 
has argued, community police must engage with substantive community 
problems if it is to be more that 'an empty shell'. At a conceptual level, 
however, the two paradigms - problem-oriented policing and community 
policing - compete: 
While problem-oriented policing is a method of analyzing and 
solving the wide array of behavioral or crime problems that the 
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police encounter on a routine, daily basis, community policing 
represents a solution to a particular difficulty of policing - gaining 
the support of the local community in helping to prevent crime and 
disorder. This difficulty is redefined as the problem of policing. 
(Clarke, 1997: 22-3, emphasis in original) 
Strictly interpreted, community policing is thus a means of addressing a 
generalised 'problem' of poor police/community relations. Its aim is to 
construct and sustain more or less permanent ties between them. Problem-
oriented policing, on the other hand, focuses on 'ends' and has a purely 
instrumental concern in engaging the police with ephemeral communities of 
interest that may coalesce around finding and implementing solutions to 
particular problems. 14 
The significance of this for present purposes is that the Assistant 
Commissioner's guidance contemplates an approach to 'getting ahead' of 
local problems that, like many other community policing programmes, 
encourages 'problem-solving' activity by individual or small teams of officers. 
But it does not seem to require the kind of systematic analytical approach to 
identifying the underlying causes of clusters of related incidents (particularly 
at 'jurisdictional' rather than 'beat' level) demanded by problem-oriented 
policing. Nor - though sector policing represents a 'whole organisation' 
reform rather than an isolated experiment - does the guidance put in place the 
battery of organisational and structural changes needed to align the 
recruitment, training, supervision and performance assessment of front line 
officers with the goal of solving substantive community problems. In 
comparison with the stress placed on geographical responsibility, community 
consultation and aligning resources with demand, problem solving is given 
scant attention in the booklets issued by the Assistant Commissioner. IS 
Having said that, the ownership and amelioration of local problems are clearly 
intended to be central to the work of sector officers. We must therefore 
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consider how problem-solving policing in its various manifestations has 
worked in practice and assess its implications for police accountability. 
Problem-solving in practice 
The dearth of rigorously evaluated case studies of police problem solving, 
whether in the context of full-blown problem-oriented policing or otherwise, 
has been lamented by both Clarke (1997) and Goldstein (1996). Studies of 
early experiments in North America yielded promising results but tended to 
restrict themselves to examining the extent and scope of the implementation of 
problem-oriented policing rather than its outcome in terms of problems 
solved. I6 A study of the" most conscientious implementation of Goldstein's 
ideas to date found that regular operational police officers were able 
successfully to address community problems as part of their normal duties 
(Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 97). But, having completed a full evaluation of 
only three problem-solving efforts and partial evaluations of fifteen others, the 
authors were commendably reluctant to put to much weight on their fmdings. 
In a subsequent study of problem-oriented policing in San Diego, California, 
researchers judged eleven of an original sample of twenty problems to have 
been ameliorated to a significant degree by police action, but found the 
application of any analytical problem solving process disappointingly patchy 
(Capowich and Roehl, 1994). Officers spent little time analysing problems 
they identified and retained such tight control of problem-solving activities 
(involving both enforcement and non-enforcement response) that the 
communities on whose behalf they were supposed to be working were left 
with no active role to play. In only three of the sixteen cases examined was 
there any evidence that efforts had been made to assess the work done either 
by the officers themselves or their department. I7 
'Britpop' 
Experience of problem solving in Britain prior to the introduction of sector 
policing was even more limited than in the United States. The results of the 
only studies from the 1980s I have been able to trace were not especially 
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encouraging. In the first, Hoare et a/ (1984) evaluated a pilot study of the 
police response to four crime problems. The results were ambiguous: 
problem-solving proved popular with the operational officers involved and 
reinforced local commitments to 'multi-agency' working. But it also 
conflicted with the highly centralised managerial structure of such a large 
organization as the Metropolitan Police. Rapid turnover in personnel and the 
pressure of incident response work made it difficult for front line officers to 
take on problem solving in addition to their normal duties. No assessment 
appears to have been made of the outcome effectiveness of the work done, and 
it should be noted that in only one case did the public appear to play any part 
in problem identification. 
If anything Chatterton's (1993) assessment of an attempt to make area beat 
officers in five divisions of the Greater Manchester Police more 'problem-
focused' in their work is even more gloomy.18 The analytical requirements of 
the project design were rarely met and (with the partial exception of one 
division) there was 'no evidence that the initiative had resulted in Area 
constables becoming more problem-focused in their work' (Chatterton, 1993: 
193-4). Rather than analysing crime reports in any systematic way, officers 
taking part in the study relied on limited, and sometimes inaccurate, 'local 
knowledge' to justify claims about the significance of the problems that they 
tackled. Area constables and their supervisors successfully resisted attempts 
to make their work more carefully targeted and to hold them more accountable 
for it. Instead of transforming how they approached their work, the use of 
information and information technology was itself shaped by the occupational 
culture and officers' desire to avoid 'within the job trouble': 
Time and again ... the existing structure dictated the response to the 
problem, not what was known (or knowable) about the problem. 
(Chatterton, 1993: 202) 
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Experiences of problem solving in the 1990s have been equally mixed (Leigh 
et aI, 1996; 1998; Home Office, 1998). Usually small-scale and with a limited 
lifespan, the six problem-oriented policing schemes reviewed by Leigh and his 
colleagues (1996) were marred (with some exceptions) by inexact problem 
definition, half-hearted attempts at community involvement and little formal 
assessment of problem-solving efforts. Initial expectations of the 
Leicestershire programme studied by Leigh et al were disappointed. Some of 
the beat officers involved in implementing problem-oriented policing in three 
local policing units of the force's East Area produced 'examples of 
outstanding work on a wide variety of problems , (Leigh et aI, 1998: (v)). 
However, many others were 'cynical, hostile to form-filling, reluctant or 
unable to analyse incident data and apt to fall back on traditional policing 
methods'. A more comprehensive national survey undertaken by Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (1998: 25, Box 3:1) found that 
'problem-solving is not the approach used to address most crime problems; 
while, of 234 'successful' initiatives submitted by forces to the inspection 
team, only 17 (5%) 'could be judged as having fully followed a problem-
solving approach' .19 
Dimensions 
In practice, operational police officers in Britain and in the United States have 
found it much harder to apply the analytical precepts of problem solving in 
their day to day work than theorists like Herman Goldstein might have hoped. 
The organisations to which they belong have found the implementation of 
fully problem-oriented style of policing more taxing still. But what are the 
implications of the theory and practice of problem solving for police 
accountability? 
Content 
According to Goldstein (1990: 35), 'problem-handling'is the core police 
function. Problems mayor may not stem from criminal behavior. Their 
resolution mayor may not involve law enforcement and the invocation of the 
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criminal process. In this sense, committing the police to problem solving 
represents nothing more than a refutation of the restricted 'crime control' view 
of their function, and a restatement of the alternative 'social service' 
perspective (Punch, 1979a), albeit in slightly different tenns. But this 
expansive view of the 'police function' tells us nothing about what the police 
bring to the multifarious problems to which they are expected to respond, or 
what those who call them for assistance think the police can do to help. Eck 
and Spelman (1987a: 34) note the disparity between the quality of life 
problems people commonly complain about, and the 'real crime' police 
traditionally concentrate on tackling. Clarke (1997: 32) uses the example of a 
police officer persuading the family of a confused old man to find him 
professional care as an illustration of how such beat level non-crime problems, 
leading to repeated calls for police assistance, can be solved and the demand 
for reactive policing reduced. 
But neither Eck and Spelman, nor Clarke, nor other writers on problem 
solving stop to ask why people call the police about noisy parties, abandoned 
cars, or -like the latter's lonely senior citizen - non-existent intruders. The 
answer of course is that they want whatever is troubling them dealt with - and 
dealt with sooner rather that later. They recognise that the ultimately coercive 
authority of the police is required to accomplish the task (Shapland and Vagg, 
1988: 108). This is not to say that force will or should be used either to deal 
with the immediate incident or, as problem solvers would insist, with its 
underlying causes. Nor is it to deny that alerting other agencies (such as social 
services in the case of the elderly and confused) to a problem, or even 
indulging in the kind of 'community advocacy' suggested by Goldstein (1990: 
47), may not be a sensible course of action for the police to pursue. On the 
contrary, when resolving problems demands personal skills and organisational 
resources that neither police officers specially trained in the distribution of 
coercive force, nor their organisations, possess, it makes sense for then to give 
way to others. The danger is that, in calling for the police to become 'problem 
solvers' rather than 'crime fighters' and 'community advocates' instead of 
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'law enforcers', the need to hold them to account for the coercive powers they 
alone bring to incidents - and to the problems that underlie them - is forgotten. 
Directions 
As we have seen, Goldstein's version of problem-oriented policing 
circumvents the difficulties that community policing has with the notion of 
'community' by focusing on ad hoc communities of interest in finding 
solutions to substantive problems. In arriving at this position Goldstein (1990: 
25) does not assume that large numbers of people will share common values in 
most urban neighbourhoods. He readily concedes that 'problems' may stem 
from tensions between groups living or doing business in the same area rather 
than the nefarious activities of 'outsiders'. From the standpoint of practical 
problem-solving policing, he accepts that people with an interest in a problem 
or its amelioration may not be law-abiding. And, with a realism absent from 
much of the writing on community policing, proponents of its problem-
oriented equivalent openly embrace the need for the police to embroil 
themselves in the hurly-burly of intra-communal power struggles (Goldstein, 
1990: 25-6: Eck and Spelman, 1987b: 48). 
However, having cast the police adrift in the turbulent waters of 
neighbourhood politics, they provide them with neither map nor compass with 
which to steer a course. Goldstein (1990: 40-1), for example, makes much of 
the need to identify and analyse the multiplicity of interests that may exist in a 
problem and its resolution. To illustrate the point, he picks out no fewer than 
13 'interests' in street prostitution - an activity that is 'clearly illegal' (though 
that description, he suggests, is unhelpful in formulating a solution) but needs 
to be dealt with as fairly and effectively as possible. The weakness of his 
analysis is that prostitution is seen primarily as a problem experienced by 'the 
community' , and created by the behavior of prostitutes, with the result that 
only 3 of the 13 different interests Goldstein identifies can be described as 
'prostitute interests'. The prioritisation of the 'community' over 'outsiders' is 
most evident perhaps in his treatment of the economic interests at stake. 
261 
Whereas he acknowledges the potential damage caused to the economy of an 
area and local property values by the presence of street prostitutes, he fails to 
recognise the competing material interest of men and woman who use the 
streets to earn their living by prostitution. In short, even the idealised practice 
of problem-oriented policing described by Goldstein fails to live up to the 
pluralist rhetoric of his theory. 
What is conspicuously lacking here are any criteria against which to measure 
competing' community interests' and decide which should be favoured. The 
police are asked to make highly political decisions but are given no secure, 
never mind socially just or equitable, basis for doing so. In reality however, 
the literature reviewed earlier suggests that this level of sophistication in the 
application of Goldstein's methods has rarely been approached. Despite his 
injunction that problem-oriented policing means 'looking to the community to 
define the problems that should be of concern to the police, rather than 
succumbing to the tendency of the police on their own to define the problems 
of concern to the community' (Goldstein, 1990: 34), the means by which 
'substantive community problems' have been identified have only rarely 
involved active input from local people. 'Scanning' for problems has usually 
been done by police officers either using their own 'craft' knowledge and 
experience (Eck and Spelman, 1987a: 45) or by studying 'management' data 
on reported crime and/or calls for service (Sherman et aI, 1989; Buerger, 
1991; Sherman, 1992; Capowich and Roehl, 1994). Such official knowledge 
was supplemented in Baltimore by some citizen surveys (Cordner, 1985) but, 
as a rule, problem identification has not been marked by the kind of openness 
and eclecticism advocated by Goldstein.2o As one commentator with 
considerable experience of problem-solving on the ground has argued, police 
definitions of what constitutes 'a problem' , and who may legitimately deem 




In the absence of citizen input, police identification of "problems" 
leans to police crime-fighter preferences, traditionally targeting out-
of-favour groups. Even when citizen participation occurs, the 
problem identification process is biased toward the organized, 
articulate segments of the community. (Buerger, 1993: 107) 
The mode and mechanisms of accountability suggested by Goldstein and 
revealed in the various attempts to put his ideas into practice are not entirely 
clear. At one point Goldstein (1990: 46) asserts that 'the ultimate decision on 
the type of service provided by the police should obviously be made by the 
community being served'. But he is also sensitive to the need to protect the 
constitutional rights of minorities from rampant local majoritarianism,21 and 
well aware of the asymmetries in knowledge about community problems 
between the police and local people (Goldstein, 1990: 71). To square the 
circle he suggests that some degree of insulation from community influence 
must be maintained: 
The standards of a neighbourhood cannot be substituted for the rules 
of the state. Police administrators cannot surrender managerial 
controls over their agency (including the assignment of personnel) 
without significantly reducing their capacity to direct the agency. 
(Goldstein, 1987: 25) 
It seems, therefore, that the ultimate arbiters of what constitutes a 'problem' -
and one that can be dealt with without infringing minority rights or 
compromising police managers' 'right to manage' - are none other than the 
police. And, sure enough, the available research is replete with examples of 
the police identifying, analysing, responding to and (very occasionally) 
assessing problems with minimal reference to the affected communities while 
a 'mobilised' citizenry is seen as an untapped resource for cash-strapped 
police organisations. The abiding impression is that the relationship between 
police and public is, at best, analogous to that between members of a band 
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playing a tune they all like and have agreed to play and, at worst, to the 
interaction between a conductor and musicians attempting a piece the former 
likes, and hopes the latter will enjoy too. 
Mechanisms 
Precisely how the communities of interest that are supposed to cohere around 
problems and their solutions are to voice their concerns is rarely explained in 
writing on problem-oriented policing. Legal and political mechanisms of 
accountability are certainly not prominent. The role of elected officials in 
providing guidance to police problem solving is acknowledged (Goldstein, 
1990: 26), and constitutionalim is, as we have seen, axiomatic. But Goldstein 
(1990: 47) also asserts that the imposition of extemallegal and political 
controls in an attempt to structure the kind of creative discretion demanded of 
junior officers by problem-oriented policing has (in the USA at least) 'added 
to the strain in relationships between the police and the community and ... 
made the police even more defensive'. No evidence to support this claim is 
cited but it does at least indicate that we must look elsewhere - to public, 
managerial and organic mechanisms of accountability - for the institutional 
means by which problem-solving police are to be held to account. 
Since problem-oriented policing is unconcerned with developing 
police/community relations as an end in itself, permanent public mechanisms 
in the form of institutionalised 'community consultation' are not 
recommended. Indeed Goldstein (1990: 70-1) counsels against calling 
community meetings as a way of identifying problems because they are likely 
to throw up a mass of 'quality-of-life offenses' to which the police would be 
wrong to respond without first articulating the need to deal with the more 
serious problems they alone can appreciate. Instead he argues that meetings 
should only be organised to address intensified concerns about a problem that 
has already been identified thus confining formal public accountability to the 
analysis and response stages of the problem-solving process. 
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If the Assistant Commissioner's guidance grafts problem solving on to 
geographical responsibility, the reverse is true of writing on problem-oriented 
policing. Permanent beat assignment is seen as essential if officers are to 'get 
to know the problems of a community, the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing systems of control, and the various resources that are useful in solving 
problems' (Goldstein, 1990: 160).22 He argues that officers assigned to 
particular areas over lengthy periods are more likely to acquire this knowledge 
than those assigned for random, discontinuous or short periods of time. But 
no explanation or illustration of how this process of assimilation, central to the 
operation of the organic mechanism of accoWltability characteristic of much 
writing on commWlity policing, should take place is provided. 'Maintaining 
beat integrity' as Goldstein calls it, may well be necessary if problem-oriented, 
community or sector police are to absorb the values and norms of the people 
of the areas they serve; but (to reinforce a point made earlier), without a clear 
explanation of how that should happen, it is hard to accept that geographical 
responsibility alone can be a sufficient condition for the creation of an 
organically accoWltable police service. 
With other legal, political, public and organic mechanisms of such dubious 
capacity or so restricted a role, the claim that problem-oriented policing will 
increase accoWltability is almost entirely dependant on the creation of a new 
technical-managerial professionalism. This manifests itself, for example, in 
Goldstein's (1990: 47-8) belief that the clearer articulation and justification of 
frontline police decisions about community problems in terms of 'the relevant 
facts' will give both their superiors and 'those who represent the community' 
more opportunity to review their actions. The rational, reflexive, nature of the 
problem-solving process and its reliance on carefully analysed':' and 
demonstrably relevant - information as a basis for action will give supervisors, 
the public and their elected representatives much greater purchase on 
operational police work. Once again the argument is plausible, but we are 
given no clues as to how - in the real world of culturally valued operational 
independence - this change will take place, and no examples of cases where it 
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has. Without being told considerably more about how, in Clarke's (1997: 19) 
words, 'rational analysis and planning' in attacking 'the substantive problems 
that the police are called upon to deal with' will lead to greater accountability, 
it is equally plausible to suggest that it may have precisely the opposite effect. 
The 'enhanced professional status' that he anticipates will flow from problem-
oriented policing may in fact serve only to legitimise police autonomy by 
glossing their decisions with the appearance of empirical social science. 
Community consultation 
Although, as we have just seen, the 'organic' accountability of sector officers 
to people with whom they are in continual contact seems to be given at least as 
much salience as any institutionalised mechanism for identifying local 
problems, the Assistant Commissioner stresses that sector inspectors are to 
consult their local communities before setting their unit's priorities and 
objectives (Metropolitan Police, 1991 b: 1). Indeed formal consultation under 
sector policing represents much more than a means by which 'local public 
concerns can be successfully identified' since the principal vehicle for it, the 
sector working group (SWG), is intended to be not only a "police service users 
group' through which the public can raise concerns of an essentially local 
nature' but also a 'forum for the police to meet with other interested agencies 
to discuss and implement agreed and co-ordinated solutions to identified local 
problems' .23 Thus the sector working group is seen both as a source of 
community input into the process of problem-identification, and a setting for 
mobilising and managing the response of the police and other agencies to 
those problems. Sector inspectors are also advised that meetings should be 
treated as an opportunity for the police to dispel some of the more unrealistic 
expectations and misconceptions that people may have about 'the police 
service's role, abilities, resources ... and what is achievable'. To this end, 
issues that are best dealt with by other agencies should, wherever possible, be 
passed on to them openly and in public so that people become more fully 
aware of the different roles and responsibilities of local service providers. 
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In sharp contrast to other aspects of sector policing touched on in the Assistant 
Commissioner's guidance, detailed advice then follows on how a sector 
working group should be set up and what its status, membership and powers 
should be once established (Metropolitan Police, 1991 b: 5-9, Appendix 1.). 
The burden of forming a working group falls squarely on the sector inspector. 
She must get together a 'nucleus' of local representatives to start meeting and 
then allow the group to develop its own momentum (Metropolitan Police, 
1991 b: 6). According to the guidance, a properly formed working group 
should be a 'voluntary, non-statutory, body consisting of people who have an 
interest in, and genuine concern about, local policing matters' .24 Though 
instigated by the police, it should not be police-run.25 The chairperson must be 
independent and seen to be SO.26 Membership of an SWG is open to three 
main groups - residents, businesses and representatives from other agencies 
whose activities affect people living and working in the area - though the 
guidelines explicitly state there are 'no strict rules of entitlement to, or 
prohibition from, participation' .27 
Among the representative organisations and individuals picked out in the text 
of the guidance are residents' associations, neighbourhood watches, ward 
councillors, trading associations, chambers of commerce, business 
crimewatches, key personnel from individual large commercial organisations 
and any other organisation 'whose leaders can fairly claim to represent local 
residents' .28 Local authority service departments should 'only be asked to 
attend if essential'. Other criminal justice agencies and emergency services 
are mentioned in the contact list appended to the guide.29 Once established, 
the guidelines suggest that a working group should be expected to decide who 
it wants at its meetings' in some reasonable and democratic way' .30 Finally 
the powers - and responsibilities relative to the police - of a sector working 
group are set out in a paragraph that is worth quoting in full: 
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Although the public have an opportunity to express their views and 
have them taken into account, this does not affect the responsibility 
of the police to make the final operational decisions. Often these 
decisions will coincide with the group's wishes and will gain strength 
from having been taken after listening to public opinion. 
(Metropolitan Police, 1991b: 6). 
History 
The model of community consultation on which SWGs are based originates in 
the patchwork of community/police liaison committees that existed in London 
in the 1970s and the statutory framework for consultation put in place 
following Lord Scarman's report in the Brixton disorders of 1981 (Scarman, 
1981: paras. 4.23 - 4.28; Morgan and Maggs, 1985a: 49; Dixon, 1991: 85).31 
The chequered history of the Lambeth liaison committee, and its untimely 
collapse in the period leading up to the Brixton disturbances, served to 
convince Lord Scarman that exclusive reliance on 'voluntary' arrangements 
would no longer do. The time had come, he decided, for consultative 
machinery to be required by law. Details about the appointment, composition, 
powers and responsibilities of the committees he envisaged were left for 
others to decide, though Lord Scarman (1981: para. 5.69) did say that their 
membership should include police officers, local councillors and 'perhaps 
other community representatives'. A committee should also be 'not just a 
statutory talking-shop': it should have the authority to discuss 'any aspect of 
police policy ... including operational questions other than those which, in the 
view of the [local police commander], must remain confidential' . 
The government's reaction to his recommendations was swift and, within 6 
months of the publications of his report, the first Home Office circular on 
consultative arrangements was issued (Home Office, 1982). Unfortunately the 
legislation needed to meet Lord Scarman' s desire for consultation to be given 
the backing of law was delayed by the 1983 general election and 
parliamentary trench warfare over other aspects of what eventually emerged as 
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the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). But this did not prevent 
committees springing up in many London boroughs and provincial police 
authority areas (Morgan and Maggs, 1984 and 1985a), while the Home 
Secretary himself played a prominent role in launching a community/police 
consultative group (CPCG) in the London Borough of Lambeth (Morgan and 
Maggs, 1985a: 46; Fyfe, 1989: 284).32 When s. 106 of PACE (now s. 96 
Police Act 1996) eventually came into force on 1 January 1985 its wording 
was very general. 33 The basic requirement was that: 
Arrangements ... be made in each police area for obtaining the views 
of people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the 
area and for obtaining their co-operation with the police in preventing 
crime in their area. (s. 106(1) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984) 
It was left to the Home Secretary to set out the framework for consultion in the 
MPD in more detail by issuing guidance to the Commissioner under s. 106 (3) 
of the Act. This guidance (Home Office, 1985: para. 3) explained that, though 
'general policing policy' remained a matter for consultion between the Home 
Secretary and the Commissioner, it should be possible for it to be 'adapted to 
meet identified needs in the light of the expressed wishes of the local 
community'. Effective policing, it stated, depends on the police carrying out 
their ftmctions with the consent of the community and 'making decisions 
which are in tune with [its] needs'. 
Mechanisms 
Public not political 
Ostensibly at least, the establishment of CPCGs represented the 
institutionalisation of a mechanism of public accountability linking the police 
directly to members of the communities they serve.34 Forming part of a 'local 
infrastructure' (Morgan, 1987) that was to include panels of lay visitors to 
269 
police stations, neighbourhood watches and inter-agency crime prevention 
initiatives (Morgan and Maggs, 1985a: Section 5), the Home Secretary's 
guidance to the Commissioner made it clear that CPCGs were to operate 
within the existing constitutional framework for governance of the 
Metropolitan Police. The Commissioner remained responsible for the 
direction and control of police operations and the Home Secretary for deciding 
upon the resources to be made available to him and the 'general policies' 
governing their allocation and use (Home Office, 1985: para. 2). Section 106 
thus posed no obvious threat to the existing constitutional position of the 
Metropolitan Police. Indeed Rod Morgan (1989b: 178) - an authoritative and 
not unsympathetic observer - has argued that the zeal with which the 
government pursued the task of setting up consultative groups 
... is indicative of the importance [it] attaches to the creation of 
mechanisms through the working of which it can be claimed there is 
policing by consent, thereby bolstering the case for the operational 
independence of the police.3s 
By setting up CPCGs as forums for direct interaction between the police and 
the community, the government hoped to cut the ground from beneath the feet 
of those in academia, local government and the Labour Party calling for 
political mechanisms of accountability to be strengthened by bringing 
operational policy-making under the control of elected representatives. 
That this profoundly political project was - to put it no higher - a factor in the 
government's thinking is evident from the Home Office's guidance (1985) to 
the Commissioner. Sub-section 106(5) of PACE obliged the Commissioner to 
consult the council in each London borough about making' appropriate' 
arrangements for consultation in their area. Yet the guidance (para. 8.5) 
sought to pre-empt the outcome of this exercise by suggesting a limit on 
councils' representation on their local group to five members. Further 
evidence of the highly politicised context within which groups were being 
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established is provided by an instruction issued by A 7 Branch of the 
Metropolitan Police in February 1985. This stated that, if a council asked the 
police to meet with its police committee ('with whom in normal circumstances 
there is no formal contact') to discuss arrangements for consultation, the 
police could comply with the request but 'for this purpose alone' 
(Metropolitan Police, 1985, para. 7, emphasis in original). The worst fears of 
critics of Lord Scarman's proposals on consultation (GLC, 1982) and the 
Home Office's plans for putting them into effect (Christian, 1983) seemed to 
be coming to pass: not only was consultation going to change nothing 
constitutionally, it was also threatening to 'impede progress towards 
accountability in London by giving a false impression of control when in 
reality the police remain accountable to no one' (Policing London, No. 7 
AprillMay 1983: 14, quoted in Fyfe, 1989: 288; and cf. Morgan, 1989b: 180). 
The upshot of this was that several Labour-controlled borough councils -
fearful of the threat posed by CPCGs to the campaign for democratic 
accountability, and to their own status as representative bodies - refused to co-
operate with the formation or functioning of groups in their areas (Fyfe, 1989: 
28).36 Others sought to subvert the (as they saw it) carefully contrived 
impotence of CPCOs by having councillors take an active role, and use their 
local group as a public forum in which to call senior police officers to account 
(Fyfe, 1992: 312; Keith, 1988: 69). 
Community consultation in Islington 
The 'left realist' influenced council in Islington was the most prominent 
exponent of the second approach. Fyfe' s (1989; 1992) case studies of 
developments there, and in the Conservative-controlled borough of Sutton, 
demonstrate how the council's attitude towards statutory consultation mirrored 
the shifts in its position on the OLC' s campaign for democratic 
accountability.37 When the possibility of setting up a consultative body in 
Islington was first mooted in 1982 in the immediate aftermath of the Scarman 
Report, the Council informed the local police commander that its Police Sub-
Committee was the means of communication between the community and the 
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police (Pyfe, 1989: 291). The Home Office refused to accept this and several 
months of haggling over the relative number of councillors and 'community 
representatives' to be included on the group ensued. As Fyfe (1989: 291) 
remarks, neither party could claim a monopoly of virtue on the issue. The 
Council's position was based on the faintly elitist assumption that elected 
members were uniquely qualified to represent all community interests in 
policing while the Home Office rooted their insistence on other forms of 
community representation in a belief in the (empirically dubious) existence of 
'a participatory political culture where all groups have an equal ability to 
organise and articulate their interests' . 
The impasse was eventually broken in April 1983 when the Council accepted 
a Home Office proposal that ten (twice the number later suggested as 
'reasonable' in the 1985 guidance) elected members be allowed to represent it 
on the Group, counter-balanced by at least eleven 'community 
representatives' .38 This formula was trumpeted by the Council as de facto 
recognition of its claim to represent the community and, in the early days of 
what became the Islington Police/Community Consultative Group (IPCCG), 
councillors seized every opportunity to highlight the lack of London-wide 
mechanisms of political accountability by raising non-local policing issues 
(Pyfe, 1989: 291; 1992: 325). However, by 1987 and Labour's third election 
defeat, Fyfe (1992: 314-5, 325) records that, having prevailed upon the police 
to accept a degree of 'moral accountability' to the community, the Council 
was keen to co-operate over crime prevention. Unlike Sutton, Islington had 
succeeded in getting the police to respond to some Council and community 
demands and leading politicians had come round to the view that practical 
politics demanded a less confrontational approach to consultation. 
You've got to be realistic. We've convinced the Labour Party of the 
need for an elected police authority in London but until they're in 
power we haven't got a hope of that happening. So should we bang 
our heads against a brick wall until then? We've go to show the 
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police that we are capable of working with them. (Labour Member 
of Islington Police Sub-Committee quoted in Fyfe, 1992: 314) 
Managerial and organic 
The use of CPCGs as a forum for the expression of the customers' perspective 
on policing is discussed in some detail shortly. All that needs to be noted here 
is the disjuncture between consultation as a public mechanism of 
accountability, and the deployment of community constables to geographically 
distinct beats as a means of making them organically accountable to the people 
of those areas. Both Fyfe (1992: 324) and Morgan (1992: 179) comment on 
this lack of articulation between the outcome of senior police managers' 
engagement with the community represented in CPCGs and the work of 
community constables. They note that home beat officers are generally 
unaware of the existence of their local CPCG while the middle managers who 
attend group meetings on behalf of the police do nothing to disseminate 
information about what is discussed to the lower ranks. This leaves Morgan 
(1992: 179) to conclude that 'the existence of formal ... consultation [has] had 
little discernible impact on the character of community policing.39 
Content 
Taking its cue from Lord Scarman (1981: 93, para. 5.56), the Home Office 
guidance (1985: para. 5) on the content of community/police consultation 
states that 'the police will be as open as possible in their dealings with 
consultative groups, and will be ready to discuss all aspects of police aims and 
policy, including operational matters ... so far as they are able to do so'. 40 The 
only fixed limits to this principle of openness are that consultative groups (like 
the Home Secretary) may not interfere in 'the enforcement of the law in 
individual cases'. However the guidance also establishes that the deployment 
of police officers and the method and timing of police operations are 'matters 
for the Commissioner'. Whether, when and how such issues may be discussed 
must therefore remain at the discretion of the police. 
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Thus, though openness was to be the guiding principle of consultation, the 
police were left with wide powers to derogate from it in the interest of 
operational independence.41 This attempt to give CPCGs a sense of purpose -
and something meaningful to talk about - without compromising police 
autonomy left local commanders with the whip hand in determining what they 
were, and were not, prepared to discuss with their lay interlocutors. As a 
result, a review of consultative arrangements conducted by the Home Office 
(1989: II, para. 40) three years after the guidance was published found 
considerable variation in police attitudes towards groups. The amount of 
information disclosed to CPCGs differed markedly from place to place, as did 
the encouragement given to their involvement in setting local policing 
objectives and the willingness of the police to discuss the availability and 
deployment of resources. Fyfe (1992: 321) too discovered significant 
variation in the attitudes of senior police officers in the two London boroughs 
he studied. While Islington's commander was prepared to discuss the number 
of local officers being deployed outside the borough to police industrial 
disputes, his colleague in Sutton refused to provide the borough's CPCG with 
the same information on the grounds that it was 'an operational matter' .42 
When it comes to active participation in problem solving or crime prevention 
efforts, few CPCGs have proved able to make any substantial practical 
contribution (Home Office, 1989: 12, para. 44; Morgan, 1989b: 231-2) despite 
the insistence of the Home Office (1985: para. 3) that they should focus on 
local problems in the context of the shared responsibility of police and 
community for taclding them. In practice, the vast majority of CPCGs seem to 
be subject to what Rod Morgan (1989b: 182) has graphically described as the 
'dog shit syndrome'. Instead of grappling with local crime problems and their 
solution, researchers have found most CPCGs absorbed with routine 
complaints about small-scale, often highly localised, 'quality of life' issues 
such as littering, vandalism, parking, noise nuisance and dog-fouled 
pavements (Home Office, 1989; Morgan, 1989a and b; Stratta, 1990; Elliott 
and Nicholls, 1996). Restricted by their 'limited experience of their potential 
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needs and imperfect knowledge of crime' the average CPCG member is 
concerned not with the potentially serious, yet rarely experienced, events that 
accord with police definitions of 'crime', but with the everyday aggravations 
of stepping in dog mess or standing in a vandalised bus shelter (Morgan, 
1989b: 182). All too ready to accept that such matters are of low priority and 
excuse the inability of an already overstrecthed police force to provide the 
kind of visible presence they would like, lay CPCG members find it difficult 
to raise their sights and engage with broader questions about police priorities, 
and how the resources forces do have are deployed to meet them (Morgan, 
1989a: 232; Stratta, 1990,531-2). For police officers ill-equipped (as they see 
it) to deal with such small-scale problems, and unwilling to accept that they 
really are 'police business', these preoccupations are a continual source of 
frustration and tend to undermine the credibility of the consultative process 
(Home Office, 1989: 11-12, para. 42). Even when police presentations on 
what they regard as 'real crime' problems (such as illegal fIrearms or child 
abuse) succeed in moving the consultative agenda on from quality of life 
issues, 'developmental discussion' seldom takes place. More than 10 years 
after the implementation ofs. 106, Morgan (1995: 34) concedes that groups 
still face considerable difficulty in demonstrating worthwhile practical 
achievements. 
Direction 
According to the Home Office (1985: para. 7) CPCGs ought to be 'as 
representative as possible of [the] community'. To be so they should include 
not only the police, elected representatives (GLC and borough councillors and 
MPs) and statutory agencies (the probation service and local authority 
departments such as education and housing) but 'the community in its widest 
sense' (including any individuals with a particular contribution to make). 
They must be 'free-standing' and 'independent' of local and central 
government and the police (Home Office, 1985: para. 8.1). With membership 
open to 'all bona fIde formally constituted bodies which represent a signifIcant 
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number of local people' the guidelines appear to emphasise consultation as an 
inclusive process designed to give voice to the full range of local opinion 
(Home Office, 1985: para. 8.2). 
The reality of local consultation has been rather different. In the first place, 
the guidance itself limits the representative capacity of CPCGs by insisting on 
a degree of formality and organisation as a prerequisite to participation. Then 
there is the exclusion of 'political pressure groups ... whose terms of reference 
include the monitoring of the police service or consideration of its 
constitutional position' (Metropolitan Police, 1985: para. 9). This insistence 
on organisation and political respectability - and the mindset that goes with it 
- has had predictable consequences. The Home Office's own review team 
(1989: 8, para. 24; 31, para. 119), for example, found 'people well used to 
committees: professional and middle-class white people, most of whom are in 
the 40-plus age range' dominating CPCGs, few of which had 'succeeded in 
attracting those sections of the community who are most likely to be wary of 
or actively hostile to the police (such as the under-25s, people from the ethnic 
minorities and the poor)' .43 
Respectable, active in community affairs, with little or no direct experience of 
adversarial contact with the police, and instinctively supportive of what they 
are trying to do, researchers have found the typical CPCG 'community 
representative' singularly ill-equipped to challenge police definitions of reality 
and easily susceptible to being 'educated' into police ways of thinking 
(Morgan and Maggs, 1985b: 92-3; Morgan, 1989a: 229-30). Any 
correspondence between members' views on policing and those of the general 
public is purely coincidental, and not the outcome of any attempt on their part 
to canvass the views of the constituencies or organisations they are supposed 
to 'represent' (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990: Section 5). Few 
participants report that they raise matters at CPCG meetings on behalf of 
others, and most say they seldom have anything to report back to their parent 
bodies (Morgan 1992: 179). 'Gate-keeping' by the police (Stratta, 1990: 528-
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9), local councils (Fyfe, 1989: 292; 1992: 315-8) and umbrella bodies such as 
community relations and voluntary service councils (Home Office, 1989: 6, 
para. 17) helps to ensure that organisations sympathetic to the positions of 
dominant institutional players in the consultative process are well represented 
while, as Fyfe (1992: 318) has noted, the individuals sent to 'represent' those 
bodies at CPCG meetings are invariably selected by the self-appointment of an 
existing office holder. 
If the notion of 'representation' implicit in s. 106 and the Home Office 
guidelines is flawed and glosses over real differences in the status of CPCG 
members, their relationship with non-participants, and the role they can play in 
bridging the gap between police and 'community' (Keith, 1988: 67), so too is 
their construction of 'community' and the bureaucratically convenient, but 
empirically unwarranted, assumption that the administrative boundaries with 
which consultation should take place reflect 'natural community links' (Home 
Office, 1989: 16, para. 58-61). Taking local government boundaries as the 
geographical basis for consultation risks both splitting those 'natural' 
communities that do exist, and forcing people together when they have little in 
common. Operating in what Morgan (1992: 180) calls the administrative 
'stratosphere' , CPCGs have proved to be too far removed from the highly 
localised policing problems that concern most people (Stratta, 1990: 546; 
Shapland and Vagg, 1988). All too often, groups have become not the 
authentic voice of civil society; but slightly ineffectual intermediaries between 
the police and marginalised social groups whose interests they are unable 
credibly to represent (Home Office, 1989: 29 para. 118; Dixon, 1991: 93-5). 
Mode 
It has already been suggested that the characteristics of the typical participant 
in community consultation make it difficult for most CPCGs to get to grips 
with policing policies and present a sufficiently broad and inclusive view of 
local priorities. But, even if the majority of 'community representatives' on 
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CPCGs wanted to take a more robust line with the police, the Home Office 
guidelines (1985: para. 8.3) are unequivocal in their rejection of directive 
accountability: 
'The police must be members as of right, not called to account in any 
legal sense, but enabled to discuss, to explain and to be criticised and 
to prompt action' . 
It is not for CPCGs to decide matters of policy, still less to approve or censure 
police operations. Rather it is for them to help ensure that 'the decisions 
which are properly for the police or the Home Secretary can be more closely 
informed by the views of the local community' (Home Office, 1985: para. 45). 
By consulting the community, the ultimate decision-makers are doing no more 
than adding to the stock of information they rely on before determining how to 
act (Dixon, 1991: 63). The outcome of consultation is not a prescribed course 
of action, and the relationship between the 'consultor' and the consulted is 
strictly non-hierarchical. As Michael Keith (1988: 76) has put it, 
'Accountability is about power relations, consultation is about dialogue. They 
are not the same.' Or, in the blunt terms of a provincial superintendent 
responding to CPCG criticism of the police response to rowdy football 
supporters, 'No one directs the police as to what they are going to do' (quoted 
in Stratta, 1990: 539). 
If Morgan and Maggs (1985a: 7-8) are correct in interpreting the model of 
community police consultation suggested by s. 106 and the Home Office 
guidance as a partnership between the police and lay CPCG members, the 
rough equality to be expected between partners in a joint enterprise has rarely 
been observed in practice. Their greater and far more systematic knowledge 
of the distribution of crime, disorder and the myriad other problems brought to 
their attention, give the police an advantage in their dealings with lay 
representatives and lead to a significant asymmetry in the power relations that 
exist between the two parties to community consultation (Stratta, 1990: 533; 
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Fyfe, 1992: 322). Understandably perhaps, the police have done little to 
restore the balance. So, for example, researchers have found that reports to 
CPCGs are usually given verbally making it difficult for lay members to digest 
and comment sensibly on statistics and other complex issues (Home Office, 
1989~ 10, para. 33; 28, para. 112). Debate on local police objectives is 
foreclosed by their presentation to groups as a fait accompli (Home Office, 
1989: 29 para. 114; Stratta, 1990: 531). Experience of consultation suggests 
that, instead of members of the community informing the police about their 
priorities and values, police presentations emphasising a chronic lack of 
resources in the face of rising levels of crime and disorder provoke sympathy 
among already solidly 'pro-police' lay representatives (Morgan, 1989b: 229-
30). Hence, if anything, the transmission of information, attitudes, priorities 
and values is from the police to the community rather than the reverse with 
CPCG member eager to know how they can help strengthen the thin blue line 
standing between civilised society and chaos (Morgan and Maggs, 1985b: 92-
3; Savage and Wilson, 1987: 260).45 
Lessons of community consultation 
By the early 1990s the model of community consultation used in sector 
policing had been given ample time at least to begin to yield positive results. 
Yet, almost without exception, researchers were inclined to pessimism about 
its contribution to accountability and the realisation of policing by consent. 46 
Originally conceived as a means of enabling the police 'to meet identified 
needs in the light of the expressed wishes of the local community' (Home 
Office, 1985: para. 3), evidence that community consultation had increased 
public influence over policing had proved extremely hard to come by (Savage 
and Wilson, 1987: 262; Fyfe, 1992: 325). The 'cosy ritual' of consultation 
had achieved little of practical value and had 'no discernible impact on what 
the police do' (Morgan, 1989a: 232). By co-opting the 'great and the good'to 
the police standpoint, community consultation had reinforced the exclusion of 
the socially marginal and politically powerless from any influence over 
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policing (Morgan, 1992: 181-2). The insistent demands of the organised and 
articulate for a better quality of life crowded out any consideration of the 
social distribution of coercion and protection. However, as Rod Morgan 
(1992: 182), its most assiduous student, has observed, if it had achieved 
nothing else, the spread of community consultation had at least succeeded in 
removing the debate on police accountability from the constitutional sphere to 
the safer realms of management and resources. 
Managerialism and Consumerism 
The last of the four core elements of sector policing is more ideological than 
material: more a theme that informs and colours its programmatic constituents 
than a distinctive way of working. It has two aspects. The first relates to the 
'managerial' reforms associated with sector policing: the devolution of 
authority for operational decision-making down to the lowest appropriate 
level; making the most efficient use of resources by re-examining workloads; 
matching the availability of staff to periods of peak demand; and holding 
sector inspectors as local operational commanders accountable within the 
police organisation for delivering a 'quality service' to the public (Metropolitan 
Police, 1991a: 1, 5-6, 8). These changes to the organisational structure of 
front line police work resonate with a second aspect of the ideology of sector 
policing - its reconceptualisation of the people to whom that 'service' is 
provided as 'consumers'. Sector policing, the guidelines say, is a style that 
'measures and provides customer satisfaction at a local level' while sector 
working groups provide forums for 'service users' to inform policing priorities 
and objectives.47 Stray phrases perhaps, but the message they convey is clear 
enough. Whether they are seen as users, customers or consumers, the nature 
of the relationship between police and people is being described in the 
language, if not of the marketplace, then certainly of a 'new managerialism' 
that seeks to undermine the barriers between the public and private sectors 
(McLaughlin and Murji, 1995; 1997).48 
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Origins 
The origins of the new managerialism in the recurrent fiscal crises of the last 
25 years, the pre-eminence of market ideology ('private sector good, public 
sector bad') and an accumulating body of research evidence suggesting that 
increased spending on the police did not necessarily lead to lower levels of 
crime has been well documented (Morgan, 1990; Weatheritt, 1993; 
McLaughlin and Muncie, 1994; McLaughlin and Murji, 1995, 1997; Leishman 
et al, 1996; Savage and Charman, 1996). So too has its development from the 
first Thatcher government's Financial Management Initiative, through the 
celebrated Home Office Circular 114/83 on Manpower, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the police service, to the 'police reforms' of the early 1990s. 
All that needs to be noted here then is that sector policing was designed and 
implemented at a time when police forces generally were chaffing against the 
strict financial and rationalist disciplines imposed by what turned out to be the 
first wave of managerialist reforms (including management or policing 'by 
objectives') and were becoming increasingly anxious to reposition themselves 
as forward thinking public services.49 
Itself the fruit of the distinctly managerialist PLUS programme, sector 
policing came hard on the heels of the Operational Policing Review (Joint 
Consultative Committee, 1990) and ACPO's (1990) response to it. The first of 
these documents reflected the disenchantment of the three police staff 
associations with the rising tide of 'efficiency initiatives' characteristic of first 
wave managerialism. It advanced the claim that, by focusing on crude 
quantitative measures of 'value for money' and 'productivity' at the expense of 
'the fulfilment of reasonable public and police expectations', such initiatives 
threatened 'traditional policing' (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990: 
Introduction,4-5). The second paper saw the police service respond with the 
publication of: 
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· .. a strategic framework to identify and improve the quality of 
service delivery and a system to monitor and measure over time 
Police Service ability to meet public expectations and consequently 
increase public confidence in it. (ACPO, 1990: 2, para. 4) 
When John Major (prime Minister, 1991: 24-5) published the Citizen's 
Charter in an attempt to give greater coherence, and a more positive political 
gloss, to his predecessor's concerns with value for money, ACPO's initiative 
on quality of service was endorsed as an example of second wave consumer-
sensitive managerialism.50 With its emphasis on identifying and satisfying the 
needs of the consumer as well as adopting a more rational and efficient 
approach to the analysis of demand (and the deployment of resources to meet 
it), sector policing was introduced at a critical juncture in the evolution of new 
managerialist thinking in and about the police service. Combining key 
elements of both fust and second wave managerialism, sector policing neatly 
encapsulated the zeitgeist of the period for, as the Chairman of ACPO's 
Quality of Service Working Party, put it: 'Consumerism, public expectation 
and ultimately public satisfaction, rather than the cost effectiveness of the 80s, 
will be the watchwords in the 90s' (Hirst, 1991: 183). 
Dimensions of accountability 
Thus sector policing was born on the cusp between the stark economism and 
rationalism (McLaughlin and Murji, 1995: 117) of the first phase of new 
managerialism's invasion of policing, and the consumerism of its second. But 
what does sector policing's evident, if understated, espousal of new 
managerialism suggest about its ability to deliver on its promise of a more 
. accountable police force? 
Mechanisms 
Although managerialism has spawned (and been promoted by) institutions 
such as the Audit Commission, and reoriented the work of others like Her 
Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and ACPO, the detailed 
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performance information they collect is intended for consumption not by these 
intermediate bodies themselves but by the public who 'consume' and pay for 
policing, and the politicians who represent them (Weatheritt, 1993). The 
technical mechanisms of the new managerialism are intended to inform rather 
than replace existing mechanisms of political and public accountability. So, 
outside London, the new police authorities created by the Police and 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 were expected to take up the challenge of acting 
'on behalf of local people as the 'customer' of the service which the police 
force provides' (Home Office, 1993: 20), whilst the Audit Commission (1994: 
19) is given a statutory duty (under the Local Government Act 1992) to: 
... identify, in the form of Citizen's Charter indicators, measures that 
open a window on policing for members of the public, and enable 
them to make judgements about how well their local police force is 
doing. 
In principle then, the collection of performance data by the Commission and 
the other institutions of new managerialism should be seen not as an end it 
itself but as a means of 'formulating and asking further questions and 
promoting dialogue with service providers about the prospects for service 
improvement' (Weatheritt, 1993: 41). 
However, as Nicola Lacey (1994: 553) has argued, the 'instrumentalist 
discourse' ofmanagerialism (,performance', 'value for money' and 'efficiency 
of service') frequently 
... diverts attention away from contested political questions about 
what constitutes 'value' in the relevant context and from pressing 
questions about how these values should be debated and determined 
in a fragmented and stratified society. 
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Far from infonning and invigorating political and public mechanisms of 
accountability, managerialism may in fact depoliticise the process of holding 
the police to account by reducing it to a purely technical matter of 
measurement against performance indicators assumed to reflect a consensus 
about what the police should be doing, how they do it, and to and for whom. 
Consumerism may have a similar effect in masking conflict over police 
priorities by privileging the carefully modulated and structured views of 
disembodied individuals asked to complete 'customer satisfaction surveys' 
over collective expressions of will - however contradictory and confused they 
may be - voiced in public or political forums where debate and disputation are 
possible. Even where a public mechanism such as community consultation is 
explicitly intended to provide consumers with a voice (Morgan and Maggs, 
1985a: 73) and allow them to make 'an informed contribution to discussion 
about local policing aims, priorities and policies' (Home Office, 1989: 28, 
para. 111 (i» police responsiveness to the type of 'consumer' represented on 
CPCGs means that they are less responsive to others (Morgan, 1989b: 182). 
Disaggregating the public in the form of individual 'consumers', or small 
groups of them, ignores the political problem of determining whose interests 
are served by the police. Recasting the relationship between police and public 
in the language of the market place and consumer sovereignty also reminds us 
why the provision of services like policing was socialised in the first place 
(Morgan, 1989a: 182). 
Content 
In order to 'managerialise' policing, what McLaughlin and Murji (1997: 86, 
91) have called its 'double difference' from the private sector has had to be 
overcome. Firstly, as a public service, policing (along with health, education 
and so on) has to be made to fit with a model of what constitutes a 'good 
service' based on characterisations of the successful private enterprise 
(Weatheritt, 1993: 34 citing Peter and Waterman, 1982). Under the tutelage of 
the Audit Commission, police forces and other public service providers must 
be able to show that they understand their customers, specify and pursue 
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consistent objectives, allocate management responsibilities clearly, monitor 
performance, and adapt quickly to change in the 'business' environment. 
Where the police differ from local authorities and the rest of the public sector, 
and are therefore, 'doubly different' to an ordinary business, is in their 
constitutional position which, in turn, is a product of their unique 
responsibility for the distribution of legitimate coercive force. 51 Poorly 
though the managerialist coat may fit on occasions elsewhere in the public 
service (potter, 1988; Pollitt, 1988; Deakin and Wright, 1990; Stewart and 
Walsh, 1992), the private sector cut seems singularly inappropriate in the 
context of the police and other criminal justice agencies whose stock in trade 
is coercion (McLaughlin and Muncie, 1994). Frequent adversarial contact 
between the police and their 'customers' (Morgan, 1990: 85), and the degree of 
compulsion with which their core 'service' is 'provided' (Pollitt, 1988: 80), 
make policing a particularly hostile environment for a philosophy based on 
quality and customer friendliness in the delivery of services 'demanded' by 
consumers. 
Overcoming these difficulties has required a concerted effort to replace the 
'coercive' image of post-war policing with a 'compliance' model more 
susceptible to new managerialism (Hirst, 1991: 93). In London, for example, 
one of the most striking outcomes of the Wolff OlinslPLUS process was the 
rebranding of the force as the Metropolitan Police Service complete with its 
own booklet on 'quality of service' (Meropolitan Police, undated b). 52 This 
publication - widely circulated around the time sector policing was being 
implemented across the MPD and self-evidently a product of what Pollitt 
(1988: 78) has called 'charm school' consumerism - encourages service 
personnel to be punctilious in their behaviour towards those making non-
adversarial contact with the police. But it studiously ignores the possibility 
that either interactions on the street or the presence of a member of the public 
in the police station might be based on anything other than a voluntary 
demand for 'service'. 
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Direction and mode 
Along with this repackaging of the content of policing from the distribution of 
coercive force in often adversarial contexts to the consensual delivery of a 
service comes a reconceptualisation of the people to whom the police are 
accountable and how they relate to them. Notwithstanding explicit 
commitments to include people engaging in unlawful behaviour as 'customers' 
of the police (The Guardian, 18 June 1992, cited in Cooper, 1993: 157) and 
the recent description by Commissioner Sir Paul Condon of Londoners as 'our 
shareholders - the people with stock in the Metropolitan police' (l'he 
Guardian, 8 March 1995), new managerialism's reconstruction of the citizen 
as a consumer serves to rationalise and justify the direction of accountability 
towards privileged sections of 'the community' rather than 'the people' as a 
whole. 53 
Citizens generally may indeed be the indirect 'consumers' of an (albeit 
imperfect) public good such as policing (Morgan, 1990: 84), but this is not 
how the consumerisation of policing has worked in practice. Operational 
strategies such as geographical responsibility and community consultation -
like community policing programmes generally - have tended to promote 
contact between the police and the public unevenly across different social 
groups. As a result, 'respectable', police-friendly, citizens who have little or 
no direct experience of adversarial contact with the police have found it easiest 
to establish themselves as legitimate 'consumers' of police 'services'. It is they 
on whose behalf policing is done, while the direct (but involuntary) 
'consumers' to whom policing is done - and the wider pool of rough, police-
wary, indirect citizen-consumers with some experience of adversarial contact 
from whom these compulsory 'consumers' are drawn - are kept at arm's 
length. 
Privileged indirect, and 'direct but voluntary' consumers (victims of crime, 
witnesses and neighbourhood watch activists), of managerialised policing 
come to the friendly encounter with the beat officer on the street comer or the 
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police manager in a local CPCG meeting as 'economic actors'. They have paid 
their taxes and are entitled to the same level of service as might be 'guaranteed 
were the provider constrained by the pressure of competition in the 
marketplace' (Baron and Scott, 1992: 543). But they also come as law-abiding 
members of the community with support, information and legitimation to 
provide to the police in exchange for some influence in policy-making. This 
underscores the contractual nature of the relationship between, on one side, the 
state and its agencies and, on the other, the individual citizen as taxpayer and 
the socially and politically acceptable consumer of a publicly funded service 
(Jones, 1993: 188; Cooper, 1993: 158). Instead of being directed by citizens 
(the demos) with collective needs, the 'new managerial' police become parties 
to a contract with individual voluntary service users and select groups of 
'consumers' constructed as 'the community' . 
Conclusion 
In this and the previous chapter, I have located sector policing within the 
broad tradition of community policing and identified four core elements or 
themes that emerge from the guidance on its implementation issued by the 
Assistant Commissioner. Much of what has been said is critical of the 
contribution that the introduction of geographical responsibility, problem 
solving, community consultation, the new managerialism, and community 
policing generally, have made to police accountability. But this is not to say 
that the reforms on which sector policing is modelled are worthless. On the 
contrary, there is much to be said for fresh thinking that encourage the police 
to take a more realistic and positive view of what people expect of them. 
Efforts to make the officers responsible for policing particular areas more 
sensitive to the values of the people who live, work or visit those areas, and 
more responsive to their needs and priorities, are to be applauded. Waste and 
inefficiency serve no democratic purpose. Investing scarce public resources in 
a vast bureaucracy that fails to understand what the people it serves expect of 
it, pays little attention to what they say they want it to do, and is governed by 
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whim and tradition, has little to commend it. My argument is therefore not 
with the need for change, but the way in which community policing and the 
other innovations discussed in these chapters seek to bring it about and how, in 
reinventing policing, they reconceptualise police accountability, its content, 
direction, mode, and the mechanisms by which it is realised. 
I have tried to show how sector policing draws on a philosophical tradition 
and substantive programmes that have proved difficult to implement and 
harder to evaluate. Insofar as their impact on police accountability is apparent 
they have succeeded in: redefining the police function as 'problem solving' 
instead of , crime fighting' without recognising or allowing for the coercive 
capacity the police bring to the tasks they are expected to perform; sensitising 
police officers to the demands of privileged 'communities' of 'respectable' 
consumers instead of making them responsive to the needs of all citizens; 
making these organised communities equal partners of the police while 
excluding the disorganised and the 'rough' from any real influence over police 
policies; and shifting the burden of transmitting public values and priorities to 
the police from formal (and imperfectly inclusive) legal and political 
institutions to less formal (but still more exclusive) mechanisms of public, 
managerial and organic accountability. On the evidence presented here it is 
difficult to be sanguine about the prospects for sector policing as a route to 
greater police accountability and the re-establishment of policing by consent. 
It is the task of the next chapter to see whether such pessimism is justified. 
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Notes 
1 The population policed by a team reached 20,000 in some places. 
2 The results of a more methodologically rigorous evaluation of team policing in 
Cincinatti were similarly disappointing (Schwartz and Clarren, 1977). With the 
benefit of hindsight, Kelling and Moore (1988: 23-4) aver that a community policing 
strategy such as team policing was at variance with the core assumptions of the still 
dominant 'reform era' model of policing and therefore doomed to fail. 
3 Both the Chelmsey Wood and Peckham schemes were inspired by an earlier 
'coordinated policing project' set up in Skelmersdale, Lancashire, in 1979. 
4 Brixton, Hackney, Kilburn and Notting Hill in the MPD and Addlestone and 
Camberley in Surrey. An evaluation of the entire programme was undertaken by an 
independent consultant (Turner, 1987). A more detailed examination of 
neighbourhood policing on the Notting Hill Division of the Metropolitan Police was 
carried out by external evaluators from the Police Foundation (Irving et aI, 1989). 
These two documents form the basis of the discussion here. 
s Turner (1987: 7, para. 25). 
6 Ibid.; 21, para. 91. 
7 Ibid.: 22, para. 97. 
8 Ibid.: 27, para. 122. 
9 Ibid.: 28, para. 123 
10 Ibid.: 13, para. 62 (i). The example quoted is of 'sector working group' meetings in 
Brixton where Turner comments that the minutes showed 'raised but unfulfilled 
expectations, and a concentration on issues regarded by the police as of low priority'. 
11 The source material for this account of developments in Surrey is a series of 
undated documents on Total Geographic Policing produced by Surrey Constabulary 
and a personal interview with Superintendent David Dodd of W oking Police 
conducted by the author in September 1992. 
12 This study found that the average number of 'public initiated encounters' involving 
single officers on foot patrol was 35% higher than for officers working in pairs. 
13 If, for example, the officer to household ratio of 1 :400 achieved in Bennett's study 
areas were to be applied across a whole police area such as Holloway, more than half 
the division's uniformed officers would have to devote a whole year to nothing but 
resident contact and visible patrol work. 
14 See the discussion of notions of, and attitudes towards 'community' in the broad 
community policing tradition in the previous chapter. Also see Clarke (1997: 22-3); 
Goldstein (1990: 24-6). 
15 The sketchy treatment of problem solving contained in the guidance covers few of 
the basic elements of problem-oriented policing or the characteristics of a problem 
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oriented police agency set out by Goldstein (1990: Chap. 4) and Eck and Spelman, 
(1987a: 102-3) respectively. 
16 See Goldstein (1990: Chap. 5) for a summary and Goldstein and Susmilch (1982) 
and Cordner (1985) for accounts of problem-solving in Madison, Wisconsin, and 
Baltimore, Maryland, respectively. 
17 Four of the initial sample of 20 problems proved useless for the purposes of 
studying the impact of police problem-solving. 
18 Cf .. Chatterton and Rogers (1989). 
19 Clarke (1997: 86-96) reports only slightly less discouraging fmdings from the US: 
only 33 out of 88 projects submitted by 59 different police departments for a 
problem-oriented policing award passed muster as 'focused opportunity-reducing 
preventive measures' compatible with a strict definition of problem-oriented policing. 
20 Later stages of the problem-solving process have if anything been kept even more 
closely under police control. 
21 Talk of 'constitutional rights' is of course much more problematic in the British 
context where such rights as do exist have traditionally been defmed only in the 
negative. 
22 In similar vein Eck and Spelman (1987b: 45) suggest that boundaries to the 
potentially limitless authority of problem-solving police will be set by a combination 
of 'informal pressure from private citizens in their contacts with individual officers; 
elected officials; the staff of other private and pubic agencies; and the police 
themselves' . 
23 Metropolitan Police (1991b: 4-5). 
24 Ibid.: 5. 
25 Ibid.: 6. 
26 Ibid.: 9. 
27 Ibid.: 7,8. 
28 Ibid. 7. 
29 Ibid. 8 and Appendix 1. 
30 Ibid.: 8. 
31 See Skogan and Hartnett (1997: Chap 5) for a recent account of citizen 
involvement in community policing from North America. Their description of how 
the network of 'beat meetings' and 'district advisory committees' set up as part of 
Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy resonates with much of what follows here. 
32 The committees established at this time and later in response to legislation are 
referred to by various titles in the literature. Here I will call them community/police 
consultative groups or CPCGs. 
33 Morgan and Maggs (1985a) are among several commentators who note that the 
establishment of CPCGs as such is not required by the Act. A minority of provincial 
police authorities held out against the 'informal' Home Office line for a while only to 
be brought gradually round to it by unrelenting pressure from Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate. 
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34 Precisely how direct the contact between police and community turned out to be is 
dealt with in more detail below. 
35 Cf Morgan and Maggs (1985a: 74) and Morgan (1989a: 227). 
36 By the end of 1988 the controlling Labour groups in five London boroughs were 
still refusing to take part in their local CPCG (Metropolitan Police, 1989b: 11) 
37 See Chapter 5 for further discussion. The two boroughs Fyfe researched are named 
in his earlier work (1989) but rather thinly disguised as 'Northley' (Islington) and 
Southam (Sutton) in the later piece. Dixon (1991) charts events in one of the 
boycotting London boroughs. 
38 Overriding the Council's objections that other forums existed for them to make 
their views on policing known, the Home Office successfully insisted on the inclusion 
of local Members of Parliament and GLC councillors. 
39 Much of the research cited in the previous chapter on geographically responsible 
policing showing the isolation of community constables from the mainstream of 
operational policing suggests that communication in the opposite direction was no 
better. 
40 The 1985 guidance was firmer on the need for the police to approach consultation 
in a positive way than that issued three years earlier immediately after Scarman 
reported (Morgan and Maggs, 1985a: 18). 
41 A non-exhaustive list of25 examples of the kind of subject that could usefully be 
taken up in local consultation is provided in paragraph 5 of the guidance but it adds 
nothing to the bald statement of objectives contained in s. 106 of PACE. Attempts to 
specify a set of aims against which the achievements of CPCGs might be assessed 
have been made with varying results (see Home Office, 1989: para. 80; Morgan, 
1989a: 221; 1992: 177-8; Elliott and Nicholls, 1996: 5-8). 
42 It seems likely that these differences were not simply a function of the 
idiosyncrasies of local police commanders but also a product of the determination of 
particular consultative groups in pursuing certain issues and insisting on relevant 
information being provided. 
43 See Morgan (1989a: 229; 1995: 34), Stratta (1990: 528-9), Joint Consultative 
Committee (1990: 5,2) and Elliott and Nicholls (1996: 10-11) for further evidence of 
the firm and apparently unshakeable hold of white, middle-aged, middle class males 
on local consultation. 
45 Morgan (1992: 176) makes the important point that the police values inculcated in 
CPCG members are those of locally based middle managers not 'street police'. 
46 The distinctly mixed reports offered in Morgan (1995) and Elliott and Nicholls 
(1996) indicate that not much has changed since. 
47 Metropolitan Police (1991a: 2). 
48 Cf. the 'new public management' discussed by Leishman et al (1996). 
49 The message of Circular 114/83 was reinforced in 1988 by a Circular on 
Applications for increases in police force establishments. This saw the Home Office 
up the stakes in their dealings with the police service by making permission for an 
increase in establishment dependent on a force's ability to demonstrate 'where 
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possible [with] quantitative output or performance measures' that its service 
objectives were being met. 
50 See Butler (1992) for a wary assessment of the Charter's implications for the police. 
Waters (1996: 214-5) has detected a tension both within the ACPO document and the 
approaches adopted by individual forces between what he describes as an initially 
dominant professional 'public service' view of quality of service and the more 
consumerist 'business' model that gained ground following publication of the Citizen's 
Charter. 
51 McLaughlin and Murji (1997) do not make this last point sufficiently clear. 
52 Cf. Jones (1993: 188) and, more generally, Stephens and Becker (1994). 
53 On the transformation of citizens into consumers and its implications see Barron 
and Scott (1992); Cooper (1993) and Lacey (1994). 
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8 
Sector Policing: The Holloway Experience 
Sector policing went 'live' on Holloway Division on 6 April 1992. After months 
of preparations the grand design was ready to be put into practice. Exactly how 
this was done and what the implications of sector policing were for the public 
accountability of the police to the people of north Islington is not the concern of 
this chapter. The intention here is rather to show firstly how some of the 
theoretical issues highlighted in the discussion of sector policing and its origins in 
the last two chapters worked themselves out in practice during its implementation 
in Holloway; and secondly to suggest, in the light of that experience, how far the 
reconceptualisation of consent and accountability had progressed by the early 
1990s. 
The raw material for this chapter consists mainly of fieldnotes for the research 
reported in detail by Dixon and Stanko (1993a, and see also Dixon and Stanko, 
1995) supplemented by some quantitative data from Holloway Division's own 
evaluation of the first 6 months of sector policing (Holloway Division, 1992).1 
The findings of the only other contemporary study of sector policing undertaken 
by Trevor Bennett and Charles Kemp (1994) in two police areas in Thames 
Valley will also be referred to at various points. Although the programmes 
evaluated by Bennett and Kemp differed in some significant respects from the 
style of sector policing implemented in London, their survey-based research is 
useful in that it puts some of the issues raised by the qualitative data collected in 
Holloway in a slightly broader context.2 The bulk of the chapter is concerned 
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with the effect of sector policing on the content, direction and mode of local 
police accountability. However it begins with a profile of Holloway and a short 
discussion of the main mechanisms of accountability put in place on the division 
from the beginning of April 1992. 
Holloway: a profIle3 
Holloway Division covers roughly half of the London Borough Islington. In 
many respects a typical slice of inner city London, the division is coterminous 
with the Islington North parliamentary constituency and includes 10 Council 
wards. Census figures for 1991 give a total resident population for 
HollowaylNorth Islington of 86,352 (38,277 households). More than a fifth 
(22.1 %) of the population identified themselves as coming from ethnic minority 
groupS.4 A similar proportion (19.5%) of residents was under the age of 16. 
Unemployment at 20% of the economically active resident population in January 
1993 was significantly higher than the greater London average of 11.7%. 
Housing in the area was dominated by the public and voluntary sectors with more 
than half (53.1 %) of North Islington's households living in accommodation rented 
either from the local authority or a housing association. 
In 1992 Holloway Division logged a total of 49,682 messages on the computer-
aided despatch (CAD) system and recorded 13,498 notifiable criminal offences. 
More than 6,450 custody records were opened at the Division's two police 
stations over the same period. To meet this demand Holloway had 173 uniformed 
police constables in post as of22 December 1992, almost a fifth (19%) of whom 
were probationers in their first two years of service. Above them in supervisory 
and managerial positions the Division had 38 uniformed sergeants, 8 inspectors, 2 
chief inspectors, a superintendent and a chief superintendent. 
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A slightly different impression of crime and policing across the borough as a 
whole is provided by the Second Islington Crime Survey (ICS2) (Crawford et aI, 
1990). This suggested that, compared with the rest of the country, Islington could 
be described as a relatively 'high crime' area. For example, 7% of households in 
the borough reported having been burgled and had property stolen within the 
survey's 12-month recall period compared with only 4% of households 
nationally.s Four out of five respondents (80.5%) to ICS2 identified crime as at 
least a bit of a problem and two out of five (40%) rated it among the three most 
serious local problems. Fear of crime was a significant feature of many people's 
lives: nearly half (49%) of all female respondents and almost a quarter (23%) of 
males told researchers that they sometimes felt unsafe in their own homes. ICS2 
also provided an interesting snapshot of public attitudes towards the police in 
Islington in the late 1980s. Between two thirds and four fifths of respondents felt 
that the police were either fairly or very unsuccessful in dealing with routine 
crimes such as residential burglary (73%), street robbery (70%) and vandalism 
(80%). Young people aged 16 to 24 were markedly more negative in their 
assessments than their elders: 45% of this age group identified police behaviour as 
a problem for them and 53% agreed to some degree at least that they were 
unfairly treated by the police. These feelings were probably not unconnected to 
young respondents' experience of policing reflected in the ICS2 fmding that a 
young black man of between 16 and 24 was 40 times more likely to be stopped 
and searched on the street than a white male over 45.6 
Mechanisms: consultation and responsibility 
Before we look in detail at the impact of sector policing on the content, direction 
and mode of accountability, it is worth recalling how the new style of policing 
aimed to change the mechanisms by which the police were to account to the 
people they serve. Far-reaching though the organisational changes implied by 
sector policing were, much of the institutional framework of policing in London 
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remained unchanged. The idiosyncratic constitutional status of the MPS with the 
unfathomable relationship between Commissioner and Home Secretary at its apex 
and the post-Blackburn courts hovering diffidently in the background was 
unaffected by sector policing. Nor did it contemplate any changes to existing 
mechanisms of public accountability at borough level. In practical terms, the 
effects of sector policing on mechanisms of police accountability were limited to 
adding sector working groups to the existing local infrastructure of public 
accountability consisting of the Islington Police/Community Consultative Group 
(IPCCG), lay visitors, inter-agency panels and neighbourhood watches. On top of 
this was the notion that the allocation of geographical responsibility to dedicated 
sector teams would make policing organically accountable through regular 
contact between locally based officers and the people they serve. The only other 
significant changes to the mechanisms of accountability implied by sector 
policing were reforms associated with such 'new managerial' concerns as the 
alignment of resources with demand, outcome-based performance assessment and 
the consumer-orientation of service delivery. 
In putting these changes into effect Holloway Division took the Assistant 
Commissioner (Metropolitan Police, 1991a: 1,8) at his word and adapted his 
guidelines to suit local conditions. Having undertaken the suggested workload 
analysis, the Division decided to create three sectors - Highbury, Tollington and 
Archway - each with a local base. Responsibility for policing these areas was 
then entrusted to six teams of about half a dozen uniformed officers (making 18 
teams in all) supervised by one or two 'team sergeants'. Contrary to advice in the 
official guidance that responsibility for local policing should be invested in a 
clearly identifiable individual, each sector was put under the command of two 
inspectors.7 A new shift system was devised that preserved the traditional 
'earlies' (6.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m.) 'lates' (2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m.) and 'nights' 
(10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m.) but added new 'day' (8.00 or 10.00 a.m. to 4.00 or 6.00 
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p.m.) and 'evening' or 'late/late' (6.00 p.m. to 2.00 a.m.) shifts. The creation of 
these shifts was intended to align the availability of personnel more closely with 
the demand for police services and to give officers more time in which to solve 
problems rather than respond to calls.8 
The existence of a network of 14 neighbourhood forums (NF s) made up of elected 
area and street representatives and delegates from local community organisations 
allowed Holloway to postpone the establishment of sector working groups based 
on the Assistant Commissioner's model. A product of Islington Council's 
commitment to decentralisation, NFs lacked formal decision-making powers but 
were intended to provide a platform for ordinary members of the public to express 
their views on housing, planning, transport and other local authority services 
(Islington Council, 1989).9 On two of Holloway's three sectors (Archway and 
Tollington) neighbourhood forums themselves continued to be the main vehicle 
for community consultation in the first year of sector policing much as they had 
under the old 'relief system. 10 Only on Highbury Sector was any effort made to 
set up a separate consultative body drawn from the membership of local 
neighbourhood forums. 11 Even there it was not until the spring of 1993 that the 
sector inspectors began to think of renaming the Highbury Sector Crime Panel 
(HSCP) as it had become known and seeking regular representation on a 
'Working Group' from other local agencies in line with the Assistant 
C .. , ·dan 12 OmmISSIOner s gul ceo 
As for 'new managerial' changes to the internal accountability of operational 
officers, little was done to formalise mechanisms through which sector 
commanders could be called upon to account for their performance while the 
impact of 'conswnerism' was restricted, as we shall see, to the occasional 
rhetorical flourish. 
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Content: problems, crime and credibility 
Making' community problems' the main focus of uniformed police activity was a 
key element in the design of sector policing. And, from the outset, senior 
managers at Holloway were convinced that the process of identifying problems 
and allocating them to sector officers as discrete 'tasks' was critical to its success: 
sector policing, they believed, would 'live or die on tasking,.13 Six months after 
implementation, the Division's internal evaluation pronounced the system a 
success. 14 A total of 102 'tasks' had been undertaken across the three sectors, of 
which 85% had been 'community-generated' usually as a result of 'formal contact 
through Sector Working Parties or Neighbourhood Forum meetings'. Some 
sector officers, it conceded, were disappointed that 'community representatives 
[had] been unable to provide a more comprehensive programme of actions that 
they would like the police to undertake'. However this could perhaps be 
attributed to the public's lack of understanding of the police and to 'a degree of 
satisfaction with current police performance'. Tasks ranging from 'crime 
problems' (like drug dealing or handling stolen goods) centred on a particular 
address to 'short term community problem[s] associated with parking or anti-
social behaviour' had been identified and notable successes had been achieved in 
the shape of multi-agency law enforcement action against' [ car] window washers 
and [unlicensed] street traders' . 
Unfortunately, on closer inspection, there was little substantial evidence on which 
to support so sanguine a conclusion about early experiences of problem-solving 
policing in Holloway. The Division was unable to come up either with a 
comprehensive list of the 102 problems referred to in the evaluation or with an 
explanation of what exactly had been done in response to them. Nor could it 
explain how the problem-solving work with which officers were tasked had been 
assessed. It is also impossible to believe that carrying out what, on the report's 
own admission, were often fairly minor tasks can have taken up many, never 
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mind all, of the 4,992 officer hours worked on problem-solving 'day' shifts in the 
six months April- October 1992 covered by the internal evaluation. ls Inevitably 
perhaps the reality of the problem solving/tasking process reflected in my 
observation of community consultation was considerably more profane than the 
authors of the internal evaluation felt able to report. 
In the course of the five meetings of the HSCP held between July 1992 and March 
1993 a total of 35 distinct 'community problems' was raised by neighbourhood 
forum representatives. 16 Of these, 10 were identified at the Panel's fIrst meeting 
on 13 July. Yet by the time it met 8 months later on 8 March it was impossible to 
conclude that a single one of them had been resolved. Seven of the 10 problems 
simply disappeared from HSCP's agenda either at its second meeting on 7 
September or thereafter. Forum representatives attending the September meeting 
reported some positive change in two of the other three cases but did not attribute 
the apparent amelioration of the problem to police action. The remaining problem 
(involving obstructed access to a housing estate) became a regular feature of 
Panel discussions but defied all attempts to resolve it. Difficulties with 'tasking' 
were not limited to Highbury Sector as the following field note of conversations 
with Archway Sector officers indicate: 
Paul' s [uniformed constable] team has not been given a specific task to 
perform for 3-4 months. He can remember brown tasking dockets 
coming round in the months immediately after sector policing was 
introduced but hasn't seen one for a long time. Steve [sector support 
sergeant] concedes that he has given up allocating tasks to 'day' shifts. 
Some of the teams simply didn't do anything on the tasks they were 
allocated and he got fed up with chasing team sergeants up on them. 
[FN, 14/3/93] 
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Explanations for the difficulties Holloway Division experienced with the practice 
of community problem solving are not hard to find. 
Credibility 
The fITst and in many ways the most serious of these was that, in the eyes of the 
front line police officers responsible for carrying out problem solving work, the 
tasks they were given lacked operational credibility. One Highbury Sector 
sergeant captured the prevailing mood when he described neighbourhood forum 
meetings as 'one or two lunatics going on about dog crap and parking. ,17 This 
statement neatly captures both the main criticisms made of the consultative 
process used to identify community problems under sector policing. Firstly rank 
and file officers saw members of neighbourhood forums not as legitimate 
community representatives but as egotistical 'busybodies' .18 Obsessed with their 
own (usually trivial) problems, ignorant of the true extent of crime, and unable to 
appreciate the inconsistency in their demands for visible patrol and a quick 
response to emergency calls, forum members were easily dismissed as 
representing no-one but themselves. 19 These misgivings about the make-up of 
HSCP and the neighbourhood forums from which its membership was drawn 
were shared by divisional managers although they generally chose to express their 
reservations in more measured terms. Shortly before sector policing went 'live' 
an inspector confessed that the membership of one of the forums on what was to 
become 'his' sector was 'middle class and, though it may be heresy to say this, 
not particularly representative'. Several months later even senior managers were 
becoming disillusioned: 
We go to lots of meetings and we usually get stuck with the dog-shit 
brigade. We haven't sold ourselves well enough.20 
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Flowing from and reinforcing these doubts about the credibility of forum 
members as genuinely representative of the community were still more profound 
doubts about the 'problems' they tended to identify. Analysis of the 35 problems 
discussed by HSCP reveals that fully two thirds (23) of them were related to 
traffic, parking and the anti-social use of roads and pavements. Another 6 
involved behaviour - drug-taking, public urination, prostitution, intimidation and 
young people breaking into utility rooms in blocks of flats - that may well have 
been 'criminal' but fell some way short of conventional views of 'real police 
work' (McConville and Shepherd, 1992). Only 5 of the problems raised at HSCP 
meetings accorded with occupational and organisational perceptions of 'real 
crime' such as burglary and criminal damage.21 To officers socialised into a 
culture that glorifies bandit-catching, the thrill of the chase and the prospect of the 
'good' arrest, the kind of work called for by HSPC was (in one instance quite 
literally) 'crap' (Reiner, 1992, Chap. 3). 
The following fieldnote summarising a debate about the priority to be given to the 
'problem' of cars parked on street comers graphically illustrates the disjuncture 
between police and 'community' views of the priority of local problems. 
Forum representative: Another thing there is great concern at is comer 
parking. We asked [about it] but we didn't get an answer from our boys 
in blue. 
Sector inspector: Well, it's all a question of priority ... crime or dealing 
with parked vehicles within 15 yards of a junction. Do you want officers 
patrolling areas where burglaries are being committed or dealing with 
parked cars? 
[Two forum representatives intervene to say that parking near a junction 
is still a 'crime' and could be 'worse than a burglary' if it led to an 
accident and someone was injured. Questions are asked about whether, 
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and if so what, enforcement action the police take against 'junction 
parkers'.] 
Sector inspector: Enforcement would be by fixed penalty notice. But 
it's not something we would go out to look for. If you went out to look 
for it, you would be writing out tickets forever.22 
In the early days of sector policing inspectors had been reluctant to discourage 
forum representatives from raising quality of life problems like parking.23 But by 
the third meeting of the HSCP when this exchange took place, they were finding 
it increasingly awkward to mediate between sector officers contemptuous of the 
tasks they were being given and forum representatives anxious to have the police 
respond to problems that affected their quality of life. As shop floor anger at their 
superiors' failure to 'stand up to' forum representatives mounted, it was not just 
the panel's credibility that was in doubt but the ability of sector inspectors to 
maintain the respect of the officers under their command.24 With sector teams 
and their supervisors openly dismissive of the tasks they had been allocated as 
unworthy of their attention, one sector inspector resorted to the expedient of 
'making up' police action to report back to the HSCp.25 
Tasking and patrol direction 
Another weakness in the machinery for translating community problems into 
policing tasks was the persistence of a deeply traditional crime orientation to the 
work of units, such as the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit (DIIU), 
responsible for analysing workload and supplying information to operational 
supervisors about matters requiring special police attention. While sector 
inspectors were struggling to establish the credibility of 'community-generated' 
quality of life problems in the eyes of sceptical sector officers those same officers 
and their team sergeants continued to be fed a constant diet of traditional, and 
highly credible, 'real crime' tasks. Long after 6 April the walls of sector offices 
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where teams were either briefed or briefed themselves at the start of a shift were 
still festooned with DllU bar charts showing the distribution by sub-sector of 
standard categories of reported crime. Information about 'community problems' 
was noticeable only by its absence. Support for the conclusion that the attention 
of sector teams (like the reliefs before them) continued to be directed towards 
using familiar police tactics of patrol and selective enforcement to address under-
analysed 'real crime' problems is provided by statistics presented in Holloway's 
internal evaluation. These show little change in traditional indicators of crime-
fighting activity such as receptions into custody and the use of powers of stop and 
search.26 
Prominent though DllU-identified crime problems were on office walls and in the 
minds of some sector officers for some of their time on duty, it would be wrong to 
suggest that even this culturally credible data, or indeed anything said or read at 
shift briefings, informed the average routine patrol?7 Infmitely preferable to any 
kind of directed patrol was the opportunity to 'do your own thing', as one 
probationer put it after stopping a succession of drivers for minor traffic 
offences.28 Day shift officers who should have been using their 'non-response' 
time to work on community problems found a whole range of alternative 
attractions hard to resist. Many simply ignored injunctions to avoid taking calls 
unless absolutely necessary and hitched rides with motorised colleagues working 
on 'response' shifts. Others sought out 'real police work', or as close an 
approximation of it as they could find, to keep themselves occupied. 
Opportunities to execute warrants for the arrest of minor malefactors such as 
television licence defaulters, undertake plain clothes observation work, or stop 
and search people on the street were taken up with enthusiasm. Still others used 
the time to pursue personal interests in particular aspects of police work such as 
traffic. Stories of outrageous 'easing' behaviour - shopping, swimming and 
going to the hairdresser - also abounded (Cain, 1973: 37; Holdaway, 1983: 52-4). 
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Such cavalier attitudes towards these 'problem solving' shifts were scarcely 
discouraged by managers' eagerness to give officers leave when they were 
working' days' and to use them as a pool of' spare' resources to he drawn on 
whenever personnel were needed to meet 'aid' commitments to other areas. The 
marginality of 'day' shift policing from the paradigmatic activity of 'keeping 
busy' responding to calls was summed up in the description - widely used by all 
ranks at Holloway - of the traditional 'earlies', 'lates' and 'nights' as 'core' shifts. 
Lack of information about what were in any case non-credible priorities, the 
continuing availability of traditional 'crime' tasks identified by the DIID, and the 
rival attraction of self-directed activity, all contributed to the difficulty Holloway 
experienced in focusing routine police work on community problems. The effect 
of these difficulties is evident in these extracts from fieldnotes made on a 
'late/late' or evening shift some 5 months after the introduction of sector 
policing.29 
6.00 p.m. The Tollington Sector office wall is adorned with the usual 
multi-coloured bar charts. [ ... ] Having established that Dave, a 
qualified van driver, is required for other duties ... Sean's [sector 
sergeant] briefing begins with him telling Alan and Chris that their main 
task for the evening is to 'provide a high visibility presence around 
Knighton Square to deal with the burglary problem on M [sub] sector' . 
He suggests they' do a few stops and see who's doing what around 
there'. I ask about the way in which 'day' and 'latellate' teams are 
deployed and allocated to specific tasks. Sean smiles and says that 'it's 
all a bit difficult really' because the teams aren't often given specific 
tasks by the sector inspectors and he and the other sergeants probably 
don't do enough 'to clarify things'. [Alan, Chris, Dave and I retire to the 
station canteen for coffee.] 
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7.00 p.m. From the control room Dave is sent off to collect a prisoner. 
Chris and Alan succeed in 'borrowing' a panda from Bob, the late turn 
officer down to drive it. [ ... ] They appear unconcerned at the apparent 
inconsistency between their assigned task and their enthusiasm for 
borrowing Bob's car while he is 'tucked up' in the station with an arrest. 
[Alan and Chris spend more than an hour in the panda taking calls to deal 
with an abandoned vehicle, children suspected of tormenting an elderly 
woman and two false activations of remote signalling burglar alarms.] 
8.15 p.m. After returning the panda to Bob, Alan and Chris leave the 
station on foot. Alan is relieved there is only an hour or so of patrol left 
... [They have been told to take a meal break at 9.30 p.m. before crewing 
the Division's regular Friday evening 'battlebus' on 'rowdyism patrol'.] 
Chris says, 'I don't mind walking for a change, but 1 wouldn't want to do 
too much of it '. They set off towards Knighton Square providing for the 
first time that evening the kind of 'visible presence' Sean envisaged 
during the briefmg session. [After dealing with a missing person on a 
nearby housing estate and taking two turns around Knighton Square 
(stopping only to make a cursory inspection of a house where a burglar 
alarm is sounding) Alan is back in the station for a meal by 9.30. Before 
they can get back to the Square for the second time, Chris is picked up in 
a car to accompany a prisoner to a local hospital.] 
In the course of an 8 hour evening shift free of responsibility for emergency 
response and taking calls over the radio, Alan and Chris thus spent no more than 
75 minutes on high visibility foot patrol and considerably less than that on the 
slightly vague crime control task they had been given at their shift briefing.3o 
Ownership 
The other main means by which sector policing was intended to encourage the 
identification and solution of community problems was by giving teams of 
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officers geographical responsibility. Allocation to sector teams would give them 
an intimate knowledge of an area and its people, and fire them with a commitment 
to solving their problems. Putting this into practice in Holloway proved much 
more difficult than the designers of sector policing seem to have anticipated 
largely because of the size of the Division's three sectors, and the inability of the 
officers deployed on them to identify with the people and problems of 'their' area. 
Scale 
When neighbourhood forums were being' consulted' about the introduction of 
sector policing they were often told that it would be like 'an extended home beat 
system' .31 Characterising sector policing in this way played well to audiences 
anxious to retain ties with familiar home beat officers. But it completely ignored 
the inevitable differences of scale between the two methods of deployment. 
Sector officers responsible for areas with average resident populations of less than 
30,000 people (and 13,000 households) were simply not close enough to the 
ground to forge the kind of relationships with local people that home beats 
working patches less than a quarter of the size had been (and continued to be) able 
to maintain. One long serving home beat officer made the point that he and his 
colleagues were 'on our beats for good' while sector officers - though more 
geographically constrained than before - could still 'move around the whole of 
Highbury' using their freedom to do more or less what they wanted, and to avoid 
getting bogged down in the unpalatable work of community problem solving. 32 
Even where one might have expected the effects of decentralisation to have been 
most keenly felt, the 'footprint' of more regular patrol by sector officers seemed 
to be highly localised. In spite of favourable coverage in the national press 
(Hospital beat puts crime fight on to the street, The Times, June 9 1992), the 
establishment of a new Archway sector office on the site of a local hospital 
seemed to have little effect on how the area as a whole was policed. 
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People have said to me just generally in the street and at meetings that 
they have not noticed any extra foot patrols, and extra contact as such 
with police on a day to day basis other than calling them to something 
specific. So ... I haven't really found that much difference [between 
sector and relief policing]. (Archway Sector Home Beat Officer)33 
Integrity and identification 
Apart from the size of the area for which they were responsible, another critical 
factor in determining the extent to which officers were able to identify with a 
sector and own its people's problems became known as 'sector integrity'. At 
Holloway this was taken to be a function of the proportion of calls for service on a 
sector to which a response was provided by an officer from that sector. A study 
of a sample of 370 calls undertaken for the Division's internal evaluation revealed 
that just over half (54%) had been dealt with 'on sector' in this way.34 Officers 
perfonning divisional duties such as driving or operating the fast response car 
dealt with a further 17% of calls. All other things being equal, a third of these 
officers would also have been from the sector concerned raising the proportion of 
calls to which a 'sector' response was provided to 60%. But this still means that 
there would be no more than a 36% chance of any (let alone the same) sector 
officer being called to two separate incidents at the same location providing 
officers with only a very limited incentive to identify, own and resolve any 
underlying problems in the manner hypothesised in the Assistant Commissioner's 
guidelines. 
Certainly, despite early fears that the centrifugal tendencies of sector policing 
were about to tear Holloway Division into 'three police forces' , rank and file 
officers found it much harder to identify with sector colleagues they rarely met, 
but with whom they shared responsibility for the problems of a particular 
geographical area, than with officers based on other sectors who worked the same 
shift pattern.35 By early 1993 a constable with several years service could begin 
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to see the sense of solidarity characteristic of the old four relief system 
establishing itself across geographical boundaries among the six teams created 
under sector policing~ 36 
Ownership 
The net effect of the size of the areas they were expected to police, the difficulty 
of maintaining 'sector integrity' at levels where officers might be encouraged to 
solve underlying problems rather than simply respond to symptomatic incidents, 
and the persistence of peer group solidarity based on shared responsibility for a 
block of time rather than a piece of ground, left the ideal of sector ownership 
largely unrealised at Holloway. The proprietary interest of a home beat officer in 
her beat was not reflected in other officers' feelings about their sector. Indeed 
home beat officers continued to resent what they saw as interference by sector 
colleagues in their work and the delicate network of co-operative relationships 
they had developed with local people and the staff of other agencies. 
Rebecca [home beat officer] is annoyed at Ron Williams, the duty 
inspector, for making her do late turns today and tomorrow. She 
complains that she should have been allowed to come in to go on the 
picket line at her neighbourhood office. [ ... ] She is concerned that other 
[sector] pes may 'wade in and arrest people' when she would have dealt 
with problems by just having a word with people she has worked 
alongside, and will have to work with again. 37 
From the standpoint of the home beat officer at least, sector policing had only a 
very limited impact on their sector (fonnerly relief) colleagues. If anything they 
seemed to think that pressure on resources and low morale following the 
introduction of the new style of policing had resulted in attitudes to the public 
taking a tum for the worse. 
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Mike recalls one person complaining to him that a [ sector] officer called 
to deal with an abandoned vehicle had told him, 'You don't expect us to 
deal with crap like that, we've got better things to do'. Rebecca confirms 
that the people who get abused tend to be those who are 'pro-police ... 
the people who do call us when they see something ... one bad 
experience and it all goes out of the window'. Simon adds that it 
wouldn't be so bad if the pes 'picked on some slag' .38 
Self-interest in maintaining their status as home beat officers may have prompted 
such stories yet they are consistent with my observations of operational police 
work which revealed no detectable increase in the quantity, or change in the 
quality, of routine interactions between police and public. Furthermore, 
remarkably similar findings are reported by Bennett and Kemp (1994: 32) whose 
activity surveys of police officers in Thames Valley fOWld no consistent evidence 
of any change in police practice congruent with sector-based problem-oriented 
policing.39 Nor did the introduction of a new style of policing at their research 
sites have a marked impact on public perceptions of the police. Only a quarter of 
residents surveyed noticed any change in the way their areas were policed.4o Of 
these, most had noticed an increase in the number of officers patrolling in vehicles 
and on foot. Although residents in one area thought that the police were making a 
greater effort to consult them, the overall post-test assessment of the police by 
members of the public at both sites was less favourable than before the 
. b 41 expenments egan. 
According to Holloway'S internal evaluation the Division 'achieved 10,700 man 
days of uniform patrol' between April and October 1992, representing a 220/0 
increase over the previous 6 months.42 What I have tried to suggest is that such 
superficially impressive statistics should be treated with some circumspection. 
The evidence presented here and by Bennett and Kemp (1994) certainly does not 
exclude the possibility that giving patrol officers responsibility for clearly defined 
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geographical areas, and creating mechanisms for public consultation at a similarly 
local level, may be a necessary condition for police 'ownership' of community 
problems. But it does indicate that such changes are unlikely to be sufficient to 
ensure that such problems become the principal business of the police and the 
main focus of patrol operations. 
Direction 
This analysis of the difficulties encountered in translating 'community problems' 
into operational priorities assumes that 'communities' speak with one voice and 
are capable of articulating a clear set of problems for the police to work on. Thus 
far it has been accepted that the people consulted by Holloway police in 
neighbourhood forum and HSCP meetings were capable of representing local 
public opinion to the police. Yet it will be recalled from the previous chapter that 
one of the most damaging criticisms made of the whole tradition of' community 
policing' was its failure to question this central concept of 'community'. It is to 
this notion of community and its construction in the inner city social milieu of 
Holloway that I turn to now. 
Community 
The boundaries of Holloway's three sectors were drawn so as to accord with those 
of Islington Council's 'neighbourhoods,.43 No doubt some heed was paid to other 
factors such as the availability of premises and the existence of the old Highbury 
Sub-Division, but the over-riding consideration in delineating sectors was the 
administrative convenience of having police areas coterminous with coherent 
groups of neighbourhoods. 44 The consequences of the decision to devolve 
responsibility for routine policing and 'community consultation' down to sectors 
defmed without regard to local social and political geography soon became 
apparent. As one participant in a public meeting on Highbury Sector saw it, a 
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'community' of people with 'common interests' could not be conjured up by 
dr . 1· 45 T d . awmg mes on a map. 0 escnbe a sector as a community was, as he put it, 
'baloney'. He and the other members of his residents association might share 
some concerns with people elsewhere on the sector but their most immediate 
problems were peculiar to 'their area' consisting in his mind of not more than a 
couple of streets. 
However much the police might try to persuade themselves that - by consulting 
with neighbourhood forums or the HSCP - they were talking to people who 
represented people with a genuine community of interest they frequently found 
themselves paralysed by the reality of intra-communal conflict. Instead of being 
called on to defend homogeneous, self-contained, social units from external 
threats, sector inspectors found themselves and their officers becoming embroiled 
in disputes about the appropriate use of public space between people living, 
working or taking their leisure in the same street or housing estate. At the second 
meeting of HSCP for example one of the sector inspectors tried to explain to a 
member of the panel who had complained about drug-takers littering the stairwell 
of her block of flats with discarded syringes and cigarette papers that the police 
could do little to help - the young people concerned lived on the estate and had 
lookouts posted to warn them of police patrols.46 In much the same way, 
demands for illegally parked vehicles to be ticketed or towed away were also 
rebuffed by the police on the grounds that their owners were local residents while 
discussion of a burglary problem on an estate was brought to an abrupt conclusion 
by a sector inspector intervening with: 'I can't say any more but they're a lot to do 
with residents of the estate' .47 Faced with the complex reality of social 
heterogeneity and conflict over appropriate behaviour and the use of public space 
within the large locational communities so arbitrarily defined by sector policing, 
the immediate reaction of the police was to pull back from any involvement in the 
multi-faceted and potentially messy problems of dysfunctional micro-
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communities. In the absence of a credible real crime problem, the police took 
evidence of communal dissension as an excuse for inaction. 
Representation and participation 
No less problematic than the definition of community in crudely locational terms 
was its representation through the process of consultation put in place following 
the introduction of sector policing. The extent to which the police relied on 
neighbourhood forums and their members - directly on Archway and Tollington 
Sectors, indirectly on Highbury - as direct participants in community consultation 
has already been noted. What needs to be examined in slightly more detail here is 
who these people were, what attitudes and experiences they brought to the 
consultative process and how they were chosen and held to account by the 
organisations and communities they were supposed to represent. 
Neighbourhood Forums 
Islington's 24 neighbourhood forums were in many ways models of grassroots 
democracy. Membership was based on election, nomination by local 
organisations or, most commonly, a combination of the two (Islington Council, 
1989: para. 15.2). Under constitutional arrangements approved by Islington 
Council each forum also had to reserve two places for each of five normally 
under-represented sections of the population including people under the age of 21, 
women with caring responsibilities and people from minority ethnic groupS.48 
However, a Council review of the operation of these provisions found that there 
was 'still some way to go to ensure that all sections of the community are 
adequately represented on forums' .49 Under 21 s, people with disabilities and 
people from ethnic minority communities remained seriously under-represented. 50 
Moreover Khan (1989 cited in Gyford, 1991: 178) found that 'forums consist 
largely of activists' from 'the more settled and secure elements of the community' 
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whose experience at running meetings enabled them to exclude people less used 
to such formality from fully participating in collective decision-making.51 
From what I observed at the 20 or so neighbourhood meetings I attended in late 
1991 and early 1992 there is no reason to believe that the make-up of forums had 
changed substantially since the reviews undertaken by Khan and Islington 
Council were completed 2 years earlier. While the number of people attending 
forums varied from fewer than 20 to more than 50 (most meetings attracted 
between 20 and 30 people including council officers, councillors and police) 
meetings were dominated by seasoned 'committee people'. There was no sign of 
anyone under the age of 30 at any of the meetings I attended while the fifth of 
Holloway's popUlation that came from the 'visible' ethnic minorities was never 
represented by more than a handful of stalwarts who rarely played any active role 
in proceedings (Dixon and Stanko, 1993: 19). 
Highhury Sector Crime Panel 
In many respects the make-up of HSCP faithfully reflected that of the five 
neighbourhood forums whence its members came. Exclusively white, 
overwhelmingly middle aged and active in the 'community', its membership 
emerged from the forums by a slightly opaque process of self-selection and 
nomination. At the two forums I attended where the subject was discussed 5 of 
the 6 places available on HSCP were filled by volunteers and the sixth by an 
elderly man nominated from the chair.52 Freshly installed on the Panel, members 
stood on their dignity as delegates of their respective forums and insisted on 
having their contributions minuted accordingly: 'after all we're representing our 
neighbourhood offices not ourselves' .53 Scruples about raising personal 
grievances did not last long however, and by the third meeting of HSCP a 
member from the best attended of the Highbury forums was asking for' someone 
in uniform' to go along to the next meeting 'to encourage feedback': 
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The things we bring up [at HSCP meetings] are more personal than what 
the forums want us to bring up. Forums generally don't come up with 
anything. All we get is silence when we ask. People clam up when the 
police are mentioned. 54 
Although HSCP members' views on the aetiology of crime made some allowance 
for general social deprivation and the lack of adequate leisure facilities for young 
people, they had little sympathy for individual offenders. If the phrase had been 
current at the time there can be little doubt that they would have been enthusiastic 
supporters of a policing strategy based on principles of 'zero tolerance' (Dennis, 
1998). A leading chain store's policy of taking no action in shoplifting cases 
involving goods valued at less than £1 was condemned because 'the little thieves 
of today are the big ones of tomorrow' .55 Turning a blind eye to petty crime was 
'the thin end of the wedge' and firm action against everyone from pavement 
cyclists to the owners of defecating dogs was needed if the police were to 'stop 
the rot' .56 As a group of regular (several members of HSPC seemed to have 
almost daily contact with the police in their capacity as neighbourhood watch co-
ordinators and tenants association activists), direct but voluntary service users, 
panellists generally took a favourable view of the police. 'Most of them are pro-
police. They don't really give us a hard time' as one sector inspector put it.s7 On 
the rare occasions when members were critical others soon leapt to the defence of 
the police as the following exchange over a complaint that officers had failed to 
put a stop to a 'pay party' attended by 300 people shows: 
Sector inspector: You'd have had to call half the Met out to deal with 
that. 
Forum representative: Yes. I suppose policing today is a question of 
changed priorities. The police have more important things to do than tell 
people to tum their stereo down. 58 
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Delighted at being able to play to so naturally sympathetic an audience, sector 
inspectors took every opportunity to present the police as the hapless victims of a 
criminal justice system stacked in favour of the criminal and administered by 
prosecutors and magistrates unwilling to take suitably robust action against 
wrongdoers: 
What is really appalling is that these ratbags [repeat juvenile offenders] 
go into the police station and ask for 50 or more burglaries to be taken 
into consideration as you've said. Then they go up to court and get a 
little pat on the bot. 59 
Instead of providing an institutional mechanism for transmitting the values and 
priorities of the public to the police, HSCP meetings rapidly became a setting for 
the inculcation of a select group of respectable citizens with the world view of the 
police middle manager. The following discussion, which took place when 
members of the Panel were invited to visit Highbury Police Station 'to see our 
limitations', illustrates this process at work: 
Forum representative 1: A lot of people don't call the police because 
they know about your limitations. You're not seen as the knights in 
shining armour any more ... 
Forum representative 2: Wouldn't it be good if we could get back to 
the days when old Dixon [of Dock Green] had his light flashing ... ? But 
what do you [the police] feel about your limitations - how your hands 
are tied? Don't you feel frustrated? 
Sector inspector: [Admits to frustration, especially with other criminal 
justice agencies like the Crown Prosecution Service.] They [the CPS] do 
all the prosecuting now and we [the police] are only witnesses. We can't 
force them to do anything. 
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Forum representative 3: lbat must be a problem ... it must be difficult 
for the police to get knocked back when they've put a lot of work into 
't 60 1 . 
Representing the community? 
From a police perspective the membership ofHSCP (and the forums from which 
it was drawn) accurately reflected the views of precisely those 'ordinary decent 
people' to whom sector policing was designed to appeal. 61 Whether they 
represented anything resembling a cross-section of local opinion is a question to 
which I will return at the end of this chapter. All I want to do here is to draw on 
two sets of field notes to illustrate how views on the police and the way in which 
neighbouring 'problem' housing estates were, and should be, policed could differ 
quite dramatically among residents living within yards of each other. In the fIrst 
note a middle aged white woman's contribution to a meeting of the local 
neighbourhood forum is gratefully accepted by the police as indicative of popular 
support for firm enforcement action to be taken against local troublemakers. 62 
Her heartfelt gratitude to the police for holding the line against chaos contrasts 
starkly with the hostility displayed by a young African Caribbean woman with 
whom a sector officer had to deal while out on patrol only a few days after the 
forum meeting at which the efforts of he and his colleagues had been so warmly 
applauded. 
A tenants association representative from Beckett Close reports seeing 'a 
lot more' police patrolling the nearby Claridge Court estate. Later in the 
meeting the same woman says, 'Our community policemen ... I see them 
walking up and down and they're all we've got between us and anarchy 
and I would like to thank them.' (Fieldnotes (JCNF), 15/6/92) 
* * * * * 
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Neil is on patrol on Claridge Court. As he drives slowly past some 
swings in the middle of the estate a child of 6 or 7 at most shouts 
'pighead'. Neil shakes his head and remarks that it is not an uncommon 
reaction to police presence on Claridge Court. Reaching the other side of 
the play area, Neil gets out of his car to speak to a boy who appears from 
beneath the stairs up to a block of flats. The boy seems to have been 
hammering at something. Neil retrieves an axe from under the stairs. He 
calls the boy (who says he is 12 and is called Ricci) over to speak to him. 
As Neil takes him to one side a woman's voice rings out from the 
benches in the middle of the play area, 'Where are you going with him?' 
Maureen is a young African Caribbean woman. She claims to be Ricci's 
mother and wants to know what her 'son' has done wrong. Neil explains 
that he saw Ricci hammering at something beneath the stairs with an axe. 
After a series of conversations with Ricci, Maureen and the resident 
caretaker for the block, Neil manages to establish that the boy (who, it 
turns out, is neither Maureen's son nor called 'Ricci') was aimlessly 
battering the coin mechanism from an old supermarket trolley. He may 
also have landed a few blows on a fuse box that the caretaker has 
repeatedly warned him and other kids on the estate not to damage. 
Before he leaves, Neil tries to impress on Maureen and her 'son' how 
close 'Ricci' has come to being arrested and how dangerous it is for a 12 
year old to play with an axe - especially near a fuse box. He also 
admonishes Maureen for lying to him. Neil puts the axe in his car and 
gets in. Maureen says, 'I'm going to get a petition up about police 
coming on this estate. I don't want any police on my estate.' 
Back on the main road leading on to the estate Neil stops to ask the 
driver of the divisional fast response car who stops for a chat to go down 
to Claridge Court and 'look out for a couple of scrotes'. He describes 
Maureen as 'a young Ie3 female' .63 (Fieldnotes,21/6/92) 
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Management 
In the last chapter I argued that the influence of 'new managerialism' on the 
design of sector policing could be seen, amongst other things, in its commitment 
to aligning resources with demand, refocusing the business of policing on finding 
solutions to community problems, providing a 'quality service' to the 
organisation's 'customers' and replacing procedural conformity with achievement 
against clearly defined outcome objectives as the basis for performance 
assessment. In addition to entrenching the position of 'the community' (partially 
defmed in terms of its members' use or consumption of police services) as the 
immediate direction in which accountability was to flow beyond the police 
organisation, the new style was also intended to improve the effectiveness of 
internal mechanisms of accountability linking patrol officers to their sector 
commanders, and thence through divisional managers to 'Area'. 64 We have 
already seen how difficult Holloway found it to refocus its business, and this is 
not the place to debate the 'manpower' requirements of sector policing in a futile 
attempt to determine whether the six shift rota worked under the new system 
represented a more or less efficient use of personnel than the traditional four shift 
relief system. 65 All I want to do here therefore is to use some observational data 
to illustrate three of the more intractable problems faced by Holloway Division as 
it struggled to implement the new managerial thinking manifested in the design of 
sector policing. 
Autonomy and resistance 
The fust of these problems is a failing not only of managerialism but also of much 
of the writing on police accountability and community policing reviewed in 
earlier chapters. Police management theorists, radical critics of accountability and 
advocates of community policing have all tended to share an over-optimistic view 
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of 'management' as an engine of change within police organisations. The less 
sophisticated among them assume that once managers begin working to a clear set 
of objectives, commit themselves and their staff to meeting the needs of the 
consumer, are obliged to take account of the values and priorities of the public 
mediated by locally elected representatives, or buy into the principles of 
community policing, the operating practices of rank and file police will be 
magically transformed. In reality of course, long-established ways of working are 
not so easily susceptible to change by organisational fiat. This is probably true of 
most large bureaucracies but particularly so of the police where discretion is 
greatest at the bottom of the organisational hierarchy and where routine 
interactions between police and public are, absent the invocation of legal process, 
invisible (Goldstein, 1960). 
Some of the difficulties encountered in 'managing' the transition from time-
based, incident-led, relief policing to area-based, problem focused, sector policing 
at Holloway have already been touched on elsewhere in this chapter. Rank and 
file resistance to the new approach (usually in proportion to officers' length of 
service and socialisation) is discussed in detail in Dixon and Stanko (1993, 
chapter 6) and explained largely in terms of the conflict between the precepts of 
sector policing and well-documented characteristics of the occupational culture 
such as conservatism, pragmatism and solidarity in the face of physical danger 
and social isolation. The point that needs to be emphasised here in the context of 
sector policing's ability to deliver greater managerial and public accountability is 
the extent to which personal and collective autonomy is critical to rank and file 
police officers' sense of what it is to be a police officer. Thus, in the final 
analysis, it was the threat that it seemed to pose to patrol officers' ability to 
control their working lives that made officers so suspicious of sector policing and 
so resistant to attempts to give either local people or their own managers more 
influence over their day-to-day activities. 
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On the first shift I spent in the control room at Holloway five months before 
sector policing was due to be implemented I was told 'it's shit', 'it stinks', 'it's a 
load of crap' .66 When I recounted this experience to an inspector and mentioned 
that officers seemed particularly aggrieved that fewer of them would have the 
opportunity to work night shifts under the new system he explained that 'They 
like night duties because there are no guv'nors and no public and they can get on 
with some real police work' .67 As a summary of the rank and file's attitudes 
towards their precious autonomy and what motivated their struggle to defend it 
against encroachment by people both inside and outside the organisation, this 
short sentence is hard to better. Sector policing sought to redirect patrol officers' 
attention away from the varied, and at least potentially rewarding and exciting, 
work of taking calls, responding to incidents and 'fighting crime' towards dealing 
with a far more diverse set of culturally 'unreal' problems identified by people -
'the community' - spectacularly ill-qualified to know what was good for them. 
By breaking reliefs consisting of about 30 constables and perhaps half a dozen 
sergeants (or 'pes with stripes' as they were often described) down into smaller 
teams and giving the latter much clearer line responsibility for 'managing' the 
former, it threatened to increase the organisational visibility of patrol operations. 
Worse still, sector policing would put both temporal and spatial limits on 
opportunities for 'real police work' and 'doing your own thing'. Officers did not 
relish the prospect of working additional days on public priorities under the gaze 
of senior managers at the expense of nights when they could follow their 
operational instincts safe in the knowledge that both managers and public were 
safely in bed. Nor did they like the thought of having to stay on their sectors 
however quiet they might be instead of roaming the Division looking for action: 
'We won't be able to go on to Highbury to nick someone because it will be on 
another sector' .68 
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Minimising the threat to operational autonomy posed by the new style of policing 
soon became a priority for many rank and file officers at Holloway. The only 
alternative to allowing sector policing to change what counted as 'policing' was to 
make sure that it was adapted to accommodate the familiar rhythms and 
established practices of uniformed patrol work. This is made very plain in the 
opening paragraphs of a paper on some of the organisational implications of 
sector policing written by a long-serving sergeant and circulated to the 
membership of the divisional working party responsible for monitoring its 
implementation. 
Sector policing is going to be brought in at Holloway, so we must be 
positive about it, and use the opportunity to make changes that are of 
advantage to us as well as the policing needs of the division. 
It seems likely that three sectors will be the preferred option, two at 
Holloway and one at Highbury. I think we all have to accept that this 
will mean the end of the traditional relief system. However, by careful 
selection of a new duty rota, I think it will be possible for the new 
working shifts to allow us to work more or less together as the existing 
reliefs. 
Thus, a full five months before sector policing was introduced, damage limitation 
was already taking place. Fourteen months later, with sector policing no longer a 
novelty, most officers were becoming increasingly adept at making the system 
work for them, and increasingly exasperated at a hard core of malcontents who 
continued to condemn it at every opportunity. 
In spite of cold steady rain Darren [sector officer on a 6.00 p.m. to 2.00 
a.m. evening shift] wants to walk. He says it's the only way of getting to 
know 'who's at it' locally - of 'letting them know who you are and that 
you know them'. He has got to know Tollington Sector much better 
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since the introduction of sector policing but the only people he seems 
either interested in or familiar with are active juvenile burglars, car 
thieves and street robbers. 
He and some other officers on his cross-sector team have got together _ 
apparently informally - to do old-fashioned 'night duty proactive stop 
and search work' on some shifts. They have also come up with some 
special 'tasks' of their own such as a recent week-long 'blitz' on drink 
drivers. 
Darren, with over 4 years service, is exasperated by the attitudes of other 
more experienced officers towards sector policing. He has no time for 
anyone who 'lets the system get on top of them instead of making the 
system work for them'. He is happy to take advantage of sector 
policing's flexibility to get on and do the kind of crimina] intelligence 
gathering work he wants to do. [Fieldnotes, 19-20/12/92] 
Three loosely connected but important points emerge from all this. The first is 
that the capacity of police managers to control their own organisation and the 
actions of the people who actually 'do' policing is not nearly as extensive as 
either they or people who rely on them to change police practice usually seem to 
believe. The second is that, inasmuch as sector policing challenged the 
operational autonomy of the rank and file by exposing (or threatening to expose) 
their activities to more effective bureaucratic control and more extensive 
community influence, change was either resisted or subverted. As a result - and 
this is the third and final point - patrol officers on Holloway seemed no more 
accountable to their managers (and through them either internally up the 
organisational hierarchy or externally to 'consumers' and the 'community') after 
nine months of sector policing than they had been before. 
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Managing consumers 
The implementation of sector policing in Holloway also revealed a second flaw in 
managerial thinking about the direction of police accountability. Unlike the 
problems of autonomy and resistance discussed in the previous section, this 
second difficulty is peculiar to new managerialism and results from tension 
between the two groups of people - managers and consumers - to whom sector 
policing, under the influence of new managerialism, would have police service 
providers account for their performance. It would be an exaggeration to say that 
the introduction of sector policmg to Holloway prompted many operational 
officers to see the public as their customers and their relationship with local 
people in the quasi-contractual terms implied by new managerialism. On the shop 
floor, any use of consumerist language was heavily laced with irony: 
Tracy and Joanne arrive back in the Archway Sector office to be greeted 
by Denis with the sardonic but not unfriendly inquiry, 'Well, have you 
been out meeting our customers then?'. 69 
Their superiors deployed the rhetoric with greater facility and sincerity. One 
senior manager, for example, chose to recommend the idea of holding annual 
public meetings on their areas to sector inspectors by drawing an analogy with 'a 
company shareholders' meeting. 70 Then, warming to his theme he went on: 
[It's] an opportunity for us to tell local people what we have done in their 
area and for the public to tell us what they want or feel as a group. We 
need the public's help in making sure we are running the business which 
they have entrusted us with running. It's all about taking policing to the 
consumer. 
Unfortunately such rhetorical commitments to addressing the priorities and 
solving the problems of consumers were regularly confounded by the still more 
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pressing organisational need to please superiors by producing 'good [crime] 
figures' and lending suitably enthusiastic support to high-profile special 
operations. Several months before sector policing began Holloway was prevailed 
upon to set up an eight strong 'Tasking Unit' as the Division's contribution to the 
service-wide anti-burglary initiative known as Operation Bumblebee. 71 Though 
they were well aware of the effect its creation would have on the reliefs and the 
transition to sector policing, divisional managers had been left in doubt by their 
superiors at Area that Holloway'S failure to meet 'Bumblebee' targets was 
unacceptable. 
Then, with community problem solving under sector policing still in its infancy, a 
management meeting was told that' Area are still into crime' and were becoming 
restive about levels of motor vehicle crime.72 'You've had burglary and robbery 
so you could have guessed what would be next', as a divisional manager put it. 
Several weeks later a colleague told sector inspectors at a similar gathering that 
'we must be seen to be doing something' on autocrime.73 'Area policy' required 
divisions to come up with initiatives to deal with the problem. Amidst general 
cynicism it was pointed out that, although vehicle crime accounted for a large 
proportion of total crime, 'it isn't something the community harps on about'. 
Finally, after a crime prevention slogan competition in local schools had been 
suggested, an inspector suggested that children should be asked to complete a 
sentence beginning 'I don't care about autocrime because ... '. 
Frustrated though they were by Area's demands on them, divisional managers 
were also guilty of infringing or attempting to infringe the principle that priorities 
on a sector should be framed by local commanders in consultation with the 
community. For example, a meeting of High bury sergeants 1 observed was told 
by one of the sector inspectors that he kept on getting 'hit over the head' about 
burglary figures and the sector's poor performance in comparison with the rest of 
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the Division.74 After toying with the idea of massaging burglary figures by 
reclassifying attempts as criminal damage it was decided that the sector 'shouldn't 
get into the position of cooking the books for anyone'. Nor, as one sergeant 
observed with some asperity, should too much attention be paid to Division's 
demands: 'We've got to respond to their [the public's] needs not [the Chief 
Superintendent's]'. From what he had heard at public meetings, people saw 
burglary as one of the hazards of living in a place like Highbury and not 
something the sector ought to be getting too concerned about. 
Performance assessment 
The apparent conflict between the priorities of managers within the police 
organisation and consumers outside it leads us on to a third and final difficulty 
with the management of sector policing. In theory any assessment of the 
performance of sector inspectors and the operational officers under their 
command should have been - as the jargon would have it - outcome rather than 
output based. In other words it should have taken as its starting point their 
success in identifying and resolving substantive community problems. To do this 
two major obstacles had to be overcome. Firstly the Division had to expand the 
information on which judgements about performance were based from traditional 
'crime' and 'process' records relating to the number of offences, 'stops', and 
arrests made by a unit (or, still more invidiously, by an individual officer) so as to 
encompass new measures consistent with the more diffuse mandate of community 
oriented policing. And secondly it had to ensure that it was not simply output that 
was being measured but outcomes. In neither case were Holloway's efforts 
entirely successful. 
Operational managers were well aware of the need to reinforce the aims of sector 
policing by adjusting reward structures geared to conventional measures of 
competence.75 Within weeks of sectors being established an inspector went to a 
manager's meeting to complain that it was unhelpful of the Division Information 
325 
and Intelligence Unit to continue publishing stop and search and arrest figures 
broken down by sector. 76 It was not the quantity of traditional police work that 
sectors should be worried about but the quality of their interactions with the 
public. A senior manager agreed and promised to have a word with the Unit's 
head. However, an end to official pUblication of such data did not mean that 
'body counts' lost their cultural salience as a measure of sector and team 
performance. The following notes of a meeting for team sergeants on Highbury 
Sector give a flavour of the continuing debate about how performance should be 
measured. 77 
Arrest figures taken from custody records have been circulated by a 
sector inspector to loud protests: are they going to be used as a 
performance indicator? One sergeant dismisses the constable responsible 
for compiling the figures as a 'fuckwit'. The constable's supervisor 
leaps to his defence and denies that the data is going to be used to 
compare teams' performance. 'If you're not going to use it why was it 
published? Why not school visits or follow-ups with victims of crime?' , 
asks another sergeant. 'What worries me is you end up with the old [X] 
relief nonsense ... ' 'But it's still important isn't it?' says another who, it 
turns out, leads the team that has come top of the arrest table.78 
In the end, crime and process figures, along with data on response times, found 
their way into the internal evaluation report under the heading 'traditional 
workload' .79 But instead of being used to compare the performance of individual 
sectors they were made the basis for assessing the performance of the Division as 
a whole in the first six months of sector policing against benchmarks provided by 
the last two half years of the relief system. 
Coming up with alternative measures more relevant to sector policing and tailored 
to assessing the impact rather than the amount of community oriented police 
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activity presented a serious challenge to managers' ingenuity. The internal 
evaluation stated that 
Increasing contact between police and the public was one of the most 
important objectives of Sector Policing, both as an end in itself and as a 
means of discovering more precisely what the public want from the 
police service. 80 
Why 'public contact' was seen as desirable other than as a way of making local 
policing more responsive to public priorities is not explained. In any case, the 
statistics used to demonstrate increased levels of contact - 287 visits to schools, 
475 crime prevention visits, additional support to 44 victims of crime and 
attendance at 234 meetings with community groups - would have carried more 
conviction if the pattern of the rest of the evaluation had been followed and 
comparative data for similar periods of relief policing been presented. Without 
baseline data even such apparently impressive figures prove nothing. Nor do they 
give any indication of the impact these contacts had on victims of crime, on the 
students and staff of the schools visited, or on the vulnerability of the premises 
surveyed and people spoken to by crime prevention and sector officers. Indeed 
the only evidence of 'contact' leading to greater police awareness of public 
priorities cited is the somewhat contentious claim (in view of the evidence 
presented earlier) that the two meetings of HSCP held between April and October 
1992 had 'proved a useful sOWlding board for the sector' .81 Thus, when it came 
down to the critical new managerial task of evaluating sector policing in terms of 
its impact on community problems, Holloway was forced to supplement more 
traditional indices of police effectiveness by relying on a basket of what one of 




Three aspects of sector policing as it was introduced and implemented on 
Holloway Division illustrate how the relationship between the police and their 
interlocutors in the 'community' remained fixed in a firmly non-directive, non-
hierarchical, mode. 
Pre-implementation consultation and the demand for sector policing 
In its official explanations of the need to introduce sector policing the MPS liked 
to refer to the overwhelming public support for 'traditional policing' detected by 
the Operational Policing Review (Joint Consultative Committee, 1990, 
Introduction: 4). Confirmed by the findings of private (and, as far as 1 am aware, 
unpublished) public opinion surveys commissioned by the MPS, this was 
routinely interpreted as proof of widespread popular demand for the kind of 
community oriented policing that the service's new approach would provide. 82 
Evidence to the contrary - including survey findings reported in the Operational 
Policing Review itself - that most people strongly endorsed the emergency 
response and 'crime fighting' priorities of traditional reactive policing was simply 
ignored in the promotional literature. 83 Even as the new style was being 'rolled 
out' across London doubts remained within the upper echelons of the MPS 
hierarchy about the need for so precipitate and wholesale a reform of uniformed 
policing. At an inspectors' training day in the spring of 1992 an ACPO rank 
officer from No.1 Area (North) confessed that it 'seems to be a way of 
responding to a series of 'I wants' from the public but we haven't asked whether 
they want sector policing as such'. 84 
Given this somewhat tenuous connection between the kind of police service the 
public appeared to want and what they were going to get in the shape of sector 
policing, some hard selling was required in the months leading up to 6th April. 85 
The task was undertaken with some aplomb, and considerable success, by the 
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Division's community liaison officer who toured neighbourhood forums 
reassuring them that they would not lose 'their' home beat officers as a result of 
sector policing. Stock phrases used to describe the new style - 'policing the way 
people want', 'better police/community links' and 'an extended home beat 
system' - soon won most people over and allowed the internal evaluation to note 
that neighbourhood forums had been 'very supportive' of its introduction. 86 A 
meeting of the Islington Police/Community Consultative Group (IPCCG) also 
endorsed sector policing following a presentation by senior officers from 
Holloway and the boroughs other police division.87 Looked at with slightly more 
objectivity than either police officers anxious to demonstrate public support for 
sector policing or 'community representatives', who knew only as much about the 
proposed changes as they were told, were able to bring to their assessment, it is 
. difficult to see the pre-implementation 'consultative' process as amounting to 
anything more than what Irving et al (1989: 210) characterised as 'proclamation'. 
At meetings of both neighbourhood forums and IPCCG representatives were told 
not only that sector policing was going to be introduced but also that, on 
Holloway Division at least, how it was going to be implemented. Forum 
members who knew next to nothing about the old relief system (and often had to 
have its features explained to them) were simply told that Holloway was to be 
divided into three sectors. These areas - which had already been decided on -
would be policed by locally based officers who would be expected to get to know 
and be known by the community. Presented with what amounted to a fait 
accompli, forum members were left with nothing to contribute to the process but 
their support for the retention of home beat officers. 
Only once at one of what was to become Tollington Sector's least malleable 
forums did the futility of the 'consultation' exercise, and the nature of the 
relationship between proclaiming police officers and impotent community 
representatives, become clear: 
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Forum representative: Why are you putting sector policing forward for 
consideration now? 
Liaison inspector: We're not putting it forward for consideration. It's 
an instruction from the Commissioner.88 
The fact that most forum and IPCCG members seemed happy simply to be told 
what was about to happen to policing in Holloway was testimony not to the 
commitment of the MPS to the empowerment of local people but to the modesty 
of their representatives' expectations. 
Operational independence and asymmetrical access to information 
From the outset, control over the introduction of sector policing and the form in 
which it was implemented rested firmly in police hands. That sector policing was 
to be done in Holloway had been decreed by the Assistant Commissioner. How it 
was to be done had been decided by the Division. Popular participation in the 
process was thus kept to a minimum. A lot of what has already been said about 
developments in Holloway is indicative of the extent to which the partnership 
between the police and the 'community' promised by sector policing was 
dominated by the former. All that remains to be done here is to show firstly how 
asymmetrical access to information about crime, troublesome events and other 
community problems enabled the police to maintain this dominance when sector 
policing was implemented, and secondly how the realities of the doctrine of 
constabulary independence were brought home to representatives bold enough to 
challenge the operational autonomy of local commanders. 
In much the same way as ignorance about the organisation of policing under the 
relief system, and enforced reliance on the police themselves for information 
about what was to replace it, left lay representatives poorly placed to challenge 
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the professionals over its introduction, their very limited experience of 'real 
crime' and restricted knowledge of the extent and distribution of other 
troublesome behaviours seriously hampered HSCPs ability to identify and 
prioritise 'community problems'. Part of the reason why the Panel came up with 
so few' crime problems' and so many quality of life issues was that they had no 
way of knowing whether there had been, in the slightly melodramatic words of 
one member, 'a spate of local rapings [or] muggings' - unless of course the police 
told them.89 It was not, as some police officers seemed to think, that members 
rated pavement cycling a more serious problem than burglary. But it and other 
incivilities, unlike burglary, were part of their daily experience of life on their 
street or estate in a way that 'real crime' was not. Two comments made by forum 
representatives suggest why common, but relatively minor, incivilities crowded 
out more serious, but still mercifully infrequent, instances of criminal 
victimisation: 
'I'll only come up against the petty crimes because I'm just an ordinary 
Joe. ,90 
'I've never seen a mugging in my life ... but I walk out of my front and 
see people double parking every day. ,91 
Shapland and Vagg (1988) have argued that people react to what they regard as 
'real crime' and other types of troublesome, but not (to them) paradigmatically 
criminal, behaviour in quite different ways. Whereas 'real crime' is reported 
more or less as it happens because people feel that is what they ought to do, other 
incidents are drawn to police attention more selectively and instrumentally 
primarily because citizens believe, or hope, that the police have the special 
powers needed to respond to what has happened. As a result of this differential 
reporting (and in so far as popular conceptions and legal definitions of 'crime' 
coincide) the police are likely to have a much more complete picture of 'real 
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crime' than local residents. The tendency of ordinary citizens to identify 'quality 
of life' problems in the course of consultation with the police, and of the police to 
react to them with incredulity given their knowledge of the incidence of 'real 
crime', is thus explicable in terms of the former's highly localised experience of 
incivilities judged not worth reporting to the police unless specifically invited to 
do so, and the latter's privileged access to comprehensive data about criminal 
victimisation.92 To turn community consultation on Highbury Sector into a 
genuine, and information-rich, dialogue the police had to be prepared to share 
their institutional knowledge of crime and calls for service with the public. 
But this did not happen. Despite repeated requests for information about local 
crime it was not until the HSCP's fifth meeting in March 1993 (some eight 
months after the first) that data was eventually provided. Even then the 'Crime 
Update' consisted of the usual bar charts showing reported 'autocrime', 
'robberies/dips' and 'burglary' broken down by sector, sub-sector and time of 
day. No attempt was made either in the accompanying text or during the course 
of the meeting at which the update was discussed to explain what the broad 
offence categories included. Analysis of the problems underlying the reports was 
limited to the identification of certain sub-sectors or beats as being particularly 
badly affected by 'burglary' or 'vehicle thefts' and some vague information about 
suspects ('Greek type male together with a WlIndian', 'a white youth with a 
pony-tail') and their vehicles ('blue sierra, part index:- C485 V?,).93 This failure 
to provide Panel members with the information they needed to transcend their 
own experiences and take a more rounded view of local problems made their 
absorption with the quality of life issues that so frustrated the operational police 
officers tasked to deal with them inevitable. What Crawford (1997) has called 
asymmetrical access to information shrank the dialogue necessary for genuine 
consultation into an ill-informed monologue of complaints that were all too easily 
dismissed leaving police priorities and police autonomy unchallenged. 
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Even if the barrier to external interference in police decision-making that this 
asymmetry and its consequences represented were to fail, sector policing gave 
local officers a final, and impregnable, line of defence. It will be recalled from 
the previous chapter that the Assistant Commissioner's guidance (Metropolitan 
Police, 1991 b: 6) stated that 
Although the public have an opportunity to express their views and have 
them taken into account, this does not affect the responsibility of the 
police to make the final operational decisions. 
This application of the doctrine of constabulary independence to sector-level 
consultation was only pressed into service once at the five meetings of HSCP I 
observed and then only when - at the end of the discussion of corner parking parts 
of which were referred to earlier - the patience of one of the sector inspectors 
fmally ran out. Having explained that ticketing cars parked too close to road 
junctions would make unsustainable demands on police resources and been 
challenged yet again about his priorities by a forum representative who argued 
that they prevented blind and other disabled people from using dropped curbs, he 
replied, 'As sector inspector here I have to decide about priorities to get the best 
results' .94 With this forceful restatement of operational autonomy the discussion 
came to an abrupt end. When push came to shove in a contest for control of local 
policing, the doctrine of constabulary independence gave the police too much 
weight for a mere citizen to resist. 
Continuity in change: the distribution of coercion and protection 
In so far as the introduction of sector policing was intended to reorient routine 
uniformed policing away from crime and emergency response-centred police 
priorities to solving substantive 'community problems', its impact was limited by 
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the inability of poorly informed 'representatives' to identify policing tasks that 
operational officers regarded as 'credible' and worthy of police attention. These 
weaknesses in the mechanism of public accountability established by sector 
policing were not made good by any obvious change in the relationship between 
geographically responsible officers and the areas and people they served. Sector 
police did not readily identify with the relatively large areas to which they were 
deployed or fmd it easy to 'own' local problems. As a result, patrol activities 
continued to be determined by officers themselves according to prevailing cultural 
norms and values. The empirical incoherence of the concept of 'community' 
implicit in sector policing's vision of public consultation soon became apparent as 
the police and the mainly white, middle aged, and respectable local activists with 
whom consultation took place in neighbourhood forums and the Highbury Sector 
Crime Panel grappled with the reality of intra-communal conflict and the extreme 
localisation of recognisable communities of interest. Police managers on whose 
capacity to manage so much depended came up against the determination of rank 
and file officers to maintain their autonomy either by resisting change or 
refashioning reforms to accommodate established working practices. For their 
part, operational officers and their immediate supervisors were pulled in opposite 
directions by the unresolved tension between the needs of consumers expressed at 
community meetings and the prioritisation of good crime figures by senior 
managers with an eye on the media and a public audience far beyond sector 
boundaries. Where working relationships were forged between the police and 
select groups of local people it was characterised more by proclamation and 
monologue than consultation and dialogue. The introduction of sector policing 
itself was effectively non-negotiable while persistent asymmetries in the police 
and public's access to information about local problems, underpinned by the 
doctrine of constabulary independence, allowed the police to retain control of 
operational priorities once implementation had taken place. 
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Stripped down to the bare essentials of coercion, protection and their social 
distribution, the kind of policing delivered by Holloway officers after 6 April 
1992 did not differ to any significant degree to that which had gone before. The 
'roughs' continued to bear the brunt of police coercion and receive less in the way 
of protection than their more 'respectable' fellow citizens. Two calls to quite 
similar incidents - one before and one after 6 April - illustrate the deeply 
engrained police world view that survived the introduction of sector policing and 
continued to infonn operational police work into the new era of problem solving 
and quality of service.95 
Jim and Martin [sector officers] get called to deal with 'a man assaulting 
a woman in the street' outside an address in the south east of the 
Division. They set off at high speed in the fast response car from the 
opposite end of the 'ground'. After some time searching for the address 
they come across a woman sitting on the pavement with her feet in the 
gutter and her head in her hands. One of her shoes is lying under a 
parked car. The man is standing on the opposite pavement with a half-
closed suitcase on his shoulder. Clothes lie in a bundle on the pavement 
beside him. 
Martin gets out of the car to talk to the woman. Jim deals with the man. 
Martin succeeds in establishing that the man has spent 6 years working 
abroad leaving the woman to look after their three children (now aged 6, 
7 and 8). He has recently returned only to spend his time drinking and 
sleeping around. Tonight he tried to leave her altogether. She tried to 
stop him. He has not hit her this evening but has in the past. She says 
she has an injunction out against him. [Neither Martin nor Jim makes 
any attempt to find out whether this is true.] Martin tells her that if the 
man wants to leave her there is nothing she can do to stop him. All she 
can do is go to the courts to get maintenance. He is concerned about who 
is looking after the children while their parents are arguing in the street. 
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He gives her a stem lectw'e on parental responsibility. She protests that 
she has looked after them for six years and now it's his [the man's] tum. 
Why should she look after them when he's done nothing? 
Jim finishes talking to the man and Martin offers the woman a lift home. 
She accepts and gets in the car but before they can pull away she jumps 
out again to chase the retreating figure of the man back up the street. Jim 
and Martin drive on despairing of a situation Martin says is 'nothing to 
do with us really'. He is much less sympathetic to the woman, who 
shouted a lot and seemed to have been drinking, than Jim is about the 
man who was calm and quietly spoken. 
After a few minutes they drive back down the same street to find the 
couple standing in the middle of the road arguing again. Martin gets out 
of the car and lectures the woman about her family responsibilities for a 
second time. Jim remonstrates with the man but in less forceful terms. 
The woman tells Martin the man has taken her last £ 1 0 and continues to 
complain bitterly about his desertion. When Martin and Jim discover 
that relatives are looking after the children they lose all interest in the 
dispute, offer the man a lift to a cab office which he accepts and leave the 
woman to make her own way home still protesting loudly about her £10. 
Alone in the car once more Martin deplores the couples' irresponsible 
attitude towards their children - typical of the area if the number of kids 
they see wandering the street at night and getting involved in crime is 
anything to go by. 
* * * * * 
Neville and Eddy [sector officers] are called to a domestic incident on 
Highbury Sector. They are told that a woman has been assaulted by her 
male cohabitee who has returned drunk from work. Later they are told 
that 'children are at risk' and they set off at high speed with siren on and 
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blue light flashing. They arrive at the address they have been given over 
the radio only to discover that it is incorrect. After asking neighbours at 
an immaculately kept town house they eventually find the right address. 
The external paintwork of the house is peeling slightly. Neville remarks, 
'This looks more like it.' 
At the door to a first floor flat Neville and Eddy are met by a black 
woman, probably in her early or mid thirties. She stands awkwardly and 
walks into the flat very deliberately keeping her legs well apart. She 
looks as though she is in considerable discomfort if not actually in pain. 
A slightly older looking white man is standing just inside the living room 
door. His eyes are glazed and his speech slightly slurred. He is dressed 
in overalls and workboots covered in paint and dust. The other 
occupants of the flat are a younger black man who seems to be a friend 
of the family, and three children under the age of 10. 
The woman says that the man came back from work drunk and they had 
an argument. She says, 'He kicked me between the legs' and adds that it 
was particularly painful because she has recently had an operation 'down 
there'. She has also had part of one breast removed. During the 
argument the man had said something to the effect that she 'didn't even 
have two tits any more'. He says that he only gave her' a light kick up 
the arse' after she had thrown a bottle of milk at him. There is no 
obvious evidence of this and Neville and Eddy make no attempt to find 
any. 
Eddy takes the man into the living room while Neville talks to the 
woman in the kitchen. Eddy tells the man that 'these days' it is 
'unacceptable' for him to 'raise his hand' to a woman. Neville explains 
to the woman that what has happened to her is a common assault. They 
will not arrest the man. She wants him to be arrested. 
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When the two of them are brought back together Neville stresses to the 
man that he must not use physical force against his wife. Neville is 
visibly annoyed when the man interrupts him repeatedly. The woman 
says she is frightened about what will happen to her when she is left 
alone with her husband. Neville warns him that he will be arrested is 
they are called back to the flat again. He is not to touch his wife when 
they leave. 
Back in the car, Neville explains why they did not arrest the man: the 
woman had admitted to waiting 45 minutes before calling the police after 
what seemed to be a fairly minor assault; the children were happy 
enough and looked in no danger in spite of what had come over the 
radio; and further violence seemed unlikely because he (Neville) 
remembered having seen the couple 'aliluvvy-duvvy' before when he 
had gone round to deal with a lodger refusing to leave. In any case, 
arresting the man would have been a serious step in the circumstances -
'it's your home, your wife' as Neville put it. 
These two incidents underline the limitations of the reforms contemplated by 
sector policing as a means of changing routine police practice. Virtually invisible 
to managers and community alike (the critical decision in both instances being not 
to make use of the legal power of arrest) the way in which the four officers dealt 
with these incidents was structured not by any sense of the organisational or 
public priority attached to the problem of domestic violence, and how it should be 
handled, but by their common sense understanding of the situations with which 
they were confronted and the role that they as police officers could play in them. 
How they reacted was conditioned by their perceptions of the kind of area, people 
and behaviour they were dealing with. Visual, verbal and behavioural cues were 
picked up and assimilated in reaching decisions about what to do. Should 
coercive power be used against the two men, or against the woman in the first 
incident? Did the woman in the second incident 'deserve' the protection her 
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husband's arrest might afford? Were the children of both families (whose safety 
was clearly of paramount importance to all four officers) in danger and need 
immediate help of the kind only the police can provide? These and many other 
questions about how to handle these incidents were finally decided only after 
crucial information about where and how the couples lived, their attitudes and 
demeanour (particularly towards the police), the seriousness and legal status of 
the violence that had taken place between them, and the nature of the space in 
which the dispute was being conducted, had been absorbed and interpreted in the 
light of a complex web of personal values and cultural norms. In the end, 
judgements about roughness, criminality, vulnerability, sobriety, and 
respectfulness combined with officers' views on the mandate of the police and the 
distinction between public and private space led to the woman in the frrst incident 
and the man in the second avoiding arrest while the man in the first got a ride in a 
police car. 
Similar judgements of place and personality based on 'roughness' and 
'respectability' also continued to structure the distribution of coercion under 
sector policing as these field note extracts (again from before and after 6th April) 
suggest. 96 
Ken drives past commercial premises he says have been squatted by 
'hippies'. He spoke to them last night and they seemed perfectly 
pleasant and unlikely to cause trouble. Since they are on private 
premises he, and they, know he has no legal powers to force them to 
leave. But he also realises that if they are allowed to stay there will be a 
stream of complaints from the public and the fire brigade will be called 
whenever they light a fire. Police and fire brigade time will be wasted 
'so they will have to go'. Because they seemed nice enough he had 
given them 24 hours to leave and had promised to check back this 
evemng. 
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I ask how he proposes to get rid of them if they refuse to leave. 'Do you 
want to know on the record or off the record?' he asks with a laugh. 
'How about off?' 'Hound them. We would hound them off. Police 
would keep going round there at 3.00 in the morning asking questions 
until they decide there has to be somewhere where they would get less 
hassle.' 
[Embarrassed perhaps at dealing with the 'hippies' after he has been so 
candid about police tactics Ken continues on past the squatted premises 
saying he'll come back and see them later.] 
* * * * * 
Very much at a loose end at the end of a night shift Jason decides to go 
up to the Oak Lodge Estate. It is the only part of the sector he has not 
been round already. As he drives through the estate he comments, 'We 
don't get called up here much now ... domestics mainly. But there's 
quite a few IC3s up here - not being racist or anything.' 
If sector policing had increased public accountability and helped thus to re-
establish policing by consent it seemed to do so in Holloway only by co-opting a 
small elite of community activists 'representative' ofthoseJor whom a policing 
service should be provided while continuing to exclude large swathes of the 
population that failed to live up to police ideals of decency and respectability and 
against whom police force continued to be used. 
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Notes 
1 References to fieldnotes in the remainder of this chapter will consist of the date of the 
note prefaced by the letters 'FN'. The internal evaluation will be referred to as 'IE'. 
2 The Thames Valley experiments were limited to quite small areas and were examples of 
what Bennett and Kemp (1994: 12) call 'time-based' sector policing as opposed to the 
more radical 'area-based' model introduced in the WD and by Surrey Constabulary in 
the form of TOP or total geographic policing. 
3 For a fuller profile see Dixon and Stanko (1993: 4-6) on which this section is based. 
4 This figure includes people in the census groups Black Caribbean, Black African, 
Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. 
5 The national figure comes from the third sweep of the British Crime Survey (Mayhew 
et ai, 1989). 
6 A young white male of the same age was 33 times more likely to be stopped than an 
older man. 
7 The official justification for this was the need to provide 'cover' for leave and other 
absences. 
8 'Days' were worked Monday to Friday with two teams on duty on Thursdays. 
'Evening' shifts were restricted to Fridays and Saturdays. 
9 For a more general discussion of decentralisation in Islington and elsewhere see Oyford 
(1991) and Burns et al (1994). 
10 IE: 7. 
11 Developments on this sector were the main focus of the research reported here and are 
discussed in detail throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
12 FN (HSPC), 18/1/93. 
13 FN, 22/4/92. 
14 IE, 16-7. 
15 This figure is obtained by multiplying the number of officers on a sector team 
(assumed to be 4 to allow for leave and other abstractions) by the number of 8 hour 'day' 
shifts worked over a six month period at 6 shifts a week (4 x 6 x 8 x 26 = 4,992). 
16 I use the term 'community problem' here in its broadest sense to encompass the full 
range of troublesome behaviours brought to the attention of the police at the meetings I 
observed. 
17 FN, 19/11/92. 
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18 FN, 7111192. 
19 FN, 14/1193. 
20 FN, 30/11192. 
21 The remaining problem concerned an advertisement for replica firearms in a local 
newspaper. 
22 FN (HSCP), 2/11192. 
23 One sector inspector attending a neighbourhood forum meeting to drum up support for 
HSCP even went so far as to use parking as an example of the kind of 'long term 
problem' the police were eager to know about (FN (GNF), 14/4/92). 
24 FN, 17/9/92; 7/11192. 
25 FN, 7111192. 
26 IE, 13-4. The number of custody records opened in the first six months of sector 
policing fell very slightly (by 2.6%) due, it was thought, to greater parsimony in the use 
of arrest for drunkenness. Stops recorded under s.1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 between April and October 1992 were actually up by 80% on the previous 6 
months. However the latter period seems to have been highly unusual and a comparison 
with figures for 1991 revealed a 1.5% decline in the number of stops. 
27 See the recent report of the Audit Commission (1996: paras. 55-8) for a trenchant 
analysis of the shortcomings of patrol briefings. 
28 FN, 30-115/92. 
29 FN, 4-5/9/92. 
30 The examples of problem solving activity examined by Bennett and Kemp (1994: 58) 
in the two Thames Valley police areas they studied reveal a similarly perfunctory 
approach to the identification and analysis of community problems leading the authors to 
conclude that, 'In neither area was problem-solving structured in accordance with the 
strongest version of problem -oriented policing'. They (1994: 17-20; 24-7) also found that 
the response to the problems identified seldom got beyond the deployment of extra 
patrols while the outcome of police action was often either unclear or simply not 
recorded. 
31 More will be said about this pre-implementation 'consultation' later in this chapter. 
32 FN, 17/9/92. 
33 FN, 10/12/92. 
34 IE, 21, fig. 6.5. 
35 FN, 7/9/92. 
36 FN, 14/1193. 
37 FN, 22/9/92. Industrial action by staff working in the neighbourhood offices that ran 
Islington's decentralised services continued throughout most of 1992 and led to the 
342 
cancellation of several forum meetings much to the irritation of HSCP representatives 
and the police who relied on them for contributions to the consultative process. 
38 FN, 17/9/92. 
39 The only statistically significant changes found were in the proportion of time spent on 
crime prevention by area (or home) beat officers at one site and on foot patrols by shift 
officers at the other. There was no significant increase in the time spent by officers on 
'community involvement' work in either of the two areas. 
40 Bennett and Kemp (1994: 51). 
41 Ibid: 52/4,60. Their finding that the proportion of people who had seen a police 
officer on foot in their area over the past 6 months had increased under experimental 
conditions is perplexing when police officers themselves reported that they had actually 
spent less time on foot patrol than before. 
42 IE, 8. Nothing is said in the evaluation about whether these extra patrols were 
conducted on foot or in a vehicle. 
43 IE, 21. 
44 Managers at Holloway were furious when Islington Council subsequently announced 
plans to amalgamate neighbourhoods across sector boundaries (Dixon and Stanko, 1993: 
25). 
45 FN, 3/3/93. 
46 FN (HSCP), 7/9/92. 
47 FN (HSPC), 7/9/92; 2/11/92. 
48 Islington Council (1989: para. 18.2). 
49 Ibid: para. 7.2. 
50 Ibid: para. 20.2. Of the various minority ethnic groups resident in the borough, the 
review found that African Caribbeans were particularly poorly represented. 
51 Khan found that 60% of Islington forum members belonged to at least one other local 
body while 40% were also members of a national organisation. 
52 FN (GNF), 14/4/92; (QNF) 28/4/92. Arrangements for appointing representatives from 
a third neighbourhood were made privately between the sector inspector I accompanied 
to the meeting and the forum chair. 
53 FN (HSCP), 7/9/92. 
54 FN (HSCP), 2/11/92. 
55 FN (HSCP), 13/7/92. 
56 FN (HSCP), 13/7/92; 18/1/93. 
57 FN, 18/1/93. 
58 FN (HSCP), 13/7/92. 
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59 FN (HSCP), 18/1/93. 
60 FN (HSCP), 7/9/92. 
61 FN (QNF), 28/4/92. The police-friendliness of neighbourhood forums could not be 
guaranteed however and the memberships of some Tollington Sector NFs were regarded 
as distinctly unhelpful if not downright hostile (FN, 11/3/92). 
62 The woman later became an active members ofHSCP. 
63 'IC3' is the standard Metropolitan Police identity code for people who appear to be of 
African Caribbean origin. 
64 At the time sector policing was introduced the MPD was divided into 8 Areas. 
Holloway Division was part of 1 Area (North). 
65 The 'manpower' issue is discussed at some length in Dixon and Stanko (1993: 54-6). 
Suffice to say here that we found the rank and file case for a massive injection of extra 
resources to make sector policing workable unproved. 
66 FN, 7-8/11/91. 
67 FN, 25/1 0/91. 
68 Ibid. 
69 FN, 14/1/93. 
70 FN, 15/6/92. 
71 FN, 18/11/91. 
72 FN, 15/6/92. 
73FN,17/9/92. 
74 FN, 19/11/92. 
75 On notions of competence more generally see Fielding (1984; 1988) and Norris and 
Norris (1993). 
76 FN, 5/5/92. 
77 FN, 19/11/92. 
78 In the days before sector policing when arrest rates were widely accepted as a 
performance measure, one of the reliefs at Holloway acquired a reputation for inflating its 
figures by trawling the streets for drunks. When the relief inspector and many of his 
officers moved on to Archway and into an office next to a hospital mortuary jokes about 
the quest for 'bodies' to boost the sector's reputation became predictably morbid. 
79 IE, 10-5. 
80 IE, 5-6. 
81 IE, 7. As far as dialogue with neighbourhood forums was concerned the evaluation 
admitted that it had 'proved more difficult than was envisaged' to get members of the 
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community to identify tasks for sector teams to tackle - an assessment that is 
considerably more realistic than encouraging. 
82 What is it? (Metropolitan Police, undated a) contains an example of this line of 
. 
reasomng. 
83 See Joint Consultative Committee (1990, Introduction: 4) and Weatheritt (1987: 11-2). 
Writing from a north American perspective, Manning (1988: 30) argues in similar vein 
that many of the key assumptions of 'community policing', including the notion that it is 
in some way demanded by a public dissatisfied with existing practices, are of extremely 
dubious empirical validity. 
84 FN, 24/2/92. His successor confirmed this impression during an impromptu visit to the 
Archway Sector office during the course of which he said that sector policing had been 
introduced on the strength of no more than 'a vague idea that it's what people want' . 
85 More detailed analyses of the pre-implementation consultation process are contained in 
Dixon and Stanko (1993: 17-23) and Stanko and Dixon (1992). 
86 IE, 2. 
87 Islington Police/Community Consultative Group, 29 January 1992, Minute 204. 
88 FN (SGNF), 30/1192. 
89 FN (HSCP), 18/1193. 
90 FN (HSCP), 13/7/92 
91 FN (HSCP), 2/11192 
92 The extent and accuracy of police 'knowledge' should not be taken for granted or 
exaggerated (Chatterton, 1993: 194; Tremblay and Rochon, 1991). All that is suggested 
here is that officers have access to more comprehensive and systematic data about crime 
and other incidents reported to them than the ordinary citizen. Whether they use the 
information available to them is another matter. 
93 Extracts from neighbourhood watch newsletters reproduced in the update were an 
equally unenlightening and slightly alarming mixture of crude statistics and people and 
behaviour to look out for. 
94 FN (HSCP), 2111192. 
95 FN, 28-9/3/92; 15/5/92. 
96 FN, 24/1192;13/7/92 
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Conclusion: Towards Popular Policing 
The main aim of this concluding Chapter is to return to, and attempt to answer, 
the questions about the changes in the theory and practice of police accoWltability 
with which I started this thesis. But, having done that, I also want very briefly to 
draw on some of the material presented here to indicate how I believe more 
accoWltable and democratic public policing might be achieved. 
It will be recalled from the Introduction that I used the analysis of new right-
inspired developments in the law and order debate of the 1980s presented in a 
paper by Tony Jefferson, Joe Sim and Sandra Walklate (1991) as the basis for 
asking the following questions: 
1. Was the concept of police accountability reinvented during the 
1980s? 
2. If so, what was it exactly that changed about its conceptualisation 
and how did that change occur? 
3. What were the implications of any reconceptualisation that did take 
place for the accountability of the police in practice? 
I propose answering the first two of these questions together before moving on to 
tackle the third. 
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The reinvention of police accountability 
The reason I feel able to deal with the first two questions at the same time is that it 
should be obvious from the tenor of the argument of the preceding chapters that 
police accountability was indeed reinvented during the course of the 1980s as 
Jefferson and his colleagues suggest. The first question can, therefore, be 
answered in the affirmative. Much more important though is the task of coming to 
some understanding of how and when this occurred. 
Historical context 
Almost as soon as these questions are posed it becomes necessary to qualify the 
bland affirmative offered in reply to my first question by putting the 'law and 
order' debate of the 1980s, and its impact on police accountability, in their 
historical context. This was the main purpose of Chapter 3 where I argued that 
the system of governance devised for the Metropolitan Police by Sir Robert Peel 
was about as rigorous (ifnot as transparent) as it could be. At a time when the 
demos consisted of a wealthy male elite and local government was at worst an 
oxymoron and at best rudimentary and disorganised, the arrangements put in 
place by the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 represented a more than creditable 
attempt to subject the 'new police' to popular control. The appointment of two 
justices to administer the police subject to the direction of a cabinet minister 
individually responsible to a vigilant parliament gave an explicitly public and 
national dimension to already familiar systems of local control. 
As it was thought of and operated throughout the nineteenth and well into the 
twentieth century, the institutional arrangements put in place in 1829 allowed day-
to-day decisions to be made by the commissioner(s) and his/their subordinates. 
But there was never any doubt that the Home Secretary could (as successive 
holders of the office not infrequently did) interfere in all aspects of policing in the 
metropolis, including what, in twentieth century parlance, would have been 
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described as 'operational' matters, 'individual cases' and even, on occasion, the 
'cases of individuals'. If a steward mode of accountability was the rule in the key 
relationship between the commissioner and his political master, and direction the 
exception, it was the result not of institutional impotence on the part of the Home 
Office but of a mutual recognition of where authority ultimately lay. Nor, as 
Emsley (1996: 3) implies, is there any way of making sense of the multiplicity of 
tasks accumulated by the police as the nineteenth century wore on without 
reference to their general right to use state-legitimated coercive force in the 
government and ordering of Victorian London. Although the courts actively 
responded to individual cases of police misconduct throughout much of the 
nineteenth century (Smith, 1998), the political mechanism linking the 
Metropolitan Police to a gradually expanding demos, via its Commissioner, the 
Home Secretary and Parliament, remained the dominant means of accounting for 
the priorities, resourcing and strategic direction of the capital's police. 
Slow change: 1918-79 
I also argued in Chapter 3 that the beginnings of the process of reinvention that 
was to quicken so dramatically in the 1980s can in fact be traced back over the 
preceding half century through the gradual, discontinuous, changes that took place 
- to use Jon Vagg's (1994) analogy - in the rules, play and presentation of the 
police accountability 'game' in the period after the First World War. Firstly, 
beginning with the decision ofMcCardie J in Fisher v Oldham Corporation and 
ending with Lord Denning's definitive statement of the doctrine of constabulary 
independence in Blackburn, the legal rules of the game were transformed to the 
extent that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner could be proclaimed to be 
'independent of the executive [and] not subject to the orders of the Secretary of 
State' . I Secondly, from the mid 1930s onwards, the way in which the game was 
played by its participants also seems to have changed as the advantages to be 
gained from distancing the Home Secretary from 'operational' policing became 
apparent to politicians and senior policemen alike, and the growing complexity of 
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a modem service delivery state made it more difficult in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances for ministers to involve themselves in the running of 
the huge bureaucracies for which they were nominally responsible. Thirdly, it 
became increasingly expedient for politicians and Home Office civil servants on 
the one hand, and successive commissioners on the other, to be more vocal in 
their presentation of their relationship as one of trust, co-operation and support 
involving distinct, if over-lapping, spheres of influence and responsibility. 
Thus, slowly but perceptibly, the political mechanism central to the accountability 
of the Metropolitan Police was reinvented as an informal arrangement between an 
operationally independent police chief answerable only to the courts (and then 
only when guilty of a manifest failure to discharge his duty to uphold the law) and 
a Secretary of State for whom the 'direction' of policing was unthinkable unless 
the very fabric of the state or its relations with other nations were at stake. 
Meanwhile, precisely what 'policing' was, and what 'the police' should be held to 
account for, had become lost in a fog of obscurantism about 'executive' and 
'administrative' decisions, 'policy' and 'operational' matters and the competing 
claims of 'law enforcement', 'order maintenance' and 'crime prevention' as the 
prime duty of those state agents given the right to use coercive force. 
The pace quickens: 1979-~1 
In London at least, the reinvention of police accountability that took place in the 
1980s under the influence of Mrs Thatcher and the scions of the 'new right' has, 
therefore, to be seen in the historical context of a much longer term shift from 
nineteenth century notions of directive accountability involving police, minister, 
legislature and an elite electorate to a much less hierarchical, but mutually 
convenient, political accommodation underpinned by greater reliance on the 
illusion of legal accountability. What marked the 1980s ofIfrom earlier decades 
was not that conceptions of accountability underwent change but that the pace of 
that change was so rapid, and its implications so far-reaching. For much of the 
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decade, accountability was at the forefront of debates on policing as apologists 
and critics of police governance joined battle; and, towards the end of Chapter 3, I 
showed how, in London, the 'rules' and 'play' of the enigmatic accountability 
'game' involving the police, the Home Office and the post-Blackburn courts were 
stoutly defended by successive Conservative administrations together with a 
handful of police and academic commentators. More or less explicit in the case 
for the defence was a claim that - unlike the venal local politicians more sceptical 
observers wished to empower - the Home Secretary was in some way above 
politics acting as no more than a faithful intermediary between the Metropolitan 
Police and the House of Commons. 
Police accountability's sudden emergence at the top of the political agenda owed 
much to the highly controversial involvement of the police in the urban riots, 
industrial disputes, political protests and miscarriages of justice that punctuated 
Mrs Thatcher's years as Prime Minister. But it was also a consequence of the 
tenacity and lucidity with which the arrangements for police governance were 
assailed by the generation of radical critics in academia and local government 
whose work I reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. With varying degrees of emphasis 
according to their position on a political spectrum ranging from liberal democratic 
constitutionalism to critical interventionism, their main concern was the use of 
coercive force by an increasingly militarised police service to suppress political 
and industrial opposition to the government and, more broadly, to maintain order 
in the face of the new right's social and economic restructuring of Britain. 
In pursuit of a more democratic, less highly centralised, system of police 
governance, these critics challenged both the legal basis for, and practical utility 
of, the mechanism of legal accountability at the heart of the doctrine of 
constabulary independence. They also impugned the democratic credentials of a 
'national' political mechanism of accountability, in the shape of the Home 
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Secretary, and operating almost exclusively in steward mode, as incapable of 
giving all sections of society - but particularly over-coer~ed and/or Wlder-
protected ethnic minorities, yOWlg people, women and the marginal or 'rough' 
working class - a meaningful say in the direction of policing. Their common cure 
for the ills of police governance was the democratisation of accoWltability at a 
local level, principally by the creation (in the Metropolitan Police District) or 
rehabilitation (outside London) of elected representative bodies responsible for 
the direction of policing. Though they differed about how the scope of local 
democratic control should be limited, and the nature of the safeguards needed to 
protect against corruption and discrimination, all agreed that that the police ought 
to be accoWltable for their use of coercive force through a local political 
mechanism capable of operating in an Wlashamedly directive mode. 
While debates about the nature of police governance raged between supporters 
and opponents of the status quo, the influence of community policing was 
growing. As I suggested in Chapters 6 and 7, its aim was not so much the 
reconceptualisation of police accoWltability as the reinvention of policing itself. 
Beginning with the idea that policing was not (or at least not necessarily) about 
the distribution of coercive force by agents of the state but to do with the delivery 
of a broader problem-solving 'service' that could (and should) be provided, ifnot 
by the private sector directly, then certainly by public police agencies rationally 
managed as efficient, consumer-oriented, businesses; the effect of the community 
policing tradition on the conceptualisation of police accoWltability was profoWld. 
From accoWltability centred on the relationship between the police and 'the 
people' from whom their authority to use coercive force derived, more immediate 
relationships with much smaller and more exclusive local aggregations of tax-
paying, information-providing, police-supporting, 'respectable' consumers were 
established as the key to 'responsive' policing. Collectively as 'communities' of 
'active' citizen consumers, and individually as the non-adversarial contacts of 
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geographically responsible community police officers, elite fractions of the demos 
were given strictly non-directive access to police policy-making, not through the 
formal political institutions of representative democracy but by means of new 
mechanisms of public and organic accountability supplemented by professional-
managerial institutions charged with ensuring that the delivery of a politically 
uncontroversial 'service' was delivered economically, efficiently and effectively. 
Depoliticisation, decollectivisation and disempowerment 
The successful defence of existing legal and 'national' political arrangements for 
the governance of the Metropolitan Police, and the rise of community policing as 
an alternative paradigm in policing, thus combined to precipitate the reinvention 
of police accountability. Before I attempt to assess how far this reinvention went, 
and what its impact was on police practice in the early 1990s, I want briefly to 
identify three inter-locking processes at work in the de- and then re-construction 
of police accountability. The first of these is its depoliticisation. By this I mean 
the progressive effacement of what Robert Reiner (1992: 2) describes as the 
'inherently and inescapably political' nature of policing and the process of 
accounting for it. When policing is no longer about the state's uneven and 
contestable distribution of coercive force and social protection among members of 
the demos as a whole, but the delivery of a 'service' demanded by select groups of 
citizen-consumers on a quasi-contractual basis, and when dominant mechanisms 
of accountability accommodate only the views of people with a restricted range of 
'legitimate' needs and opinions, accountability collapses into accountancy 
(Weatheritt, 1993) and the scope for argument about what the police should do, 
why they should do it, and to whom, shrinks to nothing. 
The reinvention of accountability also brings about a decollectivisation of the 
process by which patterns of policing are determined. Inadequate though they 
undoubtedly were (and are) legal and political mechanisms of accountability, and 
the institutions of the law and representative democracy, draw their ideological 
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strength from their inclusivity and their ability to reflect and enforce the popular 
will of the people as a whole. However mendacious such claims may be - and I 
do not propose to enter into the debate here - the fact remains that, as E P 
Thompson (1975) argued, the pretence (if such it be) only works if it is credible to 
most people most of the time. What developments in the 1980s implied was that 
such simulations of inclusivity could be dispensed with and accountability 
redirected towards fractions of the demos defined as communities and 
constructed, often quite explicitly, in terms of inclusion and exclusion, belonging 
and not belonging. The decollectivisation of accountability was thus achieved by 
redirecting it away from the demos as a whole towards carefully crafted 
'communities', and - though perhaps to a lesser extent than Jefferson et al suggest 
- atomised individuals. 
Closely related to this is the third process at work in the reinvention of police 
accountability - the disempowerment of those excluded from participation in new, 
exclusive, and elitist, public and organic mechanisms of accountability, and their 
ever more obvious identification as people to, rather than/or, whom policing is 
done. But to suggest that such a process of exclusion took place is not to imply 
that any countervailing empowerment of those included in the work of new 
mechanisms of accountability took place. Although, as I argued in Chapter 8, the 
values of the groups and individuals privileged by the new mechanisms of 
accountability might accord with those of the police, their priorities differed. 
And, in so far as they diverged from culturally defined 'real police work' and 
threatened operational autonomy, those priorities were resisted, reinterpreted or 
ignored. Locked into a relationship that rigorously excluded the possibility of 
direction even these 'insiders' proved impotent in the face of police 
obstructionism. 
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Police accountability reinvented 
The impact of the reinvention of police accountability that seems to have begun 
slowly in the 1930s and gathered speed in the 1980s is evident in the theory and 
practice of sector policing discussed at some length in Chapter 7 and 8. There is 
nothing to be gained from repeating the outcome of that analysis here. So, rather 
than summarise once again how changes in the content, direction, mode and 
mechanisms of police accountability were reflected in the design and 
implementation of sector policing in London in the early 1990s, I will try to 
answer my third question in two slightly different ways. First I will make use of 
the set of criteria suggested by Jones et al (1994: 44-8; 1996: 190-3) to make an 
assessment of the extent to which the 'reinvention' of police accountability 
evident in the theory and practice of sector policing contributed to ensuring that 
the arrangements for making police policy accord with some basic democratic 
principles. From there I will go on to ask whether the new forms of 
accountability put in place by the introduction of sector policing succeeded in re-
establishing policing by consent as the Assistant Commissioner anticipated in his 
guidance. 
Democratic principles 
Equity is, to Jones et ai, both the most important democratic principle, and the 
logical fount from which many of the others spring.2 For them, equity requires 
that 
In so far as the police are delivering services, these should be distributed 
fairly between groups and individuals. In so far as the police are 
enforcing the law in their adversarial role, the pattern of enforcement 
should be fair. (Jones et aI, 1994: 44i 
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They go on to argue that 'fairness' should be judged according to different criteria 
depending on whether the police are acting in their 'service delivery' or 'law 
enforcement' role. In the first instance, they suggest, principles of 'distributive 
justice' should apply so that 'service' provision is related to need. Whereas, in 
the second, police action should be 'proportionate to the number and severity of 
the offences' subject only to the qualification that it should not lead to 'relatively 
high levels of enforcement among certain groups and in certain areas' (Jones et ai, 
1994: 46). 
This distinction between the consensual activity of service delivery and the 
adversarial enforcement of the law is hard to sustain if it is accepted - as I have 
argued - that the demand for, and supply of, policing is comprehensible only in 
tenns of officers' capacity to use state-legitimated coercive force.4 It is in the 
nature of policing that, if the police are to deliver the 'service' people need, the 
chances are that other people are going to be faced with the threat or application 
of coercive force. To divorce the benefits of the police use of coercive force from 
its burdens is to misconstrue the core content of policing and to base jUdgements 
about the equity of policing as if it consisted of two analytically and practically 
separate kinds of activity when what is needed is, rather, an assessment of how its 
effects (both negative and positive) are distributed between individuals and social 
groups as part of a unified process of policing. 
Taking this more holistic approach to the assessment of sector policing, the 
evidence presented in Chapter 8 suggests that its introduction did little to make 
local police activity more equitable in its impact. The identification of individuals 
and groups to be coerced or 'enforced against' - 'irresponsible' women, 'IC3s', 
'hippies', and the residents of 'problem' estates - and deserving protection or 
'service' - men coping with 'difficult' women and 'respectable' local residents-
continued to be infonned by the personal and occupational 'common sense' of 
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operational police officers. Confronted with situations where - contrary to the 
view expressed by Jones et al - decisions about whom to coerce and/or protect 
were inextricably linked one with the other, what officers actually did seemed to 
bear little obvious relation to any objective assessment of need (for 'service') or 
proportionality (in enforcement). What the incidents discussed in Chapter 8 
illustrate is how judgements about place, respectability, demeanour, vulnerability 
and desert, and based on a complex set of personal and cultural values, informed 
officers' decisions about how to use their coercive powers, against whom, and for 
whose benefit, not in the compartmentalised fashion suggested by Jones et al but 
as integral parts of a single process. 
Looked at in the round, neither the design of sector policing, nor its 
implementation in Holloway, suggests that it led to the more equitable 
redistribution of coercion and protection. If anything, the redirection of 
accountability for local policing to 'communities' of active citizens, and the 
successful initiation of their 'representatives' into the police world view, may 
have reinforced existing patterns of over-coercion and under-protection by giving 
them the imprimatur of 'popular' approval. At the same time, the reinvention of 
the coercive content of policing as 'service delivery', to which Jones et al 
themselves contribute, only made it more rather than less likely that the 
significance of this skewing is obscured and the seriousness of its implications 
downplayed or ignored. 
The second democratic principle suggested by Jones et al relates to what they call 
delivery of service. By this they mean that, 'The police should deliver the 
appropriate services (as determined on other criteria) effectively and efficiently'. 
Their argument for elevating this to a point of principle is that, since policing is a 
public good, all citizens will benefit if it is done both equitably in accordance with 
their frrst principle, and well. The experience of sector policing at Holloway is 
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contradictory here. Efficiency (the relationship between outputs and inputs) in 
meeting the demands of the public certainly should have increased as a result of 
the new shift system aligning resources more closely with variations in workload. 
It is also possible that the police output of 'public contact' may have increased. 
But whether any of this resulted in more effective policing (the relationship 
between desired outcomes and inputs) is an open question since, as I showed in 
Chapter 8, the Division found it difficult to come up with robust outcome 
measures of police performance in community problem-solving. My observations 
of operational policing and analysis of the 'problems' raised at the Highbury 
Sector Crime Panel indicate that any achievements were modest at best. In any 
case, even if policing did become more efficient and effective, the doubts about 
its equity raised earlier would prevent any claim being made that it had therefore 
become more democratic. Efficiency does not ameliorate inequity: it exacerbates 
it. 
Jones et al see their third democratic principle being followed where 'in 
determining the order of priorities, the allocation of resources between different 
activities and objectives, and the choice of policing methods', the police are 
'responsive to the views of a representative body'. Against this yardstick, it is 
fairly clear that sector policing contributed next to nothing to what they call the 
responsiveness of local policing. The only new bodies inserted into the policy-
making process - neighbourhood forums and the Highbury Sector Crime Panel -
were hardly demographically representative or capable of accurately reflecting 
local opinion on policing. Nor were the police notably 'responsive' to what those 
bodies, acting strictly in steward mode, had to say if the experience of the HSPC 
is anything to go by. On the contrary, the experience of community/police 
consultation under s. 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes it 
at least as plausible that the accommodation reached between police middle 
managers and the representatives of well-organised groups of local activists may 
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have laid the foundations for an anti-democratic form of 'minoritarianism' 
resulting in the imposition - on an apathetic or excluded majority - of the values 
of a moral consensus extending no further than the organised 'community' 
represented in the consultative process at sector level. 
Similar considerations apply to the principle that 'the power to determine policing 
policy should not be concentrated but distributed between a number of different 
bodies' so as to ensure that mechanisms exist for achieving 'stable compromises' 
where social and individual interests conflict (Jones et aI, 1994: 47). Sector 
policing quite clearly did not lead to any significant widening in the distribution 
of power to determine local policies. Though it created new mechanisms of 
public (sector working groups) and organic (continuity of contact between 
geographically responsible community police officers and their sectors) 
accountability they were non-directive in mode; in effect, the views of 
participants were welcomed only insofar as they coincided with the values and 
priorities of the police. When the case for diverting resources to meet the 
'quality of life' concerns voiced by local 'representatives' was put too insistently, 
the police did not hesitate to insist on their operational independence. Nor did the 
institutional and organisational reforms associated with sector policing provide 
machinery for the resolution of conflicts of interest. The' social process of 
exclusion and inclusion through which 'community' [was] constructed' ensured 
that the possibility of conflict between the policed for and the policed against was 
avoided (Crawford, 1997: 138). And, where tensions within the privileged 
'community' allowed access to police policy formation and between it and the 
police did arise, they were successfully managed off the agenda of the HSCP, for 
example by 'educating' participants about the limitations of the police and, if all 
else failed, simply by misleading them as to the actions taken by the police in 
response to their 'problems'. 
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Jones et ai's fifth principle concerns a representative body's access to information 
about 'funding, expenditure, activity and outputs'. As such, it is very much 
geared towards the responsibilities of the provincial police authorities that they 
studied. But, even if allowances are made for the more localised nature of the 
accountability mechanisms established by sector policing, the evidence presented 
in the previous chapter suggests that in the very early days of sector-based 
consultation, 'community representatives' were given virtually no relevant 
information about local policing. Most of what they were told was thinly 
disguised propaganda designed to elicit sympathy for the difficulties faced by the 
police. When a written 'crime update' was eventually supplied to the HSCP the 
data it contained was partial, hard to interpret and seemed designed not to provide 
lay members with the information they might need to participate in police policy-
making and performance assessment, but to encourage 'active citizenship' in the 
form of self-initiated crime prevention activity. 
Jones et ai's sixth democratic principle, redress, is also expressed in terms more 
relevant to force level representative bodies. Suffice to say that nothing in either 
the theory or practice of sector policing suggests that the forms of redress they 
suggest - the removal of incompetent, corrupt or high-handed police commanders 
and the reversal of unfair or discriminatory policies - were obviously open either 
to sector working groups or to dissatisfied individual 'consumers'. The dutiful 
membership of HSCP would never have dreamt of demanding the removal of one 
their sector inspectors while their conspicuous lack of success in getting the police 
to take their 'quality of life' concerns seriously suggests that securing any major 
change in police policy may also have been some way beyond them. 
The seventh, last and, to Jones et ai, least important democratic principle is 
participation embodied in the ideal that' [a]s far as possible, citizens should 
participate in discussion of policing policy with police managers.' They give two 
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reasons for regarding it as relatively unimportant. First they say that its salience 
in classical democratic theory is largely a product of the elitist nature of the 
ancient and early nineteenth century societies in which it was developed. And, 
second, and more pragmatically, they note that 'getting groups of people together 
to discuss policing policy is an uphill struggle' (Jones et aI, 1994: 45). From this 
they conclude that popular participation 'in some sense' is essential, but doubt 
whether widening it beyond 'a fairly narrow circle' may always be either possible 
or necessary. 
If this unexacting standard is taken at face value, the introduction of sector 
policing could be judged a triumph of participation. It is only a slight 
exaggeration to say that the exclusive process of community construction typical 
of post-reinvention police accountability, and of sector policing, goes a long way 
towards creating precisely the kind of elitist conditions conducive to direct 
participation. But, if more extensive involvement of an elite in policy-making is 
achieved at the expense of others, and only serves to reinforce the inequitable 
distribution of the benefits and burden of police coercion, democracy cannot be 
said to have been enhanced since, as Jones et al (1994: 45) rightly contend, 
participation is substantially less important than other objectives that 'have a 
greater impact on the quality of life of the majority'. Opportunities for greater 
participation in local police policy-making (however meagre its results) may be 
good for activists who 'represent themselves' but do less than nothing for 'the 
others who must be represented ... participatory democracy has to be paralleled 
by representative democracy' (Walzer, 1980: 136, quoted by Gyford, 1991: 179, 
emphasis in original). 
Policing by consent 
This assessment of the reconceptualisation of accountability against seven 
democratic principles also makes it much easier to ascertain the extent to which 
changed notions of accountability may have contributed to (re )establishing 
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'policing by consent'. This aspect of the answer to my third question can, thus, be 
dealt with quite quickly. In Chapter 2, Morgan's (1990: 87) notion of 'policing 
by consent' as a 'general normative sense of congruence between the values and 
actions of the police and the public they allegedly serve' was discussed in the 
context of David Held's (1989) elaboration of seven grounds for consenting to, or 
complying, with a rule of law or, in this case, the general pattern of policing. 5 
The phrasing of Morgan's formula suggests that 'consent' to policing requires 
what Held calls 'normative agreement'. In other words, for policing by consent to 
exist, the public they serve must, at the very least, agree that the distribution of 
coercion and protection by the police is as it ought to be given the circumstances 
before them and the information available. Better still, would be the existence of 
a state of 'ideal normative agreement' with people having 'all the knowledge 
[ they] would like [and] all the opportunity to discover the circumstances and 
requirements of others' . 
To discern whether, following the rapid reinvention of accountability in the 
1980s, the introduction of sector policing was able to deliver 'policing by 
consent', it is important to distinguish between those individuals and groups 
brought into the policy-making process as the legitimate consumers of police 
'services' and those excluded from it. The experience of HSCP and the routine 
operations I observed indicates that - on the basis of the often partial (in both 
senses of the word) information available to them - some kind of normative 
agreement about values and actions was reached between the police and carefully 
selected 'insiders'. Though some way from 'ideal', the agreement of those active, 
respectable, citizens who made regular, direct, but voluntary use of police 
'services' generally displayed the kind ofnormativity implied both by Morgan, 
and by Held in his sixth ground for consent. But this is not to say that their 
reaction to specific police actions and incapacities was always so accommodating. 
Their response to the apparent inability or unwillingness of the police to deal with 
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'quality of life' issues like noise or parking, and some highly localised crime 
problems such as burglary, certainly did not rise above what Held describes as 
'instrumental acceptance', and often seemed to be closer to 'pragmatic 
acquiescence'. Though dissatisfied with what was happening, 'insiders' were 
prepared to go along with police priorities either because, in the long run, they 
were confident that they were still the people for whom policing would be done, 
or because they assumed that significant change was out of the question. 
For 'outsiders', marginal to the mechanisms of public and organic accountability, 
the quality of 'consent' to the local pattern of policing is much harder to assess. 
The young African-Caribbean woman on the 'problem estate' whose vehement 
reaction to regular police patrols was noted in Chapter 8 clearly felt that she had 
no choice in how she and her fellow residents were policed. Her 'consent' to 
policing was, according to Held's typology, 'coerced'. However, such hostility 
was probably untypical of most of the 'excluded' whose level of consent, from the 
encounters with police I observed, seemed to range through (in Held's terms once 
again) 'tradition' through 'apathy' to 'pragmatic acquiescence'. 
In sum then, sector policing succeeded in achieving respectable, if far from ideal, 
levels of consent from those sections of the population already well disposed 
towards the police and eager actively to participate in the mechanisms of 
accountability put in place by the new style of policing. But, for those with less 
positive experiences of - and attitudes towards - the police, sector policing 
provided no effective means by which anything approaching their normative 
consent might be obtained. 'Respectable' people with whose values and priorities 
police actions were already broadly congruent were thus furnished with new 
methods of making their views known while those whose social morality and 
lifestyle did not accord with the middle class norms cleaved to by the police were 
left, as always, to take policing very much as they found it. 
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Another reinvention? 
The end of a retrospective analysis of the trajectory and effects of changing 
conceptions of police accountability is not the place to set out a detailed agenda 
for yet another 'reinvention' of police accountability. But it is important, 
nonetheless, to attempt to highlight some of the lessons that can be learned from 
the developments documented here, and to use them as signposts along the road to 
more accountable and democratic forms of public policing. 
'New' Labour's plans 
The first point to note is that, following the election of a Labour government in 
May 1997, the ground is already moving beneath the foundations of the 
constitutional order its Conservative predecessors devoted so much energy to 
defending.6 Proposals for the creation of a Metropolitan Police Authority (MP A) 
were published in a Green Paper on New Leadership/or London (Department for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1997) shortly after the new 
government's election. The centrepiece of the Green Paper was the restoration of 
'democratic city-wide government to London' in the form ofa Greater London 
Authority consisting of a directly elected executive mayor and assembly. After a 
period of consultation, a White Paper followed in March 1998 (Department for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998) two months before the 
proposals were put to the people of London in a referendum on 7 May. Despite 
some forceful criticism of the government's plans - not least from what remains 
of the Labour left - they were approved by a two-thirds majority (72%) on a 
disappointingly low turnout. 7 
The main objective of the White Paper and the Bill is to make policing in London 
'democratically accountable to the local community' by bringing the Metropolitan 
Police into line with forces elsewhere in England and Wales (Department for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998: para. 5.140).8 In essence, this 
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entails replacing the Home Secretary as its police authority with an MP A of 23 
members, a bare majority of whom will be elected.9 At bottom, the 
government's intention is to extend to London the main features of the revamped 
provincial tri-partite relationship between police authority, police and Home 
Secretary created by the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 (now Police Act 
1996). The new MP A will thus assume responsibility for a variety of fimctions in 
relation to planning and resource allocation in addition to its overriding duty to 
maintain 'an efficient and effective police service for London' (para. 5.151). 
Now, however welcome a development this normalisation of police governance in 
London may be, it is not just the passage of 15 years, and the reinvention of police 
accountability, that separates these proposals from those of the GLC (1993).10 As 
the first tentative steps towards the democratisation of policing in London, the 
proposals are commendable. 11 But they fall some way short of what is required if 
the more radical principles that emerge from the arguments presented here are to 
be taken seriously in the search for more accountable democratic policing. 
A statement of principles 
In stating, or restating, these principles, I return to the four dimensional analysis 
of accountability I have used throughout this thesis and begin by suggesting that, 
unless the status of the police as the principal franchisees of the state's monopoly 
on the use of coercive force within its territory is recognised, the issue of their 
accountability for its social distribution is unlikely - to coin a left realist phrase -
to be taken seriously. In one sense, treating the police as though they were just 
another public service provider is exactly what is needed. There is, as the GLC 
maintained, no reason in principle why senior police officers should be any more 
or less accountable for their actions than directors of social services. But in 
another, and equally important, sense it is not, precisely because the coercive 
powers exercised by the police on behalf of the state enable them to 'chill' the 
democratic impulse in a way that is unique among the agencies of a modem 
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service delivery state (Bayley, 1991 quoted in Brogden and Shearing, 1993: 2). 
This is not, as U glow and the self-proclaimed 'realists' would suggest, an 
argument for restricting the police as far as possible to a reactive 'crimefighting' 
role. To do so would, in itself, be anti-democratic since we know that people 
routinely call on the police to deploy coercive force in response to a range of 
troublesome events extending well beyond the straightforwardly' criminal'. What 
is needed if the 'social imperialism' (Stenson, 1993) of the (particularly 
'community') police is to be resisted, is the recognition that what they bring to the 
infinite variety of incidents to which they are called are the skills not of the 
teacher, architect, urban planner, social worker, or tenancy relations officer but of 
the professional distributor of coercion. Hence, for the same prudential reasons as 
a householder might seek to restrain an electrician from tinkering with the gas 
supply it makes sense for society to limit the role of the police to those situations 
where their Wlusual capacity and skills are required. 
The second principle that needs to be restated is that the police exercise the state's 
monopoly on the use of force as agents of the people as a whole. In the final 
analysis they must, therefore, be accoWltable to the demos itself, rather than to 
geographical or social fractions of it. To begin to suggest how this is to be 
achieved in terms of the immediate relations of accountability to be established 
within and beyond police organisations, and to national and local institutions, is 
not a task to be Wldertaken here. The fundamental point is that police 
accoWltability is a political garden in which many institutional flowers should be 
allowed to flourish. No single accoWltability relation - whether it be to a judge, a 
minister of the croWD, a 'democratically elected' local police authority, a body of 
professional auditors, a committee of neighbourhood residents, a 'monitoring' 
group - or combination of relations is ever likely to suffice if, as Downes and 
Ward (1986: 22) put it, the 'visibility of routine policing as it takes place' is to be 
maximised and what is made visible controlled and accounted for. In short, a 
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plurality of institutions and techniques - legal, political, public, professional-
managerial and organic - must be encouraged and integrated into effective 
mechanisms for popular control of policing involving not just the state in its 
national and local forms, but bodies developed by, and existing within, civil 
society. 
The phrase 'popular control' implies exactly that, in principle, decisions about the 
distribution of coercive force, its benefits and burdens, should be taken by the 
people rather than the 'professionals' to whom they delegate its actual or 
threatened application. The dominant mode of accountability operating in the 
panoply of relations that exist between police and people should therefore be 
directive even if, in practice, stewardship is more likely to be characteristic of the 
day-to-day conduct of the parties. To use Vagg's analogy, the rules of the 'game' 
should allow for direction, and direction should be given when it is needed, even 
if the participants choose to playas 'stewards' most of the time. Where the line 
between popular and professional decision-making should be drawn depends, in 
the fITst instance, on the countervailing principle that local (or indeed national) 
majorities should not have a free rein to visit their prejudices upon minorities. 
Part of the solution to this clash of principles (popular control against anti-
majoritarianism) lies in the diffusion of control implicit in the existence of a 
plurality of relations and mechanisms of accountability. But the practical 
requirements of efficient administration, and the need for judgements about the 
situationally contingent use of force to be made by police officers capable of 
making a direct evaluation of the relevant facts, also militate against the extension 
of popular control down to the level of decisions about the use of coercive powers 
in the case of individuals (GLC, 1983; Lustgarten, 1986). 
The ultimate objective must be to produce a style of policing that is procedurally 
fair in the sense that decisions about the use of coercive force are taken only on 
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the basis of criteria agreed through some democratic mechanism and expressed, 
with varying degrees of generality and specificity, in organisational policies and 
legal rules. But - and this is the point made so strongly by Grimshaw and 
Jefferson (1984) - such decisions must also be situated within a social context of 
substantive inequality in the material conditions of the people the police are called 
upon to coerce and protect. Ifpolicing is to be founded, as Jones et al (1994; 
1996) suggest, on the principle of equity, it is critical that one of the 
democratically agreed criterion for deciding on the deployment of coercive force 
should be its consequences for the general social distribution of its effects, both 
positive and negative. In other words, it must always be asked whether in any 
given situation, the use or threat of coercion is likely to reduce or widen existing 
inequalities in the life chances and vulnerability of the people involved. 
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Notes 
1 [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 at 135. 
2 Although, as I suggested in Chapter 2, it is an important feature of debates about 
democracy, the tension between liberty and the egalitarianism so essential to their set of 
principles is not seriously explored by Jones et al. However this is scarcely the place to 
quibble over such matters and their analysis is by some way the most useful on offer 
when it comes to assessing the democratic qualities of police governance. 
3 Unless otherwise stated this is the reference for all quotations from Jones et al hereafter. 
4 This is only one of a number of problems with Jones et ai's position. Other difficulties 
include their insistence on an individualistic model of justice that emphasises procedural 
rather than substantive fairness despite their evident distaste for the grotesque over-
coercion of certain groups and individuals that they concede might result from relating 
enforcement to the number and severity of offences - criteria that in themselves raise 
serious questions about the reliability of the 'data' to be used in judging what an 
equitable amount of police enforcement action might be. 
5 Coincidentally, Jones et al (1996: 187-8) also refer to Held's work though the use they 
make of it differs from the analysis offered here. 
6 The final act of this defence turned out to be the creation in 1995 of a 12-member non-
statutory advisory body, known as the Metropolitan Police Committee, to assist the Home 
Secretary in his role as police authority for London (Home Office, 1993: Chapter 11; 
1994). The MPC was given similar terms of reference to the new local police authorities 
established by the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 but, lacking even the limited 
statutory powers of its provincial counterparts, it is very much the creature of the Home 
Secretary and has what can most kindly be described as a low public profile. 
7 At the time of writing (March 1999), a Greater London Authority Bill based on the 
White Paper is before parliament. 
8 All references hereafter are to the White Paper. 
9 Of these 12, 11 will come from the Assembly and include the Deputy Mayor, and one 
from the district councils outside London falling within the MPD (para. 5.142). The 
remaining 11 non-elected members will be magistrates and 'independents' appointed in 
similar fashion to those sitting on provincial authorities under the terms of the Police Act 
1996 (para. 5.153). 
10 For an analysis of the more notable differences see the discussion in Chapter 5 of the 
not too dissimilar plans for 'tri-partitism' put forward in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
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by the London Strategic Policy Committee (LSPU, 1987) and the Association of London 
Authorities. 
t t It should be noted that the independence of the City of London Police and the distinctly 
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